Orbán Plays with Sentiment of National Humiliation

Thomas Thiel interviews Wolfgang Reinicke, GPPi president and founding dean of the School of Public Policy at Central European University.

Mr. Reinicke, you recently started accepting applications for the Global Challenges Fellowship program (GCF) for non-Western researchers at Central European University’s School of Public Policy in Budapest in cooperation with GPPi in Berlin. The program focuses on outside perspectives on a weakening West. How firmly is Hungary currently rooted in the Western world?

One has to differentiate between the Hungarian government and the Hungarian people… 

… who voted for this government…

Still, I regard the Hungarian people as firmly grounded in the West. The specter of communism is still very much present and retains its deterrent effect. Viktor Orbán’s sympathy for authoritarian models of society is well known. Recently, he has tried to make a name for himself as a mediator between the East and West. 

Is he a mediator or a divider in this role? How strong is the Eurasian ideology’s influence in Hungary?

Earlier this year, the far-right extremist party Jobbik published an interview with Alexander Dugin, the Eurasian Union’s chief ideologist. This ideology, however, resonates much less than the deeply ingrained Hungarian nationalism, which feeds off the sense of humiliation caused by the loss of large chunks of territory in the Treaty of Versailles. Orbán skillfully capitalizes on this sentiment. His strategy is also motivated by energy interests. Here, Orbán wants to keep his options. 

Energy deals are one aspect. Isn’t there also an overlap of values between Fidesz and Russia?

First and foremost, Orbán is an opportunist motivated by clinging to power at all costs. He is fascinated by Putin’s nationalist-authoritarian toolkit; the way in which he has consolidated his power and restored Russia’s self-confidence. From Putin, Orbán also learned how to control the media and harass all too independent-minded non-governmental organizations. 

During Putin’s visit in February, Orbán did not mention Ukraine at all. Does this mean he has made a decision in favor of Russia?

No. He will try to continue his balancing act as long as possible, not vetoing the extension of EU sanctions on Russia. Germany is far too important an economic partner for Hungary for this to happen. Orbán himself said in a recent interview with a Russian newspaper that ​“as long as the Germans want to maintain the sanctions against Russia, this can hardly change – regardless of whether Hungary agrees or not.” 

In addition, Orbán knows that in his Fidesz party there is a signifcant number of transatlantic-minded members who are greatly worried by the massive deterioration of Hungarian-US relations in recent months. As a consequence, Orbán seems to have realized that an offensive, pro-Putin stance carries a significant price tag. The losses of his Fidesz party during the recent by-election may further give Orbán pause. It is too early to say whether the recent defeats are harbingers of his demise. Currently, the only serious opponent Orbán has is the right-wing extremist Jobbik party. 

Investor George Soros founded Central European University in Budapest after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the aim of promoting the opening up of post-communist societies. This was also the founding objective of the now national-conservative Fidesz. Soros used to support Fidesz and Orbán in their early days. Today, Orbán openly criticizes NGOs supported by Soros as bridgeheads for the US. Do you feel any direct pressure at CEU?

I am concerned about the increasing government interference with Hungarian public universities, for example the appointment of chancellors who have budgetary veto powers. As a private and US-accredited university, we do not face any direct pressure at CEU. The authoritarian backsliding in Hungary motivates us to double-down on our efforts.

A German version of this interview ran in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 2 March 2015.