Ms. Merkel Goes to Budapest
An interview with Thorsten Benner by Gabor Gyori of the Hungarian newspaper Vasárnapi Hírek on the February 2nd visit of Chancellor Merkel to Budapest.
GG: Why do you think Angela Merkel has chosen to visit the controversial Hungarian prime minister at this time, especially since the press has reported that previous Hungarian attempts to secure a visit have failed?
TB: In a sense the visit was overdue. Merkel´s last visit to Hungary coincided with the 20th anniversary of the fall of the wall, and she did not travel to Budapest at that time. After Viktor Orban’s reelection it was clear that she would need to visit Budapest sooner rather than later.
GG: There has been some speculation that Merkel’s visit is meant to ensure that Orbán will fall in line when it comes to the extension of sanctions against Russia. Do you think that is the main reason or among the main reasons of this visit?
TB: Russia and Ukraine will certainly feature on the agenda. For Chancellor Merkel it is indeed a key concern to make sure the EU agrees on extending the Russia sanctions in case she deems this necessary (in the summer when the most biting financial sanctions need to be renewed). She will certainly tell Mr. Orban that she very much expects Hungary not to break with the EU consensus, especially if Russian military operations in Eastern Ukraine continue. In addition, Ms. Merkel should avoid anything that will give Mr. Orban cover to act as a mediator between Russia and the rest of Europe during the upcoming visit of Mr. Putin in Budapest just two weeks after her visit. From a German perspective, the visit of Mr. Putin is a clear breach of the EU agreement not to host Mr. Putin for high-profile visits in the EU.
GG: Do you think that the visit now is a sign that German-Hungarian relations are either improving or at least becoming more pragmatic, with the implication that problems in democracy and the rule of law will become irrelevant in terms of bilateral relations?
TB: Merkel has always taken a very pragmatic stance vis-à-vis Mr. Orban, and this likely will not change. She seems to think, “Mr. Orban gives me quite a bit of headache, but Mr. Putin is an even bigger headache. Plus, as long as key German companies in the automotive sector in particular make good business producing in Hungary and as long Fidesz is useful as a voting bloc in the European Parliament, I would rather not rock the boat too much.” Therefore it seems she is reluctant to throw Orban and Fidesz out of the EPP family, and she seems to continue to believe that keeping Orban inside the tent and voicing criticism mostly behind closed doors is a good strategy, even though it does not seem to bear any obvious fruit. That is a pity. It is important to note that German-Hungarian relations are and should be much more than relations between the current governments. Germany should continue to invest in people-to-people ties and German foundations should also invest much more in measures to strengthen independent civil society and media in Hungary. Here Merkel should also encourage German players to invest – not just in the production of cars, but also the production of independent knowledge and news in Hungary.
GG: Do you expect Chancellor Merkel to raise critical issues such as the state of democracy in Hungary or the way some western European/German businesses (eg, Spar and RTL) are being treated by the government?
TB: It will be interesting to watch how Merkel reacts if students at her event at Andrassy University ask her about her opinion on the state of Hungarian democracy. It would be her duty to speak out against, for example, the treatment of NGOs the same way she has spoken out in Russia and met with opposition groups. I doubt, though, she will find strong and clear words in public. That doesn’t mean that she condones Mr. Orban’s behavior and also his rhetorical support for illiberal democracy and the Putin and Erdogan models. But her political cost-benefit calculation still seems to be that it is more advantageous to not confront Mr. Orban aggressively in public. I would have hoped that she would have decided to meet with key civil society representatives and independent journalists and artists (in addition to the important meeting with members of the Jewish community) – but unfortunately that kind of meeting does not seem to be foreseen.
As regards the treatment of businesses, Merkel may well tell Mr. Orban that she expects German and European service providers operating in Hungary to be treated as well as companies in the automotive sector. Again, I think this will more likely happen behind closed doors than in public. This also includes the treatment of RTL (where also many Germans understand the tax to be politically motivated). The fact that Mr. Lazar is in talks with RTL to reach an agreement on lowering the tax underscores that Mr. Orban is a smart and responsive authoritarian leader. He seems to have concluded that pacifying RTL and the critics on that front is the better way. If indeed the agreement includes a pledge by RTL to tone down its political coverage and exchange key staff that would be outrageous and would only show that in the end RTL puts profit above anything else – the same way the German car manufactures such as Daimler and Audi do not seem to mind being exploited as PR tools by the Orban government whenever convenient.
GG: Syriza, the victor of the recent Greek elections is also openly pro-Russian and is likely to upset the EU’s joint stance on Russia. Do you think Syriza’s election victory will reduce the pressure on Orbán? Is Merkel more likely to take a friendly approach towards the Fidesz government in order to ensure that Hungary does not stray from the joint EU line on Russia?
TB: Syriza uses its veto power on Russia sanctions as a bargaining chip in order to get better deals with EU partners on economic and financial issues that really matter to their ability to deliver on the promises made to the Greek voters. They are out to cut a deal, not protect Russia at all costs. Similarly, Orban can use the trump of vetoing EU sanctions to deter measures against his government by EU partners. Both games affect Ms. Merkel’s choices and if anything in her mind it may solidify the case for dealing with Mr. Orban and Fidesz in a pragmatic way, meaning not to pick any fights. That is not because Ms. Merkel would not have any cards to play if she decided to play hardball with Mr. Orban. It is probably more because she does not want this to distract her from what she regards as the crucial fight right now over war and peace in Ukraine and Europe at large.
The original interview, in Hungarian, is available at Vasárnapi Hírek online.