Europe’s Dangerous Gamble
Ask around political Berlin, Brussels or Paris how the current moment of relative Russian weakness should be used in Ukraine’s favor, and one is met with embarrassed silence. There would be more than enough reason for debate: Ukraine is hitting Russian oil infrastructure and military targets ever more effectively, Russia’s first spring offensive is petering out without visible results and Kyiv is making cautious territorial gains.
That Europe is not using this moment more decisively reveals its real strategic calculus: Europe has made itself comfortable in the status quo because it seems manageable – and because a Russia tied down in Ukraine appears, in the short term, less threatening to the rest of Europe. But that is precisely where the risk lies. Current policy is not as cautious as it presents itself. Behind the impression of control, new vulnerabilities are emerging that barely figure in public debate.
The first risk concerns the widespread assumption that the front is entirely and irreversibly frozen. It is true that we are currently seeing a deadlocked war of attrition. But this is by no means unchangeable. It is the result of a technical equilibrium in which drones on both sides make mechanized advances difficult. But both sides are working at full speed on effective drone defense. Should one side succeed in developing and scaling such protection across the battlefield, maneuver warfare could very well return. The fact that Ukraine is currently more innovative in drones should not lull Europe into a false sense of security. Russia, too, is continually developing new technology, and the possibility that Moscow could be the first to achieve technical breakthroughs reveals considerable risks of remaining in the status quo.
The second risk lies in the Western assumption that Russia can be weakened economically to such an extent that Moscow will sooner or later be forced to the negotiating table. This strategy is highly dependent on external factors. For example, Iran and the development of the oil price show how volatile the global political conditions are that shape the success of this economic strategy. Russia is simply too deeply embedded in globalized supply chains for Europe to be able to trust in an accelerating process of economic degradation. A renewed gas or oil price shock could undermine the Western calculation just as much as a potential decision by China to support Russia more actively in economic terms. Europe’s basic strategic idea – to support Ukraine militarily for as long as it takes until Russia gives in under economic pressure – is therefore highly vulnerable.
The third risk arises from the logic of Western arms-delivery decisions. Long-range systems such as Taurus or Tomahawk have been denied to Ukraine with reference to escalation risks. Ukraine is now closing this gap on its own, as the development of systems such as the Flamingo cruise missile shows. This speaks to the capacity of Ukraine’s military-industrial innovation base. At the same time, it ties up resources that would be needed elsewhere, and costs development time that translates into losses. That the capability will exist in the end is foreseeable; what remains open is only when, at what price, and whether Europe will still have a say at that point.
These risks illustrate the problem with the current European line. It presents itself as a policy of caution, but it is itself based on risky assumptions. The status quo is much more precarious and costly than it appears at first sight. And part of the hard truth is that it is bearable for Europe only because its harshest costs are borne by Ukraine. It follows that Western support must be reoriented. Ukraine does not merely need enough help to hold the status quo, but also the means to move into a position of strength vis-à-vis Russia.
This includes, first, the delivery of long-range systems such as Taurus, so that Russian logistics, military bases and the arms industry can be put reliably under pressure. Second, Europe must relieve Ukraine where it does not directly intervene in active combat operations. This applies to the protection of western Ukrainian airspace against Russian drones and missiles. And it applies to the northern border with Belarus. Since the beginning of the war, the possibility of another Russian advance from Belarus has tied down Ukrainian forces that are missing on other parts of the front. An EU-led protection mission on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border would not lead the EU directly into the war. But it would free up Ukrainian reserves and deprive Moscow of the ability to repeatedly fix Ukrainian forces through threats.
Third, Europe must limit Russian energy exports more effectively, above all through more consistent maritime enforcement of existing sanctions and tougher pressure on the shadow fleet. Fourth, it needs clearer prioritization. Where support for Ukraine and the rebuilding of Europe’s own armed forces compete in the short term, the focus should clearly be on Ukraine. The greatest security risk for Europe is not the reform of the German or the French armed forces, but a Russian breakthrough in Ukraine.
Europe must decide whether it wants to seize the initiative. The current moment of Russian weakness offers the opportunity to do so. Instead of using it, Europe continues to settle into the supposedly safer status quo. That is precisely what remains Europe’s dangerous gamble.
This piece was first published in German by Handelsblatt on May 28, 2026.
