Partners from the “Global South”: A Way Towards New Alliances for Ukraine?
European engagement of key non-Western powers against Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine has been partially successful at best. Western attempts to sway others were footed on a variety of misconceptions, including how much of a priority the war in Ukraine would be for them among other strategic and economic interests, as well as the depth of their relations to Russia. While some key non-Western powers might be willing to engage on an interest base on select issues, none of them are likely to become additional allies to Ukraine.
The view of the war in Ukraine as a “watershed moment” which threatens the core of the rules-based international order, is mostly a European one. In other parts of the world, the economic consequences of the war, including secondary effects of sanctions, were much more discussed and in fact criticized. Drawing on its longstanding effort to position itself as a champion of the so-called Global South against the West, Russia seamlessly integrated narratives to counter the Western response to its aggression into its advocacy for a different, multi-polar world order, attempting to shift the blame for the war and its consequences to the West. While there are few illusions about the nature of Russian aggression against Ukraine in most “Global South” countries, it has had a very limited effect on their relationship to Moscow.
Western, including German and Polish, attempts to engage key non-Western actors such as Brazil, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa in support of Ukraine and against Russia have so far proven largely unsuccessful. This has had important consequences in preventing the international isolation of Russia while in particular the new depth of Chinese-Russian relations has become vital for the Russian economy.
At a time when support for Ukraine might be dwindling on both sides of the Atlantic, three crucial questions need to be addressed: Who else might step up for Ukraine? Is there a realistic possibility for an increased support by key non-Western actors? Why have efforts to mobilize support beyond the West proven largely unsuccessful, and what are the lessons to be learned?
Julia Friedrich’s chapter is part of the academic publication Poland, Germany and Ukraine at a Turning Point: Making or Breaking the Western Alliance, edited by Adam Balcer and published in January 2025.