How Do We Know What Works in Preventing Violent Extremism?

Evidence and Trends in Evaluation from 14 Countries

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Executive Summary

In response to high-profile attacks by violent extremists, the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has drawn increasing attention and funding since the early 2000s. Today, countries in all regions across the globe have put in place dedicated policies and measures to prevent extremism and support deradicalization alongside evolving threat patterns. In addition, various other policy domains beyond P/CVE also aim to foster the peaceful coexistence of different groups and promote social cohesion, often sharing similarities with approaches in extremism prevention.

But without a sound evidence base and careful consideration of (un-)intended effects, activities to prevent and counter violent extremism can do more harm than good. Evaluations can help stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of P/CVE activities and identify how they can be improved. Compared to other policy fields like public health or economic development, however, evaluation as a practice in P/CVE is less widespread and still faces many challenges.

Building on existing comparative research, this report provides an overview of the state of P/CVE evaluation as well as its current challenges and outlines ways forward. The insights presented here are based on the first iteration of an online expert survey we conducted across 14 countries on five different continents: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Research Focus and Approach

To determine the state of P/CVE evaluation around the world, we developed a survey questionnaire and selected the 14 survey countries in consultation with German and international experts. A total of 37 individual P/CVE experts completed the survey online in late summer 2023. Each expert answered the questionnaire based on their country-specific knowledge of and experience with P/CVE evaluation.

The survey questions inquired about three themes: the general P/CVE landscape, trends in extremist phenomena, and evaluation practices for extremism prevention and related fields. The survey results do not represent the official record or final word on the P/CVE evaluation landscape in any given country; rather, they reflect the assessments of the selected experts, none of whom are affiliated with a government. What the results in this report provide is a comparative perspective on contemporary P/CVE and evaluation practices, structures, and innovations across the globe. Moreover, they detail the key challenges, pressing needs, and promising developments for moving evaluation and quality assurance practices forward, both in P/CVE and in related fields.

Key Findings and Recommendations

The findings below summarize the results of our survey. They are presented in the order of their corresponding sections in the main text, followed by our recommendations, which are explained in greater detail at the end of the report.

Extremism Prevention

A diverse set of actors and funders contribute to the prevention of violent extremism across a wide range of policy fields. Government authorities remain the key coordinators and funders, but civil society is crucial for holistic prevention efforts.

Responsibility and funding for P/CVE activities varies across countries. Overall, government authorities remain the key coordinators and funders of extremism prevention, but civil society plays a crucial role in addressing communities and individuals. In some countries, responsibility for driving and funding P/CVE is more centralized at the national level, while local and regional governments are more relevant in others and fund activities in most of the countries we surveyed. Civil society, foreign donor governments, and international organizations also fund and sometimes deliver P/CVE activities, as do philanthropic foundations and regional organizations. Experts also mentioned the role of private entities, like Big Tech companies, that fund research and activities to counter hate speech.

In all countries we surveyed, P/CVE spans a wide range of policy domains including law enforcement, criminal justice, public safety, education, public health, the social sector, and religious affairs. This diversity reflects a shift away from narrow, security-centered responses to violent extremism toward a more holistic approach to P/CVE in many places. The boundaries between P/CVE and the various other fields of practice that aim to strengthen social cohesion and resilience – from social literacy and arts and culture to infrastructure and human rights – can be blurry. Some actors in these adjacent fields insist on setting their activities firmly apart from P/CVE, while others consider themselves to be part of the same field. This varies across and within countries, due to ideational or legal reasons.

The relationship between government and civil society varies across contexts and can be contentious. Building trust is crucial to enable effective prevention.

The relationship between government and civil society actors is important and often contentious, varying by country and across levels of government. Overall, civil society actors are recognized for their experience, commitment to the cause, in-depth local knowledge, and at times higher level of credibility among communities. Yet they also face difficulty in sustaining financial support and building crucial capacity.

Some governments have taken P/CVE approaches that, together with individual cases of malpractice, have created the perception that target communities are being marginalized, discriminated against, securitized, or stigmatized. This impacts the level of cooperation between actors and can lead organizations and even whole professions to distance themselves from P/CVE efforts.

Addressing this trust deficit is thus one opportunity for P/CVE evaluation. If designed carefully, to make explicit the at times differing goals and intervention logics of P/CVE activities and share experiences by various actors involved, evaluations can foster mutual understanding and help close the trust gap.

Innovation in P/CVE activities occurs through multi-stakeholder cooperation, prison-based initiatives, a focus on resilience building, and the use of new technologies.

As notable innovations in P/CVE, experts mentioned multi-agency cooperation formats and the increasing involvement of and cooperation with civil society. They also highlighted

innovations emerging from prison settings specifically, including risk assessment tools, disengagement work, and programs to counter radicalization among youth, as well as measures for building primary sector resilience. Some experts also raised the innovative potential of artificial intelligence (AI) for improving early warning instruments on extremist activities, while noting the risk of AI's exploitation by extremist actors.

Violent Extremist Threats

Current violent extremist threats and tactics as well as expected future threats vary across countries, but the most prominent are related to religiously motivated extremism, right-wing extremism, and new types of single-issue extremism.

The countries we surveyed are confronted with a variety of extremist phenomena and actors. While Islamist and right-wing extremism are the most frequently mentioned threats, security concerns also stem from anti-government extremism, conspiracy theories, and disinformation campaigns. Some of these extremist phenomena are also intertwined. Right-wing extremism in Europe, North America and Australia is increasingly connected to the influence of anti-democratic actors, anti-government or anti-vaccine sentiments, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns, and other types of conspiracy theories. For some countries, relevant threat phenomena include single-issue extremism, including misogynist and Incel violence, as well as the increasing radicalization and mobilization of minors online.

Notable trends in violent-extremist tools and tactics include improvised explosive devices and small-scale knife attacks on government representatives and law enforcement personnel, extremists infiltrating security services, and the instrumentalization of religion by different actors. In some contexts, violent extremism has exacerbated existing inter-community tensions. Experts also worry about social marginalization and isolation as risk factors for radicalization and mobilization.

Looking forward, survey respondents expect the above-mentioned extremist phenomena to be persistent threats over the coming two to five years. Individual experts also identified future threats: failed efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate extremists who are returning foreign fighters; insufficient attention to right-wing nationalism in virtual spaces; eco-extremism; as well as new or resurgent forms of left-wing extremism, including in response to right-wing political victories. Experts further noted that it will be crucial to address extremism holistically in the future, for example, by ensuring political inclusion and equal access to social services while avoiding P/CVE policies that increase perceptions of intolerance and oppression.

Evaluation

Key challenges for the evaluation of P/CVE efforts are funding constraints, methodological difficulties, capacity constraints, insufficient awareness of the value that evaluation provides, as well as a lack of coordination and standardization.

Our survey results add nuance to the conventional view that extremism prevention is rarely evaluated. Experts indicated that activities in primary prevention – aimed at the level of a society or community as a whole – are evaluated slightly less frequently than secondary and

tertiary interventions, which target specific individuals and their social networks. Evaluation frequency depends on the type of activity to be evaluated, the evaluation goals, as well as the availability of funding and other resources, including time. Overall, process and outcome evaluations tend to occur more frequently than impact evaluations.

The results show great variation in who is conducting evaluations, with practitioners and university-based researchers playing the most important roles. In several countries, evaluations are also strongly linked to the piloting of new projects or programs.

The expert assessments point to five central challenges in planning and implementing P/CVE evaluations, which are shared across countries: methodological challenges, including ethical considerations and obstacles to data collection; limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations; the lack of central coordination and standard setting for evaluations; insufficient awareness around the value of evaluation; and funding constraints.

As key initiators and funders of P/CVE evaluations, governments hold significant power over whether and what type of evaluations are conducted. Dedicated funding mechanisms can help improve evaluations for both accountability and learning purposes.

P/CVE evaluation practice is primarily driven by logics of accountability: evaluations can serve as a precondition for receiving funding, as a justification for public spending, and as proof that P/CVE activities achieve their objectives. In practice, evaluations are also often linked to learning and development goals around strengthening ongoing and future prevention approaches. Some evaluations are conducted to ensure coordination between stakeholders or to assess the risk of extremist violence.

Governments are key initiators of evaluations, but implementers sometimes evaluate their activities independent of any external request. Academic researchers also frequently drive and initiate evaluations, adding crucial knowledge to the P/CVE field of practice. When government grants foresee evaluations, a budget share of five to ten percent for evaluation efforts is common in multiple countries. When governments request evaluations that were not budgeted for, they provide additional funding for them. Similarly, in contexts where foreign donors or international organizations fund P/CVE, they cover evaluation costs or require a budget line for evaluation. Dedicated funding mechanisms for implementers who themselves wish to evaluate their activities only exist in some countries including Australia, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Norway. Academics, independent experts, and research institutes often evaluate P/CVE activities using research budgets as opposed to dedicated evaluation funding.

When P/CVE projects face funding constraints, evaluation quickly loses priority or is abandoned altogether. Resource shortfalls for evaluation also result when evaluation plans are not included from the outset of a project, though experts in some contexts see a positive trend in that planning for evaluation happens earlier in project cycles. Overall, however, insufficient funding remains a key barrier to more widespread and high-quality evaluation. Inadequate evaluation budgets also affect the choice of methods and data collection, leading evaluators to choose less resource-intensive evaluation designs and thus limiting their ability to measure the delayed effects of an intervention after project funding has ended. Another reason why government stakeholders and P/CVE implementers do not prioritize evaluation is because they are unaware of its value.

The use of quasi-experimental methods and digital tools for evaluation needs to be decided case by case, after carefully weighing benefits and risks.

Evaluation methods are varied. They include qualitative, quantitative and mixed-method approaches. Despite their reputation for rigor, experimental and quasi-experimental methods are not frequently used due to their limited applicability, high costs, and the ethical implications of leaving the control group untreated. Digital tools can facilitate the evaluation process, especially the data collection, through easier and more cost-effective access. However, respondents also expressed concerns about data quality and research ethics.

Evaluation results are published and shared infrequently. Constraints on resource and data sharing often impede knowledge-sharing and cooperation. Informal networks remain essential for exchanging good evaluation practices.

Publicly available evaluation results can legitimize funding decisions and provide evidence to determine which measures are effective (and under what circumstances and why). Yet across countries, evaluations are only published infrequently, depending on the type of activity evaluated, the evaluating actor, and the funder. Funders hold significant power to decide whether evaluation findings are released or not. On both the funder and implementer side, reasons not to publish results include the desire to avoid dealing with negative results, which are feared to lead to funding cuts and to damage reputations and crucial relationships. Also relevant is the duty and care to protect individuals and their personal data. Researchers often lack the resources to disseminate evaluation results and findings. To still enable sharing and learning, actors in some contexts have resorted to publishing partial results, in summarized or redacted form, through policy briefs or infographics.

A wide range of P/CVE knowledge-sharing and cooperation networks, through which researchers and practitioners exchange good practices, exist at different local, national and international levels. Although they are not always accessible to all P/CVE stakeholders, professional networks are seen as the most prevalent and helpful evaluation assistance structures. Such networks are typically informal linkages between evaluators. Informal collegial connections also remain crucial sources of reflection and support. Formal knowledge hubs and evaluation databases are less common overall.

The most widespread challenges to knowledge exchange are resource constraints, followed by constraints on sharing data or information. A high degree of fragmentation across many initiatives, which are not always sustainable and coordinated, puts additional strain on limited resources.

The extent to which evaluation results are used to improve P/CVE policies and activities remains largely unclear.

Survey respondents were not able to identify many formal uptake mechanisms that exist to ensure that relevant evaluation results drive P/CVE program improvement. Evaluation findings are sometimes discussed within governments, but it is often unclear to what extent they influence government decisions. Without formal obligations, oversight or incentives to systematically integrate evaluation findings into practice, their uptake often depends on the voluntary initiative of individual actors. Practitioners and researchers, for example, share key findings and learnings through professional networks, scholarly articles, or social media, provided they receive the approval and sufficient resources to do so.

To strengthen learning, experts highlighted the need for more dialogue on evaluation, clear communication to decision-makers, longer funding periods and sufficient dedicated time, the inclusion of uptake measures into the design of evaluations, and participatory approaches. Evaluation databases that provide anonymized information on P/CVE activities and evaluation results could also help lower barriers to uptake. Ideally, to reserve sufficient resources for future learning needs, stakeholders should already plan how evaluation results will be used from the outset of a project.

Methodological and practical skills for evaluation need to be strengthened. Low-barrier, capacity-building resources like evaluation toolkits should be complemented with additional support formats.

The most relevant skill gap for evaluation relates to methodological know-how. A lack of standardized metrics also makes it difficult to measure the impact of interventions as complex as those in the field of extremism prevention. Experts highlighted a need for more quantitative research skills, experience with (quasi-)experimental methods, training to handle and protect sensitive data, and engagement with research ethics. Experts also argued that there is room to strengthen theoretical knowledge on radicalization as well as cultural, religious and context sensitivity in the P/CVE and evaluation expert communities.

The number of toolkits that assist with evaluation is growing. Toolkits are valued because they are easy to access and can be co-designed with users. Ideally, they should be complemented with interactive training formats and with evaluation databases, which are less common despite several experts highlighting their utility. A centralized helpdesk system reportedly only exists in Singapore. Some countries either completely lack support structures or such offers are not widely known. Language barriers also impede international exchange on evaluation issues and limit access to transnational support tools.

Experts find inspiration for innovative evaluation approaches in adjacent fields as well as in scientific research and other countries.

To innovate in P/CVE evaluation and develop new techniques, experts look to the fields of public health and crime prevention, including efforts to measure behavioral change and evaluate programs to reduce drug abuse or gang violence. They also find inspiration for primary prevention evaluation methods in experimental or quasi-experimental setups in, for example, civic education or school settings. Other fields that offer relevant innovative examples include behavioral sciences, psychology, conflict studies and peacebuilding, as well as social work.

The main innovators are academic researchers, followed by specialized independent consultants. National governments, international organizations, and commercial evaluation companies are also seen as innovators. Experts particularly value academic researchers' systematic reviews and syntheses of evaluation and research results. Evaluation associations are another relevant source of inspiration. Finally, experts see value in adopting systematic criteria from adjacent fields, like the OECD DAC criteria and the Brief Resilience Scale, for P/CVE evaluation. The countries most frequently mentioned as inspiring innovation for P/CVE programming and evaluation are Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark, followed by Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and Indonesia.

Recommendations

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1   All P/CVE stakeholders should approach evaluations as an opportunity to build trust between each other and achieve more coherent and effective prevention efforts. A first step toward this is to openly share their respective goals, intervention logics, and experiences to foster mutual understanding.

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2   Stakeholders should ensure adequate funding for high-quality evaluations.

     a.   Funders should provide resources for the evaluation of P/CVE activities they support. Where evaluation costs are covered by grants, funders should require implementers to budget for these costs at the proposal stage, and implementers should earmark those funds accordingly from the outset of a project.

     b.   To enable implementers to conduct or commission evaluations at their own initiative, funders should develop dedicated funding mechanisms.

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3   Stakeholders should ensure that evaluations follow learning strategies with clear uptake mechanisms.

     a.   Governments and implementers should develop uptake mechanisms which ensure that evaluation results feed into efforts to improve extremism prevention policies, strategies, programs, and activities.

     b.   Governments should make their uptake mechanisms more transparent to ensure that evaluation is perceived as a tool to improve P/CVE policy and practice rather than merely an instrument to control implementers.

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4   Wherever possible, funders should support and enable the sharing of evaluation results and lessons learned, for example, through an accessible evaluation database. To address confidentiality concerns, evaluations can be published as summaries or redacted reports.

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5   Stakeholders should invest in building the capacity of implementers and government officials to conduct and manage high-quality evaluations and learning processes.

     a.   When designing evaluation support and capacity-building tools, developers should consider different learning needs and work to overcome barriers to participation.

     b.   Capacity-building tools should include trainings to interpret and communicate evaluation results and translate them into improved practice, as well as guidance on research ethics, including for the use of digital tools.

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6   Stakeholders should continue to invest in P/CVE (evaluation) research and international, interdisciplinary exchange.

     a.   Funders should continue to invest in and support high-quality meta reviews that synthesize findings from different academic and practice fields within countries and internationally.

     b.   Stakeholders in research, civil society and government should exchange experiences about how new and evolving forms of extremism can be prevented and how evaluation designs need to be adjusted to produce better knowledge of what works. While formal P/CVE evaluation networks are rare, existing P/CVE networks as well as broader evaluation networks can serve as entry points for such discussions.

     c.   Funders should invest in inclusive exchange formats, such as conferences, which foster informal connections between practitioners, researchers, evaluators, and policymakers and facilitate dialogue.

Introduction

Violent extremism endangers people and challenges countries across the world, even if it manifests differently and with varying levels of intensity. In response, dedicated activities to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) have emerged over recent decades. These measures reflect a spectrum of non-coercive, preventative, and interventional actions applied at the individual, relational, group, and societal levels to mitigate key drivers of radicalization to violent extremism, and to dissuade individuals from engaging in extremist violence.[1]

Just as the number of measures, public spending on P/CVE has also increased – especially in countries where preventing and countering violent extremism has received significant political attention.[2] In the United States, for example, homeland security spending between 2001 and 2020 was more than six times as high as in the previous 20 years.[3] In Germany, where this study originates, national government funding to prevent violent extremism and deradicalization has also increased substantially over the past decade, from €43.1 million in 2015 to €155.2 million in 2019.[4] This raises questions regarding the extent to which funded measures are actually effective in preventing and countering violent extremism, and how they can be improved.[5]

Evaluation – the systematic assessment of activities – can help answer these questions. It can support accountability for P/CVE policies, strategies, programs, and activities by assessing their design, implementation, and results.[6] Evaluation can also contribute to organizational learning and a better understanding of the underlying dynamics that drive people toward or dissuade them from violent extremism. Naturally, different stakeholders have different priorities and expectations for evaluation.[7] Government agencies as funders tend to be most interested in what works so they can make informed funding decisions, which leads to demands for short-term impact evaluations. Meanwhile, practitioners tend to prefer learning-oriented processes that make it possible to improve interventions.[8] At the same time, scholars are grappling with fundamental challenges in evaluating the effects of P/CVE interventions to advance our knowledge of "what works, for whom, in which context, and how."[9]

Questions about the effectiveness of measures to prevent and counter extremism preoccupy actors that offer, fund, and research these measures across countries. While we still know comparatively little about the effects of many P/CVE measures, demands that these measures be "evidence-based,"[10] meaning that they are "developed, implemented and evaluated on a scientific basis,"[11] appear to exist across countries.[12] Based on a previous study comparing the formal rules, evaluation capabilities, and cultures in Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, we know that governments differ in their approaches to evaluation and quality assurance.[13] At the same time, the value of international exchange to ensure that evaluation practices contribute to a constructive culture of learning and accountability in multi-stakeholder contexts is frequently emphasized in the literature.[14]

This study aims to add to the growing body of knowledge on the state of P/CVE practice, evaluation, and quality assurance around the world through an international expert survey stretching 14 countries. It provides a comparative picture of the state of evaluation in extremism prevention and related fields with a view to the future, a perspective that the literature has so far lacked. The report discusses expert-based assessments on a range of questions, such as: What types of activities are evaluated, by whom, and on whose initiative? What is the logic of evaluation, and what uptake mechanisms exist to influence future funding and programming decisions? And which contexts provide inspiration and good practices for innovative P/CVE programming and evaluation approaches?

Figure 1: Countries Covered by the Survey

While the focus of this study is P/CVE – a field much critiqued in its own right[15] – it also considers practices in related fields that seek to foster social cohesion. This reflects the fuzzy boundaries between and overlap of activities across policy fields as well as the evolving nature of many governments' policies to prevent societal divisions and foster peaceful coexistence. The survey is the first iteration of a monitoring effort designed to regularly assess the state and development of evaluation in this field across countries in the future.

This report is part of the research and dialogue project "PrEval: Evaluation and Quality Assurance in Extremism Prevention, Democracy Promotion and Civic Education: Analysis, Monitoring, Dialogue." PrEval is currently funded (from September 2022 to October 2025) by the German Ministry of the Interior and Community. The project aims to design and develop formats and structures to strengthen evaluation and quality assurance in extremism prevention, democracy promotion, and civic education in Germany. The key recommendations derived from the research findings presented in the executive summary are primarily addressed to actors in the German prevention and evaluation landscape, but they are relevant beyond the German context.

In the following sections, we first situate our study within the field of comparative P/CVE evaluation research. After that, we define key concepts used in this report and the research methodology. In the results section, we first provide an overview of the survey results regarding the P/CVE landscape in the 14 countries – including actors, funding, civil society-government relations, innovations, and knowledge sharing – followed by result on trends regarding relevant current and future extremist phenomena. After that, the main results section presents evidence on evaluation practices, with details on typical motivations for evaluation as well as funding, methods, publication, and uptake of results. The section on challenges discusses obstacles to more widespread, frequent, and high-quality evaluations, and the sections on capacity-building and innovations respectively focus on solutions to overcome challenges. In the concluding section, we propose recommendations to move the P/CVE evaluation field forward.

What We Know: Comparing P/CVE Evaluation Practices

Formal evaluation efforts to assess and improve P/CVE have only gained traction in the last 20 years, after a surge in policy attention and measures to prevent radicalization.[16] For years, the P/CVE field has been diagnosed with a fundamental lack of evaluations in general and a lack of evaluations with high-quality or empirical evidence in particular.[17] The reasons for this are varied. A frequently highlighted obstacle to more widespread evaluation is the lack of "an analytical framework for measuring whether, how, and why theories and programs are effective."[18]

Pathways into violent extremism are highly complex and specific to each individual,[19] making it difficult to specify uniform metrics with which to measure behavioral and attitudinal change. Parameters to measure phenomena like deradicalization, which lack a universal definition, as well metrics for behavioral and attitudinal change are not clearly defined.[20] Agreeing on criteria for prevention success or indicators to be achieved by P/CVE programs remains challenging. The heterogeneity of the target groups with which most P/CVE programs engage poses an additional challenge to establishing indicators and metrics. Nevertheless, Köhler states that "the possibility of comparing the set objectives with the program organization and the results that are ultimately achieved is what makes an evaluation possible in the first place."[21] Similarly, Gielen and Van Leeuwen explain how challenges in evaluating P/CVE can be addressed.[22]

In practice, practitioners and evaluators often follow a flexible approach to evaluation and observe various indicators for change.[23] In some cases, the only metric used is the absence of a terrorist attack since a program began.[24] Other reasons for the lack of (high-quality) evaluations that the literature identifies include a lack of resources,[25] data shortages,[26] and the fact that efforts to identify long-term effects of prevention interventions are problematic and rare due to other priorities from funders.[27]

Consequently, there is little comparative research on evaluation practices across countries. A systematic search of the English-language academic literature reveals a total of 37 comparative P/CVE evaluation studies, 16 of which compare P/CVE policies or approaches in different countries, closely followed by studies comparing individual P/CVE projects and programs across countries (11).[28] Individual activities of P/CVE actors are compared least frequently (3). An additional 7 studies focusing on evaluation practices across countries without a clear comparative approach were identified under "other resources." The most frequently compared countries at the level of policies and approaches are the United Kingdom (12) and the Netherlands (9), followed by the United States, Denmark, France, and Belgium (7 each).

> Existing evaluation efforts lack quality and learning across contexts is rare. Many studies describe evaluation practices in P/CVE as rudimentary.

Overall, these studies show that existing evaluation efforts lack quality and that learning across contexts is rare. Many studies describe evaluation practices in P/CVE as rudimentary, but the desire to evaluate activities and study their effectiveness has increased in recent years. This mostly follows a functional logic to justify public spending.[29] Dawson and colleagues refer to the evaluation systems of several member states of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) as "immature."[30] In a similar vein, Baruch and colleagues remarked in 2018 that "(w)hile there is a growing appetite for supporting and using evaluations in CVE, these efforts result in great diversity, providing at best a series of insights rather than an accumulation of knowledge."[31] From a global perspective, Rosand et al. lament that monitoring and evaluation often focuses on output rather than outcomes, hampering valid inferences about the effectiveness of P/CVE activities.[32]

Only 27% of the security policies, legislation, and procedures to prevent radicalization and extremism in Europe that Jurczyszyn and colleagues analyzed included "appropriate provisions for evaluation."[33] Despite the lack of evaluations that assess P/CVE activities for effectiveness, they continue to be implemented. However, it is counter-narrative interventions, or what the literature often calls *educational* P/CVE projects, that appear to be evaluated more often.[34] The outcomes and effects of such interventions are sometimes even determined using experimental methods to measure effectiveness, albeit of questionable quality.[35]

Given this paucity of evaluations, and of high-quality evaluations in particular, there is a shared need across countries to improve both evaluation capacity and practice. In our interviews, experts all over Europe emphasized the vitality of this need.[36] They also suggested that "EU member states could establish shared measures of effectiveness to more efficiently evaluate counter- and deradicalization policy."[37] This points to a need for cross-border exchange on evaluation in the field of extremism prevention.

Overall, a review of the literature underscores the need for more international exchange of good practices to advance P/CVE evaluation. With this study, we detail the challenges actors in various countries face and provide evidence for what they see as promising innovations, good practices, and ways forward.

Key Concepts

The types of activities that are labeled as P/CVE may differ from country to country. This often depends, for example, on linguistic particularities, the origins and evolution of extremism prevention in a given context, and distinct domestic political debates. As Baugh and Guion put it, "one of the primary cross-cultural challenges when using survey methods is to assess whether respondents in other cultures interpret the meaning of survey items similarly as respondents in the country in which the survey was developed."[38] In order to analyze the results of the expert survey in a comparative fashion, we provided survey participants with working definitions of central concepts, which are described in what follows.

We understand **preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)** as a spectrum of non-coercive efforts aimed at mitigating key drivers of radicalization and dissuading individuals from engaging in ideologically motivated violence.[39] All activities that meet this definition, regardless of whether they are also designated as P/CVE in the respective country, are relevant to the present research project.

In addition, the expert survey also covered **related activities beyond the P/CVE framework**, which are designed to promote community resilience without being explicitly considered preventive, for example, by fostering social cohesion or peaceful coexistence.[40] Stephens and colleagues also call such measures "upstream preventative approaches that position themselves explicitly outside of a security-driven framework" and note that these approaches "have largely emerged in response to the extensive criticism of approaches to CVE that extend the security agenda into the realms of care, social work, and education."[41] This is the case in Germany, where many civic education providers and some researchers firmly reject the concept of prevention because, among other reasons, their pedagogical self-conception and their core mandate to enable active social and political participation is diametrically opposed to a defensive logic of prevention. At the same time, some actors in German civic education still speak of civic education's preventive effects, in line with what Stephens and colleagues find in the English-speaking literature.[42]

To conceptualize P/CVE, this research project draws on a public health model[43] that distinguishes between primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, acknowledging that those boundaries may be fluid.[44] **Primary prevention** includes measures that target the broader society, aiming to mitigate conducive conditions, behaviors, or attitudes to radicalization, and building resilience against extremism.[45] **Secondary prevention** refers to more targeted intervention, characterized by working with or among the social network of people considered *at risk* of cognitive and behavioral radicalization, which the measures aim to reduce.[46] Lastly, **tertiary prevention** refers to deradicalization, disengagement, and rehabilitation.[47]

In addition to these thematic terms and concepts, it is important to clarify at which level P/CVE efforts and related activities can occur, as many different terms are used in the existing literature for efforts of varying scope (see Figure 2). This survey and report understand P/CVE **measures** as individual preventative or interventional actions that can be applied at an individual, relational, group, or societal level, depending on where the driver of radicalization is identified. If P/CVE measures reflect coordinated efforts with a clearly defined scope and life cycle, targeting specific aspects of primary, secondary, and/or tertiary prevention, they may be understood as P/CVE **projects**. A broader scope of activities defines P/CVE **programs**, which may therefore include multiple projects. They usually stem from P/CVE **policies** and/or **strategies**, which provide guidelines and frameworks for P/CVE objectives and how they intend to be achieved. Lastly, this research project uses P/CVE activities as an inclusive term for the aforementioned concepts, representing any and all undertakings of relevant P/CVE stakeholders to counter and prevent violent extremism, as well as previously listed related activities beyond the P/CVE framework, within a given context.

Figure 2: Levels of P/CVE Activities and Evaluation

To define **evaluation and quality assurance**, this project follows the OECD by understanding evaluation as "the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results."[48] An evaluation aims to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives such as efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and/or sustainability. Beyond this rather narrow understanding of evaluation, quality assurance may also take other forms, especially in different contexts. For the purposes of this study, in addition to formal evaluations, we were also interested in discovering other mechanisms and measures for quality assurance.

Methodology

Survey Development

To find out about P/CVE evaluation practices, challenges, needs, and innovative approaches in different countries, we conducted an online survey among international experts between June and August 2023. The survey questionnaire and country selection were developed in consultation with experts in two online workshops in spring 2023: one with 18 interdisciplinary experts and interested stakeholders in P/CVE and related fields from Germany; and one with 26 international experts. The workshop participants reiterated the relevance of comparative research and – alongside feedback from project partners – served as a peer-review and testing process for the questionnaire.[49] Participants critically discussed the cross-country transferability of core concepts, a topic we also discussed at an additional expert workshop during a conference of the German evaluation society's[50] democracy working group in summer 2023. The final questionnaire also reflects key interests of and synergies with the research of other PrEval partners, for example, those monitoring evaluation needs in Germany or developing concepts for evaluation capacity support.

The final anonymized online survey consisted of 42 questions and was administered through the online survey tool LimeSurvey. We combined open-ended and multiple-choice questions to encourage detailed answers. As almost half of the questions allowed for open answers, the survey had an exploratory character.[51] The full questionnaire can be found in the annex (p. 63). The questionnaire was structured into three sections to gather insights on current approaches and promising developments for evaluation and extremism prevention practice. The first section enquired about evaluation and quality assurance practices and issues, including questions about evaluation actors, financing structures, (digital) methods, innovative developments, and the management of evaluation results. To gain a deeper understanding of the context in which these evaluation practices take place, respondents were then asked to provide more details on the P/CVE landscape in their respective country. This second section enquired about examples of P/CVE activities and actors, the policy domains, financing structures, support formats involved, and the role of civil society. Finally, experts were asked about present and future extremist phenomena in their country of expertise. To increase the validity of answers, they also received the definitions of key concepts used in the survey.[52] The expected survey completion time was 60-90 minutes, depending on the extent of the selected questions and information provided.

Country Selection

To select the countries covered in the survey, we considered multiple factors: a representation of different world regions and various extremist threat phenomena; the existence of P/CVE evaluation according to the literature; and the level of academic freedom. Due to research ethics considerations around the sensitive topic of P/CVE, to avoid putting respondents at risk, and to receive reliable responses within the constraints of the chosen research methodology, we decided to exclude both countries with large-scale ongoing conflicts and those with low rankings on the Academic Freedom Index.[53]

We first identified relevant countries based on the frequency of their mentions in the comparative literature review. We then added findings from additional literature and recommendations from PrEval experts. The preliminary country list was further discussed during the participatory expert workshop process and subsequently adjusted. The final

sample of 14 countries consists of **Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States** (see Figure 1). Brazil, Denmark, and Finland were part of an initial list of 17 countries, but not enough non-governmental evaluation experts were available to complete the survey for those countries within the research timeframe.

Survey Participants

We selected respondents from among researchers, practitioners, and evaluators who work independently of any government authority and who have both expertise in P/CVE or related activities in one of the survey countries and comprehensive knowledge about evaluations in these fields. The respondent sample included two to three experts per country. For their participation, respondents received financial compensation of EUR 380.

We based the sampling process on online searches, expert networks, and a snowball approach. Wherever possible, we paid particular attention to gender diversity and the inclusion of local experts. In cases where we could not recruit enough local experts with relevant evaluation expertise, we invited external experts with extensive country experience. Most of the selected respondents were located in or originally from the country on which they reported. We excluded government representatives from the selection to avoid conflicts of interest, as the survey asks for individual expert judgements rather than official records of P/CVE and evaluation.

Ultimately, the sample of responses analyzed for this report contains answers from 37 experts, who answered the survey for one country of expertise each (see Table 1).[54] Of 60 invited experts, 38 accepted the invitation and 22 did not respond, resulting in a response rate of 63.3%.[55] Of the final group of respondents, 68% were assumed to be male and 32% female.[56] The respondents are predominantly academics or consultants, more than half of whom are affiliated with a university, and some of whom work as independent consultants for think tanks or in other non-profit organizations.[57] One respondent worked for an international organization and another at an intergovernmental organization.

Table 1: Respondents by Country

Country	Number of Experts Invited	Number of Respondents in Final Sample
Australia	3	4*
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	2
Canada	4	3
Czech Republic	5	2
Indonesia	3	2*
Côte d'Ivoire	5	2
Kenya	4	3
The Netherlands	5	3
Norway	5	2
Singapore	3	3
Spain	3	3
Tunisia	4	3
United Kingdom	6	3

United States	6	2
Total:	60	37

*One expert with expertise on both countries was invited to answer the survey for Indonesia but instead completed it for Australia.

Analysis

The research team analyzed the survey results between August and October 2023. Since the results included a mix of qualitative and quantitative data, we combined a descriptive statistical analysis[58] with a qualitative content analysis using MAXQDA. Open answers were categorized inductively, by identifying and labeling emerging themes and patterns within the qualitative data. The team members first discussed interim results to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the respective categories. Individual text fragments were then allocated to the appropriate category and compiled in a structured format to facilitate the subsequent analysis. After the data processing was completed, the research team began analyzing recurring themes, challenges, examples of good practices, and other noteworthy points within the individual categories. We then cross-referenced relevant findings with secondary literature as well as findings from the previous PrEval research phase.[59] Finally, the synthesized analysis of key findings informed the development of relevant recommendations for policy and practice to strengthen effective evaluation efforts and evidence-based P/CVE policies.

Limitations

All empirical claims presented in this study are drawn from insights obtained through the expert survey, unless explicitly cited from a specific document or source. The results represent the assessments of individual experts, meaning we do not claim to representatively discuss the prevention and evaluation landscapes in the respective country contexts. Collecting official government positions and assessments would require a different methodology, which would also consider that different parts and levels of government in individual countries may have differing assessments. Our results therefore do not represent official government positions or records.

The survey's scope and our available resources, as well as limited publicly available information concerning some of the issues addressed in the survey, restricted our ability to verify participants' responses against official records or external sources. All survey responses were compared against responses from different participants answering for the same country context, in order to note relevant differences and deviations. The aggregate findings are to be read as an assessment of the sector in the various countries according to two to four experts per country, not as the objective reality.

The survey and associated research was conducted predominantly in English, which means the country selection is based on available information about P/CVE activities and evaluation in English. This also applies to the identification of experts for the selected countries. Whenever it was particularly challenging to identify respondents, we translated key terms into the national language using online tools, to expand the scope of possible results. Overall, the population of experts with both P/CVE and evaluation expertise and a comprehensive overview of the landscape in a given country is not very extensive. The number of experts who fulfilled the inclusion criteria varied greatly from country to country.

As discussed in the key concepts section, varying definitions for what constitutes "P/CVE" create challenges for the transferability of labels and comparability of results across contexts. To acknowledge this issue and allow for more nuance, the survey questionnaire provided respondents with a relatively broad definition that also accounts for P/CVE-related fields and activities, even if these may not be labeled as such in the given context. Wherever appropriate, we asked survey respondents to reflect on these considerations through open-ended follow-up questions. A cross-national exchange of good practices and lessons learned should remain sensitive to the specificity of individual contexts. As Malet notes, "a risk of relying on best practices from shared data is that their lessons may not be transferable to other conflicts and at-risk communities."[60] Although this study considers country contexts when analyzing survey data, it acknowledges inherent limitations in transferring extremism prevention and deradicalization programs into other contexts.[61] An initial contextual analysis is required before a promising practice from one country can be explored and adopted in another context. This also has implications when managing expectations for similar outcomes of these P/CVE activities in one's domestic context.

The P/CVE Landscape

P/CVE Actors

To allow us to better understand the context in which evaluations take place, the survey included a range of questions on the P/CVE landscape in the 14 case-study countries. These enquired about actors and policy domains, funding, government-civil society relations, innovations, and knowledge-sharing opportunities.

Results show that government (97.3% of respondents) and civil society or non-governmental organizations (CSOs; 94.6%) are relevant in P/CVE across every country we surveyed. In most countries, expert respondents also mentioned subnational (70.3%) and municipal governments (78.4%) as relevant actors, although there was a higher degree of disagreement between experts within most countries. Foreign donor governments (35.1%) and regional or international organizations (45.9%) play a role in P/CVE according to respondents for all countries in our sample that receive development aid, while respondents also mentioned regional and international organizations as relevant actors in the Czech Republic, Spain, and the United States. Commercial businesses (32.4% across sample countries)[62] and private philanthropic actors (48.6%)[63] were mentioned inconsistently across some countries, so their relevance appears to be either limited or disputed. Experts for the Czech Republic and Singapore also mentioned universities and think tanks as relevant actors.[64]

Figure 3: Which Actors Are Involved in P/CVE Activities in Your Country? (Q30, multiple selection, n=37)

At the municipal level, respondents particularly emphasized the coordinating role that local governments and law enforcement representatives play in multi-agency prevention settings. For example, one respondent highlighted the coordinating role of municipal stakeholders in the Norwegian "SLT model", which coordinates local crime prevention with a youth focus,

including radicalization prevention.[65] In the Netherlands, local governments reportedly also coordinate the involvement of relevant stakeholders, including from social work and education, especially for individual cases. In Spain, one expert explained how without a coordinated government-led P/CVE approach, a number of projects have been developed under the initiative of various cities, including Málaga, Fuenlabrada, and Hospitalet de Llobregat. Some of these are also affiliated with the Strong Cities Network, a global network that supports local governments in responding to issues relating to violent extremism and polarization, which was named as a knowledge-sharing network by multiple respondents from European countries and Tunisia.[66]

When asked to provide details about the role of civil society in the field of P/CVE, several experts observed that civil society organizations are mostly involved in primary prevention, while secondary and tertiary prevention measures tend to be government-led. Experts for Kenya, Norway, Singapore, and the United Kingdom mentioned this.[67] In the United Kingdom, when civil society actors contribute to secondary and tertiary prevention, this usually takes place upon government stakeholders' request. In Singapore, religious groups support counseling of at-risk individuals and Islamic clerics cooperate with authorities to contribute to the deradicalization of detained individuals, although they sometimes do this in their capacity as individual experts rather than as civil society organization members. When extremists are released after time in prison in Indonesia and Singapore, civil society again takes a more active part in helping former detainees with their resocialization and reintegration into society.

P/CVE and Related Policy Domains

When asked which policy domains include P/CVE efforts, respondents across countries reported that P/CVE efforts span a wide range of domains, both security-centric (such as law enforcement, public safety, criminal justice) and social-centric (welfare, education, public health, religious affairs). The diversity of issue areas and involved stakeholders reflects a shift away from a predominantly security-centered response toward a whole-of-society approach to P/CVE in many places. This transition recognizes that extremism prevention cannot be effective through security measures alone but requires the cooperation of stakeholders across sectors, including non-governmental stakeholders and civil society.[68]

When asked in which policy domains they see actors who do not consider their activities P/CVE, but who aim to foster social or community cohesion, resilience, and peaceful co-existence, respondents named various sectors across different countries. These include social work, education, community safety, mental health, socioeconomic infrastructure and housing, cultural policy, digital literacy, cyber policy, sports clubs and youth initiatives, and even the arts, culture, and human rights. Respondents mentioned reconciliation and anti-corruption projects and programs for Bosnia and Herzegovina and government bodies such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the National Gender and Equality Commission for Kenya.

Some actors working on social cohesion are happy to be considered as participating in broadly intended primary P/CVE efforts. Others are not.

The fact that respondents mentioned fields like social work and education both as P/CVE domains in some contexts, but also as domains in which actors who foster cohesion do not consider themselves as working on P/CVE shows that this field is varied and not clearly delineated – not just across, but even within some countries. As one respondent for Australia explained: the situation was "very arbitrary and ideological. Some actors working on social cohesion are happy to be considered as participating in broadly intended primary P/CVE efforts. Others aren't." According to the survey results, many sectors were officially listed as involved in

P/CVE efforts due to statutory requirements, even though they would not voluntarily consider themselves under this umbrella. For example, under the Prevent Duty policy in the United Kingdom, education and public health representatives are assigned a responsibility to report certain behaviors linked to radicalization in vulnerable children and adults to the authorities, as one expert explained.[69] In Tunisia, as another respondent argued, actors in P/CVE-associated policy domains generally assume responsibility for this role or are invited to contribute through the National Counterterrorism Commission and the Office of the Presidency (CNLCT). For the Netherlands, the extent to which actors in related fields were involved in P/CVE differed from case to case, even if P/CVE was not considered their core task.

P/CVE Funding

Funding sources for P/CVE activities vary by type and implementation context. The survey responses indicate that domestic government entities almost always contribute to P/CVE funding (according to 83.8% of respondents), except in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Examples mentioned include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in the United States, the United Kingdom Home Office through the Prevent program, and Public Safety Canada.

P/CVE funding may also be provided by government entities at the sub-national or local level, as 62.2% of respondents indicated. With regard to Australia, one respondent said the shift to less centralized funding sources is positive. Canada is an outlier with no reported funding from sub-national levels and one respondent argued that more diverse funding opportunities at different levels were desirable. Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out because foreign donor governments were the only reported P/CVE funders. When comparing these findings across countries with vastly different sizes, it is important to note that governance systems and the responsibilities of various governance levels differ.

Table 2: Who Funds P/CVE Activities in Your Country? (Q33, multiple selection, n=37)

	AUS (4)	BIH (2)	CAN (3)	CIV (2)	CZE (2)	IDN (2)	KEN (3)	NL (3)	NOR (2)	SGP (3)	ESP (3)	TUN (3)	UK (3)	US (2)
National government	X*		X*	X*	X*	X	X*	X*	X*	X*	X	X	X*	X*
Sub-national or local government	X*		X	X*	X*	X	X*	X*	X	X			X*	X*
Non-governmental organizations	X		X*	X*	X	X*	X	X	X	X		X*	X	X*
Foundations / philanthropies	X		X*	X*			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Foreign donor governments		X*	X*	X*	X*	X*				X		X*		
Regional organizations (e.g., EU, AU)		X*	X*	X*	X*	X				X	X*	X		
International organizations (e.g., UN agencies, World Bank)		X*	X*	X*	X*	X				X				
Other										X				X

X: Option selected by at least one respondent for the respective country
X*: Option selected by all respondents for the respective country

Beyond the authorities, civil society organizations often receive government funding to implement P/CVE activities. In some cases, non-governmental organizations use their own budgets from other sources to fund P/CVE programs or projects (56.8%). In contexts where foreign donor governments (40.5%) or international organizations (35.1%) implement projects related to addressing drivers of violent extremism – including by promoting stability, resilience, and social cohesion – respondents report that these also provide funding for local P/CVE initiatives. Examples include development agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAid) as well as United Nations agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP). According to 45.9% of respondents, foundations or philanthropies contribute to funding P/CVE, while 43.2% of respondents said that regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union are involved in financing P/CVE. In the case of Spain, for instance, respondents noted that due to the lack of funding provided through the National Action Plans from 2015 and 2020, most projects and programs depended on third-party funding. Examples mentioned include grants from European institutions such as through the Horizon 2020 or Erasmus+ schemes, but also companies like Google, which is involved in the SomosMás campaign against hate speech and radicalization.[70] The role of the private sector was also highlighted by one respondent for the United States.

Government-Civil Society Relations

The relationship between government and civil society in P/CVE is important but sometimes contentious. When asked about the role of civil society and its relations with public authorities, almost all respondents emphasized civil society's crucial contributions to P/CVE, especially for the delivery of community-based initiatives and in fostering community

> The relationship between government and civil society in P/CVE is important but sometimes contentious.

resilience. Participants particularly appreciated civil society actors' experience, commitment to the cause, in-depth local knowledge, and – in the case of Indonesia and Spain – sometimes higher level of credibility among vulnerable communities.

The survey responses also show some high in-country variation, and several challenges. In Kenya, for example, partnerships between government and civil society actors reportedly vary from moderate at the national level to sometimes very strong at the local level. One respondent described civil society as a core actor in the eyes of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), while relationships with other ministries range from good to "combative." Multiple experts positively highlighted an increasing involvement of civil society actors working on P/CVE issues, encouraged by greater recognition of their role as change agents and the need for stronger collaboration, as highlighted in the Kenyan National Strategy for the Fight Against Terrorism from 2016.

Frequently mentioned challenges include financial and skills-related constraints. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, one respondent described civil society as a crucial P/CVE stakeholder, but one that often lacks sufficient funding and capacity – both in terms of the quality of project delivery and especially when it comes to personnel. The expert partially attributed capacity-related issues to inadequate training for first-line practitioners. For Spain, one expert argued that the availability of funding and opportunities to influence public policies has motivated civil society actors from various sectors without specific expertise in P/CVE to engage in the field. This development reportedly shows why it is an issue when a culture lacks evaluation to provide scientific evidence on the success of certain activities. For Côte d'Ivoire, survey respondents described civil society as neither organized nor professional as well as lacking government support for their involvement in P/CVE. Instead, most initiatives are implemented by international organizations.

For Indonesia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, respondents described civil society actors' trust in official institutions and the government in the context of P/CVE as impaired or requiring confidence-building measures. Frequently mentioned issues were a perception of marginalization, discrimination, or stigmatization of societal groups and individuals as a result of government P/CVE approaches and policies, for example, in the context of the United Kingdom's Prevent program or within Muslim communities in Indonesia.

For some contexts, experts noted that such issues impact the willingness of important stakeholders to engage with P/CVE-related labels and issues, particularly in the education and social work sectors.[71] One respondent explained that in Australia, social workers and (non-forensic) psychologists have raised political reservations about participating in activities they believe contribute to a "state-based securitization of vulnerable communities and groups." While bad experiences, blunders from the government in its engagement with certain communities, and a securitization of prevention are named as the main explanatory factors for this impaired relationship, current developments – including the rise of anti-government sentiment post-pandemic – are aggravating these issues. Overall, the involvement of civil society actors in the field of P/CVE remains limited. Participating parties are reported to often represent a few trusted organizations with limited opportunities to increase collaboration due to trust and capacity-related issues surrounding outsiders and newcomers.

Government malpractice can also impede government-civil society relations, for example, due to corruption (as mentioned for Indonesia). In the Netherlands, the relationship was strained as a result of a surveillance scandal after it became publicly known that the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) had commissioned a private agency for surveillance and to gather intelligence on Islamic religious institutions, as one respondent reported. This appears particularly problematic since the Dutch P/CVE approach heavily relies on inter-agency and multi-stakeholder cooperation, including with religious organizations and communities.

In contexts with strong government steering, non-governmental actors' ability to influence P/CVE policies and practice may be limited, sometimes with adverse consequences. This became evident in Kenya, where the NCTC's almost exclusive P/CVE mandate was described as "problematic" because it resulted in the approval of P/CVE activities based on personal interests, despite many stakeholders' loose understanding of "violent extremism dynamics happening at the margins." And even where government stakeholders encourage civil society actors to engage in P/CVE, they usually hold significant power over what is realized, because CSOs depend on government funding (e.g., especially in the US).

Innovations in P/CVE Practice

The survey also presented a unique opportunity to ask experts about notable and promising innovations and trends in P/CVE programming and activities. Their replies can be grouped into the following themes: multi-agency cooperation; the increasing participation of civil society in P/CVE activities; innovations in disengagement within primary and secondary prevention; primary sector resilience-building measures; and the use of artificial intelligence (AI).

Many respondents cited increasing multi-agency cooperation as a positive trend. For Canada, one respondent mentioned that "risk-driven and multi-sectoral response teams design and develop wrap around" interventions for secondary and tertiary prevention.

Prevention is targeted through an upstream approach by aiming to identify new ways to measure changes in risk to radicalization, which requires "a unique, whole-of-system approach to understanding individuals and families." Respondents also highlighted multi-agency models in Norway, namely the SLT model (Coordination of Local Crime Prevention Enterprises), which are implemented within various municipalities and involve the coordination of a variety of stakeholders' crime prevention efforts targeting young people and young adults. Respondents further mentioned educational programs, like Dembra in Norway, which provides resources and trainings for schools and teachers to build democratic competences to address discrimination and extremism.[72]

Many respondents cited increasing multi-agency cooperation as a positive trend.

In Indonesia, experts reported the government's increased openness toward including civil society actors as well as improved coordination as positive developments. The recently developed I-KHub, a central knowledge hub, was highlighted for its promising role in fostering knowledge-exchange and cooperation, which CSOs reportedly hope for.[73] Another expert additionally highlighted the role of religious institutions in promoting Indonesian culture. In the Czech Republic, multi-stakeholder cooperation between academics, law enforcement, and the intelligence community reportedly finds application in educational activities. Innovative practices have reportedly also been developed in prison contexts in the form of the SAIRO (System for Analytic Identification of Radicalized Inmates) program, which is an analytical tool that aims to monitor possible manifestations of radicalization among detainees through data collection and analysis.[74] Still, another expert argued that the space for innovation is limited: most initiatives rely on established, years-old civic education activities.

Innovations emerging from prison settings also appear relevant in other contexts. Some respondents, for example, referenced disengagement work in Kenyan prisons and new initiatives under development in Spain, but they did not provide further explanation. Another respondent positively highlighted emerging efforts to evaluate tertiary interventions in Spanish prisons. For Australia, reported examples included the implementation of the Youth Justice New South Wales CVE framework to address radicalized youth offenders,[75] as well as the work of the Board of Imams and the Victoria Police to support post-conviction reintegration. Other state-based programs named as valuable resources for P/CVE included the New South Wales COMPACT Program, which aims to foster social cohesion and build community resilience,[76] and the Step Together support helpline, which focuses on early intervention for at-risk individuals.[77]

For the Netherlands and Singapore, respondents also mentioned innovative, resilience-oriented measures as a trend. Such measures promote critical thinking and other relevant social skills, build ideological and digital resilience, and provide support for issues surrounding family relationships and personal identity. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, experts highlighted an improved knowledge of religious issues among young people as a positive trend in countering radical narratives over the last five to six years.

Finally, two experts mentioned developments around the emerging role of AI, both in terms of an increased awareness of threats arising from a possible exploitation by extremists (for the United Kingdom) and as a tool for early-warning data collection on evolving extremist narratives (for Tunisia).

Knowledge Sharing Regarding P/CVE

Support networks play a pivotal role in improving P/CVE research and practice. The literature frequently mentions the lack of effective knowledge sharing across P/CVE actors as a challenge for P/CVE and its evaluation.[78] The survey results show that a range of networks exist at different levels, but the responses also indicate significant challenges and room for improvement. In particular, it seems that instead of funding even more new initiatives and formats, emphasis should be placed on ensuring sustainable funding for existing formats, analyzing gaps, exploring synergies, and streamlining efforts.

When asked which networks and aspects of knowledge-sharing they find particularly useful, respondents highlighted opportunities to share best practices, methods, experiences, and to consult with other experts in the field (responses for the Czech Republic, Kenya, and the United Kingdom). Further, such forums can help improve a mutual understanding of needs and challenges by connecting research, practice, and relevant stakeholders. Two respondents, answering for Australia and Canada, explained that this was critical for researchers because the exchange with practitioners enabled them to better understand "local and on-the-ground programming challenges." Interactive elements of knowledge exchange encourage discussions and problem-solving exercises around different perspectives and were therefore viewed favorably. Beyond mutual learning, respondents generally valued the opportunity to connect with fellow experts in the field, identify new project partners (Czech Republic), and stay informed about P/CVE approaches elsewhere (Singapore, Spain), even if other approaches were not always applicable to their own context.

When asked which local knowledge-sharing opportunities regarding P/CVE (and civic education) they were aware of, respondents listed a variety of working groups and networks across the surveyed contexts. Examples include the Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism (AVERT) Research Network (Australia), regional Prevent networks (United Kingdom), the Czech Association of Civic Education and Social Science Teachers (Občankáři), the Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV), as well as the discontinued Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS), the United States Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), the Tunisian Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre le Terrorisme (CNLCT), SLT (Norway, see previous section), and the Norwegian Institute for the Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (ARKIVET Platform), which promotes multi-stakeholder collaboration between law enforcement, Agder municipalities, and researchers.

Asked about regional working groups or networks, experts mentioned the Regional Network of National Counter-Terrorism/Countering Violent Extremism Coordinators of the Western Balkans (RNNC, Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Center for Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (Kenya), the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENET), and the Southeast Asian Network of Civil Society Organizations (SEAN-CSO). The value of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) for practitioners was particularly emphasized by various country experts (on Spain, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Participants highlighted the role of RAN Policy Support (RAN PS) in promoting knowledge exchange among EU policymakers, researchers, and CSOs to inform evidence-based decision-making. The recognition for RAN's work extended beyond the European context and has reportedly led to a similar model being developed elsewhere. One expert on Indonesia, for example, indicated that the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), together with United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is currently working on replicating a similar framework for Southeast Asia. To their knowledge, this initiative was still in development at the time of the survey and so far mostly consisted of a series of workshops.

Knowledge-sharing networks and working groups at an international or global level that were mentioned in the survey responses include, among others, the efforts of UNODC, the Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Network, the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN), and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In addition, one respondent emphasized the role of research institutes and networks as support structures for knowledge-sharing. Relevant examples included the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), Hedayah, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Strong Cities Network, Réseau FrancoPREV, and the Extremism Gaming Research Network (EGRN).

Alongside institutionalized support formats, such as formalized P/CVE networks and conferences, respondents frequently referenced informal networks that continue to play an important role for cooperation and knowledge exchange. These may operate through various communication channels, for instance via WhatsApp groups among local practitioners (in Indonesia), other content-sharing platforms, or bilateral exchanges via self-built networks and contacts (in Indonesia, Kenya and Spain). For the Czech Republic, one participant reported

Informal networks play an important role for cooperation and knowledge exchange.

that stakeholders from intelligence agencies, the police, academia, and NGOs had built an informal network to counter hate crimes. Meanwhile, one expert on Canada mentioned that the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy runs regular virtual conversations with individuals "doing work on P/CVE." Virtual exchanges like these enable the prompt dissemination of information and sharing of cutting-edge findings that "are generally not publicly available," as the respondent explained. More generally, the use of digital communication tools benefits capacity-building at the global level by breaking down regional barriers. This can have a positive impact on the coordination and networking of P/CVE actors at local levels, especially in large countries like Indonesia. Here, experts highlighted that the normalization of video teleconferences due to the Covid-19 pandemic had a considerable impact in fostering knowledge exchange within the country.

When further asked what hinders knowledge exchange and cooperation between P/CVE actors, respondents mentioned a lack of organizational capacity (78.4%) and time and money (64.9% and 62.2%, respectively) as well as data or information-sharing constraints (67.6%).[79] Contentious issues or relationships were reported by 29.7% of respondents. A lack of interest in collaboration and exchange played the least important role in the eyes of the experts (24.3%), a view somewhat supported by the significant diversity of the previously listed networks.

The responses show that the diversity of exchange and cooperation activities is generally welcomed but also challenging. Balancing participation across various initiatives is difficult for P/CVE stakeholders, who must spread their limited resources across multiple roles and initiatives on top of their primary work responsibilities. This includes attending research conferences, webinars, practitioner workshops, advisory boards, and looking after personal networks (both in person and online). One respondent, referencing time constraints, mentioned that despite being registered on various knowledge platforms, they seldom used them and often relied on personal networks for the issues and actors relevant to their work. In addition, a lack of sustainable funding often results in the termination of such projects and therefore the loss of valuable expertise and established networks. One respondent from Australia highlighted that this has also led to fragmentation and sometimes overlapping efforts. Stating that they "[felt] overloaded by the amount of webinars, events, publications,

etc. and [could not] stay on top of everything," they argued that relevant gaps should be identified before developing new initiatives. Two other experts raised competition between relevant actors as an issue, including between different agencies from the same governments.

With regards to contentious issues or relationships as obstacles to cooperation, participants highlighted mistrust and negative experiences between civil society and government entities, for example, in relation to the United Kingdom's Prevent program and the government's perceived marginalization of communities classified as at risk, as well as the Dutch government's surveillance of Islamic religious institutions to gather intelligence.[80]

A lack of exchange and cooperation can also result from previously unsuccessful attempts to connect stakeholders. For the Czech Republic, one respondent explained that despite a commitment from a few local initiatives, efforts to establish diverse local networks often yielded no discernible results. A lack of understanding of the issue, limited capacity among state administrators, and limited interest were among the reasons why these attempts were reportedly discontinued. The expert further highlighted how initiatives eventually lose momentum because the few motivated individuals who typically drive them forward find it challenging to sustain their efforts over time. In Tunisia, initiatives from international organizations to provide access to data, networking opportunities, and government support to strengthen the capacity of local partners reportedly had similarly limited success. To some extent, however, this space is filled through national governing bodies like the CNLCT, which due to its coordinating role offers a platform for dialogue and exchange between international actors, government stakeholders, and a consolidated network of CSOs across Tunisia. For the Netherlands, one respondent said a missing sense of urgency was a reason for the lack of engagement in knowledge sharing.

Finally, two respondents, answering for Côte d'Ivoire and Spain, respectively, named language barriers as a challenge to international knowledge exchange.

Trends in Violent Extremist Threats

Aside from evidence on "what works" to address violent extremism, preventive policies and measures are driven by political attention to particularly salient extremist threats. Understanding which violent extremist phenomena are relevant and may become more widespread is important to developing effective approaches for the future. For this reason, we asked respondents which extremist phenomena they considered a threat to public safety in their country context at the time of the survey (June-August 2023), and which will likely become a challenge for P/CVE in the coming two to five years.

Current Threat Landscape

Experts' responses regarding the current threat landscape show that Islamist and right-wing extremism remain two of the most widespread manifestations of violent extremism. Individual respondents also mentioned single-issue extremism (for Australia and the United Kingdom) as well as misogynistic violence from so-called and self-proclaimed Incels (short for "involuntarily celibate"; responses for Canada, Spain and the United States).[81]

Experts in Kenya, Singapore, and Spain identified Islamist extremism as the most prominent threat in their national contexts. In many other countries, it was also mentioned as one notable threat.[82] Explicitly named perpetrators of both larger-scale and lone-actor attacks included, for instance, groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab. For Singapore, respondents raised both the potential for domestic attacks by ISIS- or al-Qaeda-affiliated individuals and those to be carried out overseas. With regards to ISIS, another expert answering for the United Kingdom noted a somewhat reduced threat posed by the group, along with a reduced instrumentalization capacity through "propaganda-led, self-initiated terrorism." Still, the expert recognized growing efforts by ISIS to mobilize supporters, generate funds, and spread propaganda through individuals located in the United Kingdom and other European countries. Therefore, the possibility of future attacks by ISIS-affiliated entities, both domestically and against British interests abroad, could reportedly not be ruled out.

Racially and ethnically motivated extremism overlaps with other emerging risks.

In some instances (for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), experts observed an increasing prevalence of right-wing extremism, despite the continued prioritization of Islamist extremism in government assessments. This shift is not isolated but concurrent with a broader political movement toward the right, which has created space for the emergence and influence of anti-democratic actors (response for Bosnia and Herzegovina). In several Western countries, racially and ethnically motivated extremism overlaps with emerging risks from anti-government, anti-vaccine sentiments, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns, and other conspiracy theories that use far-right narratives (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States). Experts also highlighted how radicalization and extremist narratives are increasingly spreading within virtual spaces, manifesting, for example, in forms of hate speech (responses for the Czech Republic).

In addition, experts from multiple countries voiced concerns about tensions stemming from social polarization and intercommunal divides, including those based on religious and ethnic differences (Australia, Indonesia, Spain, Tunisia). For Kenya, one respondent noted that both extremist actors and authorities instrumentalize religion to mobilize people, which contributes to inter-religious and interethnic divides. The expert further highlighted the risk of pastoral violence between herders and farmers, arguing that this was aggravated by

violent extremism, as well as disinformation and corruption across the Kenyan government. For Tunisia, experts highlighted a reduction in democratization and political freedom, growing feelings of marginalization and isolation, and a lack of access to social support, which all constitute risk factors for radicalization and mobilization of individuals into extremist groups.

An expert on the United Kingdom emphasized the need to address the increasing radicalization and mobilization of minors online, which is relevant for different forms of violent extremism. Finally, experts also discussed the challenges of current extremist tactics and tools, including the use of improvised explosive devices (in Côte d'Ivoire) and small-scale knife attacks to target government representatives and law enforcement (in Indonesia). Respondents answering for Australia and Tunisia raised concerns about extremists' infiltration of government security services to exploit insider knowledge for their own objectives.

Future Threats

We also asked respondents which phenomena, if not adequately addressed, will likely threaten public safety in their respective country within the next two to five years. Some responses to this question corresponded to the respective answers on the current threat landscape, suggesting that experts expect key threats to remain the same (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Kenya, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States).

Within Europe, experts see Islamist-inspired perpetrators, including those with connections to larger extremist networks (Norway) and more specifically returning foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq (United Kingdom), as threats in the near future. For the United Kingdom, two experts raised concerns about the consequences of possible failures to rehabilitate and reintegrate returnees as well as of failures to return British nationals that left for Syria or Iraq to their home countries, thus risking the exploitation of these cases in service of the recruitment narratives of ISIS entities. Although the threat of a direct, coordinated attack by al-Qaeda was reported to be less severe, the group remains a concern for one expert due to the risk that it will foster online mobilization and radicalization of individuals based in the United Kingdom. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one expert noted that over the past decade, funding and research have been predominantly directed toward the issue of Islamist radicalization, particularly accentuated by the foreign fighter issue. The warning reportedly underscored the imperative to redirect attention to other forms of extremism and radicalization, including right-wing nationalism, especially within virtual spaces.

Respondents also highlighted trends in issue-driven extremism, including the increasing challenges posed by anti-government or anti-democratic as well as misogynistic violence (Australia, Canada, Netherlands, United States), but also by conspiracy theories and disinformation more broadly (Czech Republic, Kenya, United States). To illustrate the extent of the challenge, an expert on the Netherlands cited the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) estimation that approximately 100,000 individuals in the country currently believe that the government is malicious and harbors intentions to cause them harm. Also in the Dutch case, experts further highlighted the potential gradual descent into more extreme beliefs or actions by environmental groups – including the Extinction Rebellion movement – and a potential acceleration of increasingly "dehumanizing language" from "left-wing/'woke' circles." Eco-extremism was also mentioned for the Czech Republic. For Spain, one expert expressed concern about the potential resurgence of separatism and the emergence of left-wing extremism facilitated by the potential victory of a far-right government.

Experts further highlighted the need to address violent extremism holistically to avoid future risk factors for radicalization that could undermine current efforts while avoiding P/CVE policies that increase perceptions of intolerance and oppression. This was indicated for Kenya, where one expert argued that efforts to sustainably weaken al-Shabaab's capacity could only succeed if social services are provided uniformly and concerns of community exclusion from power and decision-making processes are addressed. Similarly, for Tunisia, one expert pointed out that the current lack of policies to deliver social services for the reintegration and rehabilitation of former extremist offenders could significantly threaten public safety in the near future, due to the serious risk of recidivism. In the case of Indonesia, one expert positively highlighted the police's success in combatting the rise of a threat posed by ISIS affiliates. However, they also raised concerns about increasing intolerance and pointed out the need for a balanced approach to P/CVE that is "careful not to be too stringent," in order to prevent perceptions of oppression turning into violence.

Evaluation Practices

Evaluation Actors, Types and Frequency

The survey data adds nuance to the general assumption that extremism prevention is rarely evaluated.[83] Contrary to what the academic literature suggests, our results indicate that across the countries surveyed, primary prevention activities – those directed at society at large or at certain sub-sections of society – are evaluated slightly less often than activities at the secondary or tertiary levels (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: How Often Are Evaluations and Quality Assurance Measures Conducted in Your Country at the Respective Prevention Levels? (Q2, n=33)*

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Primary (e.g., society at large, certain sub-sections of society)	6.1%	18.2%	24.2%	33.3%	12.1%	6.1%	
Secondary (e.g., individuals considered "at risk", local communities considered "at risk")	6.1%	15.2%	45.5%	27.3%		6.1%	
Tertiary (e.g., individuals considered to be "radicalized")	9.1%	18.2%	30.3%	30.3%		9.1%	3%

* Response percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding

When asked about the type of activities evaluated, survey participants indicated a medium frequency of evaluation for individual projects and programs (see Figure 5). Although the survey results suggest that individual P/CVE measures, policies and strategies as well as organizations are slightly less frequently evaluated than projects and programs, there was also more uncertainty here, with more respondents saying they were unable to answer.

Figure 5: How Often Are the Following Types of P/CVE Activities Evaluated? (Q3, n=33)*

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Individual P/CVE measures	9.1%	9.1%	30.3%	33.3%	3%	15.2%	
Individual P/CVE projects	3%	24.2%	39.4%	24.2%		9.1%	
P/CVE programs	6.1%	24.2%	39.4%	27.3%		3%	
P/CVE policies/strategies	3%	12.1%	39.4%	27.3%	6.1%	12.1%	
Organizations	6.1%	15.2%	24.2%	33.3%	6.1%	15.2%	

* Response percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding

One participant from Kenya and another from Tunisia pointed out that P/CVE projects and programs financed by international donors (e.g., the UN or the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, GCERF) encompass requirements for periodic evaluation the frequency and timing of which usually reflect donor timelines and priorities. Unlike local partners, such international actors usually have the necessary know-how and resources for regular quality assurance.

A detailed assessment of the frequency and time intervals at which P/CVE evaluations are conducted proved challenging, with discrepancies among experts' assessments for the same country context which diverged between "very often" and "rarely". Such divergences were particularly prominent in the cases of Australia, the Netherlands, and Tunisia (for both questions highlighted in Figures 4 and 5). Evaluation coverage across levels and types of activities seemed particularly good (meaning evaluations happen "very often" or "often" according to experts) in Singapore (n=2) and Indonesia (n=1).

Respondents explained that the frequency and time intervals of evaluations varied in several respect – among others, the type of activity evaluated (including its level of implementation and objectives), the funding structure and other available resources, and the reason for conducting an evaluation. In Singapore, P/CVE measures are reportedly assessed every few months, while P/CVE programs are subject to evaluation at least once every two years. For the United States, one respondent noted positively that although evaluations remained rare, things are improving. According to their statement, evaluations usually occur within the scope of two-year projects. In the United Kingdom, individual P/CVE measures and projects are typically evaluated internally every year and externally once the project has ended. However, another participant commented that primary prevention interventions in particular have evaluation built into their design, while secondary and tertiary projects are evaluated only once every few years, if at all. One respondent further explained that organizations in the United Kingdom working in the P/CVE field were "probably" evaluated on a twelve-month basis, with a focus on output reporting and from a funding perspective.

In several countries, evaluation is strongly linked to the piloting of new projects or programs. In Australia, the Czech Republic, and Spain, the regularity of evaluation reportedly depends on the existence of such pilot projects, which are then tested for impact by means of evaluation after the pilot period. In the Netherlands, where programs such as the National Support Centre for Extremism are funded on a long-term basis, evaluations must occur regularly to test the efficacy of programs. However, one participant also said that very few evaluations are actually "conducted with more elaborated evidential value." In Côte d'Ivoire, evaluations are reported to typically take place in the middle of a project. One participant from the Czech Republic and one from Australia also pointed out that the regularity of evaluations depends on available finances and time. Some participants' statements suggest that at the policy and strategy levels, evaluations are lacking due to a lack of evaluation requirements. This was explicitly pointed out for the Spanish National Action Plans from 2015 and 2020[84], with the respondent stating that to their knowledge the implementation and results of the plans had not been evaluated at all, but also for the United Kingdom's Prevent program that is part of the government's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST). Experts for the United Kingdom stated that while Prevent had been externally reviewed in 2021 and 2023, these reviews were not formal evaluations. The respondents positively highlighted a step toward more evaluation transparency. This referred to a greater commitment to evaluation and the dissemination of results under the updated Prevent policy, despite a lack of clarity as to how this would be practically implemented, and an ongoing evaluation of CONTEST's Channel program. For Kenya, it was noted that the number of evaluations for individual measures, projects, and programs "heavily outweigh strategy reviews/evaluations, to a detriment." In Singapore, strategies and policies are only evaluated when needed. In the Netherlands, they are evaluated every four to five years.

In addition to the occurrence and regularity of P/CVE evaluations, we also asked experts who evaluates the aforementioned P/CVE activities (see Figure 6). The results show that the types of evaluators greatly vary. P/CVE implementers themselves (self-evaluation) were mentioned most frequently (84.8%) across all contexts. According to 72.7% of respondents, university-based researchers also conduct evaluations, as reported across all contexts except for Tunisia. Slightly less involved but still relatively prominent in P/CVE evaluations are independent consultants (66.7%; reported for all countries but the Czech Republic, Indonesia, and Spain) and funders (63.6%; except for Canada and Norway). Only 48.5% of survey respondents indicated that commercial evaluation companies conduct evaluations in their respective country; this applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Norway, Singapore, the Netherlands, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, one respondent from Norway highlighted that evaluations are also sometimes conducted in mixed teams, while another from Singapore pointed to evaluations by foreign governments. Finally, one respondent stated that in Spain, who evaluates depended on the respective intervention under evaluation.

Figure 6: Who Acts as Evaluators of the Aforementioned P/CVE Activities? (Q5, multiple selection, n=33)

84.8%	The implementers of the project / program themselves (self-evaluation)
72.7%	University-based researchers (third party)
66.7%	Independent consultants (third party)
63.6%	Funders (e.g., government entities, foundations, international organizations)
48.5%	Commercial evaluation companies (third party)
9.1%	Other

With regard to the type of evaluations that are being carried out, survey respondents indicated that process and outcome evaluations tend to be more frequent than impact evaluations, mostly for political and economic reasons, which we discuss in the next section. In Canada, the specific choice of formative or developmental evaluation[85] is representative of an explorative and learning-oriented approach to P/CVE evaluation (see next section). Experts did not provide many more details on evaluation types, but they did name the use of outcome harvesting for Côte d'Ivoire. In this evaluation practice, evaluators work backward through the collected data to determine the extent to which an intervention has led to change – and how.

Goals and Logics of Evaluations

For most countries, the respondents described P/CVE evaluation as frequently, though not exclusively, driven by logics of accountability, i.e., to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of allocated resources in a sensitive political field with particularly high stakes. In practice, however, accountability is often interlinked with the learning purposes of evaluation, as participants from various countries, namely Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom, reported.

Policymakers use evaluation results as a basis for decision-making on the future scope of funding for P/CVE projects and hence link them to outcome evaluations. As multiple respondents reported, many evaluations intend to determine "whether further investment of funding and resources is warranted to continue a program" (Australia), or in other words, to "justify the economic investment" (Spain). This also reflects respondents' answers to the question of who funds P/CVE evaluations.[86]

> Most evaluations are conducted as a condition of funding. Very few are conducted to genuinely learn and improve.

When asked who requested or initiated evaluations in their country, experts most often named governments (75.8%; selected for all cases except Côte d'Ivoire). One respondent for Australia explained: "bluntly, most [evaluations] are conducted as a condition of funding. Very few are conducted to genuinely learn and improve." Many grants for P/CVE activities in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands reportedly require applicants to develop a built-in evaluation component at the proposal stage. The same is often true for international organizations, which were also frequently (by 36.4% of respondents) identified as actors initiating P/CVE evaluations. Respondents for Côte d'Ivoire and Tunisia, for example, mentioned the UN and USAID as actors requesting evaluation. According to 30.3% of respondents, foreign donor governments also request evaluations, followed by regional organizations and foundations/philanthropies (both selected by 21.2% of respondents).

According to the respondents, the second most frequent initiators of evaluations are implementers themselves (51.5%), followed by academic researchers (48.5%), which shows that the decision to evaluate may also be motivated by scientific interest or considerations of learning and development. Another goal for evaluation is to ensure coordination between stakeholders involved in a given P/CVE project, which may eventually contribute to learning by providing policymakers with information on which programmatic adjustments and political strategies are necessary or useful. In the United Kingdom, for example, the National Counterterrorism Commission planned to analyze the effectiveness of the Prevent pillar in 2021 with the aim to inform general P/CVE programming and program designs. Specifically, the objective was to utilize recommendations to draw up a new national policy program for early warning and early intervention mechanisms. Moreover, evaluations oriented toward the knowledge interests of the donors do not necessarily have to be outcome evaluations only. According to one expert on the United Kingdom, there are many internal process evaluations to provide accountability to funders.

According to one respondent, in the Czech Republic even the media can initiate P/CVE evaluations. In Norway, evaluations are usually conducted within a year after a terrorist incident, to evaluate stakeholders' actions – especially those of the police – prior to, during, and following the attack. In Singapore, according to one expert, evaluations of secondary or tertiary interventions are conducted regularly prior to the release of detainees from prison or once a restriction order ends.

Figure 7: At Whose Request or Initiative Are P/CVE Evaluations Initiated in Your Country? (Q6, multiple selection, n=33)

Government (national or sub-national / local): 75.8%
Implementers take the initiative to evaluate their activities without external requests: 51.5%
Academic researchers: 48.5%
International organizations: 36.4%
Foreign donor governments: 30.3%
Foundations / philanthropies: 21.2%
Regional organizations: 21.2%
Other: 9.1%

Evaluations that do not primarily pursue a legitimacy logic also refer in part to whether the assessed P/CVE measure achieves its basic objective, namely, as one Australian participant described it, "diversion from radicalization pathways or disengagement/desistance" (Australia) or "relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a specific initiative and program" (Tunisia). Furthermore, evaluations driven by such non-political or non-economic interests also examine "achievement of objectives/goals as described in the program or project theory of change" (Kenya) or whether there are possible unintended side effects (Canada). This typically leads to many process, formative or developmental evaluations, as emphasized for Canada. The aim is to learn how a project should be adapted during its implementation or in relation to a follow-up project, "to identify areas of course-correction or adaptation" (Kenya). Uniquely among our respondents, an expert from Spain pointed out that project evaluation can also examine "user satisfaction." In some countries, the strong prevalence of such learning-oriented types of evaluation is reflected by the fact that the results are primarily being made available to academic audiences. This is the case in the United States, where most of the few evaluations conducted are published in peer-reviewed journals.[87]

Evaluation Funding

Overall, funders of P/CVE activities – mainly governments – hold significant influence over whether evaluations are conducted and funded. As with P/CVE activities, related evaluations are frequently funded by national governments.[88] When such evaluations are conducted, funding is mostly included in budgets for P/CVE activities (according to 75.8% of respondents; see Table 3). In Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Singapore, P/CVE activities with a planned evaluation usually reserve five to ten percent of

their budgets for conducting that evaluation. In many cases, government entities provide additional funding for evaluations that they commission (according to 75.8% of respondents). In the Netherlands, for example, this is usually in addition to P/CVE measures for which budgets already account for evaluation activities. In the United States, DHS reportedly selects and funds only a few grantees for evaluation. In addition, the United States has annual opportunities to apply for competitive federal grants that reflect the general aims of the funding agency. The Indonesian National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT)[89] reportedly evaluates radicalization programs annually with its own government budget.

Table 3: How Are Evaluations of P/CVE Activities Financed in Your Country? (Q8, multiple selection, n=33)

	AUS (4)	BIH (2)	CAN (3)	CIV (1)	CZE (2)	IDN (1)	KEN (3)	NL (3)	NOR (2)	SGP (2)	ESP (3)	TUN (2)	UK (3)	US (2)
Budgets for P/CVE activities include funds for the evaluations	X		X	X*	X	X*	X*	X	X	X*	X*	X*	X	X*
If a government entity requests an evaluation, it provides additional funding to cover the costs	X	X	X		X*	X*	X	X*	X*	X*	X	X	X	X*
If implementers wish to evaluate their activities, they can access dedicated funds from the government	X		X	X*			X	X	X	X		X		X
Non-governmental organizations finance the evaluations		X*		X*	X		X*	X	X	X		X*		
Other		X					X	X	X	X	X			
Do not know													X	

X: Option selected by at least one respondent
X*: Option selected by all respondents for the respective country

It is less common for non-governmental organizations to finance evaluations (39.4% of respondents said this is the case in their country) or for general funds from the government to be available for evaluation activities at the discretion of implementers (30.3%). Such funding mechanisms reportedly exist in Australia, the Czech Republic, and Norway, for example, and usually require an application. In the Netherlands, the "Versterkingsgelden" are national government funds through which municipalities can request budgets for P/CVE activities, including their evaluation.

In addition, external donors sometimes provide funding to evaluate their activities, or they require grantees to allocate a budget line for evaluation purposes. Examples include previously named P/CVE actors like AusAid, USAID, or UNDP,[90] as well as the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism (CT Morse). Scientific or commercial institutes or individual academic researchers also often evaluate P/CVE projects, which in turn bring their own funding, for example, by successfully applying for funding from research councils or private foundations (responses for Kenya, Netherlands, Norway, and Spain). International research institutes, such as RUSI, RESOLVE, ICCT, and Hedayah, have their own budgets.

> When funders expect implementers to cover evaluation costs themselves, alternative funding sources are often lacking.

Some respondents indicated that when funders expect implementers to cover evaluation costs themselves, alternative funding sources are often lacking (e.g., in Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, and the Czech Republic). Four respondents also indicated that they did not know about dedicated funding mechanisms for evaluation, illustrating a lack of knowledge and information about this area. The lack of such dedicated funding instruments was particularly evident for Australia, Norway, and Spain. In the case of Norway, respondents highlighted that in the absence of specific mechanisms, the government mostly secures financing for evaluation "under special circumstances" or sometimes issues tenders for certain evaluations. In the Netherlands, participants described a positive shift: evaluations, whether external or internal, are increasingly considered from the beginning of P/CVE projects, both with regard to their design and financial planning.

Current Evaluation Methods

The survey results reveal a fairly balanced mix of applied evaluation methods, which shows the versatility of evaluation practices within the P/CVE field (see Figure 8). When asked which methods were used for the evaluation and quality assurance of P/CVE activities in their respective countries, 87.9% respondents selected qualitative methods, emphasizing the use of in-depth interviews, focus groups, and content analyses. Mixed-methods approaches received a similar number of votes (84.8%), while quantitative methods (excluding experimental methods) were selected by 72.7% of respondents.

Despite the emphasis on the value of (quasi-)experimental designs to establish a causality between the treatment and possible effects of an intervention, only 45.5% of respondents indicated that such methods were applied in practice. Throughout the survey, most respondents remained cautious regarding the usability and applicability of these designs within the field, frequently citing the ethical considerations and political implications associated with a non-treatment of the control group. For the United Kingdom and the United States, respondents noted a growing appreciation for the use of (quasi-)experimental designs, but their application nevertheless remains limited due to the aforementioned challenges. For the United Kingdom, one respondent suggested looking to the health sector for inspiration on how to address such limitations. However, they also stressed that applying potential lessons from the health sector to the P/CVE field remains challenging due to associated costs, difficulties in transferring approaches to the P/CVE field, and ethical issues. While the ethics of experimental methods are a factor in other fields as well, they may be particularly critical in parts of P/CVE, as one participant explained: "choosing not to offer an intervention to a sub-sample of individuals who may genuinely be at risk of radicalization (in the secondary prevention space) or terrorist recidivism (in the tertiary space) would raise ethical and security questions" (United Kingdom).

One promising approach is reportedly emerging from the efforts of a research team in Norway. The new project, for which the expert indicated that funding was still to be secured, is currently in the stages of planning a quasi-experimental study on the impact of teaching on democracy, human rights, and critical thinking at schools across the country. This research objective is based on evidence from another research initiative, which indicated that students who were taught about democracy and critical thinking are significantly less likely to use violence for political objectives. Methodologically, the current evidence remains weak, since it cannot be ruled out that others may have received the same education without the teaching making an impression on them. For the new project, a large-scale survey will aim to record students' attitudes before and after receiving democracy education during the time period at one school. It further aims to analyze whether resilience and moral barriers are generally

higher among young people, in light of the increased democracy education that followed the events of Utøya in 2011.

For the case of Singapore, one respondent highlighted psychological assessments of at-risk and radicalized individuals as a method used for evaluation. In Kenya, more action-oriented studies also find application. Finally, two respondents highlighted that evaluation practices do not always rely on rigorous methodological procedures but also incorporate expert knowledge, for example by seeking a second opinion (Singapore) or relying on expert assumption (Czech Republic).

Figure 8: Which Methods Are Used for Evaluation and Quality Assurance of P/CVE Activities in Your Country? (Q10, multiple selection, n=33)

Qualitative methods	Mixed methods	Quantitative methods (excluding experimental methods)	Quantitative methods (including experimental methods)	Other
87.9%	84.8%	72.7%	45.5%	12.1%

Qualitative or mixed-method approaches stood out as particularly advantageous for addressing key evaluation challenges like collecting sufficient and high-quality data. For example, respondents mentioned in-depth or life interviews as an enabling tool to gather primary data. Mixed-method approaches to data collection for P/CVE and civic education activities are used in the Netherlands in the form of pre- and post-surveys, interviews, and participant observations. Mixed methods are among others applied for the case-based approaches to deradicalization and disengagement by the city of The Hague, for which different evaluation forms and data collection tools are used (e.g., document reviews, case reviews, interviews, and focus groups).

In the Dutch context, survey respondents named realist evaluation as a promising methodological innovation in P/CVE evaluation. Realist evaluation aims to understand "what works, for whom, how, and in what circumstances" by exploring contextual and individual factors that influence whether or not an intervention leads to a change.[91] In Norway, the HEX-NA project used a mix of methods to "investigate how this variation in multiagency approaches to preventing radicalization and countering violent extremism shape perceptions

of the approach's legitimacy and levels of mutual trust."[92] Some of the methods reported by one respondent included the use of document analysis, survey experiments, simulation exercises, and qualitative interviews. Furthermore, crowdsourcing of data reportedly finds application in evaluation of civic education initiatives in Kenya and P/CVE activities in Tunisia. Whether a specific method is chosen can also depend on donor preferences. For example, for a USAID project on strengthening resilience among northern communities in Côte d'Ivoire (Resilience for Peace), the implementer Equal Access was reportedly asked to evaluate the project by employing the CAMEL framework (Complexity-Aware Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning).

Digital tools can facilitate data triangulation and data collection. In Australia, Côte d'Ivoire, Norway, and the Netherlands (since the pandemic), online interviews are now common. Especially for reaching individuals in remote or inaccessible regions, they are considered particularly valuable. An influential factor in this choice is cost effectiveness. In Tunisia, instant messaging is used by evaluation practitioners to track beneficiaries' process in real time, and to collect qualitative and quantitative data and metrics. In Australia, independent consultants use big data analysis. This involves employing digital population-level analysis to measure contributing factors in regions where P/CVE activities are implemented, including factors related to social cohesion and community resilience. Finally, digital tools find application in the form of capacity-building support structures, including the CVE Evaluation Tool of New South Wales in Australia[93] and the Indonesian I-KHub.[94]

For P/CVE programming and design, big data analyses are used for P/CVE-related studies and activities. These find application in the PIRUS (Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States) dataset, which accesses public data to identify "individual-level information on the backgrounds, attributes, and radicalization processes of over 3,200 violent and non-violent extremists who adhere to far-right, far-left, Islamist, or single-issue ideologies in the United States covering 1948–2021."[95] Online surveys equally find application within P/CVE research, for instance, in a study on young people's perceptions of extremism in Norway, and in crime prevention in Canada to target specific audiences. In Singapore, the SGSecure App was built to sensitize, train, and mobilize citizens to prevent and deal with terrorist attacks.

Even if digital tools can facilitate P/CVE (evaluation) practices, risks need to be considered and balanced. Respondents particularly mentioned limitations in the quality of the collected data and their ability to process it. For example, in situations where interviewees might face legal consequences for expressing critical viewpoints and/or harbor suspicions toward unfamiliar individuals, as raised for the context of Tunisia, using digital tools can potentially undermine the quality of the data and insights obtained. While experts see potential value in big data analytics for P/CVE programming, they also highlight challenges in evaluating their effects, for example, when digital measures reach a broad audience and indirectly target participants which are unknown and cannot be surveyed. As a result, one respondent questioned "the relevance of most big data analyses, considering difficulties with verification, triangulation and value for money, overall."

Publication of Results

The survey responses suggest that evaluation results are published occasionally, but not systematically. Reasons why both funders and implementers of P/CVE activities are reluctant to publish evaluation results include the potential adverse consequences of negative assessments as well as security and data privacy considerations.

When asked how often P/CVE evaluation results are made publicly available, 13 experts (39.4%) indicated that this happened "sometimes", while more of the remaining respondents

said "rarely or never" (11) than "often or very often" (8). When asked to elaborate, many experts across country contexts indicated a lack of systematic processes for handling the publication of evaluations. Whether and how often results are published, and in which form, varies depending on the type of the evaluated activity, the evaluating actor, and the funder.

Figure 9: How Often Are P/CVE Evaluation Results Published in the Form of (Publicly Available) Evaluation Reports? (Q14, multiple selection, n=33)*

	Very Often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Australia			●●●	●	
Bosnia and Herzegowina			●		
Canada			●●●		
Côte d'Ivoire		●			
Czech Republic			●		●
Indonesia		●			
Kenya			●●	●	
Netherlands		●	●●		
Norway	●			●	
Singapore		●			●
Spain			●	●	●
Tunisia		●		●	
United Kingdom				●●●	
United States		●●			

* Each dot represents the response of a single respondent

More transparency around evaluation results can support both accountability and learning, according to respondents. As one survey participant from Australia explained, publishing evaluations can serve to legitimize funding decisions. In Indonesia, the BNPT releases an annual evaluation report of its initiatives, which accounts for funds spent and provides recommendations for future improvement. In the United States, evaluation reports funded by the Department of Homeland Security are reportedly always released publicly. In some instances, publication may also depend on the level of the executing stakeholder. As one participant from the Netherlands pointed out, different levels of government can also have different interests: the national government always publishes evaluation results, while local governments prefer to withhold them. Nonetheless, other respondents claimed that local governments still make evaluation results public, at least in parts, if they act as funders of P/CVE activities. Moreover, they stated that reports are also disseminated among parliaments or city councils. Where international actors with established evaluation frameworks contribute to P/CVE activities, the results are often published once a program cycle concludes, as stated by one respondent for Tunisia. This reportedly aligns with the conclusion of the fiscal year for foreign governments. Research interests in advancing the scientific knowledge of P/CVE-related issues and phenomena can also play a positive role in promoting publication. In many countries, for example in Australia, Norway, Spain, and the United States, it is reportedly common practice to publish evaluation results in peer-reviewed P/CVE-related journals. In some cases, these are "empirical academic studies" or even academic discussions of evaluation results whose evaluation reports are withheld. By translating relevant findings and publishing them in peer-reviewed articles, researchers

contribute positively to knowledge dissemination and greater transparency within the field. However, this requires forward-looking planning, clearance, and adequate funding to compensate researchers, which are often lacking.

Funders do not always desire or consent to publication. When we asked why some evaluation reports are not published in their respective country context, 51.5% of experts indicated this to be the case.[96] At least two experts stated they had personal experience of reports they had worked on being embargoed, preventing them from sharing any results publicly. They specifically named confidentiality agreements tied to Horizon 2020 projects. Sometimes evaluation results are withheld to avoid publishing negative findings (36.4%). In individual countries, respondents stated that government actors may be hesitant to share the limits of their efforts or may not be open to criticism. In other instances, evaluation results are reportedly not shared publicly to eschew media scrutiny or to avoid conflicts between government authorities and respective communities targeted by their initiatives.

Funders hold significant power over the release of evaluation findings, as enablers but also as obstructers.

While several respondents highlighted the significant power that funders hold over the release of evaluation findings, as enablers but also as obstructers, publication is sometimes also not desired by the entities whose activities are evaluated (45.5%). Reasons for this may vary and can overlap with concerns from funders, including the potential consequences of providing evidence for the insufficient impact of a particular measure. The concern that reporting negative evaluation results could jeopardize the financial future of the project seems widely present (e.g., in Côte d'Ivoire, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Kenya, Singapore, and the United States) and can even entice implementers to conceal adverse findings while overemphasizing favorable results to safeguard their reputation and future funding, as was noted for Spain. Withholding evaluation results may also be a consequence of a politically sensitive or charged evaluation environment. As one respondent from Tunisia said, "[m]ost implementers working on P/CVE initiatives are not willing to jeopardize hard-won relationships by publishing anything the Tunisian state would consider to be sensitive information." This underscores the need for a constructive evaluation culture based on trust and transparency, which enables actors to make mistakes and improve.[97]

Sometimes evaluation results cannot be shared in full, for example, when individuals and their personal data need to be protected (42.4%). In such cases, stakeholders may opt to publish condensed versions of reports to convey essential findings. In Norway, one expert explained that this has resulted in the publication of anonymized reports or cases where the evaluating parties have "avoided [placing] negative responsibility on specific individuals." Usually, evaluation reports assessing authorities' responses following a terrorist attack are reportedly released through official government reports, and on rare occasions may include classified addendums. According to another expert, in Kenya evaluation results may also be published in a redacted or shortened format, depending on the agreement with the funder. They argued that implementers can usually successfully advocate for the release of results; however, this often requires significant effort and is therefore not always prioritized. Other reported publication formats included executive summaries, policy briefs, or infographics (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

At least for the United Kingdom, a slight tendency toward more, albeit still limited, transparency was noted to be the result of greater will by government stakeholders to publish information.

Evaluation Uptake

High-quality evaluation results should be used to improve P/CVE interventions. In addition, evaluation can also enhance the general understanding of (de)radicalization and violent extremism. For this to succeed, so-called evaluation uptake mechanisms would be necessary to support "the process of actively considering evaluation evidence and learning opportunities." [98] Our survey results suggest that, in practice, formalized uptake mechanisms are rare or not well known. There is a lack of transparency around whether and how governments in particular use evaluation results in a systematic fashion to improve P/CVE.

Experts explained that government stakeholders sometimes use evaluation results for internal learning processes, programming adjustments, or strategic direction (e.g., in the Czech Republic, Norway, and the United Kingdom). In countries where international and donor organizations (e.g., USAID) carry out evaluations, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Côte d'Ivoire, these organizations use evaluation results to inform their actions. Several respondents reported that practitioners or researchers sometimes assume responsibility for processing results and evoking change. In Canada, for example, one respondent said that the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence was responsible for ensuring uptake, but they did not know precisely how this is done. One of the Canada Centre's priorities was described as "leveraging the results of previous evaluations to spotlight methodological and programming innovation and encourage replication of said innovation in other P/CVE programming." Another respondent explained that in Canada, evaluation results were shared through a network of P/CVE stakeholders wherever possible. A clearer example was given for the Netherlands, where one respondent explained that evaluation results were used to inform the development of a toolkit for evidence-based evaluations of programs aiming to prevent radicalization. Insights from the toolkit were reportedly also shared through government-led discussions with municipalities. In Tunisia, the dissemination of results happens through "dialogue, awareness and information sessions ... before the beginning of a new program cycle or implementation phase." An expert on Australia highlighted that program leaders or academic researchers voluntarily ensure uptake without funders' explicit request. Another respondent for the United States highlighted conferences, peer-reviewed articles, and the dissemination of results via social media as important mechanisms to support the uptake of evaluation results.

> There is a gap between the requirement to conduct an evaluation and the integration of evaluation findings for the purpose of improving programs and activities.

Six experts stated that they knew of no uptake mechanism and were unable to provide any examples on how uptake was promoted in their respective country. Several others noted that few mechanisms existed. For Singapore, one respondent stated that uptake processes were unclear because strategic modifications were usually made independently of evaluation results, for example, based on threat assessments. The absence of administrative obligations or oversight mechanisms to monitor stakeholders' handling of evaluation results further limits incentives for uptake. This seems to also affect contexts with favorable base conditions for evaluation practice. One expert answering for Australia noted: "There is a gap between the requirement to conduct an evaluation and the integration of evaluation findings for the purpose of improving programs and activities." For the United States, another respondent highlighted how despite evaluation results being publicly available, these are not necessarily used systematically used to inform the development of future projects or programs and this is not required of stakeholders. One expert for Kenya even stated that in their experience, evaluation results from projects they were involved in were "treated as 'good to know' on the margin issues," with it being unclear how genuine interest was in using them further. Since uptake is usually not required and not always prioritized, it sometimes depends on the

impetus of selected actors who decide to forward the issue. Ideally, as another respondent answering for Kenya argued, uptake would be considered from the beginning. However, the expert also said that reflecting on and implementing lessons learned takes time and resources that stakeholders looking for quick fixes may not want to invest. Depending on the context, promoting uptake among government stakeholders may also require well-established relationships, which thus requires investment in building and sustaining such relationships (Tunisia).

According to participants, the lack of interest in evaluation results, especially from political decision-makers, could be countered primarily through dialogue (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya). The problem is often the evaluation culture in political circles. It is essential to ensure, for example through communication, that reference to evaluation results is seen as indispensable for further project planning (Australia, Spain) and that negative evaluation results are perceived as an opportunity for improvement (Netherlands, Norway). Even before planning a new P/CVE project, there must be an "agreement with stakeholders that evaluation results are used" (Côte d'Ivoire) and the necessary financial and personnel structures must be created (Singapore). In some country contexts, such as Tunisia, sustained engagement with key stakeholders requires knowledge of national and geopolitical dynamics. It is also the task of evaluators to present evaluation results in a "clear and interesting manner, using plain language and visual aids where possible" (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire). Another respondent (United Kingdom) suggested that it may be beneficial to consider how results are communicated back to respective stakeholders from the outset of an evaluation, for example, by "build(ing) specific mechanisms into evaluation design." The formative evaluations of Sara Thompson and colleagues in Canada were cited as a positive example of this.

> Evaluation results are best used when there is no end-of-period pressure and organizations and practitioners are involved in the evaluation process.

Other problems that hinder uptake according to the survey participants include short funding periods for P/CVE projects (Australia, Spain). In Canada, one respondent explained that this issue is specifically connected to a lack of funding continuity. Because projects have to reinvent themselves, this impedes learning lessons to strengthen the strategic direction of existing projects. In the United Kingdom, learning is similarly disincentivized because projects feel compelled to promote a "unique selling point" to secure continued funding. In addition, there are many calls for institutionalization of support structures (Netherlands, Norway) and more transparent handling of evaluation results (Canada, Kenya) – for example, by setting up a centralized evaluation database (United Kingdom).

Some survey participants named necessary conditions for a successful uptake of evaluation results. In the Netherlands, evaluation results were best used "if there is no end-of-period pressure and when organizations and practitioners are involved into the evaluation process." How to deal with evaluation results should also be considered at the beginning, so that relevant structures can be established (Kenya).

When further discussing challenges to uptake and how these could be overcome, survey respondents suggested setting up centralized evaluation databases that provide anonymized information on P/CVE activities and evaluation results, or developing communities of practice to share evaluation findings with peers. Furthermore, exchange formats should also reflect on access limitations to ensure that all relevant actors can participate. One respondent for the United States emphasized the need for well-funded research conferences that provide travel funding.

Evaluation Challenges

The greatest obstacles to more frequent, widespread, and high-quality evaluations according to our survey respondents can be grouped into five main areas: methodological challenges, including ethics and data collection; lack of expertise and capacity; lacking central coordination and standard setting; insufficient understanding of the value of evaluations; and funding constraints.

Strongly resonating with the existing literature on P/CVE evaluations, many experts firstly emphasized the perceived methodological challenges that P/CVE work poses. The question of how impact can be measured at all, let alone measured best, in the counter-factual field of extremism prevention arises across countries. There is particular hesitation in using (quasi-) experimental research designs, because of the difficulty of controlling for confounders and the previously described ethical reasons.[99]

Furthermore, data collection for evaluation comes with multiple challenges. On the one hand, evaluations are not always planned already during the project or program design phase, which means there is a risk that evaluation data is either not being collected at all during the project life cycle or that there is no suitable material available to collect afterward. On the other hand, even if data is collected, accessing it can prove difficult for external evaluators. As mentioned in the literature, practical access to such data can be challenging for evaluators because it may be highly sensitive.[100] Access to the project and its beneficiaries to gather personal and sensitive data poses ethical questions and requires difficult-to-obtain trust as well as a shared awareness of the importance of the evaluation by all parties (Spain, United Kingdom). Practitioners may be hesitant to share clients' personal data due to ethical concerns or they may fear a disruption of their work, especially for secondary and tertiary interventions (United Kingdom). Access is further complicated where authorities need to approve it for an external evaluator, for example, in the security-sensitive contexts of secondary and tertiary interventions. Building a relationship with participants or practitioners may be resource-intensive and problematic for contexts in which political sensitivities are likely to affect the openness and willingness of beneficiaries to participate, as highlighted by one respondent from Tunisia. Furthermore, very practical problems can also hinder access to data for evaluation. In Kenya, for example, some P/CVE projects are implemented in regions where accessing individuals is physically challenging.

Secondly, in many country contexts, P/CVE stakeholders lack the skills to deal adequately with these methodological challenges or to train practitioners accordingly. On the one hand, practitioners may lack experience with evaluation; on the other hand, they may not have the concrete skills needed to decide which tools and methods are best suited for different types of interventions and questions. At the same time, respondents also described it as difficult to obtain the necessary "know-how" from external evaluators – either because not many are available (Spain) or because this may be costly (Bosnia and Herzegovina). One respondent for Bosnia and Herzegovina explained that "organizations may lack staff members with the necessary expertise or may not have the resources to hire external evaluators." To some extent, further qualifications and support structures would at least address the need for further qualifications and knowledge among respective stakeholders. However, respondents for multiple countries, particularly Australia and Spain, explained that evaluation knowledge is rarely shared and that collaboration is rare. This may be due to the structural problem that P/CVE practitioners are often overworked and generally lack time to conduct evaluations, or because few staff are available to enable such tasks.

Thirdly, experts also referred to challenges stemming from a lack of consensus on definitions and, in many contexts, the lack of a central coordinating body for quality assurance and

knowledge management. The absence of a common understanding of the appropriate methodology to measure impact in the field of extremism prevention, for example, means that evaluations in several countries are based on varying definitions of terms and concepts, or employ different designs, which limits the comparability of evaluation results. Although this diversity of methods may not per se be problematic but rather count as an asset, experts identified a lack of knowledge transfer and dialogue, linking this to the observation of different evaluation qualities. Australia is one such case. Here, the quality of evaluation is said to vary greatly within the country, and knowledge transfer rarely occurs. What is lacking is a central coordinating body that, on one hand, controls quality and accredits external and internal evaluators and, on the other hand, acts as a resource hub for evaluators. In Canada, some researchers are currently trying to create a nationwide inventory of progress markers to challenge similar inconsistencies across a relatively small network of P/CVE projects. Another administrative problem is that evaluation and the necessary data collection are not considered in the planning of P/CVE projects. As one respondent for Spain explained, "evaluation is frequently not even considered during the design and implementation of such

> Evaluation is frequently not even considered during the design and implementation of P/CVE projects and programs.

projects and programs." In the Netherlands, this problem is reportedly being addressed by paying increased attention to designing evaluable interventions and planning sufficient funds for evaluation from the outset.

Fourth, awareness of the value of evaluations is still lacking in some countries. This was also reported of countries generally considered positive examples with regard to P/CVE evaluation, such as Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, this not only pertains to governmental authorities who could initiate evaluations with their funding decisions, but also to practitioners. There seems to be an "insufficient understanding of the need for independent, transparent and advanced evaluation in the P/CVE field" (respondent on the United Kingdom) among actors at all levels. On the one hand, respondents criticized the low commitment of governments and their lack of awareness of the relevance and urgency of evaluation in the P/CVE field (e.g., in the Netherlands or the United States). Some governments are reportedly not even interested in finding out what actually works but are only concerned with "what looks good on paper" (Tunisia), regardless of the empirical evidence. On the other hand, evaluation is also not a priority for many practitioners. They are often not interested in evaluating "because the findings may be unhelpful for their professional goals" (Indonesia) or because there is no evaluation culture. At the same time, the recognition that evaluations are important does not necessarily translate into more or more frequent evaluations. As one participant from Australia reported, evaluation is quickly abandoned when the project is under time constraints and when funding for the entire P/CVE work is limited. Often, in line with the observation that evaluation is frequently not thought of from the outset, no budget is set aside for evaluating a project. If there is a political will for evaluation and financing it, the demand is often that the effects are measured immediately after the end of a project. Long-term or delayed effects of an intervention, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels, are rarely considered and difficult to measure, as many participants highlighted. This problem also emerges from the literature on the subject.

The fifth challenge relates to funding. A lack of funding is often associated with decisions against robust and resource-intensive evaluations, such as (quasi-)experimental designs, especially by small-scale initiatives. In the United States, where researchers frequently act as evaluators, the insufficient funding opportunities also disincentivize skilled researchers from applying for evaluation grants. In other countries, for example in Australia, the main challenge is to secure funding that lasts beyond twelve-month funding cycles. The fact that funding for P/CVE projects is already competitive and tight also leads to the effect, often observed in the literature and in the context of PrEval among German practitioners, that evaluation is seen as accountability or performance measurement, the results of which have

an impact on the project's existence. This then affects the desire to share evaluation results publicly, as previously explained.

Capacity-Building for P/CVE Evaluations

According to P/CVE experts, professional networks (70.3%, n=26) are currently the most frequently available means of support for the evaluation and quality assurance of P/CVE measures and related activities. They are also considered to add significant value in comparison to other support structures. Interactive trainings or talks (62.2%) and toolkits (59.5%) exist in many places, while formal knowledge hubs (35.1%) and evaluation databases (18.9%) are less common.

Figure 10: Which Formats or Structures Exist to Support Evaluation and Quality Assurance of P/CVE in Your Country? (Q18, multiple selection, n=37)*

* e.g., webinars, advanced trainings, symposia, professional conferences

Networks may be institutionalized structures between different stakeholders who need or should cooperate to conduct evaluations and make the best use of evaluation results. In countries where P/CVE activities are carried out entirely by the government or with strong government involvement, it is a challenge for external parties to gain access to such networks. In Indonesia, the increasing networking between the government, which implements and also evaluates P/CVE projects, and international and local civil society organizations is greatly welcomed. This will be done, among other ways, through the I-KHub, an informational knowledge hub that will reportedly facilitate information sharing, coordinate activities, and contribute to reporting on the national P/CVE action plan's progress. According to one respondent, the I-KHub could therefore positively contribute to quality assurance, evaluation, and further planning of P/CVE interventions.

Although 13 respondents acknowledged that knowledge hubs to support P/CVE evaluation and quality assurance exist in their country, they gave no practical examples. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, certain stakeholder relationships and networks have also been institutionalized, sometimes only among P/CVE practitioners, sometimes

also across multiple functions and involving research. Where cooperative relationships between practice, research, and policy are enabled, this fosters opportunities for exchange and coordination on P/CVE issues in general and on evaluation where needed. However, the degree of cooperation and understanding between stakeholders depends on political dynamics and the degree of mutual trust. In Tunisia, in contrast, the very limited access to a network of government actors and a few other key stakeholders who dominate the P/CVE field and have sole access to data is a prerequisite for conducting evaluations. Any attempts to break up this network and to instead create "centralized, government-supported or other Tunisia-specific 'CVE community of practice'-type working groups" have so far failed.

More often, networks are understood as informal or formalized linkages between (potential) evaluators, whether they are also academics or civil society practitioners. Collegial connections offer the opportunity to share experiences and research and to collectively reflect on challenges and ways ahead (Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Norway, Singapore, Spain). Furthermore, they offer the opportunity to "share resources, tools, and models of good practice that could be replicated for future P/CVE activities" (Tunisia). Intra- or international exchanges on P/CVE evaluations also take place in research institutes. The Norwegian Police University College and the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) in Norway as well as the Fundación Euroárabe, CIFAL Málaga, Centro Memorial Víctimas del Terrorismo in Spain were mentioned as examples.

Professional or academic networks do not only exist at the national level. In fact, some experts complained that some countries, such as Spain, lack such national networks. At the European level, RAN was highlighted as a positive example because it links European practitioners and organizes expert meetings on pressing P/CVE issues, including evaluation. One expert reported that participation in this meeting of academics and practitioners had improved their knowledge about evaluation in Spain, precisely because there is no similar dialogue at the national level. At the international level, networks such as RESOLVE, among others, provide avenues for exchanging scientific knowledge. This would, for example, encourage practitioners to try out new evaluation methods (Canada).

Toolkits are easily accessible (Australia), require little time and money from those seeking support (Netherlands), and provide resources online. Furthermore, toolkits that were co-designed with their potential users are particularly useful for professional practice. They are especially valuable as a first point of reference for questions on evaluation and when consulted during the planning of a P/CVE project to enable the generation of meaningful data for an evaluation or to think about evaluation directly (Netherlands, Spain). For this purpose, it is particularly useful that toolkits offer guidance for different evaluation approaches (Australia). Where appropriate, this more passive support format, which requires a lower level of engagement and interaction, may be complemented by evaluation databases. These can provide insights on good practices as well as shared challenges, through a repository of implemented P/CVE activities and details on respective evaluations. Two reported examples of P/CVE-related databases were the Database of Effective Youth Interventions by the Netherlands Youth Institute (Nji)[101] and the Effective Social Interventions Database by Movisie,[102] the Dutch national knowledge institute for a coherent approach to social issues. The relatively limited availability of this type of support format was further underscored in responses from two participants (for Canada and the United Kingdom), who explained that the P/CVE field would benefit from the development of such offerings within their respective context.

Experts also described interactive – and ideally regular – events at which a large audience of P/CVE practitioners or scholars meet virtually or in person to either exchange thoughts on the current state of knowledge regarding evaluations (e.g., a conferences or symposia) or to discuss appropriate approaches to evaluation (e.g., trainings) as useful, also in combination

with toolkits (Australia, Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Kenya, United Kingdom). Such training sessions could significantly deepen the rather superficial knowledge generated by toolkits or "help provide more sophisticated approaches and knowledge for program leads" (Australia). Who organizes such conferences depends on who has particular influence on the P/CVE landscape within a country. In the United States and Singapore, government agencies have funded and designed professional conferences on P/CVE models and programs in the past.

Centralized support systems in the form of helpdesks appeared particularly rare, with only one expert from Singapore selecting this as an option that is available in their country. Moreover, respondents cited several other existing support formats and structures under the "other" category (10.8%, n=4). One example included the USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity that supports the monitoring and evaluation of implemented activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina while also promoting capacity-building.[103] Experts further highlighted the role of academic research institutions (Norway), judicial oversight for individuals in detention (Singapore), and cultural and local wisdom (in the Indonesian context). Finally, one person was unable to provide an answer to this question.

Individual participants further explained that the question which support structure had the most added value was not straightforward, as the answer depends heavily on the needs as well as on how proactive people are in seeking and using these support services (Kenya). In other countries, there were no support structures at all (Australia, Bosnia Herzegovina) or the few that exist have limited accessibility or are not very well known (United States). Some respondents could only assume that these exist in their country. The government of the United Kingdom, for example, is said to have set up an evaluation team to provide support in various policy areas. The extent to which this also applies to P/CVE remains opaque. Whether support structures exist in a country also depends on the discourse on issues such as extremist threats. One expert explained with regard to Tunisia that extremism was a taboo topic there for a long time, which significantly hindered the development of a P/CVE landscape as well as corresponding support structures and networks.

Figure 11: Please Rank the Following Qualifications That Would Need to Be Strengthened to Improve P/CVE Evaluation Practice in Your Country in Order of Importance (Q21)*

* Response percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

When asked what skills they feel need to be developed in order to strengthen P/CVE evaluation practice, most considered specific methodological skills, general evaluation skills, and increasing professional experience with evaluation in this subject area (e.g., for Australia).

This was the most important qualification to be strengthened for 54.1% of respondents. More fundamentally, evaluators should become more methodologically confident in measuring impact in interventions as complex as those in the field of extremism prevention, which often involve complicated human interactions between clients and practitioners (Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Norway), and they should develop consensus on indicators and metrics (Kenya).

According to one respondent for the United Kingdom, this would also require more expertise and experience with mixed-method and quasi-experimental research designs. Another respondent for the United States indicated the need for a strong background in quantitative research methods among social science PhD students to better prepare them to conduct and process evidence-based P/CVE (evaluation) research. However, stronger methodological training also includes a special focus on issues of research ethics and data protection. In view of the ethical challenges already mentioned elsewhere in this report, which arise in the evaluation of measures in P/CVE and related fields, this was demanded by several participants (for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Netherlands). Evaluators should have a "firm grounding in research ethics including issues around confidentiality, consent, and minimizing harm to participants" (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

> P/CVE evaluators should have a firm grounding in research ethics, including on issues around confidentiality, consent, and minimizing harm to participants.

There were criticisms in many countries that evaluation was not considered from the outset and project or program teams therefore did not generate the best possible data for evaluation; moreover, there was relative agreement that good evaluations depend on the availability of quality data. Several participants therefore suggested raising awareness of this among P/CVE practitioners and other stakeholders (Tunisia, United Kingdom). It is also seen as important to generate and raise awareness of the relevance of evaluation among certain groups of actors in certain countries. This is particularly the case in countries where policymakers and funders lack interest in or commitment to evaluation. Specific events or training could counteract this (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Kenya, Spain, Tunisia).

Training would also be needed for practitioners, not because they lack awareness of the need for and added value of evaluation, but because in some countries they lack the skills to learn from evaluation results and to adapt P/CVE projects accordingly (Spain). Sometimes, however, there is also an absence of skills to adequately communicate evaluation results. Here, too, there is room for improvement, especially when choosing the right communication strategy for the appropriate target group (Singapore). From a research perspective, it is also important to communicate evaluation knowledge widely, for example via academic journals or conferences, in order to continuously expand the state of the art and knowledge (Canada).

Next to methodological knowledge, participants also considered professional experience in P/CVE and/or civic education projects as crucial (24.3% ranked this as most important). Participants highlighted, for example, relevant expertise with and the ability to work in an increasingly diverse landscape, both in terms of the actors that are involved and the versatility of the implemented activities. Several participants also wished for more experience with multi-agency cooperation in both P/CVE and evaluations (Czech Republic). Coordination between stakeholders should be improved by enhancing interpersonal skills and navigating different interests (Canada, Indonesia). This may also require skills of compromise-building and de-escalation. Lastly, evaluators could also increase their sensitivity to the broader cultural context and the specific context in which a P/CVE intervention is embedded (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Kenya). In Indonesia, for example, "cultural and local wisdom" is required. Context sensitivity also includes, among other things, understanding how and why stakeholders – especially political decision-makers and funders – act, how they and those

needed for the evaluation can be reached and won over to the topic of evaluation, and which approach is better avoided (Tunisia). In P/CVE interventions involving Islamist clients, it is also important to have a basic understanding of Islam in order to interact adequately and to meaningfully collect data for the evaluation without any misunderstandings (Netherlands).

Finally, 21.6% of respondents ranked theoretical knowledge of radicalization as the most important qualification that must be strengthened to improve P/CVE evaluation practice. Until evaluators have a deep understanding of the factors involved in people moving toward and away from violent extremism, they cannot evaluate whether an intervention has influenced these processes or not (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya). In some countries, a lack of English language skills constitutes a barrier to the mostly English-language professional literature and prevents international networking and the use of English-language support services (e.g., in Spain).

Innovations in P/CVE Evaluation

Experts on evaluation in P/CVE and related fields see potential for innovation and inspiration in a range of other policy fields and specific countries. Other areas of crime prevention and public health in particular appear to be thematic or policy fields from which experts and practitioners in extremism prevention or related fields draw inspiration for evaluating P/CVE efforts. Due to many years of experience with evaluation, techniques for evaluating prevention efforts and measuring cognitive behavioral changes are well established in public health. P/CVE scholars and practitioners hope to gain interesting insights from evaluations of programs against drug abuse, for example, as these involve similarly complex processes linking multiple levels of analysis and a counter-factual logic.

Particularly in terms of methodology, there are lessons to be learned from public health, where attempts to use experimental methods for evaluation have been made for some time, despite all ethical and practical difficulties. While many experts consider experimental methods to be the gold standard of evaluation and argue that such rigorous methods should also be used in the P/CVE field to systematically measure the behavioral and cognitive impact of interventions, there are nevertheless strong reservations.[104] Although they also advocated learning from the public health field in this regard, as it faces similar challenges, one United Kingdom participant summarized the issues as follows: "[E]thical and security-related arguments around withholding treatment for control groups, particularly in conflict-affected environments, are often a concern in programs working with individuals who are identified as being at-risk of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism, in addition to being expensive and technically challenging to operate."

In view of these difficulties, several experts suggest using quasi-experimental methods instead. Instead of withholding a treatment from a control group, a group is identified as a control group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group in the defined base-line factors and the causal effect of the intervention is merely estimated. Another type of quasi-experimental design constitutes the pre-test and post-test design, whereby the impact of an intervention is measured by comparing indicators at two points in time. Such quasi-experimental methods are used often in the field of civic education already, which is why P/CVE experts also look for approaches in this field and try to transfer them to P/CVE for evaluation purposes. In the Netherlands, for example, mixed methods in the form of pre-post-designs, together with interviews and participant observation, are used as part of the methodological repertoire in evaluations of civic education programs.

In the field of crime prevention or criminology, however, it is especially literature on gang violence, as well as studies of evaluation in probation and correctional contexts, that

respondents describe as a source of inspiration for evaluation in P/CVE. Three other thematic and/or policy fields that were referred to by a much smaller number of survey respondents are: conflict and peacebuilding; behavioral science and psychology; and social work. The latter is strongly related to where P/CVE work is situated in a country. As one participant pointed out, P/CVE activities in Norway, for example, build on other social welfare measures, programs, and strategies, creating close linkages between different policy fields by default.

In addition to thematic fields, the survey also enquired about the actors or institutions from which experts in P/CVE or related fields draw inspiration for evaluation. The fact that academics and academic literature were mentioned especially often fits with the survey result that university-based researchers (78.8%) and independent consultants (54.5%) are said to particularly promote P/CVE innovation and new approaches for evaluation in P/CVE. In addition to the work by well-known individual researchers, systematic syntheses and review works, such as those carried out by the Campbell Collaboration (Canada) and the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST, United Kingdom), were found to be particularly inspiring. RUSI (United Kingdom), the Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV), the RESOLVE Network (global), Hedayah (based in the United Arab Emirates), and the Rand Corporation (in the United States) were also highlighted as producing particularly useful and inspiring research on P/CVE in general, but also on evaluation in particular. In addition to these P/CVE-focused research institutions, evaluation-specific institutes such as the American Evaluation Association and the African Evaluation Association were also mentioned.

Figure 12: Which Actors Promote Innovation and New Approaches for Evaluation in P/CVE in Your Country? (Q13, multiple selection, n=33)

An equal number of respondents selected national governments and non-governmental/civil society actors as promoting innovation and new approaches for evaluation in P/CVE in the respective country context (39.4%), followed by foreign donor governments and international organizations (27.3%), and commercial evaluation companies (24.2%). Respondents saw sub-national or local governments (12.1%) and regional organizations (12.1%) as well as philanthropies (9.1%) as less inspiring for innovation. International organizations such as UNDP, the World Bank, the IOM, and the OECD, as well as foreign donor agencies like USAID were named as sources of inspiration, especially due to their established evaluation

practices, which many considered noteworthy. Individual regional organizations mentioned as innovative include the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa. In the open-ended answers, experts also reflected on the value of European practitioners and research initiatives such as RAN, and they noted repositories supported by civil society, such as IMPACT Europe and GCERF. For Norway, one respondent named the police as an actor that sometimes initiates evaluations of issues relating to their work.

Many experts considered the DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance (OECD) to be transferable to the field of extremism prevention and related areas. Such organizations have also developed metrics and frameworks to measure concepts that are academically still poorly developed, like resilience. The Brief Resilience Scale, which originated from the field of health and psychology and has been adapted to P/CVE, constitutes a pre-defined list of indicators to measure resilience and coping strategies.

Finally, we also asked respondents which countries they found particularly exemplary or inspiring in terms of P/CVE programming and evaluation. Figure 13 illustrates the results. It shows – unsurprisingly, given the existing literature and frequency of scientific contributions from the countries mentioned – that Germany and the United Kingdom are considered pioneers, while Denmark is also highly regarded, especially for its multi-agency approach.

Figure 13: What Other Countries Do You Look to for Inspiration and Good Practices Regarding P/CVE Programming and Evaluation? (Q25, multiple selection, n=37)

Experts further considered the use of digital methods to be particularly promising with regard to P/CVE in general and its evaluation in particular. In Singapore, for example, the SGSecure movement, a community response against violent extremism, uses apps, simulations, and digital training to offer quantitative tracking data that lends itself to evaluation. One respondent for Bosnia and Herzegovina suggested using digital surveys, quizzes, or online assessments specifically for evaluation purposes. Because of the possibility of collecting anonymous data for evaluation, these are particularly promising for producing data to measure the true impact of an intervention (Singapore). Similarly, "the increase in digital data and advancements in data analytic tools could potentially revolutionize P/CVE evaluations,"

since they allow for the use of methods such as predictive modeling for P/CVE evaluation (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Such data analytic tools could also involve artificial intelligence, but experts made no comments on how exactly they envisioned this and whether artificial intelligence should be used to collect data for evaluation or for analysis. Alongside artificial intelligence, respondents also saw advances in communication technology as promising. These would allow different stakeholders to work better together, both in preparation for a P/CVE project as well as during its implementation and evaluation, and also to create new ways for client monitoring (Tunisia).

The increase in digital data and advancements in data analytics tools could potentially revolutionize P/CVE evaluations.

Additionally, experts in P/CVE and related fields named some methods that are already in use but for which they would consider a more frequent use to be worthwhile. However, opinions differed greatly on this point. Some would like to see more outcome evaluations that could provide valid information about the impact of evaluations (Canada, United States). In the United Kingdom, there now seems to be a P/CVE program evaluation in which several P/CVE projects with different approaches were evaluated under a common set of outcome measures. This is also seen as particularly desirable. Furthermore, some also emphasized the desire for more longitudinal studies to find out whether an intervention has also brought about long-term changes (Czech Republic, Netherlands). However, there should also be more process evaluations, developmental evaluations (Netherlands, United Kingdom), and evaluations that include the perspectives of numerous stakeholders (Bosnia and Herzegovina) – including the self-reported perspectives of target groups (Czech Republic). However, one respondent who commented on Tunisia said that there was a need to work on creating solid foundations for "old but good techniques […] before trying to innovate."

Recommendations

Extremist violence threatens people across countries and continents. It requires effective prevention. But without a sound evidence base and careful consideration of (un-)intended effects, activities to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) can do more harm than good. Evaluations can help stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of P/CVE activities and better understand the phenomena they aim to address, thus ensuring that their activities prevent violence and foster safer, more resilient societies. Compared to other policy fields like public health and economic development, however, evaluation as a practice in P/CVE is less widespread and still faces many challenges.

This report provided insights on extremism prevention activities, extremist threats, and evaluation practices across 14 countries and five continents, highlighting the state of affairs as well as ways forward. Our survey data adds nuance to the widespread perception that evaluation remains rare in P/CVE and confirms that the recognition of the value in evaluation is growing stronger in many contexts.

Based on a considerably larger country sample, the findings presented in this report generally support the results of a prior study on P/CVE evaluation in Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.[105] Across contexts, the obstacles to more regular, widespread, and high-quality evaluation to improve P/CVE practices are: funding constraints; methodological difficulties; capacity constraints; a lack of coordination and standardization; and insufficient awareness of the value of evaluation.

In this section, we outline our key recommendations for improving P/CVE evaluation practices. These follow from the report's results.

While governments remain the central coordinators of P/CVE in most contexts, civil society – including community-based organizations, educators, social workers, and health professionals – are at the forefront of developing innovative approaches to better understand extremism and reverse pathways toward radicalization through their cooperation with communities and access to individuals who often do not respond positively to authorities. In many places, however, the relationship between government and civil society is difficult and marked by high levels of mistrust. While complete congruence in goals and approaches between government and civil society cannot be the goal, a strained relationship can hamper effective P/CVE approaches and impede evaluation. Since good evaluations make goals, theories of change, and logics of action explicit, they can – if done well and in good faith – be a tool to improve mutual understanding and should be approached as such.

1 **All P/CVE stakeholders should approach evaluations as an opportunity to build trust between each other and achieve more coherent and effective prevention efforts. A first step toward this is to openly share their respective goals, intervention logics, and experiences to foster mutual understanding.**

Absent sufficient resources to evaluate at one's own initiative in order to learn and improve, formal requirements by funders that their grantees evaluate their activities remain the main driver of evaluation. At the same time, the survey results indicate that, in most places, governments as the main coordinators and funders of P/CVE do not fully leverage their powerful and important position to steer evaluations with appropriate strategies and funding tools.

The survey results reveal different tools to fund and enable external or self-evaluations at funders' request, but dedicated funding mechanisms for implementers who wish to conduct or commission evaluations at their own initiative are rare. Without adequate funding, evaluation quickly loses priority or is abandoned altogether. Insufficient planning for evaluation costs and a lack of resources to measure effects over time continue to impact the frequency and quality of evaluations in the field. To generate valuable insights and support learning and improvement, P/CVE evaluations therefore require more adequate funding and dedicated financing mechanisms.

2   **Stakeholders should ensure adequate funding for high-quality evaluations.**

a.   Funders should provide resources for the evaluation of P/CVE activities they support. Where evaluation costs are covered by grants, funders should require implementers to budget for these costs at the proposal stage, and implementers should earmark those funds accordingly from the outset of a project.

b.   To enable implementers to conduct or commission evaluations at their own initiative, funders should develop dedicated funding mechanisms.

The survey results also show that the extent to which evaluation results are used to improve policies and practices is hard to gauge. According to the experts we surveyed, evaluation findings are sometimes discussed within government, but formal uptake mechanisms to ensure that results translate into improvements are mostly lacking or otherwise unknown. With few formal obligations or incentives and little oversight to systematically link findings to practice, uptake often depends on the voluntary initiative of individual actors. The P/CVE field needs clearer uptake mechanisms to integrate lessons learned more systematically and highlight evaluation as a valuable opportunity to learn rather than as a mere additional burden or risk.

3   **Stakeholders should ensure that evaluations follow learning strategies with clear uptake mechanisms.**

a.   Governments and implementers should develop uptake mechanisms which ensure that evaluation results feed into efforts to improve extremism prevention policies, strategies, programs, and activities.

b.   Governments should make their uptake mechanisms more transparent to ensure that evaluation is perceived as a tool to improve P/CVE policy and practice rather than merely an instrument to control implementers.

Published evaluation results enable learning across contexts, can legitimize funding decisions, and provide evidence for which measures are effective, under which circumstances, and why. In reality, however, evaluations are only published infrequently. Funders hold an especially significant power over the decision to release evaluation findings or not. Many funders and implementers are reluctant to share results publicly, primarily due to concerns about potential criticism, discontinued funding, and safeguarding personal data. Sharing redacted, summarized, or partial results and recommendations can be a solution. (Academic) research – especially in the form of evidence (meta-)reviews, syntheses, and innovative

evaluation designs – is crucial, but it requires access to data and information, resources, and the permission to share results to ensure findings can be used to improve policy and practice. Evaluation databases that provide information on P/CVE activities and evaluation results can also help lower barriers to learning.

4 **Wherever possible, funders should support and enable the sharing of evaluation results and lessons learned, for example, through an accessible evaluation database. To address confidentiality concerns, evaluations can be published as summaries or redacted reports.**

Concerns regarding limited methodological expertise and evaluation experience, as well as the general difficulty of measuring P/CVE impact, show that further evaluation capacity-building is crucial to enable effective learning strategies and high-quality evaluations. Forward-looking capacity-building resources to support evaluation should address the use of evaluation methods, research ethics, and the use of digital tools. The number of toolkits to assist with evaluation is increasing,[106] and they are valued for being easily accessible, low-barrier support resources that can be co-designed with users. Ideally, they should be complemented with evaluation trainings for P/CVE, which are less common but beneficial according to several experts. In an forthcoming PrEval study, we delve deeper into this topic. Overall, funders and developers of evaluation capacity support tools can learn from existing initiatives and should keep in mind language barriers and other obstacles to inclusive participation.

5 **Stakeholders should invest in building the capacity of implementers and government officials to conduct and manage high-quality evaluations and learning processes.**

   a.   When designing evaluation support and capacity-building tools, developers should consider different learning needs and work to overcome barriers to participation.

   b.   Capacity-building tools should include trainings to interpret and communicate evaluation results and translate them into improved practice, as well as guidance on research ethics, including for the use of digital tools.

According to experts, professional networks are the most helpful way to support evaluation. While a wide range of P/CVE knowledge-sharing and cooperation networks for researchers and practitioners exist at the local, national and international levels, few of them have a dedicated focus on evaluation and they are not always accessible to all P/CVE stakeholders. In practice, informal collegial connections are a crucial support system for evaluators.

To develop evaluation designs, experts draw crucial inspiration for P/CVE evaluation from fields that have had more extensive experience with evaluation and developed methodologies for measuring behavioral change, such as public health, crime prevention, education, or peacebuilding. Academic researchers and independent consultants with specialized P/CVE evaluation expertise are important innovators and systematic synthesis reviews of evaluation results are an important contribution to move the field forward. Evolving forms of extremism – for example, overlapping ideologies and an increasing online radicalization of minors – require new prevention approaches and evaluation designs. Funders should therefore support research and opportunities for inclusive, international and interdisciplinary exchange, while using synergies with existing networks on both P/CVE and evaluation.

6   **Stakeholders should continue to invest in P/CVE (evaluation) research and international, interdisciplinary exchange.**

    a.   Funders should continue to invest in and support high-quality meta reviews that synthesize findings from different academic and practice fields within countries and internationally.

    b.   Stakeholders in research, civil society and government should exchange experiences about how new and evolving forms of extremism can be prevented and how evaluation designs need to be adjusted to produce better knowledge of what works. While formal P/CVE evaluation networks are rare, existing P/CVE networks as well as broader evaluation networks can serve as entry points for such discussions.

    c.   Funders should invest in inclusive exchange formats, such as conferences, which foster informal connections between practitioners, researchers, evaluators, and policymakers and facilitate dialogue.

Even if this report cannot describe the full extent of P/CVE practice and evaluation in each of the 14 countries covered, the survey results in each section include promising examples of P/CVE actors working to overcome challenges and close capacity gaps for P/CVE practice and evaluation. They provide inspiration and opportunities for funders, implementers and researchers in P/CVE and related fields to develop solutions and support positive developments for more widespread and high-quality evaluations to enable the effective prevention of evolving threats.

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51   In addition to the data protection concept of the entire PrEval project, a separate data privacy statement was developed for the anonymous survey to inform participants about the processing of their data.

52   See the key concepts on pp. 13-14.

53   Janika Spannagel and Katrin Kinzelbach, "The Academic Freedom Index and Its Indicators: Introduction to New Global Time-Series V-Dem Data," *Quality & Quantity* 57, no. 5 (October 2023): 3969–3989. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-022-01544-0; Michael Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v13", Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2023, https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds23.

54   One respondent with expertise on multiple countries was invited to complete the survey for Indonesia, but did so for Australia, which explains why the number of respondents for Australia (4) was one more than originally envisaged. Furthermore, the answers of one person answering for Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be excluded due to a strong suspicion of responses generated with the help of artificial intelligence software. This was indicated by the length, structure, and content of the answers. The respective answers were excluded from the analysis.

55   The number of invited experts only includes invitations sent to experts for the sampled country contexts. This number excludes one expert who initially agreed to participate in the survey for Denmark, but later withdrew their decision due to a perceived lack of expertise on the subject matter.

56   The survey did not ask participants to declare their gender, so this information is assumed based on public profiles of respondents.

57   Many respondents have more than one affiliation. To retain anonymity of responses as much as possible, we decided not to ask respondents to indicate their primary affiliation or gender in the survey and we do not provide a precise breakdown of demographics.

58   Percentages presented in the report have been rounded to one decimal point for clarity. Multi-select questions are labeled as such. Please note that percentages for single-select questions may not always sum to 100% due to rounding.

59   Baykal et al., *Evaluating P/CVE*.

60   Malet, "Countering Violent Extremism," 67.

61   Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 192, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1053.html.

62   Australia, Czech Republic, Kenya, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States.

63   Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Kenya, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Netherlands, Tunisia, United Kingdom, and the United States.

64   One person for Singapore also mentioned students.

65   SLT (Samordning av lokale rus- og kriminalitetsforebyggende tiltak) is a multi-agency model that coordinates crime and drug prevention measures between the police, municipality authorities, voluntary groups, and other relevant professionals, see Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *Collective Security - A Shared Responsibility: Action Plan to Prevent Radicalization and Violent Extremism* (Oslo: Government of Norway, 2011), 15, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/jd/vedlegg/handlingsplaner/radikalisering_engelsk.pdf.

66   See also the section on knowledge-sharing regarding P/CVE.

67   See also the section on government-civil society relations below.

68   United Nations, Report on the Secretary-General, *Agenda for Action: Recommendations on Preventing Violent Extremism* (New York, NY: United Nations General Assembly, 2015), 11-12, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/816212/files/A_70_674-EN.pdf?ln=en.

69   cf. Home Office, *Prevent Duty Guidance: Guidance For Specified Authorities in England and Wales* (London: Government of the United Kingdom, 2023), 7-8, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance; Department of Education, *The Prevent Duty: An Introduction for Those With Safeguarding Responsibilities* (London: Government of the United Kingdom, updated September 7, 2023), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-prevent-duty-

safeguarding-learners-vulnerable-to-radicalisation/the-prevent-duty-an-introduction-for-those-with-safeguarding-responsibilities.

70 "Quiénes somos?" Somos Más, accessed January 11, 2024, https://www.somos-mas.es/quienes-somos/.

71 See also the section on P/CVE and related policy domains.

72 "Democracy Against Prejudice and Exclusion," Dembra, accessed January 11, 2024, https://www.dembra.no/en.

73 "About I-KHub," Indonesian Knowledge Hub on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, accessed November 22, 2023, https://ikhub.id/tentang.

74 Council of Europe, C*ommittee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures Czech Republic: Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2018), 91, https://rm.coe.int/czech-republic-5th-round-mer/168094b621.

75 cf. Steven Barracosa and James G, "Dealing with Radicalised Youth Offenders: The Development and Implementation of a Youth-Specific Framework," *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 12, Article 773545 (January 2022): 4-5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2021.773545.

76 "The COMPACT Story," Multicultural NSW, accessed January 12, 2024, https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/community-resilience/compact/.

77 "What is Step Together?" NSW Department of Communities and Justice, Countering Violent Extremism Engagement and Support Unit, accessed November 28, 2024, https://www.steptogether.nsw.gov.au/about-us/what-is-step-together.html.

78 cf. William Stephens and Stijn Sieckelinck, "Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent Extremism: Towards a Typology for Collaborative Arrangements in PVE Policy," *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 20 (September 2019): 282-283; Gielen and van Leeuwen, *Debunking Prevailing Assumptions About Monitoring and Evaluation for P/CVE Programmes and Policies,* 7.

79 Respondents had the option to select more than one answer for this question.

80 See also page 23 on government-civil society relations; "NRC: Moskeeën heimelijk onderzocht door particulier bedrijf," Nederlandse Omroep Stichting, accessed February 26, 2024, https://nos.nl/artikel/2401867-nrc-moskeeen-heimelijk-onderzocht-door-particulier-bedrijf.

81 In Canada, the link between the Incel movement and violent extremism has recently been formally recognized, following a Canadian court's ruling that for the first time categorized an Incel-inspired murder as an act of terrorism, see Public Prosecution Service of Canada, "Court Rules That Murder and Attempted Murder Were Terrorist Activity in Youth Case," media release, July 27, 2023, https://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/nws-nvs/2023/27_07_23.html.

82 Mentioned for all countries except Czech Republic and Côte d'Ivoire. In the latter case, responses focused on terrorist tactics, not ideologies.

83 cf. Dawson et al., *Learning and Adapting*, 2; James Lewis et al., *Evaluating Programmes to Prevent and Counter Extremism*, 4; Jacopo Bellasio, Joanna Hofman, Antonia Ward, Fook Nederveen, Anna Knack, Arya Sofia Meranto, and Stijn Hoorens, *Counterterrorism Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead* (Santa Monica, CA; Cambridge, UK: RAND Corporation, 2018), 18, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2628.html.

84 See Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta (PEN-LCRV, 2015) and Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta (PENCRAV, 2020).

85 Formative evaluations are conducted before or during an initiative's implementation to inform improvements about its design. Developmental evaluations are usually applied in complex and dynamic contexts, emphasizing real-time learning and continuous improvement, see Leena Malkki, Mina Prokic, and Irina van der Vet, *Evidence-Based Evaluation of PVE/CVE and De-Radicalisation Initiatives: Principles, Challenges and Methods* (n.p.: INDEED Project, 2023), 12, https://www.indeedproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/ENG_E-Guidebook_D3.5.pdf; Elizabeth Dozois, Marc Langlois, and Natasha Blanchet-Cohen, *A Practitioner's Guide to Developmental Evaluation* (Montreal, QC; Victoria, BC: J.W. McConnell Foundation and the International Institute for Child Rights and Development, 2010), 14, https://mcconnellfoundation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/DE-201-EN.pdf.

86 See the section on evaluation funding.

87 See also page 39 on the publication of results.

88 See also page 21 on P/CVE funding.

89 Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

90 See also page 22 on P/CVE funding.

91 Gielen, "Countering Violent Extremism," 1151.

92 "Nordic Handling Extremism Nordic Approaches (HEX-NA): Nordic Multiagency Approaches to Handling Extremism: Policies, Perceptions and Practice," Center for Research on Extremism, accessed October 31, 2023, https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/projects/hex-na/index.html.

93 "Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Tool," NSW Government, accessed November 21, 2023, https://www.cveevaluation.nsw.gov.au/.

94 See page 24 on innovations in P/CVE practice.

95 "Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS)," National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, accessed December 20, 2023, https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus.

96 Respondents had the option to select more than one answer for this question.

97   Baykal, *Evaluating P/CVE*, 7.

98   Bossuyt, Jean, Louise Shaxson, and Ajoy Datta, *Study on the Uptake of Learning From EuropeAid's Strategic Evaluations Into Development Policy and Practice: Final Report* (n.p.: IBF International Consulting, 2014), v, https://www.oecd.org/derec/ec/Study-on-uptake-Main%20Report.pdf.

99   See page 36 on current evaluation methods.

100   Georgia Holmer, Peter Bauman, and Kateira Aryaeinejad, *Measuring Up: Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 9-10, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/09/measuring-monitoring-and-evaluating-pcve-programs; Paulo Teixeira, *Consolidated Overview on: Evaluation of Secondary and Tertiary Level P/CVE Programmes* (Luxembourg: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2023), 5, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/evaluation-secondary-and-tertiary-level-pcve-programmes-october-2023_en.

101   "Databank Effectieve Jjeugdinterventies," Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, accessed December 13, 2023, https://www.nji.nl/interventies.

102   "Databank Effectieve Sociale Interventies," Movisie, accessed December 13, 2023, https://www.movisie.nl/databank-effectieve-sociale-interventies.

103   "About MEASURE-BIH," United States Agency for International Development, accessed November 8, 2023, https://www.measurebih.com/about-measure-bih.

104   See page 36 on current evaluation methods.

105   See Baykal et al.

106   cf. Todd C. Helmus et al., *RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism* (Santa Monica, CA; Cambridge, UK: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html; NSW Government, "Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Tool"; Cristina Mattei and Sara Zeiger, *Evaluate Your CVE Results: Projecting Your Impact* (n.p.: Hedayah, 2018), https://hedayah.com/app/uploads/2021/09/File-16720189339.pdf; Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, "Toolkit Evidence-Based Werken bij de preventie van radicalisering", accessed January 11, 2024, https://www.socialestabiliteit.nl/si-toolkit; INDEED Project, "The INDEED Toolkit", accessed January 11, 2024, https://www.indeedproject.eu/toolkit/.

Annex: Survey Questionnaire

Section 1: P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance

In this first section of the survey, we want to explore current and future-oriented practices of evaluation and quality assurance in your country of expertise. You will be asked a series of questions on evaluation approaches, actors, innovations, and challenges.

Overview:

1. Do you know of at least one evaluation or quality assurance measure of P/CVE and related fields in your country?

    a. Yes (➲ *If yes, filter to questions 2 – 17*)

    b. No (➲ *If no, filter to question 1b, then to question 18. (Skip questions 2.-17)*)

1b. If not, what are **obstacles** to evaluation and quality assurance in your country? [*open answer*]

2. How **often** are evaluations and quality assurance measures conducted in your country at the respective levels? [*matrix*]

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Primary (e.g., society at large, certain sub-sections of society)							
Secondary (e.g., individuals considered "at risk", local communities considered "at risk")							
Tertiary (e.g., individuals considered to be "radicalized")							

3. How **often** are the following types of P/CVE activities evaluated? [*matrix*]

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Individual P/CVE measures							
Individual P/CVE projects							
P/CVE programs							
P/CVE policies/strategies							
Organizations							
Other (please specify below)							

4. Please elaborate at which **time intervals/how often** evaluations are conducted for each type. [*open answer*]

Evaluation Actors:

5. Who acts as the **evaluators** of the aforementioned P/CVE activities? [*multiple choice: select many*]

   a. The implementers of the project/program themselves (self-evaluation)
   b. Funders (e.g., government entities, foundations, international organizations)
   c. University-based researchers (third party)
   d. Independent consultants (third party)
   e. Commercial evaluation companies (third party)
   f. Other, namely [open answer]
   g. Do not know
   h. Prefer not to respond

6. At whose **request or initiative** are P/CVE evaluations initiated in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

   a. Government (national or sub-national/local)
   b. Foundations / philanthropies
   c. Foreign donor governments
   d. Regional organizations
   e. International organizations
   f. Implementers take the initiative to evaluate their activities without external requests
   g. Academic researchers
   h. Other, namely [open answer]
   i. Do not know
   j. Prefer not to respond

7. For which **reasons** are P/CVE activities evaluated in your country and what are the main **goals** of the evaluations? [*open answer*]

8. How are evaluations of P/CVE activities **financed** in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

   a. Budgets for P/CVE activities include funds for the evaluations
   b. If a government entity requests an evaluation, it provides additional funding to cover the costs
   c. If implementers wish to evaluate their activities, they can access dedicated funds from the government
   d. Non-governmental organizations finance the evaluations
   e. Other, namely [open answer]
   f. Do not know
   g. Prefer not to respond

9. If there are dedicated **funding instruments for evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE**, please provide details on how they function: *[open answer]*

Toolbox:

10.   Which **methods** are used for evaluation and quality assurance of P/CVE activities in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

   a.   Quantitative methods (*including* experimental methods)
   b.   Quantitative methods (*excluding* experimental methods)
   c.   Qualitative methods
   d.   Mixed methods
   e.   Other, namely [*open answer*]
   f.   Do not know
   g.   Prefer not to respond

11.   Which **promising methodological innovations** for P/CVE evaluations are currently being developed or used in your country (if any)? Please provide examples. [*open question*]

12.   Are you aware of any **digital** methods or tools used for evaluation in P/CVE in your country (e.g., online interviews, big data analyses…)? What are they? [*open answer*]

13.   Which actors **promote innovation and new approaches** for evaluation in P/CVE in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

   a.   Government (national)
   b.   Government (sub-national or local)
   c.   Non-governmental / civil society actors
   d.   University-based researchers
   e.   Independent consultants
   f.   Commercial evaluation companies
   g.   Foundations / philanthropies
   h.   Foreign donor governments
   i.   Regional organizations
   j.   International organizations
   k.   Other, namely [*open answer*]
   l.   Do not know
   m.   Prefer not to respond

Evaluation Results and Knowledge Management:

14.   How often are P/CVE **evaluation results published** in the form of (publicly available) evaluation reports? [*multiple choice: select one*]

   a.   Very often
   b.   Often
   c.   Sometimes
   d.   Rarely
   e.   Never
   f.   Do not know
   g.   Prefer not to respond

15. Please elaborate on **how often** evaluation reports are published, by whom and in which form: [*open answer*]

16. If some evaluation reports in your country are **not published**, what are the reasons for this decision? [*multiple choice: select many*]

    a. To protect individuals and their personal data
    b. To avoid publishing negative findings
    c. Publication is not desired by the funders of the evaluation
    d. Publication is not desired by those entities whose activities are evaluated
    e. Other, namely [*open answer*]
    f. Do not know
    g. Prefer not to respond

17. How are evaluation results used in your country? Which mechanisms exist to ensure the **uptake** of evaluation results by different actors? [*open answer*]

Support Structures:

18. Which formats or structures exist to **support** evaluation and quality assurance of P/CVE in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

    a. Professional network(s)
    b. Interactive trainings or talks (e.g., webinars, advanced trainings, symposia, professional conferences)
    c. Non-interactive lectures
    d. Evaluation database(s)
    e. Knowledge hub(s)
    f. Toolkit(s) and other educational and guidance resources
    g. Helpdesk(s)
    h. Other, namely [*open answer*]
    i. No support structures exist
    j. Do not know
    k. Prefer not to respond

19. Which existing support structures (from those listed above or other, informal mutual-support channels) add the **most value** in your view, and why? [*open answer*]

Challenges:

20. In your view, what are the **greatest obstacles** to conducting more frequent, widespread and high-quality evaluations in your country? [*open answer*]

21. Please rank the following **qualifications** that would need to be strengthened in order to improve P/CVE evaluation practice in your country in order of importance (most important (top) to least important (bottom)): [*ranking*]

a. Specific methodological and other evaluation skills and experiences

b. Theoretical knowledge of radicalization and P/CVE and/or civic education research

c. Professional experience in P/CVE and/or civic education projects

22. What **other qualifications** would need to be strengthened? [*open answer*]

23. What else would be needed to **strengthen P/CVE** evaluation in order to improve the **frequency and quality** of evaluations? [*open answer*]

24. What are the **challenges to the uptake** of evaluation results and how could they be overcome? [*open answer*]

Comparison and Outlook:

25. What **other countries** do you look to for inspiration and good practices regarding P/CVE programming and evaluation? In which areas specifically? [*open answer*]

26. Which **actors, entities, organizations**, or **other policy fields** besides P/CVE do you look to for inspiration and good practices regarding evaluation and quality assurance? [*open answer*]

27. Do you know of any promising methods for or innovations to evaluation and quality assurance in the area of **civic education** in your country? What are they? [*open answer*]

28. Do you know of any promising methods for or innovations to evaluation and quality assurance in **other areas** outside of P/CVE aimed at fostering social/community cohesion, resilience and peaceful co-existence in your country? What are they? [*open answer*]

29. In general, which methods or approaches do you find **particularly promising** for the future of P/CVE evaluations (from within or outside the field)? [*open answer*]

Section 2: P/CVE Landscape

You have now completed over half of this survey. In this second section, we would like to ask you a few more general questions about the P/CVE landscape in your country so as to gain a deeper understanding of the context of the evaluation practices you previously described.

Actors and Responsibilities:

30. Which **actors** are involved in P/CVE activities in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

a. National government
b. Regional or sub-national government
c. Local government (municipalities)
d. Non-governmental / civil society actors
e. Regional (e.g., EU, AU, ASEAN) or international organizations (e.g., UN, World Bank)
f. Individual foreign donor governments
g. Private / commercial entities
h. Philanthropies / foundations
i. Other, namely [*open answer*]
j. Do not know
k. Prefer not to respond

31. Which **policy domains** promote efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism in your country (e.g., education, internal security, law enforcement, judiciary, public health, social sector...)? Please list them, separated by comma.

32. Which **policy domains** promote efforts that do **not** consider themselves as P/CVE but are aimed at fostering social/community cohesion, resilience and peaceful co-existence in your country? Please list the policy domains and explain how these activities are referred to.

Funding:

33. Who **funds** P/CVE activities in your country? [*multiple choice: select many*]

a. National government
b. Sub-national or local government
c. Non-governmental organizations
d. Foundations / philanthropies
e. Foreign donor governments
f. Regional organizations (e.g., EU, AU)
g. International organizations (e.g., UN agencies, World Bank)
h. Other, namely [*open answer*]
i. Do not know
j. Prefer not to respond

Toolbox:

34. What are some innovative and promising **P/CVE activities or trends** in your country? [*open answer*]

Networks:

35. What **knowledge-sharing opportunities** regarding P/CVE are you aware of?

a. Local working groups or networks, for example [*open answer*]
b. Regional working groups or networks, for example [open answer]
c. Transnational working groups or networks, for example [open answer]
d. Do not know
e. Prefer not to respond

36. Which networks and aspects of knowledge sharing regarding P/CVE are **particularly useful** for you? [*open answer*]

37. What **hinders** knowledge exchange and cooperation between P/CVE actors? [*multiple choice: select many*]

a. Lack of time
b. Lack of money
c. Lack of organizational capacity
d. Contentious issues or relationships
e. Constraints around data / information sharing
f. Lack of interest
g. Other, namely [*open answer*]
h. Do not know
i. Prefer not to respond

38. How important is the role of **civil society** in the field in your country and how would you characterize the relationship between civil society and the government?

Section 3: Violent Extremism – Phenomena and Threats

Before finishing this survey, we are interested in your insights on two questions related to the violent extremist phenomena your country of expertise currently faces and is expected to face in the next years.

Threat Assessment:

39. Which violent extremist phenomena do you currently consider a **threat to public safety** in your country? [*open answer*]

40. Which violent extremist phenomena will likely threaten public safety in your country **in the next 2-5 years** if not adequately addressed? [*open answer*]

Section 4: Final Question

In this survey, we have asked you about various aspects of P/CVE evaluation and quality assurance in your country:

• P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance

- P/CVE Landscape
- Violent Extremism – Phenomena and Threats

41. Is there anything else you would like to share with us that goes beyond these aspects, or that was missing within one of these sections? [*open answer*]

42. We thank you for your time and insights. To ensure that we match your responses to the intended country context, please once more confirm your **country selection**: [*open answer*]

Acknowledgments

Reflect. Advise. Engage.

The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) is an independent non-profit think tank based in Berlin. Our mission is to improve global governance through research, policy advice and debate.

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