GPPi fellow lays out the challenge of Afghanistan to the German Army

In an opinion piece published on December 7, in the Financial Times Deutschland, GPPi Fellow Philipp Rotmann and Timo Noetzel of the University of Konstanz and the Responsible Leadership Foundation argue that recent tumultuous events at the top of the German armed forces are mere symptoms of deeper challenges to the country’s Afghanistan strategy and the institutional foundation of the Bundeswehr itself. In late November, the Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces, a Deputy Minister of Defense and the former Minister of Defense Franz-Josef Jung had to resign for mishandling the 4 September 2009 incident in Kunduz, in which the aerial bombardment of two stolen fuel trucks resulted in significant civilian casualties. The article is entitled ​“Guttenbergs doppelte Prüfung” (“Guttenberg’s Double Test”).

Noetzel and Rotmann argue that US President Barack Obama’s speech at the Military Academy in West Point, NY, could not have provided a better opportunity for the German government and the new Minister of Defense, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, to reconsider their approaches to counterinsurgency and stabilization in Afghanistan. Obama admitted previous mistakes in American policy toward the region and set a date for beginning a military withdrawal 18 months from now. 

On Afghanistan, German policymakers need to make good use of the remaining weeks until the 28 January 2010 international conference on Afghanistan is convened in London to conduct an honest and robust assessment of its own strategy, ask the hard questions and set clear goals for itself. Guttenberg will need to define benchmarks for gradual military disengagement based on measurable progress on security for the Afghan population, building the Afghan military and police, strengthening good governance and establishing civilian infrastructure.

For the Bundeswehr itself, Guttenberg has announced a panel to consider its future force structure and command organization. It will be crucial for the panelists to break out of the bureaucratic business as usual if their work is to meet its goal: to finally draw the consequences of the army’s effective primary mission as an expeditionary force. So far, the defense bureaucracy has failed to accept many of these consequences in crucial areas such as command and control arrangements for ongoing operations, procurement, administration as well as force structure and human resources — some of which may actually be easier to implement in the context of deepening European defense integration. The new Minister of Defense has his work cut out for him.