Managing Armed Group Defections: Lessons from the Borno Model

The Lake Chad Basin has been plagued by armed conflict between Boko Haram factions (the Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, or JAS, and Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP) and state security forces. This fighting has resulted in mass civilian casualties, widespread displacement, economic collapse, deepening poverty, disrupted education and social services, and grave violations of human rights. 

The death of Abubakar Shekau (who was head of JAS) was a unique moment in the history of the conflict; it seemed that, with the right policies, real change seemed possible. In particular, hundreds of thousands of people were leaving Boko Haram held areas – and finding sustainable ways to reintegrate them into society was essential. 

Nowhere was this more true than in Borno State: the epicenter of the conflict and now the area that had the most men, women, and children seeking a way back into society. To manage this challenge, the state developed what is now known as the Borno Model, a framework for receiving, rehabilitating, and reintegrating former associates of armed groups. While far from perfect, the model represents a rare opportunity: showing how more humane, community-driven approaches can help transform a conflict and open the door to peace. 

Our new policy brief examines the Borno Model and offers seven key lessons for governments, practitioners, and international partners: 

1. More humane, less securitized approaches generate higher numbers of defectors. 
2. Locally-owned, culturally-grounded approaches not only generate improved buy-in from communities but can also be more agile in adapting to differing needs. 
3. Lasting defection processes need work on several fronts, so having a number of local, national and international actors working on different parts of the problem is essential. 
4. Post-release monitoring can be used to design lasting reintegration strategies. 
5. Ensuring former fighters and associates have meaningful employment prospects is a key part of making the defection process last. 
6. Guidelines on how defection models work should be clear, transparent and consistent, to ensure systems are understood and can be coordinated. 
7. It is not enough to add programming for women and children; instead, their needs must be considered through system design. 

The Borno Model offers valuable insights not just for Nigeria, but for any context where governments and communities are grappling with how to encourage defections and prevent re-recruitment into armed groups. By learning from its strengths and shortcomings, policymakers can design better approaches that prioritize dignity, local ownership, and long-term stability. 

This publication is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office as part of the project ​“Stabilization Lab: Improving Key Instruments for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.” This arm of the project on ​“Political Tools for Managing Crises in Africa,” is a collaboration between GPPi and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The views expressed herein solely reflect those of the authors and do not present the official position of the German government.

¹ The split between the two groups occurred in 2016 following doctrinal differences and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL’s) preference for leadership changes.
² Ahmed Kingimi, ​‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram Making Gains Again in Borno State, Governor Says’, Africa, Reuters, 9 April 2025, https://​www​.reuters​.com/​w​orld/…; Abi Watson, ​‘The Two Most Dangerous Self-Deceptions in Security Sector Reform’, 9/​11 Legacies, 8 September 2021, https://911legacies.com/The%20…; PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT: Strengthening Reconciliation and Reintegration Pathways for Persons Associated with Non-State Armed Groups, and Communities of Reintegration, Including Women and Children, in Northeast of Nigeria (Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund, n.d.), accessed 6 August 2025, https://​mptf​.undp​.org/​s​i​t​es/de…
³ Mariana Llorens Zabala, ​‘A Security Dilemma during Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Lake Chad Basin’, ACCORD, 14 March 2024, https://​www​.accord​.org​.za/conf…
⁴ Milena Berks et al., Maximising Impact of Defection Programming in the Lake Chad Basin (bicc, 2025), https://​bicc​.de/​P​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​ions/…
⁵ Malik Samuel, ​‘Defections Alone Won’t Break ISWAP Terror Group’, ISS Africa, 17 April 2024, https://​issafrica​.org/​i​s​s​-toda…
⁶ Murtala Abdullahi and Mansir Muhammed, ​‘The Journey Of Boko Haram Defectors Through Geospatial Lens’, HumAngle, 8 September 2021, https://​human​gle​me​dia​.com/the-….
⁷ Francesca Batault et al., Prospects for Dialogue and Negotiation to Address the Conflict in the Lake Chad Basin (UNIDIR, 2024), https://​doi​.org/​1​0​.​3​7​5​5​9​/​MEAC/…. Remadji Hoinathy et al., Managing Exits from Violent Extremist Groups: Lessons from the Lake Chad Basin, 2023.
⁸ Hoinathy et al., Managing Exits from Violent Extremist Groups: Lessons from the Lake Chad Basin; Jeanine Ella Abatan and Remadji Hoinathy,
​‘Getting Goudoumaria Right: Are Boko Haram Defectors Reintegrating Safely?’, ISS Africa, 8 December 2021, https://​issafrica​.org/​i​s​s​-toda…; Malik Samuel et al., ​‘Boko Haram Desertions Could Be the Tipping Point’, ISS Africa, 18 August 2021, https://​issafrica​.org/​i​s​s​-toda….
⁹ Hoinathy et al., Managing Exits from Violent Extremist Groups: Lessons from the Lake Chad Basin.
¹⁰ Vincent Foucher, ‘“Burn the Camps”: Jihadist Resurgence in the Lake Chad Basin’, ISPI, 16 July 2025, https://​ww​.ispi​online​.it/​en/pu…