Europe, the US and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Twenty-five years ago, German reunification ushered in an era of expansion of Western institutions (NATO and the European Union) toward the East. The current Russia-Ukraine conflict marks the definitive end of this period. With its annexation of Crimea, the Russian government made clear that it will take military action, without regard for international law, when it sees a threat to what it sees as vital national-security interests (in this case, the Black Sea fleet) – especially if this threat is caused by what is regarded as Western-supported regime change. By conducting a military campaign in Eastern Ukraine alongside rebel forces, Russia has expressed that it views the increasing integration of Ukraine into the economic and normative orbit of the EU (even without NATO membership) as a threat to the Russian ​“sphere of influence.” Along the way, Russia has violated the cornerstones of European security order, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In addition, it has dealt a blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime by making a mockery of the security guarantees that Ukraine received in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum when it gave up its nuclear weapons. To justify its actions domestically, Vladimir Putin’s government briefly tapped into an ultra-nationalist ideology of protecting ethnic Russians around the world, which has proven hard to control once unleashed.

The Ukraine conflict is a crisis of the broader European security order. As Brookings Institution’s Jeremy Shapiro has written, ​“Ukraine is actually just one battleground in a broader struggle between Russia and the West over the regional order in Europe.” Key players in the EU and the US have realized this. But not least because of constantly shifting realities on the ground (and a Kremlin that is making up its strategy on the fly), there has been no clear medium-term approach to dealing with both Russia and Ukraine. Up until now, the common denominator between the allies has been diplomacy and sanctions, coupled with economic support for Ukraine.

Germany has been the linchpin of this approach, holding the EU together in its support for sanctions and driving diplomacy (including a strong role for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). The prerequisite for the German role has been the disillusionment about the nature of Putin’s regime, particularly for leading German Social Democrats. They have realized that there is, in fact, no partner for Modernisierungspartnerschaft, the favored approach of German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier during his first term, which combined the logic of Ostpolitik with what is good for German exporters. This realization has allowed Steinmeier and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to pursue a remarkably cohesive approach within the governing coalition, forging and forcing a common EU position on sanctions and pursuing diplomacy. Both cornerstones – sanctions and diplomacy – are now increasingly being questioned.

Sanctions have been facing criticism from EU governments that are, and have never been, on board (mainly because of the economic costs), such as Hungary, Italy and most recently Greece. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has stated that ​“as long as the Germans want to maintain the sanctions against Russia, this can hardly change – regardless of whether Hungary agrees or not.” Still, it is clear that the political costs for Germany to maintain European unity on sanctions will only increase (and it will also become much harder if the EU does not manage to control the political and economic turmoil in the Eurozone). There are also those who complain that sanctions have not had the intended effect on the Russian government, in terms of inducing behavioral changes. Merkel has dismissed this criticism as fueled by ill-informed impatience. After all, she argues, the Iran sanctions took a long time before they had a meaningful effect. Other critics note that sanctions are ill-conceived, since the goal ­– to get Russia to accept Ukraine´s desire to integrate with the West – is something that the current Russian government will never agree to.

Yet others note that Europe and the US (and a few allies) are rather alone in their support for sanctions. Not a single one of the other BRICS members has come out in favor of sanctions on Russia or openly condemned Russia´s actions in Ukraine. To the contrary: Brazil, for example, sensed a business opportunity and has stepped in for Europe as the prime provider of chicken to Russia. This behavior is not informed only by short-term business thinking. The other BRICS countries are generally wary of the West´s unilateral use of economic warfare via sanctions. They also see the BRICS alliance as a reinsurance policy against the West, should they be on the receiving end of Western pressure and sanctions in the future. While the Turkish government has expressed concern for the treatment of the Tartar population in Crimea, Turkey has flat out refused to join any sanctions against Russia and has (in the words of its foreign minister) maintained a ​“good dialogue” with both Russia and Ukraine. All the while, China is pursuing very favorable gas deals with Russia and generally appears to be quite satisfied that Europe’s and much of the US’s attention is focused on the neighborhood and the Middle East (leaving China more leeway to pursue its strategy in Asia). What looked like a united front against Russia at the Munich Security Conference (with its mainly NATO-minded audience) is in fact a fairly limited, if powerful, Western coalition (transatlantic partners, plus Japan and Australia). Precisely because the coalition is so limited in reach, transatlantic unity is a highly precious good.

This unity is also increasingly challenged by disagreements over diplomacy and arms deliveries. The German government has taken the lead on diplomacy. However frustrating the dealings with the ​“man seemingly living in a different world” (Merkel on Putin), the German government has stuck to pursuing diplomacy, investing heavily in the shaky Minsk II agreement. Both Merkel and Steinmeier have argued passionately against weapons deliveries for Ukraine, a favorite demand of US senators and a number of European commentators. The reasons presented against weapons deliveries are manifold. In the eyes of opponents, they would make the West a direct conflict party, posing the danger of weapons falling into the hands of extreme brigades fighting for the Ukrainian government); prompt further escalation by Russia (which has far greater stakes in the outcome than NATO does), raising the risk of all-out war in Europe with a nuclear power; increase the Ukrainian death toll (which, according to German intelligence estimates, is already much higher than the official figure of 6,000); and also potentially weaken Article 5 deterrence of NATO (this would happen if the West provides weapons and seemingly protection against Russian aggression and then does not follow through on protecting Ukraine if Russia escalates its own military engagement).

It is important to stress that the German case against weapons for Ukraine is not based on pacifism but a very realpolitik assessment. That does not prevent proponents of arms deliveries like The Economist from pulling out Frederick the Great´s quotation that ​“diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments” as a trump card against the German government´s objections. The German government seems thoroughly unimpressed by this. As Merkel made clear during a Q&A after her speech at the Munich Security Conference, the failure to provide Ukraine with military support is a tragic decision – similar to the West’s abandonment of Hungary in 1956 and of East Germany in 1961 against Soviet aggression, and the construction of the Berlin Wall. Both decisions were taken to avoid the dangers of all-out confrontation with a nuclear power. But for Merkel, the diplomacy-cum-sanctions path is the least insane from a pool of bad options. As she made clear in Munich, she also pursues it with the expectation that in the long run, the Western approach will prevail (as it did in the Cold War). US President Barack Obama’s new national-security strategy calls this ​“strategic patience” coupled with persistence.

While US senators and members of the House are pushing for arms deliveries (often in a diplomatically tone-deaf way, as evidenced by the Bob Corker and John McCain speeches in Munich in early February), Obama appears much less convinced by this approach. He seems content to give diplomacy (with Europe in the lead) a chance, despite the Russian government’s history of breaking agreements (as demonstrated by the occupation of Debaltseve after the signing of Minsk II). If Minsk II indeed collapses for good, the debate on weapons deliveries and further sanctions (for example, cutting Russia off from SWIFT) will certainly heat up again. There is also the lingering question of whether the US needs to take a stronger role in diplomacy or whether the Obama administration can continue to farm out the task of negotiating with Putin to Merkel. In the event that the US decides in favor of weapons deliveries (and also gets select EU countries such as Poland on board), the German government will certainly do everything to downplay the importance of this disagreement and to stress the strong transatlantic unity in the assessment of the situation on the ground and on what Russia and other players need to do.

If, however, Minsk II limps on and proves semi-viable, there are further questions in need of fairly urgent answers. These include the modalities for verifying the truce in Eastern Ukraine along the dividing line of what may become a ​“frozen conflict” (or better yet, a ​“simmering conflict modulated by Putin,” as one US analyst put it). The even more difficult task is the monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian border. The Ukrainian government has advocated for a UN-mandated EU police mission, whereas others (in Germany, for example) point to the OSCE as the only viable institution for monitoring. Yet others have advocated for an EU police mission in cooperation with Russia.

Then there is the question of the broader strategy vis-à-vis Russia. There is broad agreement that NATO´s deterrence does need strengthening. There is less readiness on the part of European allies to contribute to this in a meaningful way. As former Obama administration official Julie Smith has pointed out, EU defense spending needs to increase. US allies need to ​“spend more and spend smarter” with Germany leading the way. This should be accompanied by anti-propaganda measures, including a well-funded TV and media counter-push into Russia and the rallying of support for the abolishment of any discrimination against Russian speakers in the EU and NATO members, such as the Baltic countries. It is also clear that Ukraine needs financial and humanitarian support to deal with fallout from the ongoing conflict in the East.

Beyond this, there exist deeper disagreements on strategy. One approach advocates going back to the script of the Cold War. Former Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili, today an advisor to the Ukrainian president, has suggested treating ​“Ukraine as the new West Berlin.” In a similar vein, Washington Post’s Anne Applebaum has proposed the following: ​“Build a Berlin Wall around Donetsk in the form of a demilitarized zone and treat the rest of Ukraine like West Germany.” Leaving the particularly dubious West Berlin analogy aside, this Cold War script in essence includes pulling up the drawbridge and containing Russia. The ​“new” containment is less fraught with problems than its Cold War predecessor, some (like Brookings Institution’s Thomas Wright) have argued. After all, the ​“new” containment is limited to Europe (whereas Cold War containment was global in nature), could be based on conventional forces rather than nuclear power (the West´s conventional forces are no longer inferior, as was the case in the Cold War), and is not directed against Russia per se, just its expansionary behavior.

But critics such as Shapiro and International Insitute for Strategic Studies’s Samuel Charap, Alexander Cooley, Stephen Kotkin, and numerous Europeans such as Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, doubt the wisdom of containment – even in the limited, new form – for a number of reasons. Pursuing deep integration of Ukraine into the West would just further incite Russian determination to destabilize Ukraine, they argue. Also, while containment may be regionally limited to Europe, it makes global cooperation on matters of concern with Russia much less likely. Cooley, a professor of political science at Barnard College, also warns that ​“isolating or cutting off ​‘frozen’ areas from parent state capitals or the West […] merely serves to cement the hold of Russia over these territories.”

A more positive approach would be open to economic exchange with the Russian-led economic zone, as suggested by political scientists Krastev and Leonard. During the World Economic Forum in January 2015, Merkel offered talks on deeper cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel went even further, suggesting that ​“Putin’s idea of a free-trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok is conceivable, even better from New York to Vladivostok” (provided that certain conditions are met by Russia, and EU sanctions can be lifted). This would move the game from the military back to the economic realm, which is much more favorable for the West. Even if Russia agrees to what, for it, could well be a Trojan horse, this will unlikely be enough to achieve a medium-term solution. That is why broader discussions are in order, leading into even murkier terrain. Kotkin, a history professor at Princeton University, has advocated the following: ​“Then as now, the only real alternative was the creation of an entirely new trans-European security architecture, one that fully transcended its Cold War counterpart. This was an oft-expressed Russian wish, but in the early 1990s, there was neither the imagination nor the incentives in Washington for such a heavy lift.” Also, when then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called for a ​“Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok” in 2008, few in the West saw this as a good-faith effort worth taking up.

But Shapiro has argued that now is the time for broader discussions with Russia – not so much as a response to Russia´s projection of strength, but rather to guard against further fallout from Russia’s increasing weakness: ​“We now need to enter into a negotiation to revise the European security order on terms acceptable to Russia and the West. This would necessarily involve difficult compromises, but it is both possible and necessary because of Russia’s fundamental weakness. Regardless of its self-image, Russia is a declining state. Russian decline means it hardly matters if Russia’s long-term plan is to reconquer all of Eastern Europe. It will not have the capacity to do so. So we need not worry about Russian strength, but rather about what it will do as it begins to perceive it is weak. Along current trends, Russia will at that point have many thousands of nuclear weapons and the threat perception of a paranoid schizophrenic. To avoid that outcome, we can afford to accommodate Russia in the short-term and work toward a better Western-Russian relationship that will make managing Russian decline easier.”

Unsurprisingly, what a new deal could look like, and what the political red lines could and should be, remain unclear. In an essay for Foreign Affairs, German Social Democrat Rolf Mützenich argued that ​“some things are non-negotiable – and they include upholding the outcomes of the Helsinki Decalogue and the Charter of Paris.”

Still, is the pursuit of this path evidence of a process of ​“normative disarmament” (“normative Abrüstung”) of the West since the Balkan Wars, as Brookings Institution’s Constanze Stelzenmüller has suggested (employing a term Jürgen Habermas used in 2010 to castigate the new German political elite)? There is every reason to be outraged by the naked aggression committed by the current Russian government. But Putin is no tin-pot Balkan dictator like Slobodan Milosevic, whom you can easily whack over the head by means of NATO air strikes to induce behavioral change. The fact that Russia is a regional and a nuclear power has consequences and can help rationalize and explain the tragic choices the West has to make in the current standoff with Russia. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the Western treatment of those countries that did not find cover under NATO’s Article 5 umbrella while Russia did not mount any significant resistance to the expansion of Western institutions is hugely unfair.

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This background note was prepared for the Global Atlanticists meeting in Istanbul from 9 – 11 March 2015, organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.