The Perils of Historical Analogy: Lessons for the China Shock Debate

Humans instinctively rely on the past to understand the present and predict the future – a reality that gives those who wield historical metaphors a particular power. It is not for nothing that French poet and philosopher Paul Valéry called history ​“the most dangerous product evolved from the chemistry of the intellect.” But what happens to those who misread the history on which they base their contemporary insights?

In response to Thorsten Benner, Jakob Hensing and Florian Klumpp’s analysis on the ​“China shock,” China expert Benjamin Creutzfeldt uses a particular historical episode in Chinese history 1800 years ago to argue that Germany and Europe should work with China today. He contends that Germany and Europe need to ​“navigate smartly” in an increasingly multipolar world and apply a tripartite strategy: (1) work with China, (2) distance oneself from the United States and (3) pursue strategic autonomy. He draws on a particular historical episode 1800 years ago to make this point. Closer scrutiny, however, shows that this history suggests Europe and Germany should be even more wary of China than Benner, Hensing and Klumpp originally argued – not less.

Creutzfeldt compares Germany and Europe to the state of Yizhou and the US to the Kingdom of Wei, the Chinese hegemon in the third century CE. He equates China with what is now the state of Shu Han – somewhat erroneously, as Shu Han did not exist as such. (What he considers ​‘Shu Han,’ was in reality nothing more than an army led by the warlord Liu Bei. For simplicity, however, we continue with Creutzfeldt’s terminology.) 

Creutzfeldt’s argument is as follows: Germany and Europe should learn from Yizhou’s experience – a state that found itself wedged between two major states, Wei and Shu Han –and develop a ​“clever, active autonomy.” As Creutzfeldt points out, ​“It is not the one who strikes the hardest who wins, but the one who navigates the most.” The implication for today is that Germany and Europe should engage China with economic pragmatism. 

In his analysis, however, Creutzfeldt makes a critical historical mistake: he typifies Shu Han as having a ​“virtuous reputation,” an assumption possibly derived from the classic work of Chinese literature, Romance of the Three Kingdoms. As we’ll see, this is anything but true.

In the third century CE, the province of Yizhou invited the Shu Han army into its territory to discuss a hypothetical Wei invasion. Yizhou fed their troops, and its ruler personally welcomed the Shu Han army with a multi-day banquet. Pang Tong – the general in charge of Shu Han’s Yizhou strategy – suggested that Shu Han should take advantage of Yizhou’s goodwill and ambush its capital to take over the state. Shu Han infiltrated the top military ranks of Yizhou, but before they were able to put the plan in motion, the news leaked and war broke out. Battle ensued for almost a year and a half. Pang Tong was killed during the campaign, but Shu Han was able to completely take over Yizhou.

Creutzfeldt claims that Shu Han took over Yizhou peacefully. In reality, there was nothing peaceful about it. Shu Han’s treachery was only matched by Yizhou’s naivety. Additionally, if China is the ​‘virtuous’ Shu Han and the US is Wei, it is significant that for ideological reasons — similar to theocratic Iran’s hatred of Israel — Shu Han did not recognize the legitimacy of Wei. Yet China maintains it is possible to reset US-China relations under Trump. While the Shu Han could plausibly advise third powers to have nothing to do with the Wei, it is hypocritical for China to make the analogous recommendation with respect to the US. 

Creutzfeldt’s analogy of China as Shu Han implies that Beijing is treacherous and that Germany and Europe should be extremely wary of any engagement. In the case cited by Creutzfeldt, diplomacy and peaceful gestures were all means of infiltration and subversion. We hope that Creutzfeldt’s analogy is inaccurate and that Beijing today does not have plans to ambush Berlin or any other European capital. The true lesson of Creutzfeldt’s analogy is that a nation’s ​‘virtuous reputation’ can be a result of propaganda and embellishment. Yizhou, a much more powerful state at the time, opened up its gates to Shu Han’s army because Shu Han had a good reputation. The result: its leadership was dissolved and Yizhou was subsumed into Shu Han.

We should avoid misreading Chinese history. Otherwise, there is little chance of drawing the right lessons for Germany and Europe today. As Director of the Leipzig Confucius Institute, Creutzfeldt may be familiar with the Analects, where Confucius says, ​“If I hold up one corner and the student cannot return with the other three, I will not repeat the lesson.” Analogy is powerful, but we need to understand the corner we are holding. We invite the reader to consider what lessons, if any, Creutzfeldt’s analogy holds.