

Holding Ground in Preventing Violent Extremism

Avoiding Stagnation in P/CVE and Evaluation

New Evidence and Trends in Evaluation from 12 Countries

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Main Findings

1

Violent extremism: In our second international expert survey, among 30 respondents in 12 countries, we find that violent extremism motivated by radical Islamist and far-right ideologies is persistent, yet new challenges are arising in many places. Experts increasingly worry about ideologically fluid forms of extremism, such as anti-government or “hybrid” extremism.

2

Prevention: Experts increasingly advocate for a shift from primarily ideology-focused preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts to an emphasis on holistic violence prevention. The rise of ideologically fluid extremism and other evidence show that ideology or religion tend to play a more minor role in a person’s journey toward violent extremist acts than other, non-ideological, individual and systemic drivers of violent radicalization, such as inadequate social support networks or experiences of injustice, hardship and inequality.

3

Evaluation: The field of evaluating what works in preventing violent extremism seems to be stagnating. Compared to our first round of international monitoring in 2023, experts this time report that evaluation frequency remains unchanged, the number of already limited funding opportunities has further declined, methodological innovation is scarce, transparency around findings has decreased, and evaluation capacity gaps persist without adequate countermeasures.

4

Reasons for stagnation: Possible causes for stagnation include funding cuts and the field of P/CVE becoming increasingly politicized in many countries, where extremist ideologies have moved into the political mainstream in recent years. This, alongside the fact that many “easy wins” in establishing a P/CVE evaluation practice have been implemented, means governments are poorly incentivized to consistently invest in systems of high-quality, learning-oriented evaluation to improve the prevention of violent extremism – but it is important that they keep doing so.

Recommendations

1

All P/CVE stakeholders should focus on building mutual trust and should approach evaluations as opportunities to achieve more coherent and effective prevention efforts. Where extremist ideologies have moved into the political mainstream or positions of power, there is an increased risk of P/CVE being driven by ideology rather than by accountability, evidence and learning. Stakeholders should pay close attention to these dynamics and invest in the constructive relationships needed for learning-based improvements in P/CVE.

2

Funders should continue to invest in and support exchange among all P/CVE stakeholders.

- a. Wherever possible, funders should support and enable the sharing of evaluation results and lessons learned, even if results are redacted or summarized for confidentiality. For example, findings may be shared through accessible evaluation databases or dedicated discussion formats.
- b. Funders should invest in exchange formats that facilitate dialogue and foster informal connections between practitioners, researchers, evaluators, and policymakers. These formats should provide room for discussion of whether and why the evaluation field is stagnating, and how stakeholders can join forces to sustain progress.
- c. Wherever appropriate, stakeholders should ensure that formats for sharing evaluation results, research findings and experiences include exchanges and discussions on evolving extremism trends – such as hybrid and ideologically fluid extremism, the mainstreaming of radical and extremist beliefs, and non-ideological roots of radicalization – and their impact on P/CVE efforts and evaluations.

3

Stakeholders should ensure adequate funding for high-quality evaluations and make strategic, learning-driven investments, particularly as budgets shrink.

- a. Funders should provide resources for the evaluation of P/CVE activities they support. Where grants cover evaluation costs, funders should require implementers to budget for evaluations at the proposal stage, and implementers should earmark such funds accordingly from the project outset.
- b. To enable implementers to conduct or commission evaluations at their own initiative, funders should develop dedicated funding mechanisms.
- c. Across all types of evaluation funding, stakeholders should encourage the involvement of independent experts as third-party evaluators or advisors.

4

Stakeholders should invest in building the capacity of implementers and government officials to conduct and manage high-quality evaluations and learning processes.

- a. Stakeholders should prioritize developing and strengthening evaluation support and capacity-building formats that facilitate exchange and coordination, such as professional networks, interactive training and knowledge hubs.
- b. Stakeholders should ensure that such evaluation-support and capacity-building formats build on each other rather than funding fragmented, one-off efforts that duplicate existing structures.

5

Stakeholders should ensure that evaluations follow learning strategies with clear uptake mechanisms.

- a. Governments and implementers should develop uptake mechanisms that ensure evaluation results feed into efforts to improve extremism prevention policies, strategies, programs, and activities.
- b. Funders and implementers should set goals for evaluation uptake together and agree to engage with possible negative evaluation results for further learning, rather than as a mere performance review of implementers.

6

Stakeholders should beware of the risks of stagnation in the P/CVE evaluation field and should work to preserve critical knowledge, expertise and networks, while addressing past shortcomings.

Introduction


Preventing violent extremism requires an understanding of what works, under which conditions, to stop radicalization and violence. Evaluation – the systematic assessment of activities and interventions – is crucial for this understanding and to improve prevention in practice.¹ In this report, we present and analyze current trends in violent extremism, as well as practices, innovations and challenges in the evaluation of activities to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE), and related fields,² across 12 countries: Australia, Canada, Czechia, Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The results are based on the second iteration of an international expert monitoring survey conducted in late-2024, building on a first iteration conducted in mid-2023. The survey dives deeper into key issues and compares expert assessments of the P/CVE and evaluation field over time.³ Based on the best practices, trends and challenges identified in this study, we develop recommendations for stakeholders to improve P/CVE evaluations and practice.

Both surveys are part of the international, comparative component of the research and dialogue project “PrEval: Evaluation and Quality Assurance in Extremism Prevention, Democracy Promotion and Civic Education: Analysis, Monitoring, Dialogue”, funded by the German Ministry of the Interior from September 2022 to December 2025.

In our most recent cross-national expert survey, we find notable developments in violent extremist threats around the world. While some threats – such as radical Islamist and far-right extremism – have been persistent yet evolving over time, new ideological trends are emerging. Experts are particularly concerned about the rise of ideologically fluid forms of extremism, such as anti-government or “hybrid” extremism. At the same time, experts highlight arguments against focusing on ideology in P/CVE efforts, considering research indicates the limited role of ideology and religion in radicalization pathways.

Figure 1: Countries Covered by the Survey



Research Methodology and Terminology

The findings in this report are based on a cross-national online survey completed by 30 experts in P/CVE evaluation across 12 countries between September and December 2024, and an online validation workshop for survey respondents and additional international experts in March 2025. The survey was the second of its kind, building on a prior version fielded in 2023.

The reported results represent the assessments of two-to-three individual non-government experts per country, aggregated to monitor and analyze overall trends, challenges and innovations in the field of P/CVE and evaluation, and to develop recommendations for the field. They do not represent official government positions or records or the objective reality. The findings are to be read as an aggregate assessment of the sector in the various countries.

An extended description of the methodology, terminology and limitations, as well as the full survey questionnaire, is found in the Annexes to this report.

While violent extremism has been evolving, our results indicate that the field of evaluating what works in preventing violent extremism risks stagnating. We interpret the aggregate findings of this survey as strong signs of such stagnation. The indicators are significant, compared to our first monitoring survey 18 months prior: evaluation frequency remains unchanged, already limited funding opportunities have declined, methodological innovation is scarce, transparency around findings has decreased, and capacity gaps persist without adequate countermeasures. Despite these findings, our results also confirm examples of positive evaluation practices that were previously identified in the 2023 survey, along with some encouraging developments, such as a broader range of actors initiating P/CVE evaluations.

Many stakeholders, including the experts surveyed for this report, are involved in evaluating P/CVE activities and are contributing to an emerging practice, but they face various hurdles. The extremism prevention field faces several challenges, such as increasing societal and political polarization, the mainstreaming of extremist ideologies into political power in some countries, and declining funding for P/CVE activities in some places. In this context, our main message is therefore that **stakeholders involved in preventing violent extremism must not falter in their commitment to continuous evaluation, learning and improvement.** This means strategically preserving and driving forward evaluation efforts to improve P/CVE practice and produce evidence on what works, under which conditions, to prevent radicalization and extremist violence.

While the recommendations from our first report remain relevant, this report's results add nuance and help prioritize steps to hold ground and regain momentum. In particular, greater emphasis is needed to maintain and build trust between all P/CVE stakeholders in light of increasing politicization, enhance transparency of evaluation findings, fund independent and innovative evaluation approaches, create synergies in capacity-building efforts, and recognize the possible risks of stagnation.

We expect 2025 to be a pivotal year for P/CVE in many parts of the world, including Europe and North America, but also regions where international organizations and foreign aid programs fund P/CVE work. Early indications of broader dynamics that will affect the field are already visible but were not covered in this survey period, such as all major donors' significant development funding cuts in 2025 budgets. The upcoming third iteration of this international monitoring will delve deeper into these questions to gather additional evidence on violent extremism, P/CVE, and evaluation practices, and will synthesize the findings and lessons over three iterations of our international expert monitoring.

Trends in Violent Extremist Threats

As in 2023, we asked respondents which extremism phenomena they consider particularly dangerous to public safety in their country at the time of the survey (September–December 2024), as well as for the next two-to-five years, and which extremism threats remain underrated. We found that while some previous threats remain, the extremism landscape is evolving quickly.

Overall, experts considered **violent extremism motivated by radical Islamist and far-right ideologies** to be primary and consistent threats to public safety in their countries. Experts from 10 of our 12 case study countries named Islamist extremism as a key threat in their national contexts: Australia, Czechia, Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. In Tunisia, experts explained that Islamist extremism is closely tied to inadequate reintegration programs for convicted terrorists released from prison and their families, who remain highly stigmatized and excluded from their communities. Similarly, one expert from Kenya highlighted the threat of Al-Shabaab returnees who have not been reintegrated into society. Respondents from Canada, Czechia, and the Netherlands highlighted how Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, and Israel’s

subsequent warfare in Gaza, as well as related events such as “violations of the Koran in Europe” (the Netherlands), have fueled mobilization across the radical Islamist spectrum, as well as Islamophobia and hate crimes, for example targeting mosques.

Experts considered violent extremism motivated by radical Islamist and far-right ideologies to be primary and consistent threats to public safety in their countries.

Respondents assessed the rise of far-right extremism as similarly prevalent to Islamist extremism; nine of the countries surveyed struggle with right-wing radicalization (Australia, Canada, Czechia, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, the UK, and the US). Experts from the Netherlands and Norway described the particular danger posed by the

radicalization of youth online, where identities can be concealed, and a focus on violence has displaced ideological convictions. The fragmentation of the far-right scene and the fact that so much is playing out online also make assessing the threat potential increasingly difficult.

In addition to these well-known types of extremism, **experts see a new danger in ideologically fluid extremism phenomena.** Where individual responses indicated the rise of a new, hybrid category of “anti-state extremism” in 2023, survey answers collected from experts in late-2024 show that this trend has manifested as a key threat. Respondents frequently described radicalization stemming from combined components of established forms and single-issue types of extremism, such as anti-gender, anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ+ extremism as “hybrid extremism.”

After first emerging in the COVID-19 pandemic, “anti-government” sentiments (often labelled “anti-state,” “anti-authority,” “anti-system” or “anti-institutionalism”) have since proliferated.⁴ “Anti-government” extremists come from a broad array of ideological backgrounds, including religious groups, the far left, anti-vaccination movements, and sovereigntists.⁵ Anti-government extremism is thus commonly defined as “movements, networks and individuals who reject the legitimacy of the government and condone or show willingness to undermine the democratic legal order.”⁶ Survey respondents acknowledged the category’s novelty and its difficulties in encompassing all elements of anti-government extremism, describing it as a “very shattered and untransparent field” (the Netherlands)

that has become prevalent “as a result of government distrust that was created during [the] COVID pandemic” (Canada). **Anti-government extremism was named explicitly as a current threat** by respondents from Australia, Canada, Czechia, the Netherlands, Norway (though with emphasis on low potential for acts of terrorism), and the US. Moreover, experts from the UK and Kenya described issues closely related to anti-government extremism, such as distrust, questioning the government’s legitimacy, and prevalent conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns. Elements of anti-government extremism thus affect 8 of our 12 case study countries.

Several experts noted “hybrid extremism”

or “the hybridization of extremist

ideologies” as a distinct threat.

Similarly to 2023, **several experts also highlighted the threat posed by single-issue types of extremism**, including anti-gender and anti-LGBTQI+ (Canada, the US), anti-immigrant and racist (Czechia, the US), and anti-Semitic extremism (Canada, the Netherlands). However, these single-issue types of extremism increasingly appear together and intertwined, in an ideologically fluid manner also characteristic of anti-government extremism. **Several experts from Australia and Canada noted “hybrid extremism” or “the hybridization of extremist ideologies” as a distinct threat.** One expert explains the complexity of these new extremist phenomena as a “perverse ‘choose your own adventure’ approach to radicalization,” essentially eliminating demarcation lines between different types of extremism. Younger generations, as digital natives, are particularly susceptible to hybrid extremism, as they consume different types of extremist material online. This is as likely to come from right-wing accounts as from radical Islamist groups.⁷

Expert responses to the question of whether violent extremist phenomena might affect public safety in their country in the next two to five years, if not adequately addressed, mirrored their answers to current threats. Alongside types of extremism, across current and future threat analyses, **experts also frequently referred to the threat posed by types of extremists, in particular “incels” (so-called involuntary celibates) and “lone wolf” actors** (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Spain, Tunisia, the UK). Respondents often named incels and lone wolf actors together, since both phenomena generally refer to disenfranchised men (or male youth) who appear to “self-radicalize” without contact with an organized ideological group, mostly through social media and online fora. As such, their radicalization and mobilization for violence are difficult to detect and even more difficult to prevent. Lone wolf actors are present in a range of ideological contexts; a respondent from Indonesia highlighted, for example, that the Islamic State encourages terrorists to act alone.

An expert from Indonesia also named the rise of lone wolf actors as a key, *underrated* threat, in response to a new question from the survey’s second iteration. In both Indonesia and Tunisia, experts are concerned that insufficient attention is paid, particularly, to female lone actors and jihadist women. Overall, experts identified extremism trends – particularly far-right and anti-government extremism – as underrated threats that they had already flagged as current and future concerns. For example, one expert from Czechia noted, “While attention is often focused on traditional forms of violence or jihadist threats, the rise of online platforms for spreading xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and nationalist ideologies presents a significant, yet underrecognized danger.” Moreover, two experts from Canada identified the radicalization of youth as the most underrated future threat. This confirms a pattern throughout the survey that highlights the relevance of youth as a target group for extremists. The research team will publish a separate case study on youth, extremism and P/CVE evaluations.

However, some notable additions among underrated threats were not reflected (or not to the same extent) in respondents’ analyses of current and future threats. Experts from the UK, the Netherlands, and Indonesia are concerned about the underestimated future impact of emerging technology, including artificial intelligence (AI). Emerging technology could

facilitate the use of violence by extremist groups, for example, by utilizing increasingly commercially available drones. AI also greatly aids in producing and disseminating extremist material online, including deepfake material and disinformation.

Moreover, experts from the US, Spain, Czechia, and Canada considered **the ongoing polarization of societies and the mainstreaming of extremist ideas into the political center-ground as an underrated threat to public safety**. One expert from Canada explained, “Events in the US could embolden the rise of populism in Canada and amplify discourses that delegitimize democracy, particularly targeting women’s and minority rights,” and eventually “create a more divisive environment and increase the risk of ideologically motivated violence.” Respondents from the US emphasized the risk that virtual “echo chambers” of extremist content could further polarize society, while such content is also mainstreamed in political discourse. An expert from Czechia raised the concern that polarization and radicalization could also extend to law enforcement agencies. This, in turn, undermines public trust and can fuel broader polarization.

Prevention Beyond Ideology

While extremism is evolving, practitioners question the value of using specific types of ideologies as a basis for P/CVE work. This is not a new debate,⁸ but is an ongoing one that experts highlighted in our validation workshop and follow-up conversations, particularly when asked about the impact of emerging types of extremism, such as the hybridization of ideologies. Several experts emphasized that many P/CVE initiatives’ focus on ideology is misplaced, arguing that the more relevant concern is simply the risk of violent action. In practice, they explained, many countries are no longer focusing on ideologies behind violent extremism. According to experts, this is partly due to the difficulty in separating “extremist” views from “the norm” when radical ideologies filter into the political mainstream.

Experts emphasize the role of non-ideological and systemic drivers of violent radicalization.

More importantly, though, **P/CVE experts cited research showing that ideology and religion tend to play a minor role in a person’s journey toward violent extremism.** One expert (who was also a survey respondent) specified in an interview that ideology was just “a vehicle that brings grievances to their destination.” Similarly, in its 2025 report on P/CVE, the US FBI finds that ideological and non-ideological attackers “traverse similar behavioral pathways when moving toward the extreme decision to take American lives.” Hence, they “employ a motivation-agnostic framework to prevent and counter violent extremist behavior.”⁹ On the contrary, research on the outcomes of primary and secondary prevention programs has shown that programs targeting specific ethnic or religious groups tend to create more negative effects than benefits.¹⁰ The stigmatization connected to labelling certain groups as generally at risk of violent radicalization has the potential to make them more vulnerable to violent radicalization rather than the opposite.¹¹ Instead, **the experts we consulted, as well as literature on the topic, emphasize the role of non-ideological individual and systemic drivers of violent radicalization, ranging from social support networks to social injustices and economic inequality.**¹² While individual P/CVE programs cannot solve greater issues of injustice and inequality, they can strengthen an individual’s protective factors, such as by supporting participants in building (stronger) support networks or gaining (some) economic independence.¹³ As one expert explained, this means of P/CVE work, which focuses on violence reduction, is automatically non-ideological and, in their view, is more effective.

Summary of Violent Extremism Trends and Prevention Approaches

Respondents expect threats of violent extremism to public safety to remain the same over the next two to five years: violent extremism motivated by radical Islamist and far-right ideologies continues to be prevalent in 10 and 9 of our 12 case study countries, respectively. In a notable development since the last survey in 2023, experts highlighted even more risks from overlapping and ideologically fluid forms of extremism, in particular anti-government and “hybrid” extremism. Beyond types of extremism, experts drew attention to specific actor profiles, such as “incels” and “lone wolves,” who often self-radicalize. Their pathways to violence are difficult to detect and even harder to prevent. Underrated threats, which experts believe are paid insufficient attention, include youth radicalization, the future influence of emerging technologies, and the ongoing mainstreaming of extremist ideas in Western democracies. At the same time, experts in our validation workshop emphasized the limited role that ideology plays in radicalization processes and advocated for shifting P/CVE efforts toward anti-violence strategies rather than anti-extremism approaches, wherever this reprioritization has not already taken place.

In the validation workshop, one expert also argued against the move away from ideological categories and completely toward violence reduction, although they agreed in principle with the issues that P/CVE work faces. They emphasized that **tracking the evolution of ideologies and analyzing them is crucial to understanding the connections and overlap between different extremist information networks and how they shape larger societal trends.** The expert referenced the example of radical Islam, the far-right, and some forms of hybrid extremism, which all include anti-feminism and anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes. Such extremism is often reflected in targeted attacks on women, transgender people or persons of other gender identities. Another commonality is the spread of conspiracy theories and disinformation. Understanding this helps to separate relevant drivers and manifestations of extremist beliefs and radicalization across different ideological groups and to find ways of addressing commonalities. Other experts in the survey emphasized the importance of understanding how widespread some ideological components are: experts from three countries (Tunisia, Canada, the US) named ideological components such as racism and misogyny as the biggest threat to public safety, rather than specific ideologies or extremist groups. A respondent from Australia explained that new P/CVE approaches focusing on ideology-intersecting issues such as violent misogyny are a promising innovation.


Evaluation Trends

P/CVE is still a relatively new field. As such, evaluations of which approaches work and how well are particularly important for learning and progress. Comparing our 2024 expert survey responses with the results of the first iteration a year and a half earlier in 2023, we found that with some nuances, there was either very little or no development in P/CVE evaluation practices. We discuss notable differences and developments below.

Evaluation Frequency

Our experts reported that P/CVE activities are still evaluated at a similar frequency as in 2023. As in the previous survey, respondents indicated that **overall, primary prevention efforts are less often evaluated than secondary or tertiary efforts** (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: How Often are Evaluations and Quality Assurance Measures Conducted in the Field of P/CVE in Your Country at the Respective Levels?
(2023: n=33, 2024: n=30)




Primary prevention efforts are less often evaluated than secondary or tertiary efforts.

In contrast to 2023, only one respondent for one P/CVE level (tertiary) selected “very often” for evaluation frequency in 2024. Furthermore, respondents’ 2024 assessments of the frequency of different types of P/CVE activities mirrored 2023 results closely (see Figure 3). Overall, **projects and programs are still evaluated slightly more frequently than individual measures, policies and organizations.** However, in 2024, 17.7 percent more experts reported that individual measures were evaluated “often.” Open-ended answers could not account for this difference. The 2024 survey results revealed no clear patterns regarding evaluation frequency in individual countries, with experts’ responses sometimes even contradicting each other (e.g., “very often” and “rarely” for the same category in the same country). This was also the case in 2023.

Evaluation Actors

Evaluation actors for P/CVE activities have also stayed largely unchanged. **The main evaluators are reported to be implementers themselves** (2023: 84.8 percent; 2024: 86.7 percent), followed by university-based researchers (2023: 72.7 percent; 2024: 73.3 percent) and independent consultants (2023: 66.7 percent; 2024: 70 percent). Similarly, respondents still consider governments the key drivers in initiating evaluations (2023: 75.8 percent; 2024: 83.3 percent), with implementers the second-most frequent initiators (2023: 51.5 percent; 2024: 63.3 percent) and academic researchers third (2023: 48.5 percent; 2024: 56.7 percent, see Figure 4). **Notably, respondents were able to choose multiple options, and**

Figure 3: How Often are the Following Types of P/CVE Activities Evaluated? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30)



overall, they named more different actors as initiators of P/CVE evaluations in 2024 compared to 2023. This resulted in a 10 percent increase in responses for the categories government, implementers, academic researchers, and regional organizations, as well as a slight increase in responses for international organizations and foreign donor governments. Foundations are the only evaluation initiator category for which respondents no longer report the same presence as in 2023. However, open-ended answers did not confirm a generally higher appreciation for the value of evaluations. We discuss widespread problems with negative attitudes toward evaluations further below.

Evaluation Funding

Sources of evaluation funding have not changed. **Survey respondents reported that the two main ways P/CVE evaluations are financed remain (1) if the budget for the P/CVE activity already includes funds for the evaluation (2023: 75.8 percent; 2024: 70 percent) and (2) if a government entity requests an evaluation, it provides additional funding to cover the cost (2023: 75.8 percent; 2024: 63.3 percent, see Figure 5).** Thirty percent of respondents also indicated that the funding from NGOs is used to cover P/CVE evaluation costs in their country (2023: 39.4 percent), and 20 percent listed access to dedicated

Figure 4: At Whose Request or Initiative are P/CVE Evaluations Initiated in Your Country? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30)





Figure 5: How are Evaluations of P/CVE Activities Financed in Your Country? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30)



government funds as a source of P/CVE evaluation funding (2023: 30.3 percent). Similarly to the question on evaluation initiators, respondents were able to select multiple options. **However, although experts listed more evaluation initiators overall, they selected fewer funding opportunities than in 2023** (resulting in a 5.8 percent–12.5 percent decrease across all categories). Experts’ open-ended answers confirmed both the limited availability of evaluation funding and the two most common sources of funds. However, the field’s struggle to secure sufficient financial backing for evaluations is not a new problem and is not unique to P/CVE.

In accordance with quantitative results, **survey respondents also raised evaluation funding as a key problem when asked what is needed to strengthen P/CVE evaluation generally**. As an expert from Czechia explained, a “lack of systematic, dedicated funding streams specifically earmarked for the evaluation [...] of P/CVE activities at the national level

Experts broadly share the opinion that evaluation funding should enable third-party independent evaluations more systematically.

[...] often results in evaluations being conducted on an ad-hoc basis,” rather than as a standard practice that enables gradual methodological improvements and development of a learning culture. Alongside the requirement for *more* evaluation funding, **experts broadly share the opinion that evaluation funding should enable third-party independent evaluations more systematically**. Because the most frequent evaluators are P/CVE implementers themselves and the most frequent funding sources are P/CVE activity budgets, respondents

criticized the lack of available resources for more unbiased evaluations from independent evaluation experts with necessary training. As one expert from the US explained, “Adding funding will not provide better quality insights or allow for better methodologies. Evaluation itself is too tied to getting additional project funding.” Respondents from Indonesia, Kenya, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, and the UK provided similar arguments in favor of funding third-party evaluations to improve P/CVE evaluation quality.

Respondents considered the fulfilment of funder requirements as frequently still the primary rationale for the evaluation of P/CVE activities. They are concerned about possible **negative impacts on the frequency, quality and transparency of evaluations, and about hindrances to developing a learning culture** that can make P/CVE efforts more effective. Experts from Australia, Canada, Czechia, Indonesia, Kenya, the Netherlands, Spain, Tunisia, and the US considered funding requirements (for existing funding cycles or the next cycle) a key driver for evaluations. In some cases, this is expressed by implementers’ or evaluators’ indifference, ticking the box of evaluation completion but with “minimal engagement with the results,” as one respondent from Czechia explained. Similarly, a respondent from Canada connected the focus on funding to “the absence of an evaluation culture” in implementer organizations, which constitutes a barrier to the uptake of evaluation results. However, in other cases, the (perceived) connection between evaluation results and funding decisions leads to a more negative general attitude toward evaluations. An expert from the Netherlands is concerned about the “prejudices against evaluations, such that they are to judge the implementer,” while a respondent from Spain explained that “generally, there is a fear of receiving negative evaluations or not obtaining results, which is understandable, as it is believed that this could negatively impact those implementing the activities and ultimately lead to the loss of funding.”

It is not only implementer organizations that are worried. A respondent from Tunisia noted the Tunisian government’s apprehension regarding P/CVE evaluations based on “this belief that such evaluations could contain some elements that could embarrass the Tunisian government.” Nonetheless, cases like Tunisia also exemplify funding as an evaluation driver that has a positive influence on the frequency and quality of P/CVE evaluations. Although the Tunisian government is concerned about evaluations, “most of the P/CVE activities in

Tunisia are funded by foreign entities [that] request a clear, well-established M&E plan to monitor results achieved.” **Particularly in development contexts, international donor requirements for monitoring and evaluation are often the reason P/CVE activities are regularly evaluated.**

Innovation in P/CVE Evaluation

Survey respondents from 9 of our 12 case study countries **see little-to-no methodological innovation in P/CVE evaluations** (the exceptions are the US, UK, and Canada). This matches the 2023 survey results, where experts from 9 out of the 14 case study countries failed to see notable innovation in the field. Respondents addressed this explicitly, including one expert from Australia: “If there is innovation happening [in] methodology in P/CVE evaluations in my country, I am not aware of them. Most evaluations I’m familiar with in this space, including recent ones, include standard measures and approaches.” However, experts largely agreed on the main improvements in evaluation design and methodology they would like to see:


1. **Evaluations are not only designed as an “afterthought”** at the end of funding cycles, but throughout all stages of P/CVE activities, including developmental and real-time evaluations.
2. **Scientific approaches to P/CVE evaluations**; for example, by drawing indicators from an explicit theory of change, using theory-based methods such as realist evaluations, drawing on quasi-experimental research designs, or conducting randomized controlled trials.
3. **Standardization of indicators** so that evaluations of common types of P/CVE activities become comparable over time and across organizations, enabling more structured and systematic learning about which approaches work under what conditions.
4. **Community buy-in** to ensure evaluations account for the specific context in which the P/CVE activity is situated, and as a do-no-harm precaution as evaluators engage with beneficiaries; for example, by relying on participatory evaluation design.

As survey respondents considered that methodological improvements depend on a more scientific evaluation design, they also most frequently selected **university-based researchers (36.7 percent) as the actors most important as innovation sources** in their respective countries, with national governments as the second-most important (13.3 percent,

University-based researchers are considered the actors most important as innovation sources.

see Figure 6). Respondents also selected university-based researchers most often as an innovation actor in the 2023 survey, although the 2023 question phrasing did not ask for the “most important” source of innovation, and respondents were able to select several options, meaning the numbers are not directly comparable. In open-ended answers, 2024 respondents confirmed that they consider academic researchers the most important innovation actors due to their experience with rigorous methods – but also because their international networks enable cross-referencing and cross-pollination with other fields, such as criminal justice. National governments are considered an important innovation actor as they are the main funders of evaluations, they finance the implementation of new methodologies and can push for innovation.


Figure 6: Which Actors are the Most Important Source of Innovation for Evaluation in P/CVE in Your Country? (2024: n=30)



Evaluation Reporting and Publication

In 2023, survey respondents indicated that evaluation results were published occasionally, but not systematically, with 39.4 percent of experts saying evaluation results were made publicly available “sometimes.” **Overall, respondents still believe transparency regarding P/CVE evaluation results is lacking – publication rates might even have fallen:** in 2024, most experts indicated evaluation results were published “rarely” (43.3 percent); only 16.7 percent said results were shared “sometimes.” In total, over half (53.3 percent, see Figure 7) of our respondents said evaluation results are published “rarely or never.” Meanwhile, the rate of respondents who reported that evaluation results are made publicly available “often or very often” has stayed roughly the same, with a slight upward trend: 24.2 percent in 2023 compared to 30 percent in 2024. Responses were coherent across individual countries, with Norway and Czechia standing out as positive examples. As one Norwegian expert explained, “Official P/CVE evaluations are relatively seldom conducted [...] but when they are, they are always published openly.” Czech respondents explained that in their country, P/CVE activities tend to be either implemented within security agencies (e.g., police, prison system), which have regular evaluation and reporting cycles, or such activities are funded by international and regional organizations like the European Union, which requires evaluations and makes results publicly available. Experts from several countries noted that international funders, especially international aid organizations, often contribute to transparency by publishing (partial) evaluation results and encouraging evaluators to do likewise.

Figure 7: How Often are P/CVE Evaluation Results Published in the Form of (Publicly Available) Evaluation Reports? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30)



We also asked respondents why some evaluation reports are not published in their country. **Where evaluation results are withheld, it is often to avoid publishing negative findings or due to funders' reluctance to share evaluation results. There may also be increasing political sensitivity surrounding P/CVE activities and their evaluations.** In 2023, respondents most frequently cited funders blocking the publication of evaluation results as the reason for the lack of transparency (51.5 percent). Another frequently selected reason was wanting to avoid publishing negative findings (36.4 percent). In 2024, 46.7 percent of respondents still saw funders disagreeing on the publication of evaluation findings, and 50 percent saw evaluation reports withheld to avoid negative findings becoming public, 13.6 percent more than in 2023.

Where evaluation results are withheld, it is often to avoid publishing negative findings or due to funders' reluctance to share evaluation results.

The two drivers for blocking evaluation reports often coincide, as open-ended answers indicate. In some cases, governments are concerned about reputational costs if negative or “unexpected” evaluation findings are published. One expert from Indonesia suggested that evaluation reports could even incite “protest or criticism from radical/terrorist groups.” In other cases, there is little transparency on P/CVE to start with, and evaluations are not published to “avoid unwanted scrutiny” (the UK). This is also the case in Australia, where “law enforcement agencies who control various P/CVE programs can [...] be resistant to public release of evaluation findings.” However, withholding findings can also come with reputational damage. When the Australian Department of Home Affairs first suppressed and then released the findings of a validation study that found significant flaws with new violent extremism risk assessment tools, they were faced with “huge public and legal backlash on the government’s conduct.”¹⁴

Some experts addressed this dynamic explicitly by not selecting any of the provided options but by describing reasons for non-publication of evaluation results separately. For example, a respondent from Côte d'Ivoire listed the “sensitivity of some results,” another from Tunisia explained that “government could consider the outcome as criticism,” and in Australia, results are sometimes not published “to protect the reputation of civil society activity providers, some of whom do not wish to be publicly associated with P/CVE initiatives.”


Relatedly, 43.3 percent of respondents highlighted that some evaluation reports are not published to protect individuals and their personal data. Little has changed here since 2023, when 42.4 percent named the protection of individuals as a driver for non-publication. Strategies to deal with this issue, such as reporting on evaluation findings in a condensed or anonymized manner, have stayed the same as well. Beyond the political sensitivity of P/CVE, secondary or tertiary prevention efforts have a heightened responsibility to ensure that participants do not experience any repercussions for being labelled as having potential for radicalization or as being in a process of de-radicalization.

Interestingly, in comparison to 2023, experts saw fewer evaluation reports withheld because P/CVE implementers do not desire to see findings published (2023: 45.5 percent; 2024: 26.7 percent, see Figure 8). Several respondents in 2023 explained implementers' skepticism toward publication of evaluation results was due to concerns that findings could impact future funding or even give reason to close P/CVE activities down. While this dynamic was still frequently brought up by respondents in 2024 regarding whether an evaluation is conducted in the first place, and if so, at what level of ambition (see Evaluation Funding), its impact on the publication of results appears smaller.

Evaluation Uptake and Learning

Independent of the reasons for withholding P/CVE evaluation results, the low rate of publication also means other P/CVE actors cannot learn from evaluation findings and implement changes in their P/CVE activities. **When asked which uptake mechanisms exist to ensure stakeholders use evaluation results to improve their P/CVE policies, programming or projects, 12 of 30 respondents – twice as many as in 2023 – said that they do not know about any processes or that there simply are none.**

Figure 8: If Some Evaluation Reports in Your Country Are Not Published, What Are the Reasons for This Decision? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30)



“Which uptake mechanisms exist to ensure that stakeholders use evaluation results to improve their P/CVE policies, programming or practice in your country?”

“There are little to none, unfortunately.” – Kenya

“To my knowledge, there are no formal uptake mechanisms that exist. There are perhaps some informal mechanisms (...)” – Canada

“None.” – United States

“Unsure of any specific uptake mechanisms.” – United Kingdom

“In Tunisia, mechanisms for ensuring stakeholders use evaluation results to improve P/CVE policies and practices are extremely limited. There is no formal or institutionalized framework to systematically integrate evaluation findings into policy-making or program adjustments.” – Tunisia

“No such mechanism exists.” – Spain

“There are no mechanisms.” – Australia

Two countries are notable outliers in the uptake of evaluation results into P/CVE practice: experts from the Netherlands highlighted that a strong evaluation culture has led to different ways to learn from findings, including several databases on the evidentiary value of different types of interventions. In Norway, P/CVE evaluations are highly formalized and publicly conducted. They culminate in a political process aimed at improving the gaps in practice that are found. In other countries, **translating evaluation results into improvements in P/CVE practices seems to rely on ad-hoc and informal uptake mechanisms**. For example, one expert from Canada explained that in the framework of funding applications and planning P/CVE activities, implementers or funders may rely on published evaluation findings in other programs to adapt their activity design. **The reasons respondents highlighted for these barriers to learning from evaluation results can be categorized into two groups:**

1. Capacity and expertise constraints, both for implementers and donors

One expert from Canada explained that for implementers with limited resources, “one of the key challenges to the uptake of evaluation results is uncertainty around the continuity of funding, which can limit the capacity for long-term evaluation and follow-up.” Another respondent from the UK also highlighted that “time and resources are major factors, both in putting the findings into practice, and in enacting recommendations,” elaborating further that this becomes particularly problematic when recommendations lack practical applicability and do not account for the constraints implementer organizations realistically face. Donors may also not push for the uptake of evaluation results, as some “have a lack of scientific (including statistical) skills to appreciate the trustworthiness of (well-performed) evaluation[s],” as an expert from the US critically observed.

2. Inadequate political will and negative perceptions of evaluations

A lack of appreciation may also come from a generally negative view of evaluations; an expert from Kenya said “willingness” and “incentive/motivation” are among the biggest challenges to adapting programs based on evaluation results; donors often do not mandate change based on new conclusions. A respondent from Tunisia suggested the government is a major obstacle, explaining that uptake depends on the “government’s openness to see that the data emerging from an evaluation is mainly for better policymaking and not a criticism.” Inadequate political will can also be independent of P/CVE, as such, and rather connected to unrelated political struggles. An expert from Indonesia saw one problem as “the invested interest of influential people in certain methodologies, as opposed to other approaches involving potential competitors. There can be quite significant competition among government institutions.”

Support Structures

In terms of **structures to support quality assurance and evaluations of P/CVE activities, respondents reported a slight diversification, but no expansion** overall, in comparison to 2023. Experts still listed professional networks as the most frequently existing format to support evaluations (2023: 70.3 percent; 2024: 63.3 percent), together with toolkits and other educational and guidance resources (2023: 59.5 percent; 2024: 63.3 percent). Interactive training also remains a widespread means to support evaluation work (2023: 62.2 percent; 2024: 56.7 percent) as do knowledge hubs, though at a lower level (2023: 35.1 percent; 2024: 33.3 percent). More respondents reported evaluation databases: from 18.9 percent in 2023 to 26.7 percent in 2024. Similarly, non-interactive lectures have become slightly more common, rising from 10.8 percent of experts reporting such lectures in 2023 to 23.3 percent in 2024. However, since respondents were able to select several options at once, the (slight) increase in the use of toolkits, evaluation databases and non-interactive lectures needs to be weighed against the reduction in professional networks and interactive training – there appear to be more options to seek support for P/CVE evaluations, but not necessarily more support overall. Notably, the share of respondents reporting that there are no support

Experts listed professional networks as the most

frequently existing format to support evaluations.

structures in their country has remained the same: 13.5 percent in 2023 and 13.3 percent in 2024. In open-ended answers, even more reported that they do not see any “significant or impactful” support structures – 20 percent of 2024 respondents made similar statements.

When experts selected one or several existing support formats for P/CVE evaluations, their elaborations show that while some are highly appreciated (e.g., experts from Indonesia highlighted the value of the Indonesia Knowledge Hub on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: “IK-Hub”), others are deemed insufficient to fulfill their supporting functions effectively. For example, toolkits and guidance resources for evaluations might not cover all aspects relevant to facilitating more frequent and higher quality evaluations – a respondent from Australia criticized existing P/CVE evaluation guidelines because they do not “include guidance or information on funding resources and levels required for quality, impactful evaluation frameworks and approaches.” Another respondent from Spain explained that “there are guidelines in Spanish that emphasize the importance of evaluations, but these do not provide detailed instructions on how to conduct an evaluation.”

Many problems also come down to a lack of coordination within support structures: a Czech expert suggested that more emphasis should be placed on building local capacity for evaluations, fostering collaboration between academic institutions, government agencies and NGOs, and creating a unified system to monitor, evaluate and adjust P/CVE programs. As such, when asked which type of support structures are most valuable, experts primarily listed opportunities to connect and coordinate in the field and across levels of government: 40 percent mentioned professional networks and conferences; 16.7 percent found interactive training sessions more helpful. Some reasoned that professional networks are sometimes not inclusive enough of relevant stakeholders.


Evaluation Challenges

Finally, in line with all the interacting dynamics and issues raised throughout the survey, respondents selected **funding constraints** (26.7 percent) and **limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations** (23.3 percent) as **the greatest obstacles to conducting more frequent, widespread and high-quality evaluations**. 2024 respondents were

Funding constraints and limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations are the greatest obstacles to conducting more frequent, widespread and high-quality evaluations.

asked to choose from a list of five evaluation challenges generated from the responses of experts surveyed in 2023: methodological challenges, including ethics and data collection; lack of expertise and capacity; lacking central coordination and standard setting; insufficient understanding of the value of evaluations; and funding constraints. This year's results, therefore, shed additional light on the relative relevance of the different obstacles that P/CVE evaluation experts encounter in their work. Respondents not only found funding constraints and capacity limitations to be the most significant hurdles; they also saw these issues as interrelated. For example, evaluations, funding for evaluations and capacity-building for evaluations may become deprioritized because they block time and resources that implementers need for beneficiaries.

Figure 9: In Your View, What is the Greatest Obstacle to Conducting More Frequent, Widespread and High-Quality Evaluations in Your Country? (2024: n=30)



Summary Evaluation Trends

In summary, the 2024 expert survey on the evaluation of P/CVE activities reveals that across countries surveyed, the field has seen minimal progress since 2023. Our results indicate that the frequency of evaluations has remained the same, no matter whether we look at types or levels of P/CVE – primary prevention efforts are less evaluated than secondary and tertiary, and programs and projects are more frequently evaluated than individual measures, policies and organizations. The most common evaluators continue to be P/CVE implementers themselves, and governments remain the primary initiators and funders of evaluations.

Although experts named slightly more actors as evaluation initiators, funding opportunities were, overall, reduced in the surveyed period up to autumn 2024. The lack of funding for independent third-party evaluations remains a key concern, which can hinder the credibility, quality and learning potential of evaluations. Methodological innovation is sparse – in two-thirds of our case-study countries, experts do not see any meaningful development in evaluation design and methods. Transparency remains low and may have even decreased, with over half of our experts reporting that evaluations are rarely or never published in 2024 – often due to fear of reputational damage or political sensitivity. When results are not public, other actors cannot use them to improve their P/CVE work – and formal mechanisms to ensure that evaluation findings inform policy or practice are still largely absent, with only a few countries (e.g., Norway and the Netherlands) showing strong learning cultures.

Support structures for evaluation have slightly diversified but not expanded meaningfully, with experts desiring more coordinated efforts that allow for knowledge and expertise sharing. Overall, experts identify funding shortages and limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations as the main obstacles to better P/CVE evaluation practices.

Interpretation

Indicators for Stagnation

Our survey evidence across 12 countries globally offers sufficient indication to conclude that overall development of the P/CVE evaluation field has reached a plateau – and may even be stagnating. Consolidation of established practices and innovation definitely takes place in some areas we surveyed, and potentially also in countries not covered by our research. At the same time, our P/CVE evaluation experts report little to no improvement in the areas where we recommended improvements based on the 2023 survey, and even report noticeable negative trends.¹⁵

Overall development of the P/CVE
evaluation field has reached a plateau
– and may even be stagnating.

Our cross-national survey method warrants care in generalizing these findings. The respondent pool only covered two-to-three experts per country, which limits national-level insights. The 2024 respondents were also largely the same group as in 2023; experts may not have felt they had anything new to contribute, considering the relatively short survey intervals. Moreover, the survey did not explicitly ask experts whether they see stagnation. In addition, both P/CVE efforts and their evaluations are still under-researched. This survey was also therefore a rare opportunity for experts to voice any criticisms and frustrations they harbor, which potentially negatively impacted the overall picture.

Despite these limitations, our findings provide strong indications of stagnation in the P/CVE evaluation field, or even early signs of a possible downward trend. Some quantitative findings very clearly demonstrated a lack of growth, such as reduced publication rates for evaluation reports and reduced funding opportunities. Within the qualitative open-ended answers, respondents' statements regarding the lack of innovation in P/CVE evaluations were notably explicit and widespread; utilizing methodologies proven in other fields and trying out new approaches is key for the field's development. Moreover, although we did not directly ask them about it, respondents mentioned a lack of growth. Many of the excerpts quoted in section 2.3. Evaluation Trends illustrate this. A Spanish respondent explained that fundamentally, "evaluation is not a priority," and another from Côte d'Ivoire said that "nothing is [being] developed," no methodologies and no national strategy.

A validation workshop and additional background conversations with international experts further supported our interpretation of the survey findings. Participants provided nuanced assessments, with some suggesting the field might be consolidating rather than stagnating in individual countries, but many agreeing that the current moment is pivotal for both the future of P/CVE and evaluation. Experts also expressed varying views on whether the P/CVE field as a whole is stagnating. Some suggested it is rather the field of evaluations that is stagnating, due to the challenging nature of funding, developing and implementing sophisticated and innovative evaluation designs across the board, even though interest in P/CVE itself remains high.

Reasons for Stagnation

Beyond the question of whether the P/CVE evaluation field is stagnating, it is important to consider why this might be the case. The following analysis offers insights based on our data interpretation, validation workshop and follow-up conversations, without aiming to establish causal links.

One potential reason lies in the current stage of the field's development: **many of the easy wins – which offer reputational benefits at minimal cost – have already been achieved.** Guidelines and toolkits for P/CVE evaluation have been published in many places;¹⁶ policies mandating a minimum percentage of project budgets for evaluations are in place; national action plans have been written and released. However, such low-hanging fruit does not drive deeper, structural change to advance the field. What is required next is consistent, reliable investment in improvements that offer less immediate visibility and fewer reputational rewards – such as building substantial evaluation capacity, creating lasting support structures for knowledge – skill-sharing and fostering learning cultures that enable innovation in P/CVE efforts and their evaluations.

Experts in the validation workshop highlighted the responsibility of donors in the P/CVE and evaluation space. When they fail to use findings to improve P/CVE policies, strategies and practice, do not clearly communicate their evaluation objectives, or only decide after the fact whether negative results may be shared, they inhibit learning. One expert pointed out that **evaluations indeed largely feed donor preferences**, so donor requests for unambitious evaluation designs that do not encourage innovation or learning are one reason for stagnation and a lack of organic innovation.

Moreover, stagnation in the evaluation field could be linked to developments in the wider P/CVE field. This includes the increasingly contentious character of P/CVE. Although the label and associated activities have always been contested,¹⁷ political polarization around questions of what constitutes dangerous extremism vis-à-vis the democratic political

Stagnation in the evaluation field
could be linked to developments
in the wider P/CVE field.

mainstream is becoming more prevalent in many countries covered by this survey. As primary donors, governments continue to play a central role in shaping the direction of the P/CVE evaluation field, as we found in both our 2023 and 2024 surveys. Experts now report that governments are increasingly reluctant to promote P/CVE initiatives, their evaluations, or public discourse on these topics due to the issue's contested nature and the polarization associated with radical ideologies and their role in mainstream politics. This hesitancy is particularly evident in countries facing democratic backsliding, the (re-)emergence of authoritarianism, or where extremist political movements are gaining more political power and influence, such as Tunisia, the US, and Czechia. In their assessment of violent extremism trends within the survey, experts also identified the general mainstreaming of extremism as a growing threat to public safety. In combination, the lack of clear options for “easy wins,” high process hurdles, and increasing incentives to avoid drawing attention to P/CVE could be contributing to stagnation in the development of P/CVE evaluations.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Violent extremism remains a threat to public safety globally. While some threats – such as global Islamist extremism and far-right extremism in Europe, North America, and Australia – have persisted and evolved over time, new ideological trends are emerging. Experts are particularly concerned about the rise of ideologically fluid forms of extremism, such as anti-government or “hybrid” extremism. At the same time, many experts are skeptical of P/CVE’s focus on ideology as the main driver of radicalization, rather than mobilization to violence:

The second survey iteration shows worrying signs of stagnation. Existing obstacles remain unresolved or have worsened.

research shows that ideology and religion often play a more minor role in a person’s pathway to violent extremism, compared to social, psychological, experiential and other contextual life factors.¹⁸

These findings from our international expert monitoring highlight the importance of a strong evidence base both for effective P/CVE, and to avoid unintended harm through so-called preventive activities that are not rooted in sound knowledge of what works, under which conditions, to prevent radicalization and foster peaceful coexistence. Evaluations make a critical contribution to this evidence base.

Our first expert monitoring survey, 18 months ago, illustrated many examples of progress in different areas of P/CVE evaluation.¹⁹ Now, the second iteration shows worrying signs of stagnation. Existing obstacles remain unresolved or have worsened: evaluation frequency is stagnant; already limited funding opportunities have declined; methodological innovation is scarce; transparency has decreased; and capacity gaps persist without adequate countermeasures. Where extremist positions are moving into the political mainstream, P/CVE is increasingly politicized, and governments are becoming reluctant to fund and support evaluation efforts.

To effectively identify what works – and what does not – in preventing and countering extremism, persistent shortcomings in the P/CVE evaluation field must be addressed. The recommendations from the first report in this series based on the 2023 survey remain relevant. At the same time, this study’s findings provide further evidence and nuance useful for prioritizing recommendations to most effectively advance the field of P/CVE evaluation. In particular, greater emphasis on maintaining and building trust between all P/CVE stakeholders is needed to counter increasing politicization, enhance transparency of evaluation findings, fund independent and innovative evaluation approaches, create synergies in capacity-building efforts, and recognize the possible risks of stagnation.

1 All P/CVE stakeholders should focus on building mutual trust and should approach evaluations as opportunities to achieve more coherent and effective prevention efforts. Where extremist ideologies have moved into the political mainstream or positions of power, there is an increased risk of P/CVE being driven by ideology rather than by accountability, evidence, and learning. Stakeholders should pay close attention to these dynamics and invest in the constructive relationships needed for learning-based improvements in P/CVE.

Compared to the first monitoring round, evidence from this round indicates growing concern over changing political conditions and decreasing support for learning-based P/CVE and evaluations. Strained relationships between stakeholders – particularly government and civil society – can make P/CVE less effective.²⁰ Governments and funders should prioritize building

trust-based relationships with all P/CVE stakeholders to enable careful, coordinated approaches that do not cause unintended harm, even in increasingly polarized contexts. Where extremist ideologies have already penetrated positions of power in government, civil society needs to protect its work strategically. Depending on the context, evaluations can help demonstrate the effectiveness and rigor of P/CVE efforts. Maintaining and building trust-based relationships that can withstand external pressure also helps to address other structural issues in the P/CVE evaluation field.

2 Funders should continue to invest in and support exchange among all P/CVE stakeholders.

- a. Wherever possible, funders should support and enable the sharing of evaluation results and lessons learned, even if results are redacted or summarized for confidentiality. For example, findings may be shared through accessible evaluation databases or dedicated discussion formats**
- b. Funders should invest in exchange formats that facilitate dialogue and foster informal connections between practitioners, researchers, evaluators, and policymakers. These formats should provide room for discussion of whether and why the evaluation field is stagnating, and how stakeholders can join forces to sustain progress.**
- c. Wherever appropriate, stakeholders should ensure that formats for sharing evaluation results, research findings and experiences include exchanges and discussions on evolving extremism trends – such as hybrid and ideologically fluid extremism, the mainstreaming of radical and extremist beliefs, and non-ideological roots of radicalization – and their impact on P/CVE efforts and evaluations.**

With publication rates of evaluation findings falling, the barriers to using evaluation results to improve P/CVE practice are rising. This warrants a careful and nuanced approach to sharing evaluation results. Therefore, responsible sharing of evaluation findings and exchange between P/CVE stakeholders should be supported, considering confidentiality requirements and the sensitivity of information about P/CVE activities. Exchanges and dialogues are also crucial in adapting P/CVE efforts to current developments, not only in political dynamics, but also in violent extremism trends – such as the rise of ideologically fluid extremism phenomena. In this context, funders should support endeavors to integrate new evidence on the role of ideology and religion in radicalization in P/CVE efforts and evaluations.

3 Stakeholders should ensure adequate funding for high-quality evaluations and make strategic, learning-driven investments, particularly as budgets shrink.

- a. Funders should provide resources for the evaluation of P/CVE activities they support. Where grants cover evaluation costs, funders should require implementers to budget for evaluations at the proposal stage, and implementers should earmark such funds accordingly from the project outset.**

- b. **To enable implementers to conduct or commission evaluations at their own initiative, funders should develop dedicated funding mechanisms.**
- c. **Across all types of evaluation funding, stakeholders should encourage the involvement of independent experts as third-party evaluators or advisors.**

Experts consistently named funding as a key challenge in achieving more frequent, higher-quality P/CVE evaluations. In the surveyed period up to autumn 2024, respondents indicated that funding opportunities have further decreased from a level that many already considered insufficient. Major donors' severe cuts to development aid in 2025, particularly the dismantling of USAID, will further impact funding options for P/CVE. Although halting or reversing this trend will be difficult, stakeholders need to make strategic decisions on what to evaluate in order to move the field forward. As the P/CVE field might face additional contestation around instrumentalization in polarized societies, evaluation is an opportunity to assure quality by bringing in independent researchers for quality assurance and as third parties who support the credibility, quality, and learning focus of evaluations and P/CVE approaches.

4 Stakeholders should invest in building the capacity of implementers and government officials to conduct and manage high-quality evaluations and learning processes.

- a. **Stakeholders should prioritize developing and strengthening evaluation support and capacity-building formats that facilitate exchange and coordination, such as professional networks, interactive training, and knowledge hubs.**
- b. **Stakeholders should ensure such evaluation-support and capacity-building formats build on each other rather than funding fragmented, one-off efforts that duplicate existing structures.**

Since implementers remain the most frequent evaluators of P/CVE efforts and governments continue to be the main funders of P/CVE evaluations, the evaluation capacities of both actors are crucial for delivering valuable evaluation results. A better understanding of evaluation processes and indicators for high-quality evaluations could also support trust-building between implementers and funders, including governments. However, while budgets shrink and stagnation sets in, stakeholders cannot afford duplication or to fund structures that incentivize reinventing the wheel instead of building on what exists already. The usefulness of evaluation support and capacity-building formats depends on whether they contribute to an overall ecosystem of evaluation, learning and adjustment in P/CVE activities.²¹ By connecting stakeholders across disciplines and contexts, capacity-building formats that include network-building in addition to knowledge-exchange and training can drive methodological innovation – particularly since respondents highlighted the value of exchanges between practitioners and experts.

5 Stakeholders should ensure that evaluations follow learning strategies with clear uptake mechanisms.

- a. Governments and implementers should develop uptake mechanisms that ensure that evaluation results feed into efforts to improve extremism prevention policies, strategies, programs, and activities.**
- b. Funders and implementers should set goals for evaluation uptake together and agree to engage with possible negative evaluation results for further learning, rather than as a mere performance review of implementers.**

Uptake of results for the purpose of learning and improvement of activities to prevent violent extremism and foster peaceful coexistence should be the main reason for evaluation. However, the 2024 survey revealed that capacity and expertise constraints, as well as inadequate political will and negative perceptions of evaluations, stand in the way of effective uptake. Stakeholders should align their learning goals and allocate resources to uptake mechanisms early in the evaluation process, to ensure this last but crucial step is not neglected. Framing the improvement of P/CVE activities clearly as a shared evaluation goal can help redirect capacities and overcome fears that evaluations are mainly tools to decide on future funding.

6 Stakeholders should beware of the risks of stagnation in the P/CVE evaluation field and work to preserve critical knowledge, experts and networks, while addressing past shortcomings.

In this study, we found worrisome indications that the P/CVE evaluation field across surveyed countries is stagnating rather than thriving. Current funding cuts to many government budgets and within the multilateral system of the United Nations and other intergovernmental agencies present additional challenges to P/CVE activities and evaluation, as well as to the international architecture that gathers and synthesizes knowledge. We will further investigate the stagnation hypothesis and its potential causes in the next iteration of this survey series, but this study should already provide enough evidence to recognize the risk of stagnation and its consequences – for example, through losses of capacity, expertise and funding for P/CVE activities and evaluation methods.

This situation may also constitute an opportunity. P/CVE practice in many places has been far from perfect over the past 20 years. Programs that have never had to demonstrate their value and effectiveness might need to get serious about accountability and learning as budgets tighten. The key question is whether stakeholders will manage to preserve what is worth keeping and use this pivotal moment to leverage both lessons from the past and evidence of ongoing and future activities to reshape P/CVE and related fields of action, which seek to foster peaceful communities, as more learning-focused fields.

The upcoming third international monitoring survey and research report in this series will further investigate these questions and synthesize findings and lessons from three monitoring survey rounds into a final set of recommendations for P/CVE and evaluation.

Annex A - Methodology²²

Survey Development

We administered the expert monitoring survey on practices, challenges, needs, and innovations in P/CVE evaluation for this report through the online survey tool LimeSurvey between November and December 2024. The survey built on the first version, originally developed in 2023.²³ This second survey consisted of 42 multiple-choice and open-ended questions in four sections (see full questionnaire in Annex B).

The questionnaire's four sections gathered insights into current approaches and promising developments for evaluation and extremism prevention practice. The first part explored current and future-oriented practices of evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE and related fields by asking experts questions on evaluation approaches, actors, innovations, and challenges. The second part of the survey enquired about the role of P/CVE programs and citizenship education in the respective country in general.²⁴ Finally, we asked experts about present and future extremist phenomena in their country of expertise. To validate the answers, survey respondents received the definitions of key concepts at the survey's outset. The expected survey completion time was 60–90 minutes, depending on the length of the selected questions and answers provided.

The majority of survey questions remained unchanged from 2023, to enable comparison and continuous monitoring. We refined and added questions based on research results and lessons from the first round, to obtain additional evidence on key issues such as underrated future extremist threats, evaluation funding, innovation, challenges, evaluation, and uptake. We dropped some questions because the answers did not yield meaningful results in 2023. We also dropped a longer section on the general P/CVE landscape in the respective countries from this second iteration, because the first round already established a baseline of information about the actors and nature of P/CVE efforts per country to contextualize findings on evaluations. Only questions on recent changes and innovations that could have altered the P/CVE landscape remained.

Terminology

The types of activities that are labeled as P/CVE may differ between countries, based on aspects such as linguistics, the origins and evolution of the extremism prevention field, and domestic debates. We therefore provided survey participants with working definitions of central concepts.

We understand preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) as a spectrum of non-coercive efforts aimed at mitigating key drivers of radicalization and dissuading individuals from engaging in ideologically motivated violence.²⁵ All activities that meet this definition, regardless of whether they are designated as P/CVE in the respective country, are relevant to the present research project.

The expert survey also covered related activities beyond the P/CVE framework, which are designed to promote community resilience without being explicitly seen as preventive, for example, by fostering social cohesion or peaceful coexistence.²⁶ This research project and the questionnaire further draw on a public health model that distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, and acknowledges that these boundaries may be fluid.²⁷

This survey and report understand P/CVE measures as individual preventative or interventional actions that can be applied at an individual, relational, group or societal level, depending on where the driver of radicalization is identified. If P/CVE measures reflect coordinated efforts with a clearly defined scope and life cycle, targeting specific aspects of primary, secondary, and/or tertiary prevention, they may be understood as P/CVE projects. A broader scope of activities defines P/CVE programs, which may therefore include multiple projects. P/CVE programs usually stem from P/CVE policies and/or strategies, which provide guidelines and frameworks for P/CVE objectives and how they intend to be achieved. Lastly, this research project uses P/CVE activities as an inclusive term for the aforementioned concepts, representing any and all undertakings of relevant P/CVE stakeholders to counter and prevent violent extremism, as well as previously listed related activities beyond the P/CVE framework, within given contexts.

To define evaluation and quality assurance, this project follows the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by understanding evaluation as “the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results.”²⁸ An evaluation aims to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives such as efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and/or sustainability. Beyond this rather narrow understanding of evaluation, quality assurance may also take other forms, especially in different contexts. For the purposes of this study, in addition to formal evaluations, we were also interested in discovering other mechanisms and measures for quality assurance.

Country Selection

The 12 countries covered in this study are Australia, Canada, Czechia, Indonesia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, the UK, and the US, all of which we also covered in the first iteration of this international monitoring in 2023.²⁹ Back then, the research team had identified countries through a literature review and expert interviews. The criteria for selection included whether a country had a significant P/CVE evaluation landscape with sufficient independent (non-government) experts with an overview of the landscape, and potential survey respondents with English-language skills. Additional criteria were the representation of different world regions, various extremist-threat phenomena, the existence of P/CVE evaluation according to the literature, and the level of academic freedom in each country. In 2024, we had to drop Singapore and Bosnia and Herzegovina from the sample because it was not possible to recruit a sufficient number of independent, non-governmental experts in the P/CVE evaluation field for those countries as survey respondents within the constraints of this study in 2024 (see participant selection below).

Survey Participant Selection

The 30 survey respondents for the survey covered in this report consist of two-to-three experts per country, who we recruited from among researchers, practitioners and evaluators who work independently of any government authority and who had both expertise in P/

CVE or related activities in one of the survey countries, and comprehensive knowledge of evaluations in these fields. We started with the expert pool from our 2023 monitoring and recruited additional experts where necessary. For their participation, respondents received financial compensation of EUR 400. We based both the original and this iteration's sampling processes on online searches, expert networks and a snowballing approach. We paid particular attention to gender diversity and the inclusion of local experts who live and work in the respective countries. Most of the selected respondents were located in or originally from the country on which they reported. Overall, we invited 57 experts to complete the survey based on the selection criteria (39 percent women; 61 percent men). Of these, 34 accepted the invitation to participate (60 percent acceptance rate) and 31 completed the survey (35 percent women; 65 percent men; 54 percent completion rate). Of these 31 respondents, 11 participated for the first time, and 20 had already participated in 2023. Of the 31 responses, 30 were considered in the analysis and are reported in the results (37 percent women; 63 percent men).³⁰

Survey Analysis

We analyzed the survey results between January and March 2025. We conducted both a descriptive statistical analysis of the quantitative survey results and a qualitative content analysis of open-ended answers, using a mix of deductive and inductive coding. In a first, deductive coding round, we used the codes from the 2023 iteration of the survey. In a second, inductive coding round, we added new codes. A final, independent coding round served as validation. After we completed the data processing, we analyzed recurring themes, challenges, examples of good practices, and other noteworthy points within individual categories, and cross-referenced relevant findings with secondary literature as well as with findings from the previous expert survey in 2023.

Validation Workshop

To validate findings and gather additional expert assessments, we organized an online validation workshop. All of the survey respondents were invited, along with additional experts from our international expert pool. As the goal was to discuss the relevance of findings and recommendations, we also invited experts on the P/CVE landscape in Germany and the PrEval consortium. The discussion, among 19 participants, focused on hypotheses of stagnation in the P/CVE evaluation field and the effects of hybrid ideologies on the field. The workshop findings are referenced as such in this report. Wherever the workshop discussion left questions open, we followed up with individual experts for follow-up conversations, which are also referenced as such in the report text.

Limitations

All empirical claims presented in this study are drawn from insights obtained through the expert surveys in 2023 and 2024, unless explicitly cited from a specific document or source, including the validation workshop. The results represent the assessments of individual non-government experts, meaning we do not claim to representatively discuss the prevention and evaluation landscapes in the respective country contexts. Collecting official government positions and assessments would require a different methodology, which would also need

to consider that different parts and levels of government in individual countries may have differing assessments. Our results, therefore, do not represent official government positions or records.

The survey's scope and our available resources, as well as limited publicly available information concerning some issues addressed in the survey, restricted our ability to verify participants' responses against official records and external sources. We compared all survey responses against responses from different participants answering for the same country context, in order to note relevant differences and deviations. The aggregate findings are to be read as an assessment of the sector in the various countries according to two-to-three experts per country, not as the objective reality.

The survey and associated research were conducted predominantly in English, which means the country selection and identification of expert respondents are based on available information about P/CVE activities and evaluation in English. In 2023, the research team translated key terms into national languages using online tools, to expand the scope of possible results. Overall, the population of experts with both P/CVE and evaluation expertise and a comprehensive overview of the landscape in each country is limited, and the number of experts who fulfilled the inclusion criteria varied greatly from country to country.

As discussed in the key concepts section, varying definitions for what constitutes "P/CVE" create challenges for the transferability of labels and comparability of results across contexts. To acknowledge this issue and allow for more nuance, the survey questionnaire provided respondents with a relatively broad definition that also accounts for P/CVE-related fields and activities, even if these may not be labeled as such in the given context. Wherever appropriate, we asked survey respondents to reflect on these considerations through open-ended follow-up questions. A cross-national exchange of good practices and lessons learned should remain sensitive to the specificity of individual contexts.³¹ Although this study considers country contexts when analyzing survey data, it acknowledges inherent limitations in transferring extremism prevention and deradicalization programs into other contexts. An initial contextual analysis is required before a promising practice from one country can be explored and adopted in another context. This also has implications when managing expectations for similar outcomes of these P/CVE activities in one's domestic context.

Annex B – Survey Questionnaire

Section 1: P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance

In this first section of the survey, we want to explore current and future-oriented practices of evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE and related fields in your country of expertise. You will be asked a series of questions on evaluation approaches, actors, innovations, and challenges.

Overview:

1. How often are evaluations and quality assurance measures conducted in the field of P/CVE in your country at the respective levels? [matrix]

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Primary (e.g., society at large, certain sub-sections of society)							
Secondary (e.g., individuals considered “at risk”, local communities considered “at risk”)							
Tertiary (e.g., individuals considered to be “radicalized”)							

2. How often are the following types of P/CVE activities evaluated? [matrix]

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know
Individual P/CVE measures						
Individual P/CVE projects						
P/CVE programs						
P/CVE policies/strategies						
Organizations						
Other (please specify below)						

3. Please elaborate at which time intervals/how often evaluations are conducted for each type. [open answer]

Evaluation Actors and Funding

4. Who acts as the evaluators of the aforementioned P/CVE activities? [multiple choice: select many]
 - a. The implementers of the project/program themselves (self-evaluation)
 - b. Funders (e.g., government entities, foundations, international organizations)
 - c. University-based researchers (third party)
 - d. Independent consultants (third party)
 - e. Commercial evaluation companies (third party)
 - f. Other, namely [open answer]
 - g. Do not know
 - h. Prefer not to respond
5. At whose request or initiative are P/CVE evaluations initiated in your country? [multiple choice: select many]
 - a. Government (national or sub-national/local)
 - b. Foundations / philanthropies
 - c. Foreign donor governments
 - d. Regional organizations
 - e. International organizations
 - f. Implementers take the initiative to evaluate their activities without external requests
 - g. Academic researchers
 - h. Other, namely [open answer]
 - i. Do not know
 - j. Prefer not to respond
6. For which reasons are P/CVE activities evaluated in your country and what are the main goals of the evaluations? [open answer]
7. How are evaluations of P/CVE activities financed in your country? [multiple choice: select many]
 - a. Budgets for P/CVE activities include funds for the evaluations
 - b. If a government entity requests an evaluation, it provides additional funding to cover the costs
 - c. If implementers wish to evaluate their activities, they can access dedicated funds from the government in addition to existing project or program funding
 - d. Non-governmental organizations finance the evaluations

- e. Other, namely [open answer]
 - f. Do not know
 - g. Prefer not to respond
8. If there are dedicated funding instruments for evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE, please provide specific examples and details on what they are and how they function: [open answer]
 9. In your opinion: What would evaluation funding need to look like to better support evaluation efforts?

Innovations

10. Which promising methodological innovations for P/CVE evaluations are currently being developed or used in your country (e.g. types of evaluations, methods, cooperation)? Please provide examples. [open question]
11. Are you aware of any digital methods or tools used for evaluation in P/CVE in your country (e.g., online interviews, apps, big data analyses...)? What are they and how are they used? [open answer]
12. Which actors are the most important source of innovation for evaluation in P/CVE in your country? [multiple choice: select only one]
 - a. Government (national)
 - b. Government (sub-national or local)
 - c. Non-governmental / civil society actors
 - d. University-based researchers
 - e. Independent consultants
 - f. Commercial evaluation companies
 - g. Foundations / philanthropies
 - h. Foreign donor governments
 - i. Regional organizations
 - j. International organizations
 - k. Other, namely [open answer]
 - l. Do not know
 - m. Prefer not to respond
13. Please provide details on these actors promote innovation for P/CVE evaluation.

Evaluation Results and Knowledge Management

14. How often are P/CVE evaluation results published in the form of (publicly available) evaluation reports? [multiple choice: select one]
 - a. Very often
 - b. Often
 - c. Sometimes
 - d. Rarely
 - e. Never
 - f. Do not know
 - g. Prefer not to respond
15. Please elaborate on how often, in which form and by whom evaluation reports are published: [open answer]
16. If some evaluation reports in your country are not published, what are the reasons for this decision? [multiple choice: select many]
 - a. To protect individuals and their personal data
 - b. To avoid publishing negative findings
 - c. Publication is not desired by the funders of the evaluation
 - d. Publication is not desired by those entities whose activities are evaluated
 - e. Other, namely [open answer]
 - f. Do not know
 - g. Prefer not to respond
17. If some evaluations are not published: In which other formats and among which stakeholder groups are (partial) evaluation results shared and disseminated in your country?
18. Which uptake mechanisms exist to ensure that stakeholders use evaluation results to improve their P/CVE policies, programming or practice in your country? [open answer]
19. What are the challenges to the uptake of evaluation results and how could they be overcome? [open answer]

Support Structures

20. Which formats or structures exist to support evaluation and quality assurance of P/CVE in your country? [multiple choice: select many]
 - a. Professional network(s)
 - b. Interactive trainings or talks (e.g., webinars, advanced trainings, symposia, professional conferences)
 - c. Non-interactive lectures
 - d. Evaluation database(s)
 - e. Knowledge hub(s)
 - f. Toolkit(s) and other educational and guidance resources
 - g. Helpdesk(s)
 - h. Other, namely [open answer]
 - i. No support structures exist
 - j. Do not know
 - k. Prefer not to respond
21. Which existing support structures (from those listed above or other support channels) add the most value in your view, and why? [open answer]

Challenges

22. In your view, what is the greatest obstacle to conducting more frequent, widespread and high-quality evaluations in your country?
 - a. Methodological challenges (including ethical considerations and obstacles to data collection)
 - b. Limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations
 - c. A lack of central coordination and standard setting for evaluations
 - d. Insufficient awareness for the value of evaluation
 - e. Funding constraints
 - a. Other, namely [open answer]
23. What would be needed to strengthen P/CVE evaluation, and to improve the frequency and quality of evaluations in your country? [open answer]

Comparison and Outlook

24. What other countries do you look to for inspiration and good practices regarding P/CVE programming and evaluation? In which areas specifically? [open answer]

25. Which actors, entities, organizations, or other policy fields besides P/CVE do you look to for inspiration and good practices regarding evaluation and quality assurance? [open answer]
26. In general, which evaluation methods or approaches do you find particularly promising for evaluating and improving P/CVE (from within or outside the field)? [open answer]

Section 2: P/CVE and Civic Education

27. Which actors are involved in P/CVE activities in your country in general (no matter if they are involved in evaluation or not)? Please select all that apply. [multiple choice: select many]
 - a. National government
 - b. Regional or sub-national government
 - c. Local government (municipalities)
 - d. Non-governmental / civil society actors
 - e. Regional (e.g., EU, AU, ASEAN) or international organizations (e.g., UN, World Bank)
 - f. Individual foreign donor governments
 - g. Private / commercial entities
 - h. Philanthropies / foundations
 - i. Other, namely [open answer]
 - j. Do not know
 - k. Prefer not to respond

P/CVE Innovations

28. What are the most promising recent innovations in P/CVE programming and activities in your country to help prevent violent extremism in general? [open answer]
29. What promising programs, activities or approaches exist in your country to prevent the radicalization of youth in online spaces?

Civic Education

30. Does the field of “civic education” (or “citizenship education”) exist as distinct working area separated from other educational fields (with a distinct government budget line) in your country?
 - Yes
 - No

31. Which of the following structures on civic or citizenship education (CE) exist in your country?

	Yes	No	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Journal in a national language about civic and citizenship education				
Study programmes at colleges or universities to qualify for civic and citizenship education				
University units that focus on civic and citizenship education				
Further education and training for educators in civic and citizenship education				
Professional association(s), NGO(s) on civic and citizenship education				
Government agencies (or parts thereof) responsible for civic or citizenship education				
Professional standards for implementing civic and citizenship education				
Professional outcome standards to control the quality and effectiveness of civic and citizenship education in formal education				

32. Which of the following structures on deradicalization and P/CVE exist in your country?

	Yes	No	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Journal in a national language about prevention of political and/or religious radicalization or extremism				
Study programmes at colleges or universities to qualify for P/CVE				
University units that focus specifically on P/CVE				
Further education and training for educators on P/CVE				
Professional association(s), NGOs on P/CVE				
Government agencies (or parts thereof) responsible for P/CVE				
Professional standards for implementing P/CVE				
Professional outcome standards to control the quality and effectiveness of P/CVE in formal education				

33. How close are cooperation and exchange between the field of (civic/citizenship) education and the field of P/CVE in your country context in the following areas?

	Frequent, widespread cooperation and exchange	Some cooperation and exchange	No cooperation and exchange	Not applicable	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
In academia						
In government (e.g. policies)						
In schools (education)						
In teacher training						
In youth work / social work outside of schools						

34. Please provide details on the level of cooperation and exchange between the civic/citizenship education and P/CVE fields in your country context.
35. Have there been any evaluations of projects/programs in which the two fields have cooperated? If so, what was the context and which are some recommendations with regards to the cooperation between the two fields?

Section 3: Violent Extremism – Phenomena and Threats

Before finishing this survey, we are interested in your insights on two questions related to the violent extremist phenomena your country of expertise currently faces and is expected to face in the next years.

Threat Assessment:

36. Which violent extremist phenomena do you currently consider a threat to public safety in your country? [open answer]
37. Which violent extremist phenomena will likely threaten public safety in your country in the next 2-5 years if not adequately addressed? [open answer]
38. Which violent extremist phenomenon or tactic is the most underrated future threat to public safety in your country in the next 2-5 years?

Section 4: Final Question

39. In this survey, we have asked you about various aspects of P/CVE evaluation and quality assurance in your country:
- P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance I
 - P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance II
 - P/CVE and Civic Education
 - Violent Extremism – Phenomena and Threats

Is there anything else you would like to share with us regarding the situation of P/CVE evaluations in your country that goes beyond these aspects, or that was missing within one of these sections? [open answer]

40. Please provide any feedback or insights you have on the style or structure of the survey, e.g., its clarity, logical flow, user experience. [open answer]
41. We thank you for your time and insights. To ensure that we match your responses to the intended country context, please confirm on which country you answered this survey once more: [open answer]

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Acknowledgments

The team is indebted to Sophie Ebbecke and Lotta Rahlf for their contributions to the conception of this survey and the implementation of its first iteration, as well as to Philipp Rotmann, Lotta Rahlf and our colleagues at GPPi, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, and the PrEval consortium for their insightful comments on initial drafts and the many fruitful conversations we had while developing this report. We thank all experts who participated in our survey and the validation workshop. We are grateful to Zoë Johnson, Oliver Jung, Sonya Sugrobova and Jonathan Grayson for copyediting, proofreading, typesetting, and communicating this report as well as developing the graphs and visualizations needed to illustrate our findings.

Gefördert durch:



Bundesministerium
des Innern

aufgrund eines Beschlusses
des Deutschen Bundestages

This research was funded by the Federal Ministry of the Interior as part of the project “Evaluation and Quality Management in Extremism Prevention, Democracy Promotion and Civic Education: Analysis, Monitoring, Dialogue (PrEval).”

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