

# Real-Time Evaluation of UNICEF's Response to the Sa'ada Conflict in Northern Yemen

## Evaluation Team

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## **Final report**

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## **Disclaimer**

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of UNICEF.

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## **Front cover photograph**

A young displaced girl in al-Mazrak camp 3 during celebrations for World Water Day in March 2010. Photo by UNICEF.

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## Map of Yemen



Source: UNICEF

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## Acronyms

BEDS	Basic Education Development Strategy
BEGE	Basic Education and Gender Equality
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPPi	Global Public Policy Institute
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCA	Project Cooperation Agreement
PSS	Psychosocial support
Q&A	Question and Answer
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UXOs	Unexploded Ordnances
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
YCSD	Young Child Survival and Development

## Executive Summary

This report contains the main findings and recommendations of an evaluation of UNICEF's response to the emergency in Northern Yemen following the outbreak of the sixth round of fighting in the Sa'ada conflict in August 2009. The evaluation was conducted between July and August 2010 and was designed as a Real-Time Evaluation. As such, the main purpose of this evaluation was to support a process of organisational learning of UNICEF's country office in Yemen.

To reach this goal, the evaluation team included a strong participatory component in the evaluation exercise and implemented several learning workshops. The focus, composition and design of these workshops were defined in response to the demand of different stakeholders. They included learning exercises for two cluster groups and a workshop for members of UNICEF's emergency team in Yemen that refined, supplemented, and prioritised suggested recommendations. In addition, this exercise clarified who would be responsible for implementation, what successful implementation would mean and by when actions should be taken.

The evaluation found that key stakeholders in Yemen, including the population affected by the conflict in Sa'ada, the government and local authorities as well as humanitarian partner organisations, highly appreciate UNICEF's presence and its commitment to addressing emergency needs in Northern Yemen. UNICEF's most important achievements relating to the emergency response include:

- UNICEF was one of the first organisations active in implementing relief activities on the ground and several of its staff members demonstrated an impressive level of commitment, initially including the direct implementation of relief activities in the absence of experienced implementing partners.
- The country team showed a good capacity to identify problems and address them in the two main IDP camps in Haradh. This capacity to learn was supported by the existence of several effective institutional processes for identifying lessons.
- UNICEF and its implementing partners achieved good coverage of services in most of its areas of responsibility in Al-Mazrak camps 1 and 3 in Haradh and beneficiaries in these camps described interventions as largely appropriate (if not always sufficient) to their needs.
- Several of UNICEF's interventions had a good link to recovery and development, including for example the piped water system serving IDPs as well as host communities, the newly introduced system of water quality control and interventions educating and building the capacity of IDPs and local partner organisations.

The most important challenges currently confronting UNICEF in Yemen include:

- UNICEF was ill-prepared for the emergency in Northern Yemen, currently has no active contingency plans and, like other organisations in Yemen, lacks the necessary data and analysis for improving preparedness and longer-term planning.
- The current response focuses mainly on two camps in Haradh, while services for IDPs outside those camps, for host communities and in other governorates remain sketchy. According to UNHCR estimates, however, less than 17% of IDPs currently live in camps. Moreover, there are gaps in humanitarian response relating to landmines, child soldiers, education (above grade six) and the special needs of some groups.
- Despite an initially timely response, UNICEF's later activities were often delayed and some of the materials used, especially large tents used for educational activities, are not appropriate for the climatic conditions in Northern Yemen.
- UNICEF's country office largely operates in "development mode", leading to the overburdening of regular staff as well as processes, structures and competencies that are not adapted to the needs of an emergency situation.
- Coordination gaps persist despite progress in this area and UNICEF's work through local implementing partners faces quality problems.

With Yemen facing a very dynamic situation in the short-term and a very high risk of new emergencies in the medium-term, it is important for UNICEF to increase its capacity to respond to disasters. To do so, the organisation needs to take strategic decisions on how to balance its engagement in emergency relief with its development-oriented activities. To do so, UNICEF needs to conduct a thorough situation analysis and develop contingency plans with its partners as well as adapt its organisational structures, processes and capacities accordingly. The following table contains detailed recommendations prioritised by UNICEF's emergency team in Yemen as well as a summary of the main findings of the evaluation. To ensure follow-up to these recommendations, the country team assigned the overall responsibility for developing a follow-up process to its incoming emergency officer and it is planning an additional workshop with the evaluation team to track progress in implementation and update recommendations for October 2010.

**Table 1: Main findings and priority recommendations**

<b>PREPAREDNESS, SURGE CAPACITY AND LEARNING</b>	
<p><b>Main findings</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The UNICEF Country Office in Yemen lacked preparedness and the EPRP was not practical. {§11}</li> <li>2. The deployment of short-term, non-Arabic speaking surge capacity imposed a burden on the country team. {§12}</li> <li>3. The country team showed a good capacity to learn and there are helpful institutional mechanisms for identifying lessons in place; however, few follow-up mechanisms exist. {§§13&amp;14}</li> <li>4. Current contingency planning for accelerating return of IDP populations or, alternatively, a 7<sup>th</sup> war in Sa’ada is insufficient. {§15}</li> </ol>	<p><b>Priority recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct a comprehensive situation analysis building on existing assessments as the basis for funding proposals, annual workplans and contingency plans.</li> <li>• The Humanitarian Coordinator with the Humanitarian Country Team should provide clear inter-agency guidance on position regarding Sa’ada (e.g. focus on return and expand activities? Work through implementing partners? Collaborate with Al-Houthis?).</li> <li>• Identify partners who are accepted by the communities they are serving in Sa’ada, involve them in preparedness, build their capacity, create stand-by agreements or project cooperation agreements (PCAs) using new PCA guidelines.</li> </ul>
<b>TIMELINESS</b>	
<p><b>Main finding</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. UNICEF was one of the first organisations on the ground, but frequent delays undermine its credibility. {§16}</li> </ol>	<p><b>Priority recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply emergency procedures to all activities related to emergency, including the use of Long-Term Agreements to simplify and accelerate procurement of supplies.</li> <li>• Create a UNICEF warehouse in Yemen and pre-position critical supplies.</li> <li>• Agree with ministries through MoUs to set aside a share of around 20-25% of incoming supplies provided by UNICEF to the country to be released immediately to respond to emerging emergency situations.</li> </ul>



<b>COVERAGE AND EFFECTIVENESS</b>	
<p><b>Main findings</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. UNICEF and its implementing partners provide excellent coverage for water and relatively good coverage for other services in the main IDP camps in Haradh. {§18}</li> <li>7. IDPs and host communities outside IDP camps and in other governorates, however, receive only partial or no services. {§19}</li> <li>8. Thematic gaps related to UNICEF’s mandate include interventions relating to child soldiers, education beyond grade six, energy sources, WASH facilities in learning environments and child-friendly spaces, gender-based violence. {§20}</li> <li>9. General thematic gaps include IDP registration, landmines, early recovery, Qat consumption and smuggling, polygamy, early marriage and family planning, vector control, skin diseases, follow-up for psychiatric cases and some IDP camp design issues. {§21}</li> <li>10. Insufficient attention is paid to the special needs of different groups, such as IDPs without identification cards, large households, female-headed households, people with disabilities and marginalised groups. {§22}</li> <li>11. Risks associated with humanitarian interventions are not systematically assessed and mitigated. {§23}</li> </ol>	<p><b>Priority recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Address the current imbalance and re-focus the response effort on IDPs in Sa’ada, Amran and Al-Jawf (rather than mainly in Hajjah), and especially IDPs outside camps through an extension of partnerships with local and international NGOs and other UN agencies. As part of this, continue to advocate for linking IDPs outside camps and host communities to the new piped water system and continue to supply water until they are connected.</li> <li>• Increase focus on projects benefitting the host population to reduce social conflicts, such as the creation of water systems or the rehabilitation / expansion of schools.</li> <li>• Advocate for the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team to clearly assign responsibilities for addressing general priority thematic gaps.</li> </ul>

<b>APPROPRIATENESS</b>	
<p><b>Main findings</b></p> <p>12. Interventions were largely appropriate and problems were quickly addressed in the camps. {S24}</p> <p>13. Tent materials are inappropriate to the climatic conditions. {S25}</p> <p>14. Al-Mazrak camps 1 and 3 have effective beneficiary feedback mechanisms. {S26}</p>	<p><b>Priority recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Replace large school tents with simple or pre-fabricated semi-permanent structures (for example metal poles, galvanised iron sheets). If the return process accelerates, the structures can be deconstructed and used elsewhere or serve to expand existing school facilities.</li> <li>• Revert to building latrines with the help of IDPs. Ensure latrines next to child friendly spaces have water, are functional and include hand-washing facilities.</li> </ul>

<b>EFFICIENCY</b>	
<p><b>Main finding</b></p> <p>15. While a comparative efficiency analysis was not possible, the evaluation team identified a number of efficiency issues including: unusable large tents, slow implementation of piped water system, implementation of different latrine systems, inefficient use of air shipments, inefficient internal short-term redeployments, use of PSS mobile teams, as well as some duplications and aid abuse. {S28}</p>	

<b>CONNECTEDNESS</b>	
<p><b>Main findings</b></p> <p>16. UNICEF’s emergency response in Yemen strongly draws on its development programmes. This leads to a good fit between emergency activities and the country programme, several activities with good links to recovery and development as well as strong relations to the government. {§§29-32}</p> <p>17. It also implies, however, that regular programmes suffer and that UNICEF’s structures and processes in Yemen are not sufficiently adapted to an emergency situation. {§§33-34}</p>	<p><b>Priority recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain the balance between emergency response and regular development activities (i.e. keep sufficient attention and resources for development activities).</li> <li>• Decentralise emergency decision-making to enable rapid response and effective coordination at field-level, e.g. by providing field staff the authority to receive local quotations, while the country office provides technical consultations, and by increasing petty cash for small rehabilitation works or the procurement / hire of tools and equipment (e.g. up to a level of \$2,000). Ensure that emergency officers speak Arabic.</li> <li>• Recruit a permanent emergency officer at the country level to coordinate the response as well as needs assessments and preparedness, support proposal writing, follow-up supplies etc.</li> <li>• Provide adequate office equipment and supplies for emergency field offices.</li> </ul>

## RELATIONS TO PARTNERS, DONORS AND THE MEDIA

### Main findings

18. *Implementing partners* were initially lacking, now face some quality problems and are concerned about the lack of continuity and information in the partnership with UNICEF. {§§36-37}
19. *Coordination* has resulted in an organised response and a strong involvement of the government, but there is a lack of coherence on several technical and policy issues. {§§38-41}
20. *Donors* demand more joint UN proposals, an overall lower level of requests, a clearer distinction between development and humanitarian programmes and a higher quality of proposals and reporting. {§§42-43}
21. *Media and public relations* have received important inputs from UNICEF, though observers noted a tendency to “brush things up”. {§§44-45}

### Priority recommendations

#### Coordination

- Ensure more political commitment and senior level representation in cluster meetings; begin involving the government with the EPRP; and have clusters co-chaired by government.
- Strengthen links between (sub-) clusters in Sana’a and in the field by:
  - Sharing Sana’a meeting minutes & action points with the field
  - Scheduling field meetings before Sana’a meetings
  - Developing a simple format for the field to request action/ guidance from Sana’a (cf. DRC system of recommendations)
- Strengthen the focus of clusters on information management and support clusters through a dedicated information manager. Simplify and update the 4W format to ensure compatibility with information systems used by the government and within (sub-) clusters. Include information on the status of implementation of planned activities and only include projects that have received funding.

#### Relations to donors

- Create joint UN funding proposals in all areas.
- Create strategic links between clusters and donors, for example by convening quarterly special cluster & donor meetings.

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**RELATIONS TO PARTNERS, DONORS AND THE MEDIA CONTINUED**

**Priority recommendations (continued)**

**Public relations**

- Strengthen communications by:
  - Maintaining a list of spokespersons, their areas of expertise and their language skills
  - Familiarizing staff with their role in communication in New York, Geneva and the Regional Office
  - Creating key media documents including a Q&A, key messages, facts and statistics and update them as the situation evolves
  - Identifying or creating effective mechanisms for documenting the emergency (photos, videos, blogs) and sharing materials with Headquarters for posting on the global website.
- Present visitors with a real, not an embellished picture of the situation and the response effort. Minimize the administrative effort of organizing visits by simplifying the related administrative procedures.



## 1 Context: Emergencies in one of the world's least developed countries

1. Yemen is the least developed country on the Arabian Peninsula. It ranks 140<sup>th</sup> out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index,<sup>1</sup> has a GDP per capita estimated between US\$ 1,355<sup>2</sup> and US\$ 2,500,<sup>3</sup> and over 45% of the population live on less than US \$2 per day.<sup>4</sup> Several factors constrain the country's development: A very low level of education, with a literacy rate of only 70.4% among men and 38.4% among women;<sup>5</sup> an extreme level of gender disparity, where Yemen consistently ranks last in the Global Gender Gap Report;<sup>6</sup> and a widespread consumption of Qat, for which an estimated 10-30% of household income is spent and which uses an estimated 30% of available freshwater resources for irrigation.<sup>7</sup> In the longer-term, Yemen faces a serious exacerbation of its problems since its economy depends strongly on oil, with oil revenues accounting for 25% of GDP and 70% of government revenues. However, oil production has been steadily declining since 2003 and the World Bank predicts that reserves will run out in five to ten years.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the country is facing the additional burden of a very high population growth, averaging around 2.9% per annum,<sup>9</sup> and the depletion of fresh water resources.

A least developed country with serious challenges ahead

2. In addition to this generally difficult situation, Yemen is threatened by a number of crises. On the one hand, it is prone to natural disasters (i.e. droughts, irregular rainfalls and flooding), especially as the effects of climate change are increasingly felt in the region. On the other hand, the fragile government, which has limited control over tribal areas, faces several conflicts: a separatist movement in the South, the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Hadramouth in the South-East and the conflict with the Al-Houthi rebels in the North.

Emergencies: Natural disasters and conflicts

<sup>1</sup> Human Development Report 2009

<sup>2</sup> Data source: UN data, available at <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Yemen>

<sup>3</sup> Data source: CIA The World Factbook, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html>

<sup>4</sup> Data source: UNDP Yemen, available at <http://www.undp.org/ye/poverty.php>

<sup>5</sup> Data source: 2004 Census

<sup>6</sup> Global Gender Gap Report (2009), available at <http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderapNetwork/index.htm>

<sup>7</sup> Data source: Milanovic (2008), *Qat Expenditures in Yemen and Djibuti: An Empirical Analysis*, *Journal of African Economies* 17(5): 661-687

<sup>8</sup> World Bank (2006), *Republic of Yemen Country Assistance Evaluation*

<sup>9</sup> Data source: UN data

3. The Al-Houthis are a group of radical Shiite Zaydi based in the Northern Governorate of Sa'ada and led by Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi until his death in 2004, and since by his brother Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi. The government accuses the Al-Houthis of trying to impose Sharia law on the country and suspects Iran of supporting the group. It has been fighting the rebels with the support of other Zaydi as well as Sunni tribes, since 2004. The last round of intensive fighting escalated in August 2009 and was ended by a ceasefire in February 2010. Saudi Arabia actively intervened in this sixth round of the conflict through air strikes in support of the government of Yemen after Al-Houthis crossed the border. This round of the conflict has led to an estimated 200,000 to 350,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). For June 2010, UNHCR provided the following figures on IDPs and their location (s. table 2):

The Sa'ada conflict

<b>Table 2: UNHCR figures of registered IDPs (15 August 2010)</b>	
<b>Governorate</b>	<b>Total number of individuals</b>
Sana'a	16,820
Amran	49,903
Hajjah (verification ongoing)	135,063
Al-Jawf	17,235
Sa'ada (based on WFP food distribution figures)	110,000
<b>Total registered IDPs</b>	<b>329,021</b>
Population outside camps	83%
Population in camps	17%

4. The scale of the conflict and its consequences in 2009/2010 were much larger than during previous rounds of fighting and the government became more open to acknowledging the conflict and allowing humanitarian workers access to affected populations outside areas affected by active fighting. International as well as national humanitarian actors therefore were able to significantly scale-up their presence and activities in response to the emergency. Humanitarian actors launched a Flash Appeal in September 2009 (raising US\$ 19 million) as well as Yemen's first Consolidated Appeal for 2010 (raising US\$ 70 million by August 2010 or

Increased humanitarian response faces significant challenges

37% of the requested amount).<sup>10</sup> Overall, the humanitarian response in Northern Yemen is constrained by the following factors:

- **Access:** The security situation in Sa'ada, northern Amran and Al-Jawf remains tense and humanitarian actors require security clearances, which the government often hesitates to issue.
- **Data:** Due to access as well as registration problems, exact and comprehensive data on IDPs as well as host populations and their needs remain incomplete.
- **Local capacity:** There is only limited local capacity in Yemen for responding to the emergency since the government does not attach very high priority to emergency response and since there are few local NGOs with a humanitarian orientation.
- **Funding:** While emergency funding to Yemen has increased significantly, it remains far below the level requested by humanitarian organisations, with around 46% of the Consolidated Appeal funded by August 2010.

5. UNICEF is a crucial actor in this response effort. It has a long-term local presence and a work programme agreed with the government (the 2007-2011 Programme of Cooperation). Based on its development presence and drawing on its internal funding mechanisms, the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF), it played an important role in the response to the emergency as well. UNICEF acts as lead agency and therefore provider of last resort for the nutrition and WASH clusters as well as the child protection sub-cluster. UNICEF is also the co-lead and local lead organization for the education cluster. It or its implementing partners provide IDPs among others with services relating to water, sanitation and hygiene, education, early childhood development, child protection and nutrition. Until mid-August 2010, UNICEF had received over US\$ 9 million through the 2009 Flash Appeal and 2010 Consolidated Appeal<sup>11</sup> or around 10% of total humanitarian funding for implementing these activities.

UNICEF is a crucial actor in the response

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<sup>10</sup> Data source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service

<sup>11</sup> Data source: Financial Tracking Service, status August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2010

## 2 Evaluation purpose, scope, method and limitations

6. As a Real-Time Evaluation, this evaluation focused on working with those who implement and manage the response in order to identify lessons, define priority recommendations for improving current and future operations, and agree on a process for implementation.<sup>12</sup> The evaluation took place at a critical moment in July and August 2010: One year into the response, many lessons have been identified and the evaluation can contribute to ensuring that these lessons are systematically captured and implemented. This is particularly important because the current situation remains volatile and highly dynamic: At the time of writing, both a new round of fighting triggering additional displacement and an accelerated return process in the absence of fighting seem likely scenarios. The evaluation also took place shortly before the main planning processes for the response – the Consolidated Appeals Process and UNICEF’s Annual Workplan – began and can thus provide input to these processes.

Evaluation focus on learning

7. The evaluation has the following scope:

Scope

- Geography: It focuses on UNICEF’s humanitarian response to the conflict-related emergency in Northern Yemen.
- Time: It focuses mainly on the response to the sixth round of fighting between August 2009 and the time of the evaluation mission in July and August 2010. It includes preparedness activities before the emergency as well as current planning for the expansion of activities and the transition to recovery and development.
- Evaluation criteria: It assesses the response in terms of timeliness, appropriateness, effectiveness, coverage, coordination, coherence, connectedness, and efficiency.

8. The evaluation was managed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Section of UNICEF’s Country Office and Yemen and received guidance through an inter-agency Reference Group (see Annex E). It consisted of two phases: a data gathering phase and an analysis and learning phase. To gather relevant data, the evaluation team conducted semi-structured interviews and group discussions with all relevant stakeholders (see Annex

Focus on participatory methods

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<sup>12</sup> Traditional evaluations, by contrast, often focus mainly on producing written results. This follows the definition proposed in the ALNAP guide on real-time evaluations: “A real-time evaluation (RTE) is an evaluation in which the primary objective is to provide feedback in a participatory way in real time (i.e. during the evaluation fieldwork) to those executing and managing the humanitarian response.” (Cosgrave et al., 2009, p. 10)

A for a list of interviewees and group discussions and the inception report for the interview guidelines), visited operations in Amran, Haradh and Sa'ada, and analysed documents (see Annex B for a list of the most important documents consulted). As a Real-Time Evaluation, the exercise strongly relied on participatory methods to facilitate learning. During the country mission, the evaluation team organised four debriefings (with the local UNICEF team in Haradh, with UNICEF partners and members of the evaluation reference group, with the UNICEF Country Representative and Deputy Representative and with the Humanitarian Country Team), and three participatory workshops responding to demands of important stakeholders (with the Education Cluster, the Child Protection Sub-Cluster and the UNICEF Emergency Team in Yemen, please see Annexes C and D for the results of the cluster workshops). The refined recommendations, their prioritization, the assignment of responsibilities, definition of success criteria and setting of a timeframe for implementation as laid out in chapter 5 are all the direct result of the workshop and subsequent feedback process with UNICEF staff. Additional and follow-up workshops with that go beyond the scope of this evaluation are tentatively planned for October 2010.

9. The implementation of the Real-Time Evaluation encountered no major obstacles, but had to grapple with several constraints and limitations, including:

- Access and security. Due to security issues and problems relating to security clearances, only the Yemeni team member was able to visit Amran and Sa'ada and he could only visit specific areas close to the main cities of these governorates.
- Timing of feedback. The draft report is submitted for feedback and finalised during Ramadan when many UNICEF staff members and partner organisations have limited capacity to provide feedback.
- Lack of alternative strategies for efficiency analysis. Following the terms of reference for this evaluation, the evaluation team intended to carry out an efficiency analysis, including a benchmarking exercise between UNICEF interventions in WASH and nutrition and alternative intervention strategies used by other actors. We found that most of the few humanitarian actors engaged in Northern Yemen follow almost identical approaches and that those using other approaches (the United Arab Emirates and Al-Saleh Foundation in Al-Mazrak Camp 2) were very reluctant to share relevant data. The benchmarking exercise could therefore not be implemented.

No major obstacles to implementing the evaluation



### 3 Findings

10. The overall feedback of partners, donors and beneficiaries on the work of UNICEF in Northern Yemen is very positive. They praise in particular the relatively quick initial deployment of UNICEF staff members to IDP areas and the quick initiation of relief activities as well as the great level of organisational and individual commitment to providing support to populations affected by the conflict. While these features are clearly recognised by critical stakeholders in Yemen and beyond, there is also significant room for improvement, especially in strengthening preparedness, achieving a better and more equitable coverage of needs and adapting UNICEF's organisational structures and processes to the emergency situation. UNICEF's main achievements in the response to the Sa'ada conflict in Northern Yemen as well as the most important areas for improvement and priority recommendations are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Overall appreciation  
for UNICEF's work

#### 3.1 Preparedness, surge capacity and learning

11. The UNICEF Country Office in Yemen traditionally focuses mainly on development programmes and was not well prepared for emergency response in 2009. In 2007, the Country Office worked on an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) with the help of the UNICEF Regional Office. This plan received increased attention following the 2008 floods in the Hadramouth region. While many staff members saw the process of drafting the EPRP and the related training as useful for building their capacity, the plan did not create an appropriate level of preparedness. When the sixth round of fighting in Sa'ada broke out in August 2009, the scale of the conflict and its consequences took UNICEF by surprise. The Country Office quickly mobilized some of its field officers to initiate a response, but it could not draw on well capacitated and trained partner organisations, on sufficient pre-positioned emergency stocks, or on experienced emergency staff. Reasons why the EPRP was not practical or functional include:

Lack of  
preparedness/  
EPRP not practical

- The EPRP was based on scenarios that prioritized other emergencies, such as the escalation of the separatist movement that could trigger armed conflict in the Southern governorates. In 2009, no comprehensive updated situation analysis was conducted that could have served as the basis for an update of the EPRP.
- The EPRP was outdated. It was drafted in 2008 and should have been updated by mid-2009, but the outbreak of the war in Sa'ada overtook this planning process.

- The plan was too complex and abstract and lacked buy-in from the country team.
- Partners were not sufficiently involved in drafting the plan.

12. When the emergency broke out in August 2009 and the scale of displacement triggered by it became evident in September 2009, the Country Office mobilised resources, including staff and supplies, from its regular programmes to organise a response. Due to the slow realisation of the scale of the emergency and a lack of experience of country staff with UNICEF's global surge capacity mechanisms, the Country Office initially mainly relied on internal redeployments to fill gaps. These redeployments are typically short-term, with an average period of stay in 2009 of four and a half weeks, and a median stay of only two weeks.<sup>13</sup> Especially when the staff dispatched on these missions lacked Arabic language skills, the organization of the missions imposed a considerable burden on the country team with few perceived benefits.

**Good practice** A WASH expert from Sudan was deployed for two months as surge capacity to Yemen. He had transferable emergency experience and Arabic skills. His activities had an observable impact on the quality of the response (e.g. through the introduction of family latrines replacing communal latrines and the training of trainers for hygiene promotion).

Short-term surge capacity imposed a burden

In addition, many staff members noted a disconnect between members of the country team and short-term surge capacity, leading to a lack of control and at times to unauthorised decisions. In the most drastic case, the decision to transfer several severely malnourished children from camps to hospitals without adequate medical supervision led to the death of five children.<sup>14</sup> The country team deemed longer-term deployments of surge capacity staff either from other UNICEF offices or from UNICEF partners as much more useful, particularly when they were able to contribute relevant experiences from comparable emergency situations.

13. Since there were delays and problems relating to the activation of internal and external surge capacity, important elements of the emergency response were implemented by regular staff members of UNICEF's Country Office in Yemen. Most of these staff members had little or no

Good capacity to learn

<sup>13</sup> Data source: UNICEF staffing matrix. Between September and December 2009, a total of 21 support missions to Yemen were dispatched.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. UNICEF Yemen SitRep for October 19-26, 2009, and statements of several UNICEF staff members.

experience with emergency operations, but showed a good capacity to identify lessons and adapt interventions to the situation on the ground. Thus, for example, mobile latrines that were blocked because IDP camps that used stones instead of water were quickly replaced by community latrines, which in turn were later replaced by family latrines that proved more appropriate for the strong demand for privacy. Similarly, the water delivery systems were continuously improved. The first water tanks only had one tap that was installed too close to the ground. This was successively replaced by elevated tanks with several taps, water collection points with appropriate drainage linked to large tanks and finally by a piped (instead of trucked) water system connecting IDP camps as well as villages. Another example for learning is the treatment protocol for severely malnourished children. Initially, these children were transferred to in-patient treatment facilities outside camps, which made it difficult for parents staying in the camps to accompany them. UNICEF therefore established in-patient treatment facilities in the camps to ensure continuous care for the children.

14. These learning processes are supported by a range of important institutional mechanisms within the Country Office for identifying lessons. These mechanisms include for example regular trip reports, situation reports, annual and mid-term reviews of the Country Office's Annual Workplan and country programme and review exercises by some clusters such as the WASH Cluster review. While these processes result in a relatively reliable identification of important lessons, they are not necessarily linked to institutionalised follow-up mechanisms. Many lessons were therefore implemented in the camps in Haradh where the related problems had been identified, but not transferred to other areas outside the camps or in other governorates. Thus, for example, the evaluation team witnessed the use of tanks with few taps outside the camps, leading to the use of hoses to extract water from the top of the tank and potentially polluting the water as well as stagnant water around the tanks, increasing the risk of malaria.

Good mechanisms for identifying lessons, but few follow-up mechanisms

15. One area in which lessons were identified, but not systematically implemented, is in contingency planning and preparedness. The Country Office has recognised the lack of preparedness before the outbreak of the sixth war in Sa'ada, yet few steps are currently being taken to ensure UNICEF and its partners are better prepared for future developments or emergencies, such as an accelerated return process, the outbreak of a new round of fighting, or the intensification of other conflicts in the country:

Lack of current contingency planning

- A year into the response, UNICEF, as other organisations, still lacks access to complete and reliable data on the number and needs of IDPs, both in accessible areas such as Hajjah and inaccessible areas such as Sa'ada, Al-Jawf and parts of Amran. Furthermore, few comprehensive needs assessments are available. This is due to a combination of access problems, resource constraints, and a lack of coordination and information management.
- There is no comprehensive analysis of the situation to build credible scenarios for contingency planning and there is no “living” preparedness or contingency plan.
- UNICEF relies on several partner organisations such as the government or local NGOs for storing supplies (because it does not maintain its own warehouse in the country), yet these supplies are not necessarily accessible to UNICEF for immediate use when needed and owing to UNICEF.
- UNICEF’s presence in the governorates of Sa’ada, Amran and Al-Jawf remains minimal, in part due to security and access constraints.

#### **Priority recommendations: preparedness**

- Conduct a comprehensive situation analysis building on existing assessments as the basis for funding proposals, annual workplans and contingency plans.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator with the Humanitarian Country Team should provide clear inter-agency guidance on position regarding Sa’ada (e.g. focus on return and expand activities? Work through implementing partners? Collaborate with Al-Houthis?).
- Identify partners who are accepted by the communities they are serving in Sa’ada, involve them in preparedness, build their capacity, create stand-by agreements or project cooperation agreements (PCAs) using new PCA guidelines.

### 3.2 Timeliness

16. Despite its general lack of preparedness for emergencies and its dominant development orientation, the UNICEF Country Office in Yemen acted relatively quickly in 2009 to mobilise existing staff and supplies for the emergency response. A loan of two million US\$ from UNICEF's internal emergency financing mechanism, the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) in September 2009, enabled this rapid response. Subsequently, however, it experienced often significant delays in procuring or shipping additional supplies or implementing activities that are mainly due to the fact that the Country Office is relying on its development structures and processes which grant little autonomy to local staff and have slow procurement and supply procedures (cf. section 3.6). These delays undermine UNICEF's credibility in the eyes of its partners and beneficiaries. As a result, beneficiaries appear less open to accepting important "soft" interventions by UNICEF and its implementing partners, such as hygiene education or awareness raising activities on child protection issues. Examples of delays include:

One of the first organisations on the ground...

... but frequent delays undermine UNICEF's credibility

- Constructing additional latrines for newly arriving IDPs in Al-Mazrak camps 1 and 3 and repairing or rehabilitating existing latrines have recently taken more than 3 months due to problems relating to supplies and contractors.
- The procurement and shipping of goods needed for schooling and early childhood development activities in IDP camps took three to eight months.
- Al-Mazrak camp 1 is divided into one area supplied by UNICEF and one supplied by Oxfam. During two months, Oxfam supplied the entire camp with provisions because UNICEF faced supply problems for the monthly distribution of consumable hygiene goods. Subsequently, UNICEF resumed distributions in its part, but its distribution was several days late and contained fewer items than Oxfam's, leading to complaints among camp residents.
- Incentive payments for volunteers working in camps are often provided late. Coupled with a lower level of payment compared to other humanitarian organisations, this led to many UNICEF volunteers terminating work or switching to other agencies, leaving UNICEF with high volunteer turnover, under-qualified and under-trained volunteers with lack of commitment, and therefore a lower level of service quality. In June 2010, the psychosocial team in camp 1 stopped providing reports of their activities to show their dissatisfaction of the 45-day delay in payment of their incentives.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> SitRep June 07 - June 13, 2010



### Priority recommendations: timeliness

- Apply emergency procedures to all activities related to emergency, including the use of Long-Term Agreements to simplify and accelerate procurement of supplies.
- Create a UNICEF warehouse in Yemen and pre-position critical supplies.
- Agree with ministries through MoUs to set aside a share of around 20-25% of incoming supplies provided by UNICEF to the country to be released immediately to respond to emerging emergency situations.

### 3.3 Coverage and effectiveness

17. UNICEF's activities in emergencies are guided by its *Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action* (UNICEF 2010). This guidance document defines concrete commitments and related preparedness, response and early recovery activities in the areas of nutrition, health, WASH, child protection, education and HIV/AIDS. Moreover, UNICEF is cluster lead and has the responsibility of Provider of Last Resort in nutrition, WASH, and child protection and gender-based violence (together with UNFPA at global level, with UNFPA taking the lead in Yemen) areas of responsibility as well as acting as lead or co-lead for education. The findings relating to coverage discussed in this section assess UNICEF's activities in Northern Yemen against these commitments.

UNICEF's  
commitments in  
emergencies

18. **Geographic coverage.** Many of UNICEF's emergency activities focus mainly on two of the main IDP camps created in response to the war in Sa'ada: Al-Mazrak camps 1 and 3 in Haradh, governorate of Hajjah. Within these camps, evidence collected during visits, beneficiary statements, partner interviews and available camp statistics show that the overall level of coverage achieved is relatively good:

Good coverage in  
camps in Haradh

- Water coverage is excellent and above Sphere standards in quantity and quality.
- Sanitation facilities are broadly available and used with each family having its own latrine. However, around 300 families arrived in the Al-

Mazrak camps and still had no access to their own latrines after three months. This is due to the fact that many returning IDPs have taken latrine materials with them<sup>16</sup> and due to delays in erecting new latrines.

- Hygiene education is provided by male and female volunteers.
- IDPs regularly receive consumable hygiene goods, such as soap and nappies, though delays in distribution have occurred and IDPs state that quantities are not sufficient, especially for large families.
- Malnutrition cases are identified and treated, though it was initially not possible to organise follow-ups on all cases due to the disorderly setup of the camp. The Severe Acute Malnutrition rate among children in Al-Mazrak camp 1 decreased from over 10 percent in September 2009 to 7.7% percent in late November 2009 when UNICEF handed over nutrition activities to MSF Spain.<sup>17</sup> By contrast, malnutrition in Sa'ada remains extremely high, with MSF reporting a Severe Acute Malnutrition rate of 17% among individuals screened in a hospital in Sa'ada city and malnutrition treatment is currently "almost nonexistent".<sup>18</sup>
- Basic schooling up to grade six is available in camp 3 and in schools located close to the camps. Despite existing demand, however, no classes for grades seven, eight and nine are offered. Moreover, enrolment data for the schools show that 63% of students are male and only 37% are female. School records also show a high drop-out rate, with only 63% of all students attending final exams, which is in part due to the return process.
- Literacy classes are offered in the camps, though demand exceeds available capacity.
- Early childhood development activities are offered and child friendly spaces have been created which are used in the camps.
- Child protection cases are identified by teams of volunteers and referred to the local authorities.
- Volunteers offer psychosocial support to children and their caretakers and psychiatric cases are identified, though there is little follow-up by qualified psychiatric doctors through the health cluster. Volunteers lack sufficient qualification and training due to high volunteer turnover.

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<sup>16</sup> Monthly report June 2010

<sup>17</sup> Data source: UNICEF staff member and Truls Brekke, *Treating malnutrition among displaced children in Yemen*, 6 October 2009.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Sa'ada Rapid Needs Assessment June 2010.

- Mine awareness trainings are being conducted.
- Early marriage awareness activities are implemented.
- Health services are accessible to IDPs, though drug stocks are not always sufficient and patients are sometimes asked to buy medicines from commercial pharmacies outside the camps.
- In cooperation with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, UNICEF implemented 2-day advocacy seminars in the camps and trained 50 IDP youth volunteers on life skills and HIV/AIDS. While the trainings were conducted by an experienced trainer, the evaluation team could not locate any activity, trip or situation reports referring to the work of these volunteers or their results.

19. According to UNHCR figures, however, less than 17% of all IDPs in Northern Yemen live in camps and only an estimated 41% of IDPs are in the governorate of Hajjah (cf. table 1). Service coverage for IDPs outside camps and outside Haradh district in Hajjah remains very sketchy. Many, especially those in areas with restricted access for international organisations, such as Al-Jawf, Sa'ada outside the security zone around Sa'ada city and the northern parts of Amran, receive no or barely any services from UNICEF or its implementing partners, though UNICEF keeps channelling some support, such as school materials, clothing, hygiene kits, trainings for health workers and nutrition supplies through the government and some local NGOs. Here, security and access are the main reasons preventing service provision. Yet, even IDPs outside the Al-Mazrak camps that are easy to reach receive only partial or occasional services. In these areas, coverage gaps can be explained by a lack of resources and capacities for expanding humanitarian activities, a lack of data on the needs of these groups, greater difficulty in reaching dispersed groups of IDPs with services and their reduced visibility. Large groups of IDPs living right next to the main road connecting Haradh town to the Al-Mazrak camps, for example, receive deliveries by water trucks, but their tanks do not have enough taps, leading to a contamination risk through the use of hoses, and are not adequately drained. The distribution of consumable hygiene goods is irregular and insufficient in quantity. Access to schools strongly depends on the distance to the nearest regular school. Psychosocial support (PSS) activities are offered for an afternoon every two to three weeks by a male mobile team that tries to cover IDPs outside camps in the entire governorate. Similarly, a transit or informal camp in Amran city visited by members of the evaluation team had a much lower level of service

Partial or no coverage  
outside camps and  
outside Haradh

provision, with insufficient water supply, water quality problems, shared and inappropriate latrines, overcrowded conditions and frequent flooding of tents.

20. **Thematic coverage.** As argued in the previous paragraph, the most important coverage gap in Northern Yemen is geographic. Yet, there are also distinct thematic coverage gaps that are in part due to a lack of funding, especially in those areas that donors do not consider “life-saving” and that therefore receive low priority. Coverage gaps directly relating to UNICEF’s mandate and its core commitments for children include:

Thematic gaps in  
UNICEF’s response

- Child recruitment and the use of child soldiers: In the Sa’ada conflict, both the Al-Houthi rebels and tribes loyal to the government use child soldiers. There have been some advocacy and awareness raising efforts on this issue, but no effective system has been created for preventing child recruitment or caring for (former) child soldiers, in part because the topic is very sensitive for the Yemeni government.
- While children in camps have access to basic or primary education, there are no facilities offering education beyond grade six due to a lack of school and teacher capacity.
- Access to essential household items: Most IDP families currently use wood for cooking. This creates conflicts with host communities as wood is very scarce in the arid / desert areas of Northern Yemen. Moreover, it reportedly contributes to the high rates of theft of latrine materials, including their wooden beams. The provision of adequate energy sources is therefore a gap in the current response.
- Safe WASH facilities in learning environments and child friendly spaces: Several schools and play areas in camps currently lack adequate and functional latrines as well as handwashing facilities, in part because water supply is lacking as water taps are stolen.
- Activities against Gender-Based Violence: There is currently no active sub-cluster on Gender-Based Violence and few associated activities are being implemented due to a lack of expertise and capacity in country.
- Life-skills and HIV/AIDS awareness: There is no evidence on the activities or the effectiveness of youth volunteers trained as peer educators in camps 1 and 2 and there are no peer educators recruited from camp 3 or from outside camps.

21. In addition to the thematic gaps directly related to UNICEF’s mandate and core commitments for children, the evaluation team noted a range of general thematic gaps, some of which are closely related to

UNICEF's mandate. As a member of the Humanitarian Country Team and the inter-cluster forum, UNICEF, as any other major humanitarian actor in Yemen, bears responsibility for ensuring that these gaps are put on the agenda and that an effective response to them is organised. The gaps include:

General thematic gaps

- The identification, demarcation and clearing of mines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs): Landmines and UXOs are one of the major factors preventing the return of IDPs and they disproportionately affect children as they herd animals or play with UXOs. Demining is formally the responsibility of the National Demining Committee and, among international agencies, of UNDP. To date, mines and UXOs have not been adequately identified, marked and removed since the mine-clearing agency is closely associated to the Yemeni army, an active party to the conflict. As mines mainly affect children, they are a prime child protection concern. While UNICEF is implementing some mine awareness and advocacy activities, the root problem has not been effectively addressed.
- The appropriate identification and registration of IDPs. Even after a year into the response, the exact total number of IDPs is not known since registration was officially frozen between March and August 2010 and many cases were reported of IDPs that are unable to register because they lack identification documents (this seems to apply in particular to women), while other IDPs reportedly manage to register several times.
- The mainstreaming of early recovery into all aspects of humanitarian response, support for returnees and support for livelihoods.
- The consumption and smuggling of Qat and other drugs, especially by children, is currently not addressed and there is no clear internal guidance on these issues within UNICEF.
- Polygamy, early marriage and the lack of family planning and birth spacing.
- Unaddressed health issues: Vector control (and the control of flies), skin diseases, qualified follow-up and medication for psychiatric cases.
- Camp design issues, especially drainage systems and flood prevention.

22. **Coverage of special needs.** Within the IDP populations targeted by the response, several groups have special needs. In the camps, population statistics are sex disaggregated and special needs are registered. The evaluation team noticed several activities and installations focusing on the

Lack of attention to special needs



needs of women and girls, including for example the creation of women's centres in the camps, the creation of well protection water collection points in the camps, the installation of clothes washing facilities as female meetings points in the camps or the use of female or mixed groups of volunteers for hygiene promotion or Early Childhood Development activities. Several other types of special needs, however, seem to remain unattended. This includes the needs of IDPs without identification documents, which are often women, the needs of large households with several wives and large numbers of children who often receive the same distributions as small households, female-headed households and persons with disabilities who need support for example in carrying distributions home and the needs of marginalised people (Akhdam), some of whom have not been displaced, but are homeless and are often discriminated against.

23. **Unintended consequences.** One year into the response, some typical unintended negative consequences of the humanitarian response are becoming apparent. Already at the beginning of the displacement, local host populations in many areas vehemently opposed the creation of IDP camps as they tend to own the land and fear the permanent settlement of IDPs as well as competition for scarce resources such as water or wood. Only few humanitarian services, such as the rehabilitation of schools, some distributions or the planned linking of villages to then new water system, have also benefited the host population and there are some signs that the response has exacerbated the conflict with host populations. Accordingly, there have been reports of IDPs using scarce resources such as firewood and groundwater and conducting acts of sabotage, such as the filling of wells with stones. Solid evidence for other negative effects of the response could not (yet) be found, but the evaluation team noted that there is no systematic assessment of the risks associated with the response and consequently no development of strategies to address or mitigate them.

No systematic  
assessment and  
mitigation of  
intervention risks

### **Priority recommendations: coverage and effectiveness**

- Address the current imbalance and re-focus the response effort on IDPs in Sa'ada, Amran and Al-Jawf (rather than mainly in Hajjah), and especially IDPs outside camps through an extension of partnerships with local and international NGOs and other UN agencies. As part of this, continue to advocate for linking IDPs outside camps and host communities to the new piped water system and continue to supply water until they are connected:
- Increase focus on projects benefitting the host population to reduce social conflicts, such as the creation of water systems or the rehabilitation/expansion of schools.
- Advocate for the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team to clearly assign responsibilities for addressing general priority thematic gaps.

### **3.4 Appropriateness**

24. During the country visit for this evaluation in the summer of 2010, beneficiaries described interventions in UNICEF's areas of responsibility as largely appropriate to their needs. Their concerns typically focused on the quantity and frequency of provided services, rather than the nature of services. As described above in section 3.1, this is partly the result of an active learning process which helped address initial problems. Examples of aspects of the response that were initially ill-adapted to local circumstances and needs but improved at least in the camp settings include:

- Mobile latrines that were initially provided were quickly put out of use as IDPs filled them with the stones they traditionally use for cleaning themselves. Mobile latrines were quickly replaced by simple pit latrines.
- The first communal latrines built after that had rough concrete surfaces that were difficult to clean, their roofs were not solid enough and the holes were too small. Starting in November 2009, these were replaced with smaller family latrines using appropriate materials.
- Water tanks were initially installed with few taps that were too close to the ground. This led to people using hoses for accessing water through the top opening of the tank and a lot of spill-water increasing the risk of malaria. These were replaced first with elevated tanks with multiple taps, and later with large tanks supplying several water points with good

Detailed problems were quickly addressed and interventions are largely appropriate

drainage systems which will be connected to the new water system relying on piped water.

- Recreational kits for children initially contained small puppets of piglets. These were immediately removed by staff members.
- When child-friendly spaces were first installed in Al-Mazrak camp 1, they were undermined by the presence of waste and car traffic moving through them. Subsequently, cleaning campaigns were conducted in the camp and new traffic regulations put in place that prohibits most motorized traffic.
- Schools close to camps were initially used for food distributions, attracting large crowds of people and disrupting classes. Later, food distributions were organised in other places.
- Sanitary pads initially included in hygiene kits could not be used by women as they lacked underwear.

25. By contrast, some of the materials used in the response have proven inadequate to local conditions situation and UNICEF and its partners have not yet managed to replace them. First and foremost, this concerns the large tents that are used as classrooms and for Early Childhood Development activities. From the very beginning of the response, trip reports identified these tents as very difficult to erect, have missing parts, and despite repeated repair and reinforcements unable to withstand the fierce winds in Haradh (see illustration 1). To a lesser degree, the smaller tents provided as shelter are also problematic. While they have proven more robust, they are often too small for large families and they have ventilation problems. As a result, many families have built additional makeshift shelters, reportedly one of the reasons (next to the urgent need for firewood) why the wood and plastic sheeting of latrines are often stolen. Moreover, families tend to sleep outside the tents where they are unable to use mosquito nets as a protection against malaria.

Tent materials are inappropriate

### Illustration 1: Inadequacy of large tents



School in Al-Mazrak Camp 1



Tent in Al-Yarmouk School

26. A crucial element for ensuring the appropriateness of interventions and enabling learning is the feedback and involvement of affected populations. In Al-Mazrak camps 1 and 3, several participatory mechanisms are currently being used. These mechanisms, however, did not seem to be used outside the camps. The mechanisms include:

Effective beneficiary  
feedback  
mechanisms in  
camps 1 and 3

- Use of volunteers. From the early phases of the response, UNICEF and several of its partners recruited (moderately paid) volunteers from the IDP population to provide specific tasks, e.g. hygiene education or psycho-social support. Female volunteers in particular gained good access to families and their living situations, which enabled them to collect feedback on different aspects of the response and convey this information back to the humanitarian organisations active on the ground.
- Meetings with IDP representatives. Camps 1 and 3 have an active system of beneficiary representation in which humanitarian organisations meet on a weekly basis with IDP representatives. These meetings are well frequented and used as a forum for addressing concerns and needs. Other mechanisms, however, such as the “information centres” in the camps, seem to be used primarily for informing visitors, rather than for informing IDPs on planned distributions and other activities.

Direct involvement of IDPs in relief activities. In camp 1, for example, IDPs participated actively in the construction of family latrines. This enabled them not only to influence construction, but also to potentially replicate the systems after returning home. Unfortunately, UNICEF did not follow the same approach in camp 3, where the government instead insisted on using contractors to ensure that a fully prepared camp could be handed

over to IDPs. Even after the initial inauguration of the camp, UNICEF did not revert to the earlier practice of building additional latrines or rehabilitating damaged ones, though this was a priority of other humanitarian actors.

#### **Priority recommendations: appropriateness**

- Replace large school tents with simple or pre-fabricated semi-permanent structures (for example metal poles and galvanized iron sheets). If the return process accelerates, the structures can be deconstructed and used elsewhere, or serve to expand existing school facilities.
- Revert to building latrines with the help of IDPs. Ensure latrines next to child-friendly spaces have water, are functional and include hand-washing facilities.

### **3.5 Efficiency**

27. For the overall success of a humanitarian response, it is not only important whether the interventions are appropriate, but also whether they are cost-efficient. In the case of UNICEF's response to the emergency in Northern Yemen, a comparative efficiency analysis was impossible. On the one hand, this is because there are only very few humanitarian actors active in the area and most of them use very similar or almost identical approaches. Those actors that rely on different approaches, most notably the organisations running Al-Mazrak camp 2, are very reluctant to share basic information about their work, let alone detailed financial data on individual interventions.

Comparative  
efficiency analysis not  
possible

28. In the absence of a comparative efficiency analysis, the evaluation team sought to identify efficiency issues. While we found no evidence for major inefficiencies, we identified the following issues:

Efficiency issues

- Problems with the large tents described in the previous section were identified early in the response and a great deal of effort and money was spent on repair and reinforcement without demonstrating any useful results. This suggests that it would have been more efficient to halt the distribution of large tents earlier and to switch to using semi-permanent structures such as metal poles and galvanised iron sheets.
- In water provision, trucking was quickly identified as the most important cost and the idea of creating a piped water system emerged

early. For implementing the piped water system, however, UNICEF and its partners chose a complex division of labour involving four different parties. As a result implementation has been slow and the water system has not yet been connected at the time of the evaluation country visit in July and August 2010. Furthermore, a quicker implementation would have resulted in financial savings.

- Regarding the construction of latrines, changing twice from one system to another assumed unnecessary costs. Had UNICEF been better prepared, it could have immediately used available regional expertise on the issue and it could have built family latrines from the start. Another efficiency issue relating to latrines concerns the use of IDPs vs. contractors for building them and the switch to contractors in camp 3 has caused delays as well as efficiency losses.
- UNICEF dispatched a number of air shipments to provide supplies for the emergency response in a timely manner. These supplies required clearance and onward transportation by the government. The government, however, did not have sufficient flexibility and petty cash resources for paying airport duties. Especially for heavy items such as nutritional products, shipments by sea would have been significantly cheaper and, according to government officials, would not have taken longer in this situation.
- Especially in the early phases of the response, UNICEF relied on many short-term internal re-deployments and support missions. In the eyes of many members of the Yemen country team, these missions imposed more burden than they added value as their implementation required significant resources that could have been used more profitably in other areas.
- In Hajjah, UNICEF relies on a mobile team for providing psychosocial support activities outside camps. The team consists of only two male members and can only cover part of the governorate, providing few visits to individual locations. By working with local volunteers from among the IDP population, UNICEF and its partners could have achieved broader and more cost-effective coverage.
- Despite coordination improvements, some duplication of activities persists (cf. section 3.7 below), including for example the location and timing of Early Childhood Development activities or the training of health officials on nutrition programmes. Duplications obviously imply a waste of resources.



- Humanitarian workers in the field report a certain level of aid abuse, especially through multiple registrations of certain IDPs, which also implies a waste of resources.

### 3.6 Connectedness

29. The UNICEF Country Office in Yemen traditionally focuses on development activities and draws on these programmes to implement an emergency response. Efforts to establish a separate planning process for the emergency response, the 6-months plan covering November 2009 through April 2010, largely failed as an active tool for guiding the response as staff members felt the plan was imposed on them and as it was not integrated into the main planning tools, such as the annual workplan. Implementing an emergency response on the back of a development programme has some positive, but also several negative effects.

Emergency response draws on development programmes

30. A first positive effect is that the emergency response fits well with the aims of UNICEF's overall country programme, the 2007-2011 Country Programme Action Plan. The programme interventions emphasised in that plan are water and sanitation, nutrition, girls' education, early childhood development, and emergency obstetric care. Of these, all but the last are also the focus of UNICEF's emergency activities.

Good fit with country programme

31. Another positive effect is that several interventions implemented as part of the emergency response have strong links to recovery activities and the potential to provide long-term benefits. The water system that is currently being prepared, for instance, is a good practice example because of its strong links to recovery and development (s. box). Another good practice example is the water quality control system introduced as part of the humanitarian response. This system, implemented by the local water authority, significantly improves the pre-emergency situation and could be replicated in the rest of the country. Activities that have the potential to provide long-term benefits include hygiene promotion activities, the construction of latrines with the help of IDPs (which familiarises them with the construction technique and enables them to replicate these structures after return), the

Several activities have a strong link to recovery and development

**Good practice** Together with several partner organizations, UNICEF has been planning and implementing a piped water system. Once completed, this system will pipe water from two new wells to the IDP camps in Al-Mazrak. The system also connects several villages that will be able to continue using the system after IDPs have returned to their areas of origin.

provision of basic education and literacy classes, the rehabilitation of schools in villages close to IDP areas, capacity-building activities with partner organisations (such as nutrition trainings for health staff or the enhanced capacity for child protection of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour), and the creation of community-based protection networks. Finally, the humanitarian actors active in Al-Mazrak camps 1 and 3, including UNICEF, have agreed to support IDPs in keeping their animals, thus protecting the basis of their livelihoods and facilitating recovery. IDPs in camp 2, by contrast, are not allowed to keep their animals.

32. A third positive effect is that UNICEF can build on its relatively strong relationships with the Government of Yemen to ensure the government's involvement and its ownership of the response. Compared to emergency situations in other countries, the Government of Yemen is closely involved in the coordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance in Northern Yemen. This leads to a comparatively high level of ownership. The government, however, has articulated a strong expectation of increased transparency concerning the resources held and allocated by international actors such as UNICEF. While this level of ownership is positive overall, it can also have negative implications. On the one hand, some government offices lack capacity or commitment and at times pursue priorities that differ from those of the international actors. This can lead to conflicts and can slow down the response. On the other hand, cooperation with the government does not run smoothly in all areas. Thus, for example, promoting access to affected areas, especially in Sa'ada outside Sa'ada city, Al-Jawf and Amran remains a major constraint to an effective response. Strict and changing processes relating to visas and security clearances also impose an important burden on the country office and often lead to significant delays in staff deployments.

Strong government  
ownership

33. A negative effect of the close link between development and humanitarian programming is that the Country Office is at least in part using its development resources and staff to implement the emergency response. As a result, there has been a lack of specific emergency expertise, especially since many staff members have been in country for a long time and lack emergency experience. Moreover, this has led to the frequent overburdening of UNICEF's development staff, staffing gaps, and to a situation in which the Country Office struggles to keep its development programmes active.

Regular programmes  
suffer

34. Another negative effect is that the Country Office has for the most part not adapted its structures and processes to the emergency situation.

This has undermined UNICEF's ability to act quickly and effectively on the ground:

- There is a lack of delegation of authority. UNICEF's field and local emergency officers usually lack the authority to take decisions, make commitments or directly order supplies. In several areas, UNICEF also lacks adequate presence on the ground and therefore the capacity to take relevant decisions. As a result, bidding and contractual agreements usually have to be processed via Sana'a leading to delay and leaving local staff unable to make commitments and to coordinate effectively on the ground.
- UNICEF's information management systems are inadequate for some staff members in the field. Field officers and staff hired on the basis of consulting contracts or as surge capacity deployed by partner organisations cannot access the main information management system, the shared drive, and lack updated information on decisions and supplies that are processed in Sana'a.
- UNICEF's emergency field offices lack basic equipment and supplies such as shelves, photocopiers, tea-cups etc., restricting their ability to function effectively.

Ill adapted structures and processes undermine UNICEF's ability to act quickly and effectively on the ground

### **Priority recommendations: connectedness**

- Maintain the balance between emergency response and regular development activities (i.e. keep sufficient attention and resources for development activities).
- Decentralise emergency decision-making to enable rapid response and effective coordination at field-level, e.g. by providing field staff the authority to receive local quotations, while the country office provides technical consultations, and by increasing petty cash for small rehabilitation works or the procurement / hire of tools and equipment (e.g. up to a level of \$2,000). Ensure that emergency officers speak Arabic.
- Recruit a permanent emergency officer at the country level to coordinate the response as well as needs assessments and preparedness, support proposal writing, follow-up supplies etc.
- Provide adequate office equipment and supplies for emergency field offices.

### 3.7 Relations to partners, donors and the media

35. UNICEF does not implement its emergency activities in Northern Yemen in isolation and its relationships to partner organisations, donors and the media are an important factor influencing the success of its interventions.

#### Implementing partners

36. Before the outbreak of the sixth round of fighting in Sa'ada, UNICEF had not identified potential local emergency partners and had not implemented any emergency-focused capacity-building activities with them. Since there were few international actors present in the early phases of the response and the government lacked capacity for implementation, UNICEF initially lacked implementing partners for its programmes. Instead, its staff members directly implemented a number of interventions. For example, UNICEF staff members established treatment centres and programmes for malnourished children.

An initial lack of implementing partners

37. As the response developed, more international partners came on board, including for example Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in nutrition, and UNICEF began to work with an increasing number of local partners, such as CSSW, Al-Khair, Shawthab, Seyaj or Al-Amal. This increased level of cooperation enabled UNICEF to extend its coverage and in many cases it had a capacity-building effect for local organisations. The evaluation team identified two main issues regarding the cooperation with local implementing partners:

Quality, continuity and information problems with implementing partners

- Several observers were concerned about quality problems relating to the work of implementing partners. These problems are related to the limited capacity of these organisations, in some cases the specific local interests of the organisations and the limited capacity of UNICEF to exercise oversight, monitor activities and select its partners.
- From the perspective of the implementing partners, UNICEF is a highly appreciated partner. Almost all local implementing partners, however, were concerned that UNICEF projects are often short-term and lack continuity and that they as partners were not sufficiently informed about the current status of projects, UNICEF's future plans, or reactions to proposals or queries.

#### Coordination and coherence

38. In Yemen, several emergency-related coordination mechanisms exist. Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator and supported by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a

Yemen's emergency coordination architecture

Humanitarian Country Team and the cluster approach were introduced in early August 2009 just before the outbreak of hostilities. The Government of Yemen also created an emergency coordination mechanism, working at first mainly through a technical committee led by the Ministry of Health, and later mainly through the newly created Executive Unit for IDPs. The Government of Yemen has also created a Sa'ada Reconstruction Fund and has mobilised several international actors and donors to support the Joint Initiative for Sa'ada. Finally, a number of mainly development-oriented coordination fora exist that have at least some relevance to the emergency response. They include the Yemen International NGOs Forum, a voluntary coordination platform for around 50 international NGOs active in Yemen; the Basic Education Development Strategy (BEDS), a platform focusing on education policy; and a water-related coordination forum. At the local level, coordination revolves around IDP camps, weekly overall coordination meetings convened by local representatives of the Executive Unit for IDPs, and in some cases also cluster meetings.

39. The quick introduction of these coordination fora, together with the fact that only a comparatively small number of organisations are present and active in Northern Yemen, has facilitated the implementation of an orderly and organised response. While government involvement in the clusters differ, the activities of the technical committee and the Executive Unit for IDPs ensure a relatively strong level of engagement of the Government of Yemen as whole, though not necessarily of the individual line ministries responsible for different sectors of the response. The work of the Humanitarian Country Team and the clusters was also critical for preparing key funding and planning instruments such as the Flash Appeal and the Consolidated Appeal.

Coordination gains:  
organised response,  
involvement of the  
government

40. Despite these gains, the evaluation team observed several coordination and coherence gaps in Yemen. Thus, a spirit of competition persists among some organisations on the ground. This leads to duplications such as the creation of child-friendly spaces in the same area of a camp or the visit of mobile psychosocial support teams on successive days in the same area. Even though these duplications may not be large, they would be entirely avoidable in an area in which so few organisations are active and which has such large coverage gaps. In Sa'ada, government-led coordination meetings have been discontinued and despite the thin presence of humanitarian actors on the ground duplications have been reported, for example in the distribution of nutrition products. Moreover, there is a lack of coherence in important areas. This affects technical implementation details such as the level of incentive payments for volunteers and government officials, the sizes and distribution times of consumable hygiene

Lack of coherence on  
technical and policy  
issues

kits, or the referral process between severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition cases. It also affects key policy questions such as the position of international organisations regarding the return process to Sa'ada or coordinated advocacy positions on the issue of access.

41. Several factors account for these persisting coordination and coherence problems, including:

Factors weakening  
coordination

- OCHA typically plays a crucial role in setting up the cluster approach and facilitating inter-cluster coordination. Yet its office in Yemen has been severely understaffed over the last year.
- The purpose of the cluster approach remains unclear to many humanitarian actors in Yemen.
- Several clusters had a quick turnover of coordinators and sometimes coordinator gaps.
- The information collection and management provided by clusters remains insufficient.
- The level of engagement of the government in clusters varies strongly.
- The links between clusters at capital level and coordination fora at the field level are weak.
- With very few organisations active in some areas of the response, it is questionable whether the introduction of clusters and the organisation of cluster meetings are appropriate, especially at the field level.
- One group of actors, namely those involved in Al-Mazrak camp 2, are reluctant to participate in coordination efforts.

### **Donors**

42. To finance its emergency activities in Northern Yemen, UNICEF requested additional funds through coordinated funding instruments, namely the Flash Appeal and the Consolidated Appeal. The Country Office's fundraising strategy has not been finalised. To date, the entire revised Flash Appeal requests and 37% of its Consolidated Appeal requests are funded, compared to an overall level of funding of the Consolidated Appeal of 45.5%. Table 3 contains an overview of UNICEF's requests and their current funding status.



**Table 3: UNICEF requests and level of funding as of August 2010**

<b>Original request</b>	<b>Revised request</b>	<b>Received funding</b>
US\$ 6,150,000 (Flash Appeal)	US\$ 5,500,000	US\$ 5,655,903 or 103%
US\$ 19,007,276 (Consolidated Appeal)	US\$ 9,669,689	US\$ 3,614,779 or 37%

Data source: Financial Tracking Service, status 19 August 2010

43. While donors appreciate UNICEF's efforts, especially under the new leadership of the Country Office, they take issue with the following aspects:

- There is a lack of joint UN proposals in Yemen, which would help convince donor headquarters to increase the overall level of funding.
- The overall level of funds requested through the Consolidated Appeal (over US\$ 180 million in the original version and more than US\$ 187 million in the revised version) has been deemed too high relative to the absorption capacity of humanitarian actors in Yemen.
- The distinction between development and humanitarian programmes is not clear and too many development-oriented programmes are included in emergency appeals such as the Consolidated Appeal.
- The initial quality of proposals presented by UNICEF and the data included therein, especially if they were prepared without the help of UNICEF's regional office, was deemed insufficient.
- The ability of the Country Office to track contributions and their use is limited and consequently donors demand an improved quality of reports on the use of individual funds.
- To date, efforts to establish closer relations to donors from the Gulf countries and local private donors or partners have been limited. While most actors acknowledge that building relationships to Gulf donors can be difficult, most would deem the effort worthwhile.

Donor observations

**Public relations: Visits and the media**

44. Public relations efforts are crucial for raising global awareness about the situation in Northern Yemen and for increasing the willingness of public and private donors to fund related activities. UNICEF has played an active

Strong PR engagement by UNICEF

role in that regard by organising visits of UNICEF National Committees and UNICEF’s celebrity Goodwill Ambassadors and by facilitating the work of journalists. Some of these activities have had a clear impact. Thus, for example, contributions to Yemen from the region increased following the visit of the Egyptian actor Mahmoud Qabil – though these contributions mainly benefited other actors.

Tendency to “brush things up”

45. While these activities are important, they have generated two disadvantages. On the one hand, they impose a considerable burden on local staff members, especially since the required administrative effort is high. On the other hand, several observers have noted that UNICEF tended to “brush things up” before formal visits to convey a positive image. This undermines the organisation’s credibility among staff members, partners and beneficiaries.

## **Priority recommendations: relationships and coordination**

### **Coordination**

- Ensure more political commitment and senior level representation in cluster meetings; begin involving the government with the EPRP; and have clusters co-chaired by government.
- Strengthen links between (sub-) clusters in Sana'a and in the field by:
  - Sharing Sana'a meeting minutes & action points with the field
  - Scheduling field meetings before Sana'a meetings
  - Developing a simple format for field to request action/guidance from Sana'a (cf. DRC system of recommendations)
- Strengthen the focus of clusters on information management and support clusters through a dedicated information manager. Simplify and update the 4W format to ensure compatibility with information systems used by the government and within (sub-) clusters. Include information on the status of implementation of planned activities and only include projects that have received funding.

### **Relations to donors**

- Create joint UN funding proposals in all areas.
- Create strategic links between clusters and donors, for example by convening quarterly special cluster & donor meetings.

### **Public relations**

- Strengthen communications by:
  - Maintaining a list of spokespersons, their areas of expertise and language skills
  - Familiarizing staff with who does what in communication in New York, Geneva and the Regional Office
  - Creating key media documents including a Q&A, key messages, facts and statistics and updating them as the situation evolves
  - Identifying or creating effective mechanisms for documenting the emergency (photos, videos, blogs) and sharing materials with Headquarters for posting on the global website.
- Present visitors with a real, not an embellished picture of the situation and response effort. Minimize the administrative effort of organizing visits by simplifying the related administrative procedures.

## 4 Conclusions

46. The current situation in Yemen is very dynamic. At the beginning of the Ramadan season in the summer of 2010, hostilities between the Al-Houthi rebels on the one hand and the government and tribes loyal to it on the other have been intensifying, raising speculations that a seventh round of fighting may be imminent. At the same time, peace negotiations facilitated by Qatar are ongoing, potentially paving the way for a more stable solution of the conflict and the return of the IDPs. In the medium-term, local actors and the international community unfortunately have to prepare for new emergencies in Yemen as the political situation remains volatile, while the economic and social situations are predicted to deteriorate drastically with the depletion of oil and freshwater resources.

47. With limited national and local capacity to respond to emergencies and few international actors active in Yemen, UNICEF will remain a central humanitarian actor. It is therefore important that UNICEF takes steps for increasing its capacity to fulfil its humanitarian responsibilities as laid out in the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action. To do so, the organisation needs to take strategic decisions on how to balance its engagement in emergency relief with its development-oriented activities, it needs to conduct a thorough situation analysis and develop contingency plans on that basis together with its partners and it needs to adapt its organisational structures, processes and capacities accordingly.

48. The next chapter contains a detailed list of recommendations. The list was prepared in cooperation with UNICEF's emergency team in Yemen and is intended to serve as a living document that is periodically updated and helps to track progress. This evaluation found that the UNICEF country office in Yemen already has a range of effective mechanisms in place for identifying lessons, but that it often lacks appropriate follow-up mechanisms to ensure lessons are consistently implemented. UNICEF's country team in Yemen has decided on two steps to ensure adequate follow-up of suggested recommendations: (1) assigning the overall responsibility for developing and implementing follow-up processes to the incoming emergency officer; and, (2) extending the scope of the evaluation to allow for an additional follow-up workshop with the country team in October 2010.

## 5 Recommendations

46. Based on the findings of this Real-Time Evaluation and ideas collected from various UNICEF stakeholders, the evaluation team created a preliminary list of recommendations. A workshop with eleven members of UNICEF’s emergency team in Yemen then further refined and added to these initial suggestions, prioritised them and assigned responsibilities and timeframes for priority recommendations. The workshop results were circulated among UNICEF staff members in the Country Office in Yemen as well as the Regional Office in Amman and received additional feedback. The full list of recommendations is included below and is available as a stand-alone document for further use by the country team. It will be updated during a follow-up workshop with UNICEF staff members in Yemen in October 2010. UNICEF’s Emergency Coordinator in Yemen is responsible for ensuring follow-up to the recommendations.

<b>RECOMMENDATION 1: STRENGTHEN PREPAREDNESS</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening preparedness</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. Status</b>
1. Conduct a comprehensive situation analysis building on existing assessments as the basis for funding proposals, annual work plans and contingency plans.	Realistic situation analysis available	high	Emergency Coordinator	Next 2 months, before CAP process
2. The Humanitarian Coordinator with the Humanitarian Country Team should provide clear inter-agency guidance on position regarding Sa’ada (e.g. focus on return and expand activities? Work through implementing partners? Collaborate with Al-Houthis?).	All actors follow one clear line of action in Sa’ada	high	Representative	2 months

<b>RECOMMENDATION 1: STRENGTHEN PREPAREDNESS CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening preparedness</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. Status</b>
3. Identify partners who are accepted by the communities they are serving in Sa'ada, involve them in preparedness, build their capacity, create stand-by agreements or project cooperation agreements (PCAs) using new PCA guidelines:	Timely response during emergencies by implementing partners	high	Deputy Rep. or Emergency Coordinator with sections	Next 3-6 months
4. Engage in contingency planning based on scenarios developed in cooperation with partners / at inter-agency level, using a simple format. As part of this, plan early for staffing needs and surge capacity. Request principally Arabic speakers; maintain a list of Arabic speaking staff at regional level, including profiles / skill descriptions and prioritise surge capacity staff with comparable experience (Sudan etc.).	Contingency plans ready, regularly updated and owned; List of Arabic speaking surge capacity is created and used	medium	Emergency coordinator with sections and cluster leads; Human Resources	3-6 months
5. Strengthen presence in Sa'ada, with adequately equipped office if security situation permits.	Office in Sa'ada functional, actively coordinates UNICEF's response	medium	Representative/Dep. Rep/Emergency Coordinator	Immediately
6. (Re-)establish direct contacts to Al-Houthis for access and security.		medium	Representative	3-6 months



<b>RECOMMENDATION 1: STRENGTHEN PREPAREDNESS CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening preparedness</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. Status</b>
7. Conduct comprehensive needs assessments in all areas affected by conflict and covering all affected groups and strengthen data collection capacities. To do so, include sections into project cooperation agreements with partners, rely more on independent international NGOs and local partners in high risk areas and explore possibilities for using new technologies such as crowd-sourcing for needs assessments in inaccessible areas.	Details of situation and needs of children and women in all conflict affected areas are known	medium	Emergency Coordinator, M&E team	3-6 months
8. Map learning mechanisms and processes of UNICEF's Country Office in Yemen and develop suggestions on how to improve follow-up mechanisms.		medium	M&E team	During follow-up workshop, October 2010
9. Transfer relevant lessons from Al-Mazrak camps to all response activities, for example by ensuring that new camps or IDP settlements receive IDP-built family latrines and that water tanks are elevated, have a sufficient number of taps and adequate drainage.	Lessons documented and consistently implemented	medium	Section Heads	Next 2-3 months
10. Ensure all available information on conflict-affected populations and their needs is shared and used (from UNHCR, WFP, Office for the Reconstruction of Sa'ada, local partners etc.).		low	Monitoring and Evaluation Officers, Information Management Specialist	Partially implemented through Joint Initiative for Sa'ada / thematic group led by the World Bank

<b>RECOMMENDATION 2: INCREASE TIMELINESS</b>				
<b>Steps for increasing timeliness</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
11. Apply emergency procedures to all activities related to emergency, including the use of Long-Term Agreements to simplify and accelerate procurement of supplies.	Clear and practical guidance on businesses processes in emergency is provided	high	Management	Immediately
12. Create a UNICEF warehouse in Yemen and pre-position critical supplies.	Distribution of relevant pre-positioned supplies within 48 hours of the onset of an emergency	high	Supplies section	Next 3 months / authorization process initiated
13. Agree with ministries through MoUs to set aside a share of around 20-25% of incoming supplies provided by UNICEF to the country to be released immediately to respond to emerging emergency situations.	UNICEF has immediate access to a share of supplies kept by the government	high	Management	Immediately. Agreement on 25% of nutrition supplies has been concluded with Ministry of Public Health
14. Improve planning by programs for supplies especially as emergency becomes routine. Rely on an (adapted?) version of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for doing so.		medium	Sections	Next 4 months

<b>RECOMMENDATION 3: ADDRESS GAPS</b>				
<b>Steps for addressing gaps</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
15. Address the current imbalance and re-focus the response effort on IDPs in Sa'ada, Amran and Al-Jawf (rather than mainly in Hajjah), and especially IDPs outside camps through an extension of partnerships with local and international NGOs and other UN agencies. As part of this, continue to advocate for linking IDPs outside camps and host communities to the new piped water system and continue to supply water until they are connected.	New PCAs signed covering the gap areas and ensuring timely service delivery	high	Management to address efficiency vs. equity trade-off and define strategy; do advocacy	By end of year
16. Increase focus on projects benefitting the host population to reduce social conflicts, such as the creation of water systems or the rehabilitation / expansion of schools.	Poor host communities benefit from long-term projects	high	Inter-cluster forum (linking to Sa'ada Reconstruction Initiative, HCT, with all sections	By end of year
17. Advocate for the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team to clearly assign responsibilities for addressing general priority thematic gaps (IDP registration, demining and UXOs, follow up on mental health / psychiatric cases, smuggling and consumption of Qat and other drugs, Early Recovery, family planning / polygamy, vector control and flies, energy issues / cooking gas, livelihoods support, support for returnees, skin diseases...).		high	Representative / Deputy Representative to put on HCT agenda	During CAP process

<b>RECOMMENDATION 3: ADDRESS GAPS CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for addressing gaps</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
18. Address the problem of child soldiers, e.g. through increased advocacy with the Government and Al-Houthis, the creation of local child protection committees, reintegration programs. Facilitate a best practice exchange on child soldiers and community-based child protection committees with UNICEF Uganda and UNICEF Sudan / Darfur.	Strategy on child soldiers in place	medium	Representative supported by the Child Protection Section	Immediately
19. To enhance access to conflict areas, work more with independent organizations (ICRC, MSF), local organizations and local staff and agree with the UN Country Team on this approach.	Cooperative agreements, joint activities with organizations	medium	Deputy Representative/ Emergency Coordinator	3-6 months
20. Support local schools now to enable them to offer higher education (> grade 6) in the coming school year; address corporal punishment in schools.		medium	Education Chief	Immediately
21. Support female-headed and disabled households e.g. by organizing tent-to-tent distributions.	Special needs of different groups are adequately addressed	medium	Clusters	3-6 months
22. Systematically assess risks related to the response and develop strategies for mitigating / addressing them as part of strategy development.	Risks are clearly known and addressed	medium	Planning officer with emergency team	1-3 months

<b>RECOMMENDATION 3: ADDRESS GAPS CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for addressing gaps</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
23. Organize a best practice exchange how to integrate host populations with UNICEF DRC / North Kivu.		medium	Management, Emergency Coordinator	6 – 12 months
24. Allocate distributions, e.g. of consumable hygiene items, according to household size.		low		
25. Strengthen focus on cross-cutting issues, especially gender, environment, early recovery and Qat abuse and provide staff members with clear guidance on how to address the consumption and smuggling of Qat and other drugs.	Effective integration of cross-cutting issues	low	Deputy Representative	Immediately / ongoing

<b>RECOMMENDATION 4: ADAPT MATERIALS AND INCREASE BENEFICIARY INVOLVEMENT</b>				
<b>Steps for adapting materials and increasing beneficiary involvement</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. Status</b>
26. Replace large school tents with simple or pre-fabricated semi-permanent structures (for example metal poles, galvanised iron sheets). If the return process accelerates, the structures can be deconstructed and used elsewhere or serve to expand existing school facilities.		high	Sections / Chief of operations, Supply officer	1 – 3 months
27. Revert to building latrines with the help of IDPs. Ensure latrines next to child friendly spaces have water, are functional and include hand-washing facilities.		high	WASH program	Immediately / within 2 weeks
28. Inform IDPs better about plans and activities (for example using information centers in camps) and involve them in assessments, planning and implementation as much as possible.		medium	Field Offices	Immediately
29. Complement small tents with temporary local building materials (palm leaves, hay) to extend tents, enhance safety and engage IDPs. Upon return, these extensions can be easily deconstructed and the materials can either be taken by returning IDPs or be used by the host population.		medium	Sections / Chief of operations, Supply officer	1 – 3 months



<b>RECOMMENDATION 5: ADDRESS EFFICIENCY ISSUES</b>				
<b>Steps for enhancing efficiency</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
30. Rely on IDP volunteers instead of mobile teams to provide PSS services for IDPs outside camps.	Volunteers outside camps recruited, trained and active	medium	Education section	Next 4 months
31. Agree on emergency processes with government to address clearance of shipments / storage costs.	MoU established	low	Supply section	Immediately

<b>RECOMMENDATION 6: ADAPT PROCESSES TO THE EMERGENCY AND REBALANCE EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE CONNECTEDNESS</b>				
<b>Steps for adapting processes and rebalancing activities</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
32. Maintain the balance between emergency response and regular development activities (i.e. keep sufficient attention and resources for development activities).	Sufficient human and financial resources to implement both types of programs	high	Deputy Representative	Until end of year

<b>RECOMMENDATION 6: ADAPT PROCESSES TO THE EMERGENCY AND REBALANCE EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE CONNECTEDNESS CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for adapting processes and rebalancing activities</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
33. Decentralize emergency decision-making to enable rapid response and effective coordination at field-level, e.g. by providing field staff the authority to receive local quotations, while the country office provides technical consultation, and by increasing petty cash for small rehabilitation works or the procurement / hire of tools and equipment (e.g. up to a level of \$2,000). Ensure that emergency officers speak Arabic.	Emergency field officers and coordinators feel empowered and supported to undertake their tasks	high	Management	Immediately
34. Recruit a permanent emergency officer at country level to coordinate the response as well as needs assessments and preparedness, support proposal writing, follow-up on supplies etc.	Emergency officer hired; Better information available, therefore better coordinated response among all sections	high	Management	Recruitment ongoing
35. Strengthen coordinated advocacy on access and the importance of emergency response.		high	Representative	1 – 3 months
36. Provide adequate office equipment and supplies for emergency field offices.		high	Chief of operations	next 2 months

<b>RECOMMENDATION 6: ADAPT PROCESSES TO THE EMERGENCY AND REBALANCE EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE CONNECTEDNESS CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for adapting processes and rebalancing activities</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
37. Include emergency activities into annual workplan.	Emergency actions feature in annual workplans	medium	Emergency Coordinator/ Deputy Representative	
38. Develop simple reporting, monitoring and tracking tools in cooperation with staff, strengthen monitoring of activities and include this in TORs for staff members.	Staff members are evaluated on their development and use of monitoring mechanisms	medium	Management, Heads of Sections	At annual planning of staff tasks
39. Connectedness: Provide staff members of the UNICEF Country Office in Yemen with training on the new <i>Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action</i> , especially the sections focusing on early recovery.	Staff aware of new CCCs and implications	medium	Deputy Representative, Chief SPPME, Emergency Coordinator	Training October 2010
40. Create links to the Joint Initiative for Sa'ada through clusters.		low	Deputy Representative, Emergency Coordinator	UNICEF is likely to lead the Recovery and Social Services Thematic Group within the Joint Initiative for Sa'ada
41. Enable staff hired as consultants to use the UNICEF information management system / enable field staff to access the shared drive or alternative system and enable staff members in the field to track decision and supply processes.		low	IT	

<b>RECOMMENDATION 7: STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening relationships with implementing partners</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
42. Improve selection and monitoring processes of implementing partners. Focus on fewer, but longer term projects with implementing partners.		medium	Sections	Permanent
43. Invite international NGOs with special focus, such as Terre des Hommes, CP etc.		medium	Emergency Coordinator	3 – 6 months
44. Inform all partners (including government) better about plans.		low	Deputy Representative	1 – 3 months
<b>Steps for strengthening coordination</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
45. Ensure more political commitment and senior level representation in cluster meetings; begin involving the government with the EPRP; and have clusters co-chaired by government.		high	Management to do advocacy	Next 3 months
46. Strengthen links between (sub-) clusters in Sana'a and in the field by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sharing Sana'a meeting minutes &amp; action points with the field</li> <li>• Scheduling field meetings before Sana'a meetings</li> <li>• Developing a simple format for field to request action / guidance from Sana'a (cf. DRC system of recommendations)</li> </ul>	Achieve more effective and focused cluster meetings	high	Emergency Coordinator with cluster coordinators	Immediately

<b>RECOMMENDATION 7: STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening coordination</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
47. Strengthen the focus of clusters on information management and support clusters through a dedicated information manager. Simplify and update the 4W format to ensure compatibility with information systems used by the government and within (sub-) clusters. Include information on the status of implementation of planned activities and only include projects that have received funding.	4W tool updated and adequately used by clusters to direct response	high	Cluster coordinators with OCHA	Next 3 months
48. Harmonize incentive payments for government officials and volunteers among UN agencies and international NGOs, address overlaps in ECD activities between UNICEF and Save the Children and improve referral of malnutrition cases from UNICEF and MSF to WFP.		medium	Sections	3 months
49. Address the issue of high turn-over of cluster coordinators by including coordinator positions in fundraising proposals and issuing longer-term contracts and clearly assign individuals as (sub-) cluster coordinators and include this in their terms of reference.		medium	Representative / Deputy Representative	Permanent
50. Ensure that all relevant actors in the field are contacted, invited and informed about cluster meetings and their outcomes, especially in areas where no regular meetings take place.		medium	Cluster coordinators	Permanent


<b>RECOMMENDATION 7: STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening coordination</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
51. Focus (sub-) cluster meetings on strategic and operational issues / have more action oriented meetings and find different formats for information sharing.		medium	Cluster coordinators	Permanent
52. Hold (sub-) cluster meetings more frequently in government buildings.		medium	Cluster coordinators	Immediately
53. Conduct more joint exercises, including joint or inter-agency evaluations, taking into account potential human resource constraints.		medium	M&E section	3 – 9 months
54. Strengthen strategic inter-cluster / inter-agency coordination, enhance internal coordination between UNICEF programmes and strengthen links to existing sectoral coordination mechanisms.		low	Deputy Representative, Emergency Coordinator	Permanent
55. Rethink whether clusters are the most appropriate form of coordination at local level (alternative: focus on area-based coordination).		low	Emergency Coordinator	1 -2 months
56. Create an MoU between UNICEF and Save the Children to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities.		low	Management	1 -3 months
57. Increase commitment of cluster members to implement decisions taken by the cluster and enhance follow-up on action points.		low	Cluster coordinators	Permanent



<b>RECOMMENDATION 7: STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening relationships with donors / fundraising</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
58. Create joint UN funding proposals in all areas.	Joint proposals submitted	high	Clusters (with Representative)	Next 2 months / within CAP process
59. Create strategic links between clusters and donors, for example by convening quarterly special cluster & donor meetings.	Joint meetings take place, requests for funding are forwarded to donors	high	Cluster coordinators (in consultation with Representative)	immediately
60. Finalize the fundraising strategy for the UNICEF Country Office in Yemen		medium	Communication section	3 – 6 months
61. Explore partnerships with companies for fundraising and in-kind donations.		medium	Communication section	3 – 6 months
62. Invest more in building relationships with Gulf donors, potentially learning from other agencies such as GTZ.		low	Representative	6 months
63. Improve monitoring and tracking / reporting of use of contributions.		low	Deputy Representative	Permanent

<b>RECOMMENDATION 7: STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION CONTINUED</b>				
<b>Steps for strengthening public relations</b>	<b>Success indicator</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / impl. status</b>
64. Strengthen communications by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintaining a list of spokespersons, their areas of expertise and language skills</li> <li>• Familiarizing staff with who does what in communication in New York, Geneva and the Regional Office</li> <li>• Creating key media documents including a Q&amp;A, key messages, facts and statistics and updating them as the situation evolves</li> <li>• Identifying or creating effective mechanisms for documenting the emergency (photos, videos, blogs) and sharing materials with Headquarters for posting on the global website</li> </ul>		high	Communication Section	Next 2 weeks
65. Present visitors with a real, not an embellished picture of the situation and the response effort. Minimize the administrative effort of organizing visits by simplifying the related administrative procedures.		high	Management	Next 2 months

## Annex A: Timeline of UNICEF's Response to Sa'ada Emergency



## **Annex B: Interviews, group discussions and workshops**

### **UNICEF**

- Dr. Kamel Ben Abdallah, Chief Young Child Survival and Development, UNICEF
- Adnan M. Abdulfattah, Field Operations Specialist, UNICEF
- Mohammed Al-Ebbi, Field Officer, UNICEF
- Musaid Ali Al-Magribi, Field Officer, Area Based Programme, UNICEF
- Ali Ahmed Al-Nowirah, Emergency Administration Haradh, UNICEF
- Dr. Khaled M. Al-Shaibani, Programme Officer Hodeidah, UNICEF
- Dr. Wisam A. Al-Timimi, Nutrition and Child Survival Specialist, UNICEF
- George I. Abu Al-Zulof, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF
- Anne-Marie Baan, Programme Officer Monitoring and Evaluation, UNICEF
- Mohamed Bile, Chief of Education, UNICEF
- Isabel Candela, Senior Recovery Adviser, Recovery and Risk Reduction Section, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF
- Gerald Coffe-Djangmah, Emergency Manager Haradh, UNICEF
- Abdulaziz Dada, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UNICEF
- Thomas Davin, Regional Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response, UNICEF Regional Office Middle East and Northern Africa
- Seydou Dia, Emergency Specialist, UNICEF Regional Office Middle East and Northern Africa
- François Ducharme, Emergency Specialist, Humanitarian Support Unit, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF
- Etona Ekole, Chief, Social Policy and Planning M&E Section, UNICEF
- Anne-Marie M. Fonseca, Deputy Representative, UNICEF
- Ghada Kachachi, Chief Child Protection and HIV Prevention, UNICEF
- Majed Khalil Abu Manneh, Nutrition Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
- Ghassan Madieh, WASH Specialist, UNICEF
- Nada Mahyoub, Supply Assistant, UNICEF

- Mohamad Mehdi, Child Protection Specialist, Emergency, Psycho-Social Support, UNICEF
- Tawfiq Radman, Child Protection / Education Focal Point Haradh, UNICEF
- Sami A. Saeed, Project Officer Water and Sanitation, UNICEF
- Julien Temple, Manager, Emergency Surge Capacity, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF
- Ane Tvedt, Emergency Surge Capacity Specialist, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF
- Toby Wicks, Emergency Specialist, UNICEF Regional Office Middle East and Northern Africa
- Lieke van de Wiel, Regional Education Adviser, UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia
- Aziz Wahban, Civil Engineering Haradh, UNICEF

### **Other UN Agencies**

- Tarek Elguindi, Head of Office, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- Carlos Abbas Geha, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- Pratibha Mehta, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative
- Asmae Abusharkh, Protection Officer, UNHCR
- Moa'mer Alwan, UNHCR Sa'ada
- Khalid Halim, Protection Officer for Sa'ada, UNHCR
- Faiz Harmal, Sa'ada Coordinator, UNHCR
- Ann Maymann, Assistant Representative (Protection), UNHCR
- Nabil D. Othman, Deputy Representative, UNHCR
- Hatim Said, Field Officer Haradh, UNHCR
- Ali Al-Hebshi, WFP Head of Sa'ada Office, WFP
- Yahya Al-Nadhuri, Food Monitoring Officer, WFP
- Muneer Al-Suqatry, Field Officer, WFP
- Yukako Sato, Programme Officer, WFP

- Safa'a Saleh Al-Hashdi, WHO
- Mohammed Ali Kolaise, Emergency Officer, WHO
- Dr. Abdallah Salem Jammah, Emergency Field Coordinator Harath Office, WHO

## **NGOs**

- Saleem Ahmed, Al-Amal
- Aziz Aidah, Branch Manager Haradh, Al-Amal
- Yahia Yahia Sauad, Warehouse Manager, Al-Amal
- Altaieb Izzaddin, Deputy Director, Al-Amal
- Fat'hia Al-Attab, Director, Sa'ada Women Association
- Salah Al-Awadhi, Administration and Logistics, Médecins du Monde
- Ahmed Al-Gorashi, Executive Manager, Seyaj
- Mohamed Al-Hadrami, Director of Finance and Camp Manager Al-Mazrak Camp 2, Al-Saleh Foundation
- Ahmed Al-Hakami, Public Relations Manager Haradh, Islamic Relief
- Faryal Minhas, Regional Child Welfare Manager, Islamic Relief
- Meah Sirinj, Camp Manager Al-Mazrak Camp 3, Islamic Relief
- Mohamed Hamoud Al-Haddad, Administrator, CSSW
- Mohamed Farhan, Amran Branch Manager, CSSW
- Hamsa Abdul Mahman, Community Worker, CSSW
- Mansoor Ali, Regional Coordinator, Sa'ada Governorate, MSF-France
- Amat Albari Amir, Director, Women Union Sa'ada Branch
- Maryam Ibrahim Al-Shwafi, Executive Manager and Secretary General, Shawthab
- Feras Al-Qadny, Head, Social Care and Sustainable Development
- Roberta Contin, Program Director, CHF International Yemen
- Mosa Dahab Adam Dahab, Project Manager Harad, Oxfam
- Becky Degraaff, Acting Country Director, ADRA
- Himedan Mohammed Himedan, Health Officer, MSF Spain
- Adeel Qaiser Khan, Emergency Team Leader, Save the Children
- Pierre Yves Malgore, Head of Project, Triangle



- Ali Saalem, Coordinator for Hygiene Promotion and Environmental Health at Al-Mazrak Camp 1, Al-Khair
- Tayeb Dhaifallah Saleh, Field Officer, Razeh Foundation

### **Red Cross / Red Crescent**

- Mohamed Yahya Sawlan, Disaster Management Coordinator, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies / Yemen Red Crescent Society
- Irfan Sulejmani, Head of Sub-Delegataion in Sa'ada, International Committee of the Red Cross

### **Government, local authorities and public service providers**

- Dr. Ayman Ahmed, Health Director General, Local Council Haradh
- Marwa Ali, Psychosocial Team, Haradh
- Nagib Abdulbaqi A. Ali, Head, Nutrition Department, Ministry of Public Health and Population
- Ahmed M. Al-Kohlani, Minister of the House of Representatives and the Shura Representatives, Head of the Executive Office for IDPs
- Abdullah Mohamed Al-Rozamy, Supervisor for early childhood development and head of Al-Yarmouk School
- Mohamed Al-Shameri, Director General, Education Office, Sa'ada
- Abdullah Al-Sanany, Director, Harf Sufian Hospital Amran
- Abdullah Al-Sharafy, Head of the Branch, Executive Unit for IDPs, Haradh, Hajja Governorate
- Ibrahim Al-Tammah, Director of Information and Statistics, Amran Health Office
- Eng. Abdullah A. Malik Badr, General Director for Technical Office, General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP)
- Abdulkader Ahmed Dubaee, Branch Manager Hajjah, General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP)
- Hamoud Haiden, General Secretary, Local Council Haradh
- Dr. Hanbush Salem Hanbush, Director General, Health Office Sa'ada
- Mohamed Yahia Jubary, Supervisor of psychosocial support at Al-Mazrak Camp 1, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Hajja Governorate
- Adnan Mazahen, Director, Water Utility Hajjah

- Dr. Omar Hussein Fayed Mujalli, Assistant Deputy Minister, Ministry of Public Health and Population
- Sadeq Yahia Naji, head of psychosocial support team of volunteers at Al-Mazrak Camp 1, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Hajja Governorate
- Abdo Surour, Psychosocial Team, Haradh
- Abdo Taresh, Education Director General, Local Council Haradh
- Sadeq Yahia, Head of M&E, Local Council Haradh

### **Donors**

- Thomas Dehermann-Roy, ECHO Amman
- Mary Hockney, Programme Manager Health and Education, DFID
- Scott Mac Arthur, Management / Programme Officer, DFID

### **Group discussions and meetings**

- Discussion with IDPs in an unplanned camp in Amran, July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Haradh coordination meeting (chaired by representative of the Executive Unit for IDPs in Haradh), July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 1, Women's Center, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 1, group discussion with women and girls, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 1, discussion with women and girls at water point, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 1, discussion with men, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 1, discussion with youth, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 1, discussion with health staff and pharmacy assistants, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 3, discussion with early childhood development volunteers, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 3, discussion with WASH volunteers, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 3, discussion with psychosocial volunteers, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 3, attending the weekly camp coordination meeting between INGOs and IDP representatives, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Al-Mazrak Camp 3, interview Oxfam WASH expert, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Discussion with IDPs located near the road between Haradh town and the camps, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010

- Discussion with IDPs located near the road between Haradh town and the camps during early childhood development activities, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Visit of Yarmouk School near Mazrak Camp 1, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Discussion with women in women's centre in Al-Mazrak Camp 2, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Discussion with family in Al-Mazrak Camp 2, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Discussion with Akhdam women and children in Al-Mazrak Camp 1, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Visit of Child Protection Center Haradh, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Discussions with IDPs in Al-Jabbana camp sections C and D in Sa'ada, September 6<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup>, 2010

### **Workshop and debriefings**

- Debriefing with UNICEF team in Haradh, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Learning workshop with child-protection sub-cluster in Sana'a, August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Learning workshop with education cluster in Sana'a, August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Debriefing and learning workshop with UNICEF Emergency Team in Sana'a, August 8<sup>th</sup>, 2010
  - Participants: Ben Abdallah Kamel (YCSD); Noor Al-Kasadi (CP); Ghassan Madieh (WASH); Majed Abu Manneh (Nutrition); Neena Gupta (Supply); Mohamed Mehdi (CPS); Abdulaziz Dada (SPPME); Anne-Marie Baan (SPPME); Etona Ekole (SPPME); Raja Sharhan (YCSD Nutrition); Wisam Al-Timimi (YCSD)
- Debriefing with UNICEF partners and evaluation reference group in Sana'a, August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2010
  - Participants: Michael Heyn (UNDP), Torsten Ahren (UNDP), Marius Posthumus (INGO Forum), Becky de Graaff (ADRA), Bharati Pokharel (UNHCR), Martha Kow-Donko (UNHCR), Isameldin Awad (CSSW)
- Debriefing with UNICEF Country Representative and Deputy Representative in Sana'a, August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2010
- Debriefing with the Humanitarian Country Team in Sana'a, August 28<sup>th</sup>, 2010
  - Members: RC/HC, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDSS, WFP, WHO, IOM, FAO, UNFPA, ICS, NGO Forum, IRY, Oxfam, Save the Children, ICRC (Observer), MSF France, MSF Spain, Care International

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- Yemen Humanitarian Country Team (2010), *Mission to Sa'ada*, Mission Report, 24 March 2010

## **Annex D: Workshop results Child Protection Sub-Cluster**

### **1. Strengths – weaknesses analysis**

#### **a. Strengths / aspects most appreciated about the sub-cluster**

- The sub-cluster leads to increased networking between local NGOs and international players as well as among NGOs
- Awareness raising, capacity building and training for national NGOs
- Local NGOs start to be prepared for emergency response (establish emergency unit)
- Coordinated assessments
- Joint planning and information sharing / 3W
- Coordinated fundraising (Consolidated Appeal)
- Development / dissemination of child protection in emergencies strategy, common understanding of child protection in emergencies
- Creation of an action plan on child protection in emergencies
- Better organized efforts
- Effective team work
- Different capacities / diversity of actors
- Jointly identified need for a strategy
- Active advocacy by members
- Inter-cluster coordination

#### **b. Weaknesses / issues missing or needing improvement**

- Meetings are:
  - a. Not well enough organised
  - b. Too many and too long
  - c. No refreshments are provided
  - d. Too much talk, too little implementation
- Coordination efforts / activities need to be intensified
- Government:
  - Coordination with government players needs to be intensified
  - Government representative is not strong enough
  - In-depth assessment is lacking
  - Information sharing needs to be improved:
    - Strengthen 3W
    - Use 3W to avoid duplications
    - Improve reporting of members to clusters /to 3W
  - Limited funds are available for child protection, few actors are active in the sector
  - There is no clear common understanding of what child protection entails and what indicators should be used for reporting activities
  - Psycho-social interventions during crises need to be prioritized
  - Work in the field is not coordinated between partners; there is competition
  - Coordination between cluster at Sana'a and field level needs to be strengthened
  - Need to coordinate service provision in all areas
  - MRE & Demining

## 2. Priorities and steps forward

<b>(1) IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MEETINGS</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Clearly assign a sub-cluster coordinator and include this task in the TORs of that staff members	UNICEF management	August – October 2010
Schedule meetings only once per month, but maintain child-protection as a separate meeting (do not fuse with protection meeting)	Sub-cluster	Decision taken by cluster members
Provide more structure for meetings, focus meetings on priorities (e.g. identifying gaps and organizing a response to these gaps). Share information before meetings via email and by providing a documents table in the meeting room	Sub-cluster coordinator	Immediately
Revise sub-cluster TORs and disseminate them again	Sub-cluster coordinator / sub-cluster	August – September 2010
Provide refreshments	Meeting host	Immediately
Ensure translation is offered if meeting is held in English		Immediately



<b>(2) IMPROVE THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Hold meetings at government offices	Sub-cluster / MOSAL	Immediately
Continue incentive payments for government officials and <i>harmonize incentive payments across agencies</i>	Inter-cluster / HCT; coordinator to put issue on agenda	August – September 2010
Increase transparency of partner activities and share information on activities and their implementation	Sub-cluster	August – October 2010
Define referral system for child protection cases that refers cases to the government following the model used in Haradh	Sub-cluster with MOSAL	August – November 2010

<b>(3) IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING AND MANAGEMENT</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Strengthen collection of information for 3W by OCHA	OCHA	
Improve and simplify the template for 3W	OCHA with inputs from sub-cluster	August – October 2010
Use sub-cluster to update 3W	Sub-cluster	Immediately
Develop a matrix for child protection activities that can be used by sub-cluster members and can directly feed into / be part of the 3W	Sub-cluster	August – October 2010

<b>(4) STRENGTHEN LINKS BETWEEN SUB-CLUSTER IN SANA'A AND THE FIELD LEVEL</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Share sub-cluster meeting minutes and action points with relevant actors in the field	Coordinator	Immediately
Participate more frequently in meetings at field level	Coordinator	Immediately
Schedule field meetings in the run-up to Sana'a meeting	Sub-cluster with field clusters	August – September
Define simple template to be used by field-level sub-cluster to request action or guidance by Sana'a level (cf. recommendations system used in DRC)	Coordinator with field coordinators	August – September
Organise field-level sub-cluster meetings according to demand by local actors		
Ensure all actors at field level are contacted and invited, including in those areas where no regular meetings take place	Coordinator	August – September

General follow-up: Include this brief report as an agenda point for the next Child Protection meetings, monitor implementation using the tables above, define concrete steps for remaining issues, update assessment and next steps table during meeting in October / November 2010.

### **3. Participants**

Fiona Bulurwa, Child Protection Advisor, Save the Children

Mohammed Mehdi, Child Protection Section, UNICEF

Charlotta Land, Child Protection Section UNICEF

Asmae Abusharkh, Protection Officer, UNHCR

Noor Al-Kasadi, Child Protection Section, UNICEF

Maryam Ibrahim, Shawthab

Waleed Ahmad, Shawthab

Lina Yassin Al-Saffi, Islamic Relief

Isameldin Awad, Emergency Coordinator, CSSW

Arwa Dhumran, Al-Saleh Foundation

## **Annex E: Workshop results Education Cluster**

### **1. Strengths – weaknesses analysis**

#### **a) Strengths / elements most appreciated about the cluster**

- Strong involvement of the Ministry of Education, with clearly assigned focal point and frequent chairing of meetings by ministry representative.
- Participants with wide range of different experiences, leading to fruitful exchange and learning.
- Raising of awareness on education as an emergency issue through creation of an independent education cluster / splitting of joint protection & education cluster.
- Increasing interest in work of cluster voiced by other actors.

#### **b) Weaknesses / issues missing or needing improvement**

- Goals and purpose of clusters still unclear, roles of actors in clusters not defined clearly enough.
- Too many meetings, not enough action.
- Lack of: general guidance on clusters, information management, standardization of tools and templates / reporting formats due to lack of capacity of OCHA.
- Low participation of members.
- Continuing low recognition of education as an emergency issue among government, NGOs and donors.
- Very low funding available for education in emergency activities, therefore few activities of cluster members.
- No clear definition of clusters at field level; meetings mingled.
- Confusion concerning distinction between emergency vs. development activities, therefore scope of cluster and scope of reporting unclear.
- Turnover of cluster coordinators.
- Government ownership of cluster insufficient / government participation driven more by incentive payments than genuine interest.

## 2. Priorities and steps forward

<b>(1) RAISE AWARENESS ON EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES AND IMPROVING FUNDRAISING</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Regularly disseminate information on fundraising opportunities to cluster members (such as ERF, CERF etc.)	Coordinator	Immediately / continuous
Support NGOs in proposal writing	Coordinator, experienced cluster members	Immediately / continuous
Get support by global education cluster on global level advocacy as well as advice on country-level advocacy	Coordinator	August – October 2010
Continue using BEDS as a forum for raising awareness among donors	Coordinator	Immediately / continuous
Use new OCHA website and related cluster website for information & advocacy	Coordinator, cluster members	August – October 2010
Continue advocacy within UNICEF on the importance of education in emergencies, including to mobilize UNICEF emergency funds as provider of last resort	UNICEF Representative	August – November 2010
Clarify the distinction between education and education in emergencies	Cluster	August – September 2010
Strengthen the focus of the Humanitarian Country Team and of clusters on Early Recovery; Create an inter-agency / inter-cluster Early Recovery strategy	Coordinator, UNICEF Representative to put on HCT agenda	August – November 2010
Organize strategic meeting between education cluster and donors	Coordinator	August – September 2010
Increase the number of joint cluster / inter-agency proposals submitted to donors	Coordinator, UNICEF Representative	August – September 2010

**(2) CLARIFY DIVISION OF LABOUR AND RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN UNICEF AND SAVE THE CHILDREN**

<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Create MoU between UNICEF Yemen and Save the Children Yemen to clarify roles and responsibilities and strengthen synergies in the field	Country Representatives of UNICEF and Save the Children	Immediately

**(3) IMPROVE LINKS BETWEEN CLUSTER IN SANA'A AND THE FIELD LEVEL / RESOLVE KNOWN ISSUES**

<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Resolve outstanding coordination problems at field level (payment of incentives; location of child-friendly spaces in camps; locations and timing for PSS activities for IDPs outside camps by mobile teams) by holding a coordination meeting with relevant decision makers from Sana'a and field staff (either face-to-face in the field or through a phone conference)	Coordinator	Immediately

**(4) ENHANCE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CLUSTER APPROACH AMONG RELEVANT ACTORS**

<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Implement planned OCHA training on the cluster approach, including in the field	OCHA	August – November 2010
Enhance individual outreach activities with NGOs and government	Coordinator	August – November 2010

<b>(5) IMPROVE GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF THE CLUSTER</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Establish clear leadership of MoE	Coordinator, MoE	August – October 2010
Create a contingency plan under MoE leadership	MoE	August – November 2010
Ensure 3W and MoE database on activities are compatible and that 3W also includes information on implementation and contingency	Cluster, OCHA	August – October 2010

<b>(6) BETTER COORDINATE THE COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION</b>		
<b>Steps</b>	<b>Responsible</b>	<b>Timeframe / implementation status</b>
Harmonize data collection formats among cluster members	Coordinator / cluster	August – September 2010
Create a geographical division of labour for data collection	Coordinator / cluster	September – October 2010

General follow-up: Include this brief report as an agenda point for the next Education meetings, monitor implementation using the tables above, update assessment and next steps table during meeting in October / November 2010.

### **3. Participants**

Martin Foss, Education Section, UNICEF

Shirley Long, Education Cluster Coordinator, Save the Children

Najib Al-Mansour, GIS/HAO - UNOCHA

Fahmi Ajina, Ministry of Education



## **Annex F: Members of the Reference Group for this Evaluation**

### **Government of Yemen**

Mr. Ahmed Al-Kolani, Minister of State and Head of Emergency Unit

### **UNICEF Yemen**

Anne-Marie Fonseca, Deputy Representative

Etona Ekole, Chief, Monitoring and Evaluation

Adnan Abdulfattah, Field Operations Specialist and Emergency Focal Point

Kamel Ben Abdallah, Chief YCSD Section

Mohammed Bile, Chief BEGE

Noor Al-Kasadi, Child Protection Specialist

### **Cluster Coordinators**

Marwan Husseiki, WASH Cluster Lead

Majid Abu-Manneh, Nutrition Cluster Lead

### **UN agencies**

UNHCR, OCHA

### **NGO**

CSSW

### **INGO**

Save the Children

### **UNICEF MENARO / NYHQ**

Pierre Fourcassie, Senior Wash Specialist

Robert McCouch, Senior Evaluation Specialist – Humanitarian Evaluation Office

## Annex G: Terms of Reference of the Evaluation

<b>Purpose</b>	To undertake a real-time evaluation of UNICEF's response to the Sa'ada conflict in northern Yemen
<b>Expected fee</b>	TBD
<b>Location</b>	Sana'a, Harad, Amran. Report can be finalised away from duty station
<b>Duration</b>	9 weeks
<b>Start Date</b>	7 July 2010
<b>Reporting to</b>	Chief Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>Budget Code/PBA No</b>	GC/2006/0684-0
<b>Project and activity codes</b>	YEMA 0684 YT104

### Background

The armed conflict in Sa'ada Governorate that erupted in 2004 between the Al Houthi group and the Government of Yemen has resulted in loss of lives, damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, disruption in the provision of services and displacement of populations. Six separate rounds of fighting have each been followed by ceasefire agreements that have given way to more clashes. In August 2009, the 6<sup>th</sup> round of hostilities between the rival groups escalated with clashes in 11 of the 15 districts in Sa'ada Governorate. The conflict was then transported to neighbouring governorates of Hajjah, Amran and Al-Jawf, forcing tens of thousands to flee from their homes and creating new waves of displacement. By February 2010, UNHCR estimated the number of IDPs to be approximately 250,000. Access to the majority of IDPs has remained limited as a result of insecurity.

Sa'ada Governorate is 240km from Sana'a – the capital of Yemen. It is located in northern Yemen and is bordered by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the north and west, and the Governorates of Al Jawf, Amran and Hajjah on the east and south. These governorates with Sana'a are hosting the majority of the IDPs. Saudi Arabia was drawn into the conflict in November 2009 following skirmishes on the border with the Al-Houthis.

With the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in August 2009, the international community responded swiftly to address the growing needs in shelter, food, health, water and sanitation, education and protection of the civilian population. The cluster approach was immediately activated, facilitating coordination and coherence in response. UNICEF chairs the Nutrition and WASH clusters and co-chairs the Education cluster with Save the Children.

A Flash Appeal was launched in September 2009, requesting US\$23 million for immediate emergency relief. UNICEF requested US\$5.5 million from the appeal and effectively mobilised 100 per cent of its request. This enabled UNICEF undertake priority interventions in water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, education and protection. The Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan was launched in November 2009 requesting US\$177 million to respond to the growing needs of affected populations. UNICEF requested US\$19m within that appeal. The 2010 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan was the first consolidated humanitarian appeal for Yemen. To date it is funded at approximately 40%. Other financing mechanisms such as UNICEF's EPF and CERF have also been used in the response and the ERF has also recently been approved. Throughout the months of May and June, cluster reviews were held as well as the mid term review of the Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP).

A ceasefire was declared in February 2010 that has brought some lull to the fighting. The ceasefire has led to renewed attempts at entry into Sa'ada governorate that had previously remained inaccessible to humanitarian actors. Recovery and rehabilitation efforts are expected to be considerable given the toll the conflict has taken on lives and livelihoods, infrastructure and services.

Conflict in northern Yemen escalated in 2009 amidst growing dissent and violence in the southern governorates of Yemen and terrorist attacks fuelled by the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives. Responding equally to the needs of the growing number of refugees from the horn of Africa in addition to the humanitarian crisis on the north continues to place considerable strain on available resources. It is against this complex backdrop of political instability and overall insecurity that UNICEF and the humanitarian community have had to attend to the growing humanitarian needs of the populations affected by the Sa'ada crisis.

### **Intervention Logic**

The intervention logic for the Sa'ada emergency response can be identified as follows:

1. UNICEF is fulfilling its core corporate commitments for children in emergencies in addressing the humanitarian situation provoked by the Sa'ada conflict in Yemen.
2. IDP children and their families have benefited from life-saving interventions in health, water and sanitation and nutrition.
3. The protection of children affected by the Sa'ada conflict is ensured.
4. Education is fostering a return to normalcy as well as addressing learning.
5. Viable implementation arrangements have been established and the emergency response is effectively managed.
6. UNICEF's response is unfolding within a medium to long term development perspective for affected populations.

## **Justification**

The complexity and unpredictability of the context in which the Sa'ada emergency response is taking place and the difficulties in reaching affected populations call for the conduct of a real-time evaluation (RTE). The RTE exercise will provide feedback in a participatory manner and in real time to those executing and managing the humanitarian response. RTEs are usually carried out during the early stages of an emergency operation. Nonetheless this can also take place throughout the response. The response to the Sa'ada emergency is in its tenth month.

With the declaration of a ceasefire in February 2010 and the end to the war in March, it is envisaged that the international community can gain access to Sa'ada Governorate itself where the recovery effort is expected to be considerable. The RTE will serve to provide valuable lessons during this phase of response. It will support UNICEF in its programming that ensures a continuum between the humanitarian response and development to reduce future vulnerabilities to conflict and disasters.

The timing of the RTE in July/August is opportune given the response period so far, continued emergency operations and the recent opening up of Sa'ada governorate to humanitarian assistance. Although large parts of the governorate remain inaccessible for security reasons. The mid term review of the CHAP and cluster reviews provide a relevant set of information that the RTE can use and build upon.

## **Purpose and Objectives of the Real-Time Evaluation**

With the dual focus on learning and accountability, the RTE will examine primarily UNICEF's performance in responding to the Sa'ada crisis at country level within the context of its programme of cooperation with the Government of Yemen for the period 2007-2011. In addition, the response will be examined within the framework of adherence to international humanitarian standards and principles, partnerships with other UN agencies and partners outside of the UN system and with respect to the support provided by UNICEF MENARO and New York Headquarters. Emergency operations, particularly in Sa'ada itself will benefit from the lessons learned from the evaluation. The RTE will provide an external view of how organisational risks are being managed in the context of the Sa'ada emergency.

In this regard, the objectives of the RTE are as follows:

1. Assess UNICEF Yemen's preparedness to respond to the 6<sup>th</sup> round of the Sa'ada conflict, including the measures taken towards the preparation of Government and partners to effectively respond to the crisis.
2. Assess UNICEF's contribution to the humanitarian response within the framework of fulfilling its core corporate commitments to children, with particular emphasis on Health, Nutrition, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, Education, Protection and HIV/AIDS interventions.

3. Assess readiness and action in the areas of monitoring and evaluation, security, human resources, IT/Telecoms, supplies and logistics, resource mobilisation and organisational preparedness and support to the Sa'ada emergency operation within overall framework of the 2007-2011 Programme of Cooperation.
4. Examine the level of preparedness in phasing out interventions inside camps to the return of IDP populations to their places of origin.
5. Examine UNICEF Yemen's preparedness in responding to the humanitarian situation inside Sa'ada governorate and transition from emergency operations to addressing the medium and long-term recovery and development needs of affected populations.

### **Scope of Work**

The scope of work for the RTE is determined using the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. This will include:

#### **Timeliness**

1. How timely were immediate life-saving interventions and were there any significant delays in the response?
2. How timely was the deployment of additional technical and financial resources towards the response?

#### **Appropriateness**

1. Was the humanitarian response based on a logical planning process that has been adhered to or has it simply evolved with a response to priority needs?
2. How adequate has the Emergency Preparation and Response PLAN (EPRP) been in guiding interventions?
3. To what extent is the response meeting the priority needs of the population (as identified by the populations themselves, and in systematic needs assessments) and adapted to local conditions?
4. How evidenced-based is the decision-making process for determining interventions?
5. To what extent have initial approaches remained relevant with the passage of time?

#### **Effectiveness**

6. How well is the response meeting the core corporate commitments for children? What if any outcome-level results have been observed, above and beyond the CCCs?
7. What if any unintended consequences, positive or negative, has the response had on local populations and local institutions?

8. To what extent is the response owned by the government and other national players?
9. How effective has the country office been in resource mobilisation and leveraging to address the response?

### **Coverage**

10. How well is the response reaching the affected population in terms of total coverage and vulnerable groups within affected populations?
11. Do all groups have equal access to services provided?
12. How are protection, gender issues and the socially excluded adequately addressed?

### **Coordination**

13. How well is the response coordinated, within clusters/sectors and cross-sectorally?
14. What other coordination mechanisms exist that have facilitated response?

### **Coherence**

15. Are there lessons being captured during the response and are these being used to inform, and shape interventions strategies, priorities and actions?
16. How well is the response converging with a common framework of priorities at inter-agency level?

### **Connectedness**

17. To what extent is the emergency response shaped by commitment to addressing longer term development issues and goals?
18. What linkages are being made to disaster and conflict prevention activities and other cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights?

### **Efficiency**

19. How effectively have internal and external resources been harnessed to achieve results?
20. What cost-effective alternatives could have been used in life -saving interventions, particularly WASH and nutrition?

## Methodology

The RTE will use a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods that will include:

- A systematic desk review of all key documents generated throughout the response and other background documents, including Sitreps, Appeal documents, Emergency Plans, Reports etc....
- Semi-structured key informant interviews with UNICEF programme, management and operations staff. Interviews with UN agencies, key government policy makers responsible for the response, NGO personnel involved in the response. Key UNICEF regional and NY staff involved in the response.
- Focus group discussions with programme managers and beneficiaries
- Direct observation of affected populations and interventions

## Deliverables and period

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverable</b>	<b>Timeline: 9 weeks 7 July – 7 September 2010</b>
Preparatory Phase		
Review/Clarification of TORs	An inception report following discussion on the terms of reference and agreement on how the evaluation will be conducted (Draft outline of report structure, interview protocol, tools, calendar etc.)	Week 1-2
Review of Documentation		Week 1/2
Development data collection calendar (including meeting/interview schedule)		
Data collection phase		
Key Informant Interviews		Week 3
Direct Observation in the field		Week 3
Data analysis and interpretation, preparation of workshops		Week 4
Consultations with key stakeholders using preliminary findings from prior data collection activities		Week 5
Analysis/Report Preparation		
Preparation/Submission of First draft of Report	First draft of report	Week 6-7
Review of draft report		Week 8
Integration of Feedback from stakeholders		Week 9
Submission final report	Final report	10 September



## **Expected Background and Experience**

It is expected that the RTE will be carried out by a team of at least two consultants, one senior level and another mid-level to maximize efficiency and quality of expected results and products. The consultants will adhere strictly to international evaluation standards in order to ensure rigour in the conduct of the work and eventual use of findings by stakeholders.

### **Required qualifications and experience – Senior consultant – International (L4/L5)**

- Master or Advanced Degree in a related subject area (Public Health, Social Sciences, Sociology, Anthropology, etc...)
- At least 13 years progressively responsible experience including evaluative and analytical work on humanitarian performance at an organization or interagency level for an organization comparable to UNICEF
- Knowledge of current evaluative and analytical literature on the humanitarian sector in general
- Exposure to UNICEF's humanitarian work
- Excellent English writing skills
- Excellent and proven research skills including the development and application of analytical frameworks and tools and production of analytical papers
- Excellent interviewing capacity
- Facilitation skills.
- Knowledge of Arabic would be an asset.

### **Required qualifications and experience – Mid-level consultant- National (NOB/C)**

- Masters of Advanced Degree in a related subject area (Public Health, Social Sciences, Sociology, Anthropology, etc...)
- At least 7 years of progressively responsible professional experience in the humanitarian sector
- Significant knowledge of current evaluative and analytical literature on the humanitarian sector in general
- Excellent spoken and written Arabic
- Excellent proven research skills
- English writing skills
- Strong knowledge of results-based management and monitoring concepts and experience in use of logical frameworks.
- Knowledge of the local context, including institutions and peoples

## **Management and Technical Guidance**

The consultants will work as a team with the lead consultant providing direction and taking responsibility for the outputs of the consultation.

The consultants will work under the direct supervision of the Chief, Monitoring and Evaluation and under the general guidance of the Deputy Representative, responsible for the country programme. Resources will be drawn largely from the Social Policy,

Planning Monitoring and Evaluation programme, though other programmes will contribute through emergency funds.

A Programme Reference Group will guide the exercise in terms of the refinement of the scope of work, methodology, the development of questionnaires and the interview protocol, receive and review key deliverables. Representation from the Regional Office and NYHQ will be sought. Selected cluster members will also be approached to be a part of the Reference Group.

## General Conditions

- The consultant will be responsible for drawing as much information out of UNICEF programme staff as possible and will work independently, though in consultation with the programme group.
- State if the SSA consultancy will include other benefits: *No*
- State if consultant has right to stay in UNICEF property: *Yes*
- Should consultant provide his/her materials: *The consultant should be responsible for needed materials(Laptop computer)*
- Is he/she authorized to have access to UNICEF transport: *Yes*
- Under the consultancy agreements, a month is defined as 21 working days, and fees are prorated accordingly. Consultants are not paid for weekends or public holidays.
- State if flight costs would be covered and at what standard: *Should be included in cost of field work*
- Consultants are not entitled to payment of overtime. All remuneration must be within the contract agreement.
- No contract may commence unless the contract is signed by both UNICEF and the consultant or Contractor.
- Consultant will be required to sign the Health statement for consultants/Individual contractor prior to taking up the assignment, and to document that they have appropriate health insurance.
- The Form 'Designation, change or revocation of beneficiary' must be completed by the consultant upon arrival, at the HR Section.

Prepared by: Etona Ekole  
Chief Monitoring and Evaluation

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Approved by:  
Deputy Representative

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