Trends in Violent Extremism, Prevention and Evaluation

Three Years of International Evidence, 2023-2025

Report by Sarah Bressan, Sofie Lilli Stoffel, Zsófia Ágota Heidrich

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Table of Contents

Main Findings

1 **Violent Extremism:** Across three iterations of an international expert survey conducted in 11 countries across five continents between 2023 and 2025, experts assessed radical Islamist and far-right violent extremism as the most persistent threats. Ideologically fluid, hybrid, and nihilistic forms of violence, as well as transnationally influential right-wing violent extremist groups are on the rise, and increasingly younger people are being radicalized, often online.

2 **Prevention:** In 2025, over 40 percent of respondents said P/CVE in their country was "rather unprepared" to meet violent extremist challenges in the near future. In terms of innovations, experts report a growing recognition of early, holistic prevention and community resilience-building approaches, in contrast to more securitized and reactive approaches. Where the P/CVE field is strongly politicized, turning these insights into practice remains challenging.

3 **Evaluation:** Survey results from 2023 to 2025 reveal little progress in the evaluation of P/CVE activities at the global level. Most experts report that evaluation is under-resourced and in many instances ad-hoc and unsystematic. Overall, evaluations critically depend on governments as the main initiators and funders. Experts believe that more funding is critically important but, in many places, not feasible. They also suggest strengthening stakeholders' appreciation and capacity for evaluations, more high-quality and independent third-party evaluations, and non-financial government support for evaluation.

4 **Learning:** The greatest problem, for which deterioration occurred between 2023 and 2025, is a lack of evaluation uptake and learning mechanisms that translate knowledge about what works, under which conditions, into practical counteraction against radicalization and violence. As the most important remedies, experts emphasize strengthening evaluation culture and incentives, more long-term and learning-oriented evaluation efforts, as well as sharing evaluation results more widely among stakeholders.

Recommendations

1   **All P/CVE stakeholders should focus on building mutual trust and should approach evaluations as opportunities to achieve more coherent and effective prevention efforts. Where extremist ideologies have moved into the political mainstream or positions of power, there is an increased risk of P/CVE being driven by ideology rather than accountability, evidence and learning. Stakeholders should pay close attention to these dynamics and invest in the constructive relationships needed for learning-based improvements in P/CVE.**

2   **Stakeholders should ensure that evaluations follow learning strategies with clear uptake mechanisms.**

   a.   Governments and implementers should prioritize developing uptake mechanisms that ensure evaluation results feed into efforts to improve extremism prevention policies, strategies, programs, and activities.

   b.   Funders and implementers should set goals for evaluation uptake together and agree to engage with possible negative evaluation results for further learning, rather than as a mere performance review of implementers.

3   **Stakeholders should ensure adequate funding, incentivize high-quality evaluations and make strategic, learning-driven investments.**

   a.   Funders, particularly governments, should provide resources for the evaluation of P/CVE activities they support. Where grants cover evaluation costs, funders should require implementers to budget for evaluations at the proposal stage, and implementers should earmark such funds accordingly from the project outset.

   b.   Across all types of evaluation funding, stakeholders should encourage the involvement of independent experts as third-party evaluators or advisors.

4   **Funders should continue to invest in P/CVE (evaluation) research that responds to evolving extremist threats and supports exchange among all P/CVE stakeholders.**

   a.   Funders should continue to invest in and support high-quality meta reviews that synthesize findings from different academic and practice fields within countries and internationally, and enable academic research to continue to drive innovation in the evaluation field.

   b.   Wherever possible, funders should support and enable the sharing of evaluation results and lessons learned, even if results are redacted or summarized for confidentiality.

   c.   Funders should invest in exchange formats that facilitate dialogue and foster informal connections and cooperation between practitioners, researchers, evaluators, and policymakers.

   d.   Wherever appropriate, stakeholders should ensure that formats for sharing evaluation results, research findings and experiences include exchanges and discussions on evolving extremism trends – such as hybrid and ideologically fluid extremism, the mainstreaming of radical and extremist beliefs, youth and online radicalization, and non-ideological roots of radicalization – and their impact on P/CVE efforts and evaluations.

5   **Stakeholders should invest in building the capacity of implementers and government officials to conduct and manage high-quality evaluations and learning processes.**

   a.   Stakeholders should prioritize developing and strengthening evaluation support and capacity-building formats that facilitate exchange and coordination, such as professional networks, interactive training and knowledge hubs.

   b.   Stakeholders should ensure that such evaluation-support and capacity-building formats build on each other rather than funding fragmented, one-off efforts that duplicate existing structures.

Introduction

In this report, we present trends in violent extremism, prevention and evaluation across 11 countries worldwide. We monitored these trends over the period 2023–2025 through an annual survey among experts on the prevention of violent extremism (P/CVE) and its evaluation.[1]

The focus on evaluation follows from the argument that effectively preventing violent extremism requires an understanding of what works, under which conditions, to stop pathways toward radicalization and violence and to foster peaceful coexistence. Evaluation – the systematic assessment of activities and interventions – is crucial to improving the practice of P/CVE.[2] This is particularly true for the field of P/CVE, in which evaluation practices remain less widespread than for other policy fields.[3]

This three-year study is the first to monitor violent extremism, prevention, and particularly evaluation over time and across five continents globally. The survey series is part of the international, comparative component of the research and dialogue project "PrEval: Evaluation and Quality Assurance in Extremism Prevention, Democracy Promotion and Civic Education: Analysis, Monitoring, Dialogue," funded by the German Ministry of the Interior from September 2022 to December 2025. With this study, we provide an overview of the state of the P/CVE evaluation field and make recommendations for relevant stakeholders to contribute to more effective P/CVE practice, which builds on solid evidence and opportunities to learn from good practices and innovations in other countries.

Figure 1: Countries Covered by the Survey

This report presents the latest survey evidence gathered in late 2025 and compares it with the results of two prior reports.[4] The first report in this series focused on establishing a baseline of extremist threats, P/CVE and evaluation across countries, and formulated recommendations

for stakeholders to build on positive developments and move the field forward. It identified relevant obstacles and challenges to widespread, high-quality evaluations and their translation into more effective P/CVE practice, as well as examples of innovations in the field and capacity-building initiatives to close gaps.[5] The second report was the first to track developments over time. We detected some worrying negative trends, paired with rapidly evolving threats that pointed toward a risk of stagnation in the P/CVE evaluation field. The focus of the recommendations therefore aimed to secure progress and critical knowledge about what works in P/CVE and how we can continue to understand what works.

The third and final survey round enables us to confirm some trends and further nuance our overall findings. Overall, extremist threats continue to evolve rapidly – certainly more rapidly than the evaluation field and in many places more rapidly than P/CVE practice. In 2025, 47 percent of surveyed experts indicated that the P/CVE field in their country was "rather unprepared" or "not at all prepared" to address future extremist threats. The evolution of threats most notably includes ideologically fluid, hybrid and nihilistic forms of violence, the increasing prevalence of transnationally influential right-wing violent extremist groups, and the radicalization of increasingly younger people, often online.

P/CVE practice and evaluation continue to face new and familiar challenges, including in countries where now declining development aid from international organizations and donors has funded and organized P/CVE in the past, as well as in places where P/CVE practice is heavily politicized and cooperative, whole-of-society approaches to prevention are in decline. In other places and segments of P/CVE and evaluation, there is visible progress. This includes an increasing awareness of the value of multi-stakeholder cooperation in driving innovation and improvements, an ever more important role for university-based research in driving methodological innovation, the important role of NGOs and local communities in fostering individual and societal resilience and peaceful coexistence, and the importance of early, holistic, multi-disciplinary approaches that go beyond ideology, consider individual and systemic drivers of radicalization and violence, and learn from adjacent fields of practice.[6].

The greatest – and increasing – problem remains a lack of evaluation uptake and learning mechanisms that translate knowledge about what works, under which conditions, into practical counteraction against radicalization and violence. The 2025 survey revealed a clear deterioration in uptake and learning mechanisms. For this reason, we used the final iteration of this survey to elicit expert assessments of the most important measures to improve uptake in the future, as well as the most important measures to increase high-quality, frequent evaluation in P/CVE generally, and the feasibility of improvement in these areas over the coming years. The results are reflected in our recommendations. For stakeholders in the field of P/CVE and evaluation, all three reports include a range of positive examples and concrete innovative practices to contribute to cross-border learning and more effective prevention practice.

Research Methodology and Terminology

The findings in this report are based on a cross-national study of trends in violent extremism, prevention and – in particular – evaluation. The study consists of a series of three annual online expert surveys across 11–14 countries between 2023 and 2025. This report presents overarching insights and recommendations of the study and detailed results from the third survey round (2025).

The online survey in 2025 was completed by 32 experts in P/CVE evaluation across 11 countries, between September and December 2025. Some survey questions build on results from previous survey rounds in 2023 and 2024. Those Delphi method questions aggregate inputs to generate recommendations from expert assessments and judgment. Details of the previous surveys can be found in the respective publications (Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, 2023; Stoffel, Bressan, and Korb, 2024).

The results represent the assessments of two to three individual non-government experts per country and year, aggregated to monitor and analyze overall trends, challenges and innovations in the field of P/CVE and evaluation, and to develop recommendations for the field. They do not represent official government positions or records, or the objective, representative reality.

An extended description of the methodology, terminology and limitations, as well as the full survey questionnaire, is found in the Annexes to this report.

Findings

Trends in Violent Extremist Threats

As in the previous two surveys conducted in 2023 and 2024, we again asked respondents which forms of extremism they considered particularly dangerous to public safety in their country at the time of the survey (September–December 2025), which forms they expected to pose the greatest risks over the next two to five years, and which threats they believed remained underrated.

Across the first two years of this monitoring of international extremism trends, we observed that although experts continued to identify Islamist and right-wing extremism as core threats, the extremism landscape was nonetheless evolving rapidly. In 2023, experts pointed to the emergence of "single-issue" forms of extremism, such as anti-LGBTQ+ or anti-migration activism, and noted early signs that these issues were being combined into individualized extremist portfolios. By 2024, this development had crystallized into a new and rapidly growing category of ideologically fluid or hybrid extremism, described by one expert as "choose-your-own-adventure" extremism. Experts highlighted anti-government extremism as one particularly concerning trend in the hybrid category. This extremism phenomenon first gained momentum during the COVID-19 pandemic and became especially prominent within anti-democratic movements in Western countries.

Youth and online radicalization have emerged as critical threats.

In 2025, expert assessments continued to see established threats such as right-wing and Islamist extremism as central. However, respondents emphasized a clear shift toward right-wing extremism as the dominant risk, alongside the consolidation of hybrid, anti-government, and increasingly non-ideological forms of violence. At the same time, beyond types of extremism, modes of radicalization – particularly youth and online radicalization – have emerged as critical threats that shape the current and future extremism landscape.

Between 2023 and 2025, expert assessments shifted from viewing **Islamist and right-wing extremism** as roughly equally prevalent threats to identifying right-wing extremism as the more prominent danger to public safety. In 2023 and 2024, both forms of extremism were perceived as comparable risks, with Islamist extremism mentioned slightly more frequently. In 2025, this dynamic changed. A total of 22 experts from 10 of the 11 case study countries (Australia, Canada, Czechia, Indonesia, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Tunisia, the UK, and the US) identified right-wing extremism as a key current danger to public safety. This marks an increase from 2024, when just 16 experts from 9 of 12 case study countries did so.

By contrast, only 17 experts from 8 of the 11 case study countries (Australia, Czechia, Indonesia, Kenya, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK) highlighted Islamist extremism as a key threat in 2025. This figure remains largely unchanged from 2024, when 16 experts from 10 of 12 case study countries cited jihadism and Islamist terrorism as a major concern. The shift toward radical right extremism being considered the greater threat is even more pronounced in expert assessments of future threats. In 2025, only five experts from four countries identified Islamist extremism as a key future risk, compared to 11 experts from eight countries who named right-wing extremism.

Within the radical right, several respondents from Canada and Czechia identified so-called "**active clubs**" as a particularly concerning development. "Active clubs" represent a far-right movement organized as a loose franchise of local sports clubs and sports-related online

forms, which serve as a front for a broader white supremacist network. Founded in the United States in 2020, the movement expanded into Europe in 2023 and 2024. Outside the US, the most prominent "active clubs" operate in Canada and France, but they are also present in a large number of other European countries, including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the UK, and Sweden.[7]

An expert from Canada explained that "active clubs" pose a growing threat to public safety, noting that these groups are actively training to use violence against non-white people, minorities and political opponents. They have already demonstrated their potential for violence, for example when the English branch was involved in inciting the 2024 riots in the UK.[8] This threat assessment is shared by German extremism expert Alexander Ritzmann, who warns that the network is strategically recruiting young men and "building a militia" with the intent of engaging in organized violence.[9]

In addition to far-right extremism overtaking Islamist extremism as the primary threat, 2025 also saw a modest increase in experts highlighting the risk posed by radical left extremism. Whereas in 2024, the far left was mentioned as a key danger to public safety by only two respondents from Czechia, experts in 2025 from Australia, Czechia, Spain, and the UK raised concerns about radical left extremism. In the case of the UK, experts identified heightened risk primarily for the next two to five years, rather than as a current key threat.

> Hybrid and ideologically fluid extremist phenomena have developed into key threats.

Beyond these well-established, ideologically delineated forms of extremism, respondents in the latest survey emphasized that **hybrid and ideologically fluid extremist phenomena** have now developed into key threats. This marks a shift from 2023 and 2024, when such forms of extremism were still described as emerging. Experts assessed anti-government extremism, in particular, as a rising threat. Drawing on combinations of established extremist ideologies and single-issue grievances,[10] this has also spread to countries in the Global South.

Respondents from Australia, Canada, Czechia, Indonesia, Norway, the Netherlands, and the US explicitly identified anti-government extremism as a current threat to public safety. In addition, five experts from Indonesia, Kenya, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US highlighted the significance of anti-government extremism as a future threat. Moreover, the broader category of hybrid extremism was also identified as a key current and future threat by experts from Australia, Canada, Czechia, Norway, and the Netherlands. Notably, hybrid extremism was the single most frequently cited *underrated* threat across all responses.

In addition to ideologically fluid extremist phenomena, respondents also pointed to a new trend of largely **_non_-ideological extremism**, often described as "**nihilistic violence**." Experts from Australia, Canada, and the UK warned of the current threat posed by "violence ideation" within organized groups and online forums. These groups promote self-harm and violence for its own sake, without a coherent ideological framework. One respondent from Canada used the following description, explaining that nihilistic violence "combines a number of (sometimes un-related or diametrical[ly] [o]pposed) grievances and often leads to extreme political views."

This underscores why many experts nevertheless categorized it as a form of violent extremism. At the same time, respondents highlighted ongoing uncertainty over institutional responsibility for addressing this phenomenon. As one expert from the UK explained, "the debate is [still] out as to whether this falls under terrorism – but currently it is addressed under [P/CVE]."

Another UK-based expert warned that "the potential for nihilistic violent extremism [...] is an important dynamic to watch, given the levels of harm and transnational nature of its activities." Among several emerging groups, respondents from Canada and the UK singled out the 764

network as a particularly acute concern. This loosely connected network targets children and young people through online harassment campaigns, including efforts to acquire pedophilic material, livestream animal abuse and coerce victims into suicide. It has also been accused of planning offline terrorist attacks.[11] After radical right extremism, nihilistic violence was the second-most frequently cited extremism phenomenon that experts expected to pose a key future threat to public safety.

Beyond specific types of extremism, respondents also emphasized **modes of radicalization** as threats. In particular, they highlighted youth radicalization and online radicalization. **Youth radicalization** already emerged as a key concern in the 2024 survey. At that time, respondents from Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechia, Norway, and the Netherlands warned that extremist groups were deliberately targeting young people at formative ages, when radicalization can shape identity and worldview development with potentially lifelong effects.[12]

In 2025, this concern intensified. Seven experts from Australia, Indonesia, Kenya, Norway, and the UK identified youth radicalization as a current extremism threat. A further ten respondents from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Norway, Spain, and the UK listed it as a key future threat. One expert from Canada stressed that "the online radicalization of young people will likely threaten public safety in Canada if not adequately addressed [...]. Gaming spaces are especially concerning as a recruitment tool." Another respondent from Indonesia elaborated that while the recruitment of children and youth had been occurring for years, the numbers had previously remained low. "Only 20 children and youth [had been] sentenced under the terrorism bill," the expert explained. This changed markedly in fall 2025, when security services arrested almost 100 children and young people who had been radicalized online. The respondent described this as a new phenomenon, driven by the rapid expansion of violent actors' recruitment efforts.

Online radicalization is closely linked to youth radicalization, but it also affects older demographics. In the 2024 survey, respondents from Australia, Czechia, the Netherlands, and Tunisia mentioned online radicalization primarily in connection with other challenges, such as the fragmentation of the radical right scene. In 2025, by contrast, it was more clearly identified as a distinct threat. Respondents from Canada, Indonesia, Norway, Tunisia, and the US named online radicalization as a current risk, while experts from Australia, Kenya, Norway, the Netherlands, Tunisia, and the UK highlighted it as a key future threat.

> Online radicalization is increasingly becoming the dominant mode of recruitment for extremist groups worldwide.

The use of online spaces and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, cuts across ideological and geographic boundaries. An expert from Kenya, referring to Al-Shabaab's online activities, noted that "the production is faster than previously, higher quality, and more digestible. It is a major concern." Similarly, an expert from Norway cited official terrorism trend documents that identified the threat from the radical right as particularly pronounced due to its transnational digital networks and the sharp increase in online youth recruitment. While online radicalization has long made recruitment easier and prevention more difficult, it is increasingly becoming the primary – or at least dominant – mode of recruitment for extremist groups worldwide.

In addition to the extremist phenomena cited by multiple experts across countries, individual respondents also highlighted a range of assorted threats that have recurred across all three survey iterations. These issues are often subtypes of, or contributing factors to, the broader trends discussed above. In many cases, experts assessed them to have a more limited threat profile or to be geographically confined. This latter category includes **geographically specific phenomena** such as pan-Slavic extremism (Czechia), violence against the Shia Muslim minority (Indonesia), and challenges related to the reintegration of sentenced

terrorists or migrants deported from Europe (Tunisia). Several respondents from Australia, Czechia, Spain, and the UK also pointed to extremism fueled by foreign governments as a potential threat, including pro-Kremlin extremism linked to Russia.

Experts from Spain and the US warned that growing **societal polarization and the mainstreaming of extremist narratives** into formal politics can enable radicalization and the escalation of violent extremism. Other experts, for example from Kenya, noted that political campaigns before elections and unresolved socioeconomic grievances are increasingly used as vehicles for extremist mobilization. As in previous surveys, so-called "**incels**" (short for involuntary celibates) and lone actors were identified as particularly dangerous types of extremists by respondents from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and Spain. Both phenomena are commonly associated with disenfranchised men or male youth who appear to self-radicalize largely outside formal organizational structures, often through social media and online forums.[13] However, both the perceived severity of this threat and the frequency with which it was mentioned declined compared to 2024, when respondents from seven countries – rather than the four in 2025 – highlighted these issues.

> Radical right extremism – including references to "active clubs" – and hybrid extremism featured prominently, alongside concerns about youth and online radicalization.

Overall, as in previous years, extremist phenomena identified as current threats largely overlapped with those identified as future threats. Seven respondents explicitly answered that future threats were "the same as current threats." A similar pattern emerged for **underrated threats**, which closely mirrored assessments of both current and future risks. Radical right extremism – including references to "active clubs" – and hybrid extremism featured prominently, alongside concerns about youth and online radicalization. At the same time, responses regarding underrated threats included a small number of highly specific issues. These ranged from "political assassinations" (United States) and the "weakening of international law due to the Western response to Palestine" (Tunisia) to concerns about "returnees from fighting in Ukraine" (Czechia). A notable positive development compared to the 2023 and 2024 surveys was that respondents from Australia, Indonesia, Norway, Spain, and the UK explicitly stated that none of the extremist threats in their countries were currently underrated.

Trends in Violent Extremism Prevention

To better understand the context in which evaluations take place, this survey series included a set of questions on the P/CVE landscape and practice. The first report established a baseline of P/CVE across our sample countries. Between 2023 and 2025, development funding declined significantly – most notably following the dismantling of USAID, which had supported P/CVE activities in many countries. Several study countries, including Tunisia and the United States, have also experienced political shifts that affect how governments assess and engage with other P/CVE stakeholders. At the same time, forms of extremism have continued to evolve rapidly, altering the challenges that P/CVE efforts are expected to address. Against this backdrop, the third survey iteration delved more deeply into challenges and innovations amidst these new realities.

P/CVE Preparedness for Future Extremism Challenges

In the third survey iteration, we asked respondents for the first time how well prepared the P/CVE field is to address future extremism challenges and, where it is not, what experts believe it is missing. Overall, responses indicated that the field was not in a strong position to

effectively counter violent extremism and reduce risks to public safety. **Just under half of all respondents (43.8 percent) assessed P/CVE in their country as "rather unprepared."**

Country-level patterns reveal notable variation. Only experts based in Canada offered an overwhelmingly positive assessment, with responses limited to "well prepared" or "somewhat prepared." A middle category – in which most respondents rated P/CVE as "somewhat prepared" or "neither prepared nor unprepared" – includes Australia, Indonesia, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK. By contrast, experts from Czechia, Kenya, Tunisia, and the United States assessed the field as "rather unprepared" or even "not at all prepared."

Figure 2: How Prepared Is The Field Of P/CVE Stakeholders In Your Country To Address These Future Challenges? (2025: n=32)

Respondents highlighted five recurring themes to explain why P/CVE in their country was insufficiently prepared for future extremism challenges. These are presented below in order of how frequently they were mentioned.

1.   **Public understanding and discourse regarding extremism are lacking.**

Respondents criticized widespread gaps in public understanding of extremism. Several argued that future challenges cannot be adequately addressed because "public acknowledgment there is a problem" is lacking (Australia), particularly in relation to "new ideological content online and intersections with mental health problems" (Indonesia). Others emphasized the need for "better public education [and in the P/CVE sector] on the growing threats" (Canada) to ensure broader awareness that "the manipulation of mass groups can be exploited" (Spain).

2. **Funding for P/CVE is lacking.**

The significant changes in the funding landscape over recent years and the lower level of resources available to P/CVE actors is unsurprisingly one key factor that experts see as hindering preparedness for future extremism challenges. However, this is not purely about money; there is also a "lack of political will" (Spain) connected to the funding crisis, and no "appropriate recognition of the funding requirements of persistent P/CVE initiatives" (Indonesia) that lasts long enough to achieve their intended impact. The field also needs a "greater diversification of funding sources for both prevention work as well as its evaluation" (US) to be able to adapt to shifting political priorities and maintain impact.

3. **Research and evidence on P/CVE is lacking.**

Respondents are also concerned that the field is underprepared for future extremism challenges, due to inadequate data and evidence to indicate which prevention approaches are effective and which are not. They argue P/CVE requires greater "financial resources for research in the field of P/CVE" (Czechia) for "research piloting and developing new monitoring tools" (Australia) and "more 'aggressive' proactive research and P/CVE progra[m] building" (Tunisia).

4. **P/CVE is not tackling root causes of radicalization.**

In addition, experts see P/CVE not tackling root causes of radicalization as a key reason for its lack of preparedness for future extremism challenges. One critical focus was P/CVE's need for a "greater focus on primary prevention that avoids securitizing" (UK), including "donors' willingness to address violent extremist challenges as part of a broader socio-political framework rather than a specialized field adjacent to security only" (Tunisia). Similarly, respondents from Canada, Norway, and Kenya called for better-equipped, more equal service delivery, especially social and health services, to address root causes of radicalization that extremist groups exploit.

5. **There is insufficient cooperation between stakeholders.**

Finally, at all levels of government, from municipal to international, respondents observed insufficient cooperation between P/CVE stakeholders. This should be improved by ensuring "the cooperation between the security and welfare agencies to intervene properly in the 'right' cases" (Norway), as well as through impact-oriented collaboration between government and civil society actors at federal and provincial levels, aimed at countering violent extremism (Indonesia).

P/CVE Innovations

We also asked respondents to identify innovations in P/CVE that are advancing the field more broadly. Many highlighted approaches aimed at strengthening societal resilience in a holistic manner as particularly promising for countering radicalization. At the core of these approaches is what one expert from the United States described as a "shift from a narrow security lens to a broader public health approach." This aligns with previous findings, when

experts cautioned against ideology-centric prevention models and instead advocated for broader anti-violence strategies that address systemic drivers of radicalization .[14]

Considering the increasing relevance of youth and online radicalization in driving violent extremism,[15] experts from Czechia, Canada, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, and the US **highlighted the important role of schools in early prevention of youth radicalization**. As one US-based expert explained, relevant innovative activities include "advanced digital media literacy to help youth spot disinformation, and community-led projects that foster a sense of belonging and purpose, addressing the root causes of alienation." Consistent with this assessment, respondents also noted that promising preventive measures increasingly extend into online spaces through monitoring efforts, media literacy programs and AI-related training initiatives (Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US).

The great agreement among experts across countries suggests growing recognition of the importance of early prevention and community-wide resilience-building, in contrast to more securitized and reactive approaches – even if translating this realization into practice is more challenging in some places than in others.

P/CVE Activities against Youth Radicalization Online

Considering the increasing danger of youth radicalization, and especially youth radicalization online, the P/CVE field faces growing pressure to adapt its tools and methodologies. In particular, **experts see a need to address novel ways in which online platforms are used to disseminate extremist content and recruit young people**. When we asked our experts to identify promising approaches to preventing the radicalization of youth in online spaces, 26 out of 32 respondents pointed to a range of emerging and established initiatives, highlighting positive patterns of innovation across different national contexts. Most of the promising approaches that experts reported operate at a smaller scale and are embedded within local communities, reflecting the effectiveness of community and context-specific measures. Only 6 of 32 respondents reported that, to their knowledge, no effective measures currently exist.

The variety of promising P/CVE activities for youth that respondents saw implemented in their countries stretches across primary, secondary and tertiary prevention efforts. Among primary prevention activities, experts from Czechia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the US highlighted the role of educational materials and training in media literacy "that teach how to detect manipulation, hate speech and extremist content" (Spain) and "the manipulation tactics used by extremists before they encounter them" (US). Similarly, respondents highlighted efforts to improve how critical thinking and empathy are taught and strengthened in schools (The Netherlands, Spain). Respondents from Kenya and Spain stressed that workshops that focus on social media content generation and safe use of AI tools are particularly effective because they actively engage young people. In the same vein, promising P/CVE workshops and training sessions increasingly target practitioners, teachers, social workers, and other adults working with young people to build their capacity in teaching digital resilience, as respondents from Canada, Norway and Tunisia reported.

In the secondary and tertiary prevention categories, promising approaches include providing hybrid online/offline support for individual young people at particularly high risk of radicalization, and for their loved ones (US), and trauma-informed therapeutic monitoring programs aimed at deradicalization for already-affected young people, and for their families (Norway). Such programs often collaborate with programs that monitor online radicalization pathways or offer different systems of reporting individual young people who might be at risk of radicalization or already radicalized (Canada, Norway, Spain).

An expert from Canada stressed the importance of cooperating with tech companies to develop safe and effective tools, and moving beyond external monitoring toward integrated intervention models. One specific example mentioned repeatedly in both the second and third survey iterations is Moonshot, a company that builds tools to identify at-risk individuals in online spaces and proactively offers support services.

Respondents also highlighted the need to ensure legislative measures that hold social media platforms accountable. Australia has chosen a pathway of age restriction and has banned social media for users younger than 16 years old. In the UK, the Online Safety Bill has recently established new duties for online platforms to protect children and adults by requiring them to reduce risks from illegal and harmful content and improve user safety on their services.[16]

Among the different promising activities combating youth radicalization online, two recurring themes stood out: the need for interactive and proactive approaches. Experts from Canada, Indonesia, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom highlighted that gamified and agency-focused activities, including simulations and games to identify extremist content, reach youth more effectively than passive training sessions. Young people should also be included and integrated through proactively building "positive online communities, rather than just playing defense" (US) by relying primarily on content removal. An expert from Kenya highlighted that youth-generated content, particularly short videos produced in local languages, had proven more effective than content created by external organizations. This underscores the value of participatory and locally-grounded content creation.

Evaluation Trends

Evaluations of violent extremism prevention are crucial for learning and progress in the field – particularly in times when extremism is expanding and evolving. Across three iterations of our international monitoring survey in 2023, 2024, and 2025, we find that evaluation frequency across levels and types of P/CVE activities is overall stable, without clear trends in negative or positive directions. Nonetheless, **the results confirm that P/CVE evaluation remains generally infrequent, with few experts reporting evaluations conducted "often" or "very often" across types of activities and levels of prevention, across countries and over time.**

University-based researchers and independent consultants remain the most common types of evaluators, while there is a notable increase of funders as evaluators in 2025 compared to prior years. Governments remain the most important initiators of evaluations across all the years and in 2025, university-based researchers became the second-most relevant driver of evaluations (particularly in the Global North), overtaking implementers (now in third place), who are now less frequently reported as taking the initiative to evaluate their own activities. In countries like Indonesia, Kenya, and Tunisia, foreign donors and international organizations are still important drivers.

Evaluation funding sources have remained largely the same overall. If funding for evaluation is available, the most frequently reported source is a share of funds in the budget for the P/CVE activities being evaluated. The second most frequent source remains government provision of additional funds for requested evaluations. This reinforces the relevance of funders, and particularly governments, in enabling evaluation and determining its terms. **New, dedicated funding instruments for evaluation remain extremely rare and experts consistently assessed funding levels as too low to allow for frequent, high-equality evaluations.**

Regarding innovation in evaluation, experts we surveyed revealed little that was new in the latest iteration. Innovations mentioned by around half of the respondents clustered around academic research methods, mixed-methods designs, participatory approaches to evaluation, and advanced digital analytical techniques, while the other half of respondents reported no innovation or an explicit lack thereof. **Publication of evaluation results continues to happen only occasionally.** The most notable negative trend is visible in data on evaluation uptake and learning. The number of experts who observed no mechanisms, or who were unaware of any, doubled every year from 6 of 37 experts in 2023 to 23 of 32 experts in 2025.

The most important measures to improve uptake in the future, according to experts, are **"strengthening evaluation culture and incentives to improve practice based on evaluation results," "more long-term, learning-oriented evaluation efforts," and "wider sharing of evaluation results among stakeholders."** For each of these measures, more than half of respondents considered progress in the coming years to be rather feasible. In the following sub-sections, these results are reported in more detail.

Evaluation Frequency

Across the three survey iterations, the reported regularity of evaluation practices varied depending on the type of P/CVE activities. The 2025 survey revealed the continuation of a pattern already observed between 2023 and 2024: projects and programs tend to be evaluated more regularly than individual measures, policies or organizations (see Figure 3).[17]

Overall, results regarding the frequency of evaluation of different types of P/CVE activities between 2023 and 2025 are consistent. The most notable deviation, on aggregate, exists in the category "sometimes," for which we first see a six percentage-point rise from 2023 to 2024, and then a reversal of an 11 percentage-point decline from 2024 to 2025, across different P/CVE activities across countries. Considering the varying size of our sample, there is, however, no clear and significantly large trend in a positive or negative direction.

When asked to elaborate regarding time intervals and how often evaluations are conducted for each type of P/CVE activity, experts pointed to the fact that evaluations are tied to funding cycles, with evaluation frequency fluctuating mostly within a one to five-year timeframe. One expert from Kenya explained: "Evaluations are typically commissioned at artificial intervals in the P/CVE implementation schedule, e.g., mid-term or final, and often do not align with programmatic outcomes but rather with funding cycles."

With regard to evaluation frequency across P/CVE levels, findings from our 2024 survey indicated limited changes over time between 2023 and 2024. In both years, primary prevention efforts were evaluated less frequently than secondary and tertiary interventions (2023: primary prevention evaluated "rarely or never" – 18.2 percentage points more than secondary and 15.2 percentage points more than tertiary prevention; 2024: primary prevention evaluated "rarely or never" – 23.3 percentage points more than secondary and 10 percentage points more than tertiary prevention).

In 2025, this pattern did not change significantly, although the three levels converged slightly. The 2025 survey data suggests a small decline in the frequency of evaluations of secondary prevention between 2024 and 2025 ("often or very often" 21.2 percent in 2023, 23.3 percent in 2024, 12.5 percent in 2025; "sometimes" 45.5 percent in 2023, 50 percent in 2024, 53.1 percent in 2025) as well as a small increase in the frequency of primary prevention evaluations ("rarely or never" 45.5 percent in 2023, 46.7 percent in 2024, 34.4 percent in 2024; "sometimes" 24.2 percent in 2023, 33.3 percent in 2024, 37.5 percent in 2025).

Figure 3: How Often Are the Following Types of P/CVE Activities Evaluated? (2023: n=33; 2024: n=30; 2025: n=32)

Figure 4: How Often Are Evaluations and Quality Assurance Measures Conducted in the Field of P/CVE in Your Country at the Respective Levels? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30, 2025: n=32)

Echoing findings from earlier survey rounds, experts across countries emphasized that even where evaluations do occur, they tend to be rather descriptive activity recordings or reviews, rather than formal and methodologically sound evaluations. A respondent from Czechia described outputs as "more report than evaluation." Furthermore, one expert from Indonesia highlighted that although foreign funding is often tied to more robust monitoring and evaluation, the requirements may incentivize a mere "box-ticking approach," ultimately at the expense of utility and diligence. In a similar vein, government programs too are "evaluated in theory, but in practice it's not clear how robust [the evaluations are]" (Indonesia).

Evaluation Actors

Our 2025 data confirms the finding from past survey iterations that experts name P/CVE implementers (mentioned by 81.3 percent of respondents) as the main evaluators of P/CVE activities across case study countries, followed by university-based researchers (78.1 percent) and independent consultants (75 percent). In 2025, funders (65.6 percent) were mentioned more frequently than in previous years, with a reported 16 percentage-point growth since 2024, which suggests growing donor influence in shaping evaluation activity. Commercial evaluation companies remain the least frequently involved actor (43.8 percent).

Country-level analyses showed some interesting deviations from the general results. While on average, university-based researchers were widely recognized as evaluation actors, experts from Indonesia, Kenya, and Tunisia reported limited involvement, instead reporting a higher prevalence of independent consultants and funders as evaluators. This pattern makes sense considering that in these countries, P/CVE evaluation is often tied to international development funding, with donors having their own evaluation departments or putting out tenders for independent evaluation. The relevance of commercial evaluation providers is the most uneven across countries: respondents in the United States and the United Kingdom consistently reported their involvement, while respondents in Canada, Czechia, Indonesia, and Spain overwhelmingly reported that commercial providers do not act as evaluators.

Evaluation Initiators

The 2025 survey results indicated broad continuity with findings from 2024 and 2023 regarding who initiates P/CVE evaluations. **Governments remain the primary initiators by a wide margin, with a pattern of consistent growth since 2023:** from 75.8 percent in 2023 to 83.3 percent in 2024 and 84.4 percent in 2025, thus reinforcing the central role of public authorities in initiating evaluations.

At the same time, **the proportion of respondents reporting that implementers take the initiative to evaluate their own activities without external requests declined** by 13 percentage points compared to 2024. This marks a continued reduction in self-initiated evaluation. In contrast, **academic researchers have strengthened their position as drivers of evaluation**, moving from third place in earlier survey rounds (reported by 48.5 percent of respondents in 2023; 56.7 percent in 2024) to second place in 2025 (62.5 percent).

Among countries in our sample, this pattern of academic engagement is particularly prevalent in the Global North. Similar to the country patterns regarding evaluation actors (see above), this trend weakens in Indonesia, Kenya, and Tunisia. A similar pattern can be observed in the role of governments in initiating evaluations: while governments are reported

as initiators of evaluations in most countries, foreign donors and international organizations are more important drivers of evaluation in Indonesia, Kenya and Tunisia. Across countries, foundations and philanthropic actors are largely absent as drivers of evaluation.

Figure 5: At Whose Request or Initiative Are P/CVE Evaluations Initiated in Your Country? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30; 2025: n=32)


Evaluation Funding

Evaluation funding sources slightly dropped between our 2023 and 2024 surveys and remained fairly stable with no further decline in 2025 (see Figure 6). If funding for evaluation is available, the most frequently reported source is a share of funds in the budget for the P/CVE activities being evaluated. The second most frequent source remains government provision of additional funds for requested evaluations. This reinforces the relevance of funders, and particularly governments, in enabling evaluation and determining its terms.

Country-level comments regarding sources for evaluation funding underlined this pattern, with examples of evaluations relying on voluntary academic cooperation (Czechia), internal reshuffling of budgets (Norway), or evaluation requests without dedicated funding from the government (Spain).

Figure 6: How are Evaluations of P/CVE Activities Financed in Your Country? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30, 2025: n=32)

Legend: ● 2023 ● 2024 ● 2025

Between 2023 and 2024, experts reported declining funding sources, resulting in a 5.8–12.5 percentage point decrease across categories. Although the 2025 results did not reverse this trend, experts reported no further decline. A notable outlier is evaluation funding from non-governmental organizations, reports of which fell from 39.4 percent in 2023 to 30 percent in 2024 and 18.8 percent in 2025. This is an expected development, considering the pressure the NGO sector faces in many countries. The lack of funding decline in the other categories should not be interpreted overly positively: in the latest survey iteration, only six of 32 experts cited any kind of funding instrument when asked about the availability of any new dedicated funding instruments for evaluation and quality assurance. In their answers, participants reiterated the observation that evaluations remain expected but are increasingly not budgeted for.

The fragile balance of international donor-heavy P/CVE environments in countries like Indonesia, Kenya, and Tunisia reflect complex developments in the last year, too. An expert from Indonesia noted that USAID funding cuts have been detrimental to the sector and pointed to compounding effects: reductions in evaluation funding are accompanied by a broader de-prioritization of monitoring and evaluation as organizations adjust to tighter financial constraints. Furthermore, limited budgets may also lead to "very cursory and superficial" evaluations, as an expert from Kenya added, noting another ripple effect of financial strain. Finally, one Tunisian participant described the double bind that such environments may create, as the lack of government funding in the sector can lead to "overreliance" on international organizations, with implementers and evaluators operating in this landscape being branded as "foreign funded."

Evaluation Innovation

Our survey results from 2024 showed that **most countries experienced little-to-no methodological innovation in P/CVE evaluations.** This did not change significantly by 2025. Innovations mentioned by around half of the respondents clustered around **academic research methods, mixed-methods designs, participatory approaches to evaluation, and advanced digital analytical techniques** – and significantly overlapped with answers from 2024. The other half of the experts either reported no innovation, reliance on standard models, or highlighted structural inhibitors to innovation such as funding and capacity gaps.

> Academia is playing an increasingly important role in the P/CVE field.

When asked about promising methodological innovations for P/CVE evaluations that are currently being developed or implemented in their countries, expert replies largely mirrored the second survey's findings: they re-emphasized the importance of **community buy-in based activities, innovative scientific approaches and shared or standardized metrics in P/CVE evaluations.**[18] Similarly, in line with our previous survey results, respondents across several countries pointed to a **growing integration of academic expertise** into P/CVE evaluation practice, particularly through closer collaboration between universities, practitioners, and public authorities. This trend is evident in Canada, Czechia, Norway, and Spain, and also aligns with our finding above that academia is playing an increasingly important role in the P/CVE field , not only in evaluation but also in driving methodological innovation. In Australia, **digital tools** were also highlighted, with experts pointing to the use of agent-based modelling to assess P/CVE initiatives, and machine-learning classifiers and big data to measure the impact of online campaigns. Another expert from Spain also reported application of advanced statistical techniques, including latent profile analysis and multilevel structural equation modelling. This enables more heterogeneity in program response and "opens the door to designing 'individualized' or adaptive follow up interventions."

As for the most promising methodological innovations developed in the P/CVE evaluation field in general in recent years, expert highlighted the increased implementation of **methodological advancements** such as pre/post-designs (Canada and the US), mixed methodology approaches, and realist evaluation designs. Regarding digital tools, solutions aimed at ameliorating issues around data collection, and **AI/technology-driven** approaches to evaluation and analysis were mentioned in Kenya, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. These included the use of real-data–informed artificial data (Australia), and sentiment analysis using data mining and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to assess changes in attitudes expressed online (United Kingdom). Here too, gamified approaches were considered notable by experts from Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Finally, when asked about new innovative digital methods or tools for evaluation in their countries, experts highlighted the increasing uptake of data-centered and analytically advanced evaluation approaches. Of our 32 experts, 21 respondents stated that they knew of no such developments. Among the remaining responses, experts from Spain identified machine learning and big data frameworks (AIDA),[19] emotion- and moral-value–based content analysis (UPM),[20] and hybrid automated–human monitoring and reporting mechanisms as impactful developments. Additional examples included the analysis of AI-generated content and social media communications in Kenya and Tunisia, and more conventional quantitative and statistical analyses reported in several national contexts, including Australia, the UK and the US.

Overall, experts observed modest innovation in the P/CVE sphere, with participants from Czechia, Norway and the US reflecting most negatively on the state of innovation in their respective countries. Considering the broader image of the sector, developments suggest

that it is largely **inter-sectoral cooperation** (between academia, affected communities, public authorities, and practitioners) that drives innovation across the countries involved in our survey.

Evaluation Reporting and Publication

The first two survey iterations indicated that evaluation results were published occasionally, but not systematically. Responses in 2024 suggested that this modest level of transparency in the field might be under threat: between 2023 and 2024, experts' reporting of evaluation results being published "sometimes" dropped by 22.7 percentage points, while assessments of "rarely or never" rose by 16.9 percentage points ("often or very often" remained stable).

The 2025 survey results confirmed the pattern of inconsistent and insufficient publication of evaluation findings, albeit without continuation of the drop in reporting (see Graph 7). Small decreases in the "very often" and "often" categories can be partially explained by changes in the country sample, as experts on Cote d'Ivoire (which was part of the survey in 2023 and 2024, but not in 2025) rated the publication of evaluation results highly. Small improvement can be seen in the decrease in expert assessments that evaluation reports are published "never," which fell to 0 percent in 2025. At the same time, the publication of evaluation results "sometimes," reporting of which dropped from 39.4 percent in 2023 to 16.7 percent in 2024, is back up at 40.6 percent. However, no changes in 2025 have a major impact on the overall picture, which is that **a vast majority of experts (81.2 percent total) see results published only "rarely" (40.6 percent) or "sometimes" (40.6 percent).**

Figure 7: How Often Are P/CVE Evaluation Results Published in the Form of (Publicly Available) Evaluation Reports? (2023: n=33, 2024: n=30, 2025: n=32)

This interpretation is supported by long-text answers, in which experts emphasized that results were not often shared publicly. Overwhelmingly, respondents pointed out that whether evaluation reports are shared or not depends on the funding source: while most experts tie public and government funding to a higher level of transparency, particularly in contexts where funding comes from the development sector, experts based in Australia, the UK, and the US instead reported the opposite dynamic. As one US expert elaborated, "many evaluations only exist as internal reports for the funder (often a government agency). They might be shared within closed practitioner networks, but they rarely become public

documents, especially if the findings are not overwhelmingly positive." Several respondents from Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and the US outlined the importance of academic journals as a common outlet for (at least partial) reporting of evaluation findings. Australia seems to be a notable outlier, where academics are "strictly bound by strict clauses that prevent open publication of evaluation findings."

Evaluation Uptake and Learning

Although the second iteration's survey results demonstrated no further deterioration in evaluation transparency – which remains an important prerequisite for uptake and learning – **the 2025 survey revealed a clear deterioration in uptake and learning mechanisms.** The third iteration thereby revealed a continued pattern, identified in the first two survey iterations: In 2023, six out of 37 respondents reported that in their countries, there were no processes in place to ensure evaluation results were used to improve P/CVE policies, programs, or projects, or stated that they were not aware of any. This number doubled to 12 of 30 respondents in 2024. By 2025, 23 of the 32 experts surveyed – a staggering 71.9 percent – gave the same response.

> The 'lessons learned' from an evaluation rarely translate into concrete changes in broader policy or practice.

This trend provokes concern about the future development of P/CVE. After all, evaluation is not an end in itself but a tool intended to help the field move forward as a whole and, in particular, to make P/CVE activities more effective and impactful. As one expert from the United States explained when asked whether any new uptake mechanisms existed, "frankly, no. This is a major weakness in the field. There isn't a structured feedback loop. The 'lessons learned' from an evaluation rarely translate into concrete changes in broader policy or practice." Of the remaining nine experts who reported the existence of uptake mechanisms, three explicitly noted that these mechanisms were not new, despite the question specifically asking about new developments.

Other expert statements reinforce earlier findings that the translation of evaluation results into improved P/CVE practice largely relies on ad-hoc and informal mechanisms. For example, a respondent from Canada explained that they were "not aware of any formal uptake mechanisms, but the implementers that evaluate their projects and programs at their own initiative do use evaluation results for formative and continuous improvement purposes."

Where experts did highlight effective uptake practices, these tended to treat uptake as a social process. Rather than relying solely on the publication of reports, successful mechanisms are built on dialogue and engagement, as well as interaction between funders, governments, scholars, and practitioners. Common formats include workshops and seminars (Kenya, Norway), validation meetings (Kenya), practitioner briefings and tailored recommendations (Norway), and national or international knowledge-sharing events (Canada).

We also asked our experts to rank answer options by importance, following the question, "How important are the following measures to improve uptake and the translation of evaluation results into more effective P/CVE policies, programming, and practice in your country?"[21] Then, we asked participants to consider the same measures' feasibility over the next one to three years. Results showed that the three factors ranked as most important in improving uptake were also widely rated as feasible, signaling a positive outlook on progress in the field.

The measure rated as most important to improving uptake was "strengthening evaluation culture and incentives to improve practice based on evaluation results," with 71.88 percent of respondents considering it somewhat or very feasible. The second most important measure was **"more long-term, learning-oriented evaluation efforts,"** which was considered somewhat or very feasible by 59.4 percent of participants. Although it seems to be considered widely feasible, this factor simultaneously had the highest percentage of experts considering it rather unfeasible (25 percent). The third-most important improvement to uptake was **"wider sharing of evaluation results among stakeholders,"** which was considered either somewhat or very feasible by most experts (75 percent). The measure which experts considered most feasible, "making evaluation-based recommendations more targeted and realistic for stakeholders to implement," was however rated relatively low when asked about its importance (rank 5 of 7 – see the graph below). Expert responses indicated some country-specific trends: overall, the listed measures were mostly considered "rather unfeasible" in Kenya and the US, while respondents from Australia, Canada, and Norway answered "very feasible" most frequently across different options.

Figure 8: Ranking of Measures to Improve Uptake and the Translations of Evaluation Results into More Effective P/CVE Policies, Programming, and Practice by Importance and Feasibility (2025: n=32)

Suggested measure to improve uptake	Rank	% of respondents rating progress in the 1–3 years "somewhat feasible or "very feasible"
Strengthening evaluation culture and incentives to improve practice based on evaluation results	1	71.88%
More long-term, learning-oriented evaluation efforts	2	59.38%
Wider sharing of evaluation results among stakeholders	3	75%
More consistent standards, guidelines and frameworks for evaluation uptake	4	59.38%
Making evaluation-based recommendations more targeted and realistic for stakeholders to implement	5	78.13%
Increasing stakeholders' openness for handling and addressing negative evaluation results	6	46.88%
More collaborative and inclusive evaluations	7	59.38%

Evaluation Support Structures

In the second iteration of our survey, we found the results regarding structures to support quality assurance and evaluations of P/CVE activities to be largely consistent with the first survey, with slight diversification but no expansion overall.[22] The 2025 results show that the availability of support structures remains stagnant, although some respondents highlighted the deterioration of the ecosystem over the last year, particularly due to funding cuts.

Overall, support structure availability patterns in 2025 closely mirror those observed in 2024, with toolkits, interactive training or talks, and professional networks remaining the most widely available and positively rated formats. Knowledge hubs and helpdesks appeared slightly more frequently than in previous years, though only marginally. The steadiness in the availability of support structures across the years is underscored by the proportion of respondents reporting the absence of any support structures: 13.5 percent in 2023; 13.33 percent in 2024; and 12.5 percent in 2025.

Figure 9: Which Formats or Structures Exist to Support Evaluation and Quality Assurance of P/CVE in Your Country? (2023: n=37, 2024: n=30, 2025: n=32)

When asked about how the availability of support structures had changed over the preceding year, many participants gave answers that contradicted the relatively stagnant trend of quantitative responses and highlighted a decline in an already "rare and ad-hoc" support ecosystem. For example, one respondent from Australia stressed that, "there have been large inter-agency shifts and changes that have resulted in lower level of support around the facilitation of CVE evaluations" over the preceding year, while another from Norway explained that "no official support structures exist that [they are] aware of" in the first place. Overall, 12 experts reported no change in support structures, most of them with the disclaimer that the ecosystem was already weak, such as one UK-based expert: "Not really. It's always been pretty patchy." Seven experts said the availability of support structures had deteriorated over the preceding year, and several said "it has declined due to less funding" (Netherlands). Three experts said they simply did not know about any changes, and three did not answer at all.

Seven respondents pointed to modest improvements, such as gradual, long-term developments (Canada) or enhanced information-sharing practices (Kenya, Spain, US). An expert from Spain highlighted the following: "My perception is that there has been an increase in interest in program evaluation and greater visibility, which may indirectly increase the availability of support structures (e.g. evaluation tools, guidelines, professional associations)."

Evaluation Challenges and Solutions

Evaluation Challenges

For the survey's 2024 iteration, we asked participants what the biggest challenges to evaluation had been. Their responses indicated that first, funding constraints (26.7 percent) and second, limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations (23.3 percent) created the greatest obstacles to conducting more frequent, widespread and high-quality evaluations. In 2025, we asked the experts to indicate how these common obstacles to conducting frequent, widespread, high-quality evaluations had developed in their country in the preceding year. We found that most challenges were considered largely unchanged (over 50 percent of participants marked "unchanged" for most categories) across countries, although with three notable shifts.

First, **funding constraints show a clear negative trend:** 15.6 percent of experts reported that conditions have "somewhat worsened," 37.5 percent that they have "significantly worsened," while only 31.3 percent considered them unchanged. Kenya and the US seem to be standout cases within this pattern, with experts in unanimous agreement about this decline, while experts from Czechia and Norway reported that the funding landscape had not changed. Notably, the two obstacles considered most important by experts in the second iteration – funding constraints and capacity limitations – appeared to remain significant hurdles, demonstrating the least improvement in the last year. The other two categories that underwent notable changes were "insufficient awareness of the value of evaluation" and "methodological challenges (including ethical considerations and obstacles to data collection)," both of which lean toward patterns of improvement. For the former, 34.4 percent of participants noted that it had somewhat improved. "Methodological challenges" revealed a similar pattern, though less decisively, with 21.9 percent agreeing that it had undergone some improvement in the preceding year.

Figure 10: How Have These Obstacles to Conducting Frequent, Widespread, High-Quality Evaluations Developed in Your Country in the Past Year? (2025: n=32)

Funding constraints: 12.5%, 31.3%, 5.6%, 37.5%, 3.1%

Limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations: 3.1%, 15.6%, 56.3%, 15.6%, 6.2%, 3.1%

Lack of central coordination and standard setting for evaluations: 15.6%, 65.6%, 9.4%, 6.3%, 3.1%

Insufficient awareness of the value of evaluation: 34.4%, 53.1%, 3.1%, 6.3%, 3.1%

Methodological challenges (including ethical considerations and obstacles to data collection): 21.9%, 53.1%, 12.5%, 6.3%, 6.3%

Legend: Significantly improved | Somewhat improved | Unchanged | Somewhat worsened | Significantly worsened | Do not know

Future Improvements

We asked experts to rank a range of measures to strengthen P/CVE evaluation and improve P/CVE practice in their countries.[23] We then asked them how feasible they assessed progress on these issues to be in their countries in the coming one to three years.

For the most highly ranked measure in terms of importance (see Figure 11 below) – **increased and coherent financial government support** for evaluations – the progress in the coming one to three years was rated as rather unfeasible or not feasible at all (53.1 percent) by most experts, while over one-third rated it as rather or very feasible (34.4 percent). For the second and third-highest ranked measure in terms of importance, the majority of experts rated progress as very feasible or rather feasible: **more high-quality, independent third-party evaluations** (importance rank 3; 62.5 percent very feasible or rather feasible); **increased appreciation and capacity of all P/CVE stakeholders to conduct and participate in evaluations** (importance rank 2; 59.4 percent very feasible or rather feasible). **Increased and coherent non-financial government support** for evaluation was rated as rather or very feasible by half of the experts (50 percent; 34.4 percent said it was unfeasible or not feasible at all), and ranked fourth in terms of importance. **This indicates that progress in these three areas is both very important to move the field forward, and achievable in most places.** More collaborative evaluation efforts between different stakeholders was also highly rated as either very feasible or rather feasible (53.1 percent) by most experts, but was only ranked as the sixth most important item to improve P/CVE practice and evaluation. For a final set of items, the feasibility of progress varies significantly across respondents.[24] The country patterns show that across answer categories, respondents from Kenya, Tunisia and the US rated the prospects for progress as least feasible. In contrast, respondents from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and the Netherlands have the most positive outlook on the feasibility of progress across items.

Figure 11: Ranking of Measures to Strengthen P/CVE Evaluation and Improve P/CVE Practice in Your Country by Importance and Feasibility (2025: n=32)

Suggested measure to improve uptake	Rank	% of respondents rating progress in the 1-3 years "somewhat feasible or "very feasible"
Increased and coherent government support for evaluations (financial)	1	34.38%
Increased appreciation and capacity of all P/CVE stakeholders to conduct and participate in evaluations	2	59.38%
More high-quality, independent third-party evaluations	3	62.5%
Increased and coherent government support for evaluation (non-financial)	4	50%
A strategic national evaluation framework	5	34.38%
More collaborative evaluation efforts between different stakeholders	6	53.13%
Better data-sharing agreements	7	28.13%
New methodological frameworks to overcome methodological challenges	8	34.38%
More government transparency, accountability to the rule of law in P/CVE	9	31.25%
More standardized evaluation indicators	10	40.63%

Conclusion and Recommendations

This report presents evidence from the third and final expert survey of this international monitoring series on trends in violent extremism, prevention and evaluation across eleven countries on five continents in 2025. It compares results with two prior monitoring surveys in 2023 and 2024 and presents overall findings.

The aggregate findings from these surveys are meant to discern trends, patterns, and notable developments in the field, with a particular focus on distilling the most relevant challenges and good practice examples of innovation. While our second survey showed warning signs of potential stagnation in the field of P/CVE evaluation, the results of the third and final survey iteration in 2025 allow us to nuance this finding and provide some insight into what experts see as the most relevant and most feasible improvements.

> The most significant challenge remains the limited uptake of evaluation results toward learning and improved preventive practice.

Against the background of a rapidly evolving field of extremist threats, the most significant – and even growing – challenge according to our data remains the limited uptake of evaluation results toward learning and improved preventive practice . In addition, we see a smaller but slightly negative trend in available funding for P/CVE and evaluation. The coming years will be crucial in determining whether a downward trend continues, particularly in countries where international aid has played a large role in funding P/CVE work and amidst a decline in funding at that level. A mainstreaming of extremism and increasing politicization of P/CVE, which generally hinders the collaborative approaches conducive to effective prevention and constructive learning, is a problem that applies to a few surveyed countries in particular, but not globally. Meanwhile, other countries are experiencing significant progress and a more constructive environment for evidence-based and more holistic approaches to prevention. This confirms the overall finding that political leadership in each country tends to have a significant impact on the P/CVE field.

Violent Extremism

Survey results from 2023 to 2025 show that violent extremist threats are rapidly evolving. Islamist and right-wing extremism remain the most prevalent threats across countries, with Islamism being the most frequently mentioned threat in 2023–2024 and right-wing extremism becoming the most frequently mentioned threat in 2025 and in forward-looking threat assessments. In 2025, radical right-wing "active clubs" stand out as a great concern. There is also a modest rise in concerns about left-wing extremism in 2025, compared to previous years, albeit mainly as a future rather than current threat.

Over time, experts' concerns about ideologically fluid and mixed forms of extremism have risen. Anti-government extremism is reported as a relevant threat in an increasing number of countries worldwide over time, and hybrid forms of extremism are the most frequently reported underrated threat. In addition, mostly non-ideological and nihilistic violence is newly referenced as a great concern by many experts as the second-most reported future threat after right-wing extremism. This concern represents the rise of certain threats but also evolution in the understanding of extremist phenomena and their framing and labelling in the expert discourse and literature over time. Nihilistic violence often promotes violence ideation without dealing in explicit extremist beliefs and it frequently targets children and young people. Radicalization of increasingly young people, particularly in online spaces, has been a growing concern across years. Since 2024, we observe expert concerns about extremist

narratives entering mainstream politics and related societal polarization. In 2025, new trends include the interaction of foreign state influence with radicalization and extremism (in Europe). Incels and lone actors remain dangerous but were mentioned less frequently in 2025 than in earlier surveys.

Prevention

43.8 percent of respondents said the P/CVE field in their country was "rather unprepared" for future extremism challenges.

Regarding the prevention and countering of violent extremism, 43.8 percent of respondents in 2025 said the P/CVE field in their country was "rather unprepared" for future extremism challenges. Experts on Czechia, Kenya, Tunisia, and the US rated preparedness in their countries as the lowest, while experts on Canada rated it the highest. The most important changes needed to improve P/CVE according to experts are, overall, a better understanding of radicalization and extremism in public debate, funding for P/CVE, a lack of data and evidence to indicate which prevention approaches are effective, some P/CVE activities not tackling the broader societal root causes of radicalization that narrow security-sector approaches miss, and a lack of cooperation between different stakeholders – including government and civil society, different levels of government, as well as security and broader societal and welfare-related parts of government.

According to the surveyed experts, innovation in P/CVE is taking place, albeit slowly: there is growing recognition of the importance of early, holistic prevention and community resilience-building, in contrast to more securitized and reactive approaches. There is also a focus on and increasing activities to counter online and youth radicalization in many places. In some countries, especially where the relationship between communities, civil society and government is strained or P/CVE is a strongly politicized field, turning these insights into practice remains challenging. The common feature of interventions against youth radicalization highlighted as particularly promising by experts was that they utilized interactive and proactive approaches focused on building young people's agency, community and empowerment in context-sensitive ways.

Evaluation

Across three iterations of our international monitoring survey in 2023, 2024 and 2025, we find that evaluation frequency across levels and types of P/CVE activities is rather low overall, but fairly stable. University-based researchers and independent consultants remain the most important evaluators, while there was a notable increase of funders as evaluators in 2025, compared to prior years. Governments remained the most important initiators of evaluations across all the years and in 2025, university-based researchers became the second-most relevant driver of evaluations, particularly in the Global North, while implementers are now less frequently reported as taking the initiative to evaluate their own activities. In countries like Indonesia, Kenya and Tunisia, foreign donors and international organizations are still important drivers of evaluation.

Evaluation funding sources slightly dropped between our 2023 and 2024 surveys, and remained fairly stable in 2025, with no further decline. New dedicated funding instruments for evaluation remain extremely rare and experts consistently assessed funding levels as too low to allow for frequent, high-equality evaluations.

Most countries saw little-to-no methodological innovation in P/CVE evaluations over the reporting period. Innovations were mentioned by around half of the respondents and

they clustered around academic research methods, mixed-methods designs, participatory approaches to evaluation, highlighting the important role of multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral cooperation to innovate and improve practice. Digital innovations are scarce. Publication of evaluation results happens only occasionally, but there is no notable downward trend in publications over three years of monitoring. Some experts did note that international donor organizations are a positive factor that increases transparency regarding results, while domestic donor funding has the opposite effect in other places.

The type of structures to support evaluation capacity available to stakeholders also remain relatively stable over time. When explicitly asked about changes within the past year, many participants described stagnation or decline of the already "rare and ad-hoc" support structure ecosystem, while a few countries are positive outliers with notable positive developments.

The most common obstacles to conducting frequent, widespread, high-quality evaluations, according to experts, remain largely unchanged, with some exceptions. Funding constraints show a clear negative trend of deterioration over the past year, whereas insufficient awareness of the value of evaluation and methodological challenges shows signs of improvement. Regarding measures to improve evaluation in the future, the most importantly ranked measure was increased and coherent financial government support, which was rated as rather unfeasible or not feasible at all by most experts, although still over one-third rated it as rather or very feasible, with notable cross-country differences. For the second and third-highest ranked measures in terms of importance, more than half of experts rated progress as very feasible or rather feasible: increased appreciation and capacity of all P/CVE stakeholders to conduct and participate in evaluations, and more high-quality, independent third-party evaluations. Increased and coherent non-financial government support for evaluation was rated as rather or very feasible by half of the experts (50 percent; 34.4 percent said it was unfeasible or not feasible at all), and was ranked fourth in terms of importance.

> Experts see increasing appreciation and capacity for evaluation and more independent, high-quality, third-party evaluations as both important and feasible.

This indicates that progress in these three areas is both very important to move the field forward and achievable in most places. Country patterns show that across answer categories, respondents from Kenya, Tunisia and the US rated prospects for progress as least feasible. In contrast, respondents for Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and the Netherlands had the most positive outlook on the feasibility of progress across items. Overall, negative country patterns often span different question types. Assessments for the US and, less consistently, Kenya and Tunisia leaned on the negative side. This shows that political and funding landscapes for P/CVE impact all aspects of extremism prevention, preparedness and evaluation.

The most notable negative trend is visible in the data on evaluation uptake and learning. The number of experts who observed no mechanisms or were unaware of any mechanisms doubled every year, from 6 of 37 experts in 2023 to 23 of 32 experts in 2025. The most important measures to improve uptake in the future, according to experts, are "strengthening evaluation culture and incentives to improve practice based on evaluation results," "more long-term, learning-oriented evaluation efforts," and "wider sharing of evaluation results among stakeholders." For each of these measures, more than half of respondents considered progress in the coming years to be rather feasible.

Overall, our findings emphasize the importance of adequate funding for evaluation, knowledge, and capacity, as well as stakeholder cooperation and constructive relationships to improve P/CVE through evaluation. If past shortcomings remain, stakeholders should beware the risk of P/CVE evaluation falling short of its important role in finding what works and under which circumstances to prevent radicalization and violence. In light of the latest 2025 survey data and the overall results from three years of monitoring, we therefore recommend the following.

Recommendations

1   **All P/CVE stakeholders should focus on building mutual trust and should approach evaluations as opportunities to achieve more coherent and effective prevention efforts. Where extremist ideologies have moved into the political mainstream or positions of power, there is an increased risk of P/CVE being driven by ideology rather than accountability, evidence and learning. Stakeholders should pay close attention to these dynamics and invest in the constructive relationships needed for learning-based improvements in P/CVE.**

2   **Stakeholders should ensure that evaluations follow learning strategies with clear uptake mechanisms.**

a.   Governments and implementers should prioritize developing uptake mechanisms that ensure evaluation results feed into efforts to improve extremism prevention policies, strategies, programs, and activities.

b.   Funders and implementers should set goals for evaluation uptake together and agree to engage with possible negative evaluation results for further learning, rather than as a mere performance review of implementers.

3   **Stakeholders should ensure adequate funding, incentivize high-quality evaluations and make strategic, learning-driven investments.**

a.   Funders, particularly governments, should provide resources for the evaluation of P/CVE activities they support. Where grants cover evaluation costs, funders should require implementers to budget for evaluations at the proposal stage, and implementers should earmark such funds accordingly from the project outset.

b.   Across all types of evaluation funding, stakeholders should encourage the involvement of independent experts as third-party evaluators or advisors.

4   **Funders should continue to invest in P/CVE (evaluation) research that responds to evolving extremist threats and supports exchange among all P/CVE stakeholders.**

a.   Funders should continue to invest in and support high-quality meta reviews that synthesize findings from different academic and practice fields within countries and internationally, and enable academic research to continue to drive innovation in the evaluation field.

b.   Wherever possible, funders should support and enable the sharing of evaluation results and lessons learned, even if results are redacted or summarized for confidentiality.

c.   Funders should invest in exchange formats that facilitate dialogue and foster informal connections and cooperation between practitioners, researchers, evaluators, and policymakers.

d. Wherever appropriate, stakeholders should ensure that formats for sharing evaluation results, research findings and experiences include exchanges and discussions on evolving extremism trends – such as hybrid and ideologically fluid extremism, the mainstreaming of radical and extremist beliefs, youth and online radicalization, and non-ideological roots of radicalization – and their impact on P/CVE efforts and evaluations.

5 **Stakeholders should invest in building the capacity of implementers and government officials to conduct and manage high-quality evaluations and learning processes.**

a. Stakeholders should prioritize developing and strengthening evaluation support and capacity-building formats that facilitate exchange and coordination, such as professional networks, interactive training and knowledge hubs.

b. Stakeholders should ensure that such evaluation-support and capacity-building formats build on each other rather than funding fragmented, one-off efforts that duplicate existing structures.

Annex A – Methodology[25]

Survey Development

We administered the third PrEval expert monitoring survey on practices, challenges, needs, and innovations in P/CVE evaluation for this report through the online survey tool LimeSurvey between September and December 2025. The survey built on the first and second versions of this survey, developed and administered in 2023 and 2024 respectively.[26] This third survey consisted of 32 multiple-choice and open-ended questions in four sections (see full questionnaire in Annex B).

In 2025, the questionnaire's three sections gathered insights into current approaches and promising developments for evaluation and extremism prevention practice. The first part explored current and future-oriented practices of evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE and related fields by asking experts questions on evaluation frequency, actors, innovations, the management of evaluation results, evaluation support structures, and challenges. The second part of the survey enquired about innovations in P/CVE, several sub-fields and related fields in each country. Finally, we asked experts about present and future extremist phenomena in their country of expertise. To validate the answers, survey respondents received the definitions of key concepts at the survey's outset. The expected survey completion time was 60–70 minutes, depending on the length of the selected questions and answers provided.

Many survey questions that yielded meaningful results in prior years remained unchanged between 2023 and 2024, to enable comparison and continuous monitoring. We refined and added questions based on research results and lessons from prior survey rounds in this final round, specifically on evaluation challenges and uptake. In particular, we added Delphi-style questions that aggregated findings from prior years in order to obtain aggregate ratings from experts and elicit their judgement on the importance and feasibility of measures to improve P/CVE practice and evaluation in the future. We eliminated some questions because the answers did not yield meaningful results in prior years or did not promise significant new insights one year after the last survey.

Terminology

The types of activities that are labeled as P/CVE may differ between countries, based on aspects such as linguistics, the origins and evolution of the extremism prevention field, and domestic debates. We therefore provided survey participants with working definitions of central concepts.

We understand preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) as a spectrum of non-coercive efforts aimed at mitigating key drivers of radicalization and dissuading individuals from engaging in ideologically motivated violence.[27] All activities that meet this definition, regardless of whether they are designated as P/CVE in the respective country, are relevant to the present research project.

The expert survey also covered related activities beyond the P/CVE framework, which are designed to promote community resilience without being explicitly seen as preventive, for example, by fostering social cohesion or peaceful coexistence.[28] This research project and the questionnaire further draw on a public health model that distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, and acknowledges that these boundaries may be fluid.[29]

This survey and report understand P/CVE measures as individual preventative or interventional actions that can be applied at an individual, relational, group or societal level, depending on where the driver of radicalization is identified. If P/CVE measures reflect coordinated efforts with a clearly defined scope and life cycle, targeting specific aspects of primary, secondary, and/or tertiary prevention, they may be understood as P/CVE projects. A broader scope of activities defines P/CVE programs, which may therefore include multiple projects. P/CVE programs usually stem from P/CVE policies and/or strategies, which provide guidelines and frameworks for P/CVE objectives and how they intend to be achieved. Lastly, this research project uses P/CVE activities as an inclusive term for the aforementioned concepts, representing any and all undertakings of relevant P/CVE stakeholders to counter and prevent violent extremism, as well as previously listed related activities beyond the P/CVE framework, within given contexts.

To define evaluation and quality assurance, this project follows the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by understanding evaluation as "the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results."[30] An evaluation aims to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives such as efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and/or sustainability. Beyond this rather narrow understanding of evaluation, quality assurance may also take other forms, especially in different contexts. For the purposes of this study, in addition to formal evaluations, we were also interested in discovering other mechanisms and measures for quality assurance.

Country Selection

The 11 countries covered in this study are Australia, Canada, Czechia, Indonesia, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, the UK, and the US, all of which we also covered in the first and second iterations of this international monitoring in 2023 and 2024.[31] Back then, the research team had identified countries through a literature review and expert interviews. The criteria for selection included whether a country had a significant P/CVE evaluation landscape with sufficient independent (non-government) experts with an overview of the landscape, and potential survey respondents with English-language skills. Additional criteria were the representation of different world regions, various extremist-threat phenomena, the existence of P/CVE evaluation according to the literature, and the level of academic freedom in each country. For the 2024 survey round, we had to drop Singapore and Bosnia and Herzegovina from the original 2023 sample because it was not possible to recruit a sufficient number of independent, non-governmental experts in the P/CVE evaluation field for those countries as survey respondents within the constraints of this study in 2024 (see participant selection below). For this final survey round in 2025, we had to also drop Côte d'Ivoire for the same reason.[32] As a result, the sample size varies slightly over time and we took this into account when interpreting the results.

Survey Participant Selection

The 32 survey respondents for the survey covered in this report consist of two-to-three experts per country, who we recruited from among researchers, practitioners and evaluators who work independently of any government authority and who had both expertise in P/CVE or related activities in one of the survey countries, and comprehensive knowledge of evaluations in these fields. We started with the expert pool from our prior monitoring rounds and recruited additional experts where necessary. For their participation, respondents

received financial compensation of 400 EUR. We based both the original and this iteration's sampling processes on online searches, expert networks and a snowballing approach. We paid particular attention to gender diversity and the inclusion of local experts who live and work in the respective countries. Most of the selected respondents were located in or originally from the country on which they reported. Overall, we invited 46 experts to complete the survey based on the selection criteria (41 percent women; 59 percent men). Of these, 33 accepted the invitation to participate (72 percent acceptance rate, 36.4 percent women; 63.6 percent men) and 32 completed the survey (69 percent completion rate; 34.5 percent women; 65.5 percent men). Of these 32 respondents, 6 participated for the first time, and 26 had already participated in a previous iteration of the survey.

Survey Analysis

We analyzed the survey results between November and December 2025. We conducted both a descriptive statistical analysis of the quantitative survey results and a qualitative content analysis of open-ended answers, using a mix of deductive and inductive coding.[33] For questions that did not have a corresponding quantitative survey question, we used key codes from the 2023 and 2024 iterations of the survey in a first deductive coding round. In a second, inductive coding round, we added new codes. For all other questions, we analyzed recurring themes, challenges, examples of good practices, and other noteworthy points within individual categories after having completed the quantitative data analysis, and cross-referenced relevant findings with secondary literature as well as with findings from the previous expert surveys in 2023 and 2024.

Limitations

All empirical claims presented in this study are drawn from insights obtained through the expert surveys in 2023, 2024 and 2025, and a validation workshop that took place in 2024.[34] The results represent the assessments of individual non-government experts, meaning we do not claim to representatively discuss the prevention and evaluation landscapes in the respective country contexts. Collecting official government positions and assessments would require a different methodology, which would also need to consider that different parts and levels of government in individual countries may have differing assessments. Our results, therefore, do not represent official government positions or records.

The survey's scope and our available resources, as well as limited publicly available information concerning some issues addressed in the survey, restricted our ability to verify participants' responses against official records and external sources. We compared all survey responses against responses from different participants answering for the same country context, in order to note relevant differences and deviations. The aggregate findings are to be read as an assessment of the sector in the various countries according to two to three experts per country and year, not as the objective reality.

The survey and associated research was conducted predominantly in English, which means the country selection and identification of expert respondents are based on available information about P/CVE activities and evaluation in English. In 2023, the research team translated key terms into national languages using online tools, to expand the scope of possible results. Overall, the population of experts with both P/CVE and evaluation expertise and a comprehensive overview of the landscape in each country is limited, and the number of experts who fulfilled the inclusion criteria varied greatly from country to country.

As discussed in the key concepts section, varying definitions for what constitutes "P/CVE" create challenges for the transferability of labels and comparability of results across contexts. To acknowledge this issue and allow for more nuance, the survey questionnaire provided respondents with a relatively broad definition that also accounts for P/CVE-related fields and activities, even if these may not be labeled as such in the given context. Wherever appropriate, we asked survey respondents to reflect on these considerations through open-ended follow-up questions. A cross-national exchange of good practices and lessons learned should remain sensitive to the specificity of individual contexts.[35] Although this study considers country contexts when analyzing survey data, it acknowledges inherent limitations in transferring extremism prevention and deradicalization programs into other contexts. An initial contextual analysis is required before a promising practice from one country can be explored and adopted in another context. This also has implications when managing expectations for similar outcomes of these P/CVE activities in one's domestic context.

The sample size for this survey varied slightly across years (see "survey participant selection" above). We verified all findings against the difference in sample size and took this into account when interpreting the results. A disclaimer on this has been added to the introduction, and information on the sample size is included wherever these differences are relevant, or when they explain results and patterns.

Annex B – Survey Questionnaire 2025

Section 1.1: P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance I

In this first section of the survey, we want to explore current and future-oriented practices of evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE and related fields in your country of expertise. You will be asked a series of questions on evaluation approaches, actors, innovations, and challenges.

1. **How often are evaluations and quality assurance measures conducted in the field of P/CVE in your country at the respective levels?** *[matrix]*

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Primary (e.g., society at large, certain sub-sections of society)							
Secondary (e.g., individuals considered "at risk", local communities considered "at risk")							
Tertiary (e.g., individuals considered to be "radicalized")							

2. **How often are the following types of P/CVE activities evaluated?** *[matrix]*

	Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Individual P/CVE measures							
Individual P/CVE projects							
P/CVE programs							
P/CVE policies/strategies							
Organizations							
Other (please specify below)							

3. **Please elaborate at which time intervals/how often evaluations are conducted for each type.** *[open answer]*

Evaluation Actors and Funding

4. **Who acts as the evaluators of the aforementioned P/CVE activities?** *[multiple choice: select many]*

   a. The implementers of the project/program themselves (self-evaluation)

   b. Funders (e.g., government entities, foundations, international organizations)

   c. University-based researchers (third party)

   d. Independent consultants (third party)

e. Commercial evaluation companies (third party)

f. Other, namely [open answer]

g. Do not know

h. Prefer not to respond

5. **At whose request or initiative are P/CVE evaluations initiated in your country?**
    [multiple choice: select many]

a. Government (national or sub-national/local)

b. Foundations / philanthropies

c. Foreign donor governments

d. Regional organizations

e. International organizations

f. Implementers take the initiative to evaluate their activities without external requests

g. Academic researchers

h. Other, namely [open answer]

i. Do not know

j. Prefer not to respond

6. **How are evaluations of P/CVE activities financed in your country?**
    [multiple choice: select many]

a. Budgets for P/CVE activities include funds for the evaluations

b. If a government entity requests an evaluation, it provides additional funding to cover the costs

c. If implementers wish to evaluate their activities, they can access dedicated funds from the government in addition to existing project or program funding

d. Non-governmental organizations finance the evaluations

e. Other, namely [open answer]

f. Do not know

g. Prefer not to respond

7. **Do you know of any new dedicated funding instruments for evaluation and quality assurance in P/CVE which were developed or fielded in your country in the past year? If so, please describe them here.** *[open answer]*

Innovations

8. **Which promising methodological innovations for P/CVE evaluations are currently being developed or implemented in your country (e.g. types of evaluations, methods, cooperation)? Please provide examples.** *[open answer]*

9. **What are the most promising methodological innovations developed in the P/CVE evaluation field in general in the past years?** *[open answer]*

10. **Are you aware of any new innovative uses of digital methods or tools for evaluation in P/CVE in your country (e.g., big data analyses, use of artificial intelligence or others)? What are they and how are they used?** *[open answer]*

Evaluation Results and Knowledge Management

11. **How often are P/CVE evaluation results published in the form of (publicly available) evaluation reports?** *[multiple choice: select only one]*

a.   Very often

b.   Often

c.   Sometimes

d.   Rarely

e.   Never

f.   Do not know

g.   Prefer not to respond

12. **Please elaborate on how often, in which form, and by whom otherwise shared evaluation results are in your country.** *[open answer]*

13. **Are there any new uptake mechanisms to ensure that stakeholders use evaluation results to improve their P/CVE policies, programming or practice in your country? If so, please describe them here.** *[open answer]*

14. **How important are the following measures to improve uptake and the translation of evaluation results into more effective P/CVE policies, programming, and practice in your country? Please rank them by importance.** *[ranking question]*

a.   Wider sharing of evaluation results among stakeholders

b.   More long-term, learning-oriented evaluation efforts

c.   More consistent standards, guidelines and frameworks for evaluation uptake

d.   Strengthening evaluation culture and incentives to improve practice based on evaluation results

e.   Increasing stakeholders' openness for handling and addressing negative evaluation results

f.   Making evaluation-based recommendations more targeted and realistic for stakeholders to implement

g.   More collaborative and inclusive evaluations

15. Considering all P/CVE stakeholders, including government and non-government actors in your country: How feasible is it for P/CVE stakeholders to improve the following aspects of evaluation uptake in your country in the coming 1-3 years?
[multiple choice: select only one]

	Not feasible at all	Rather unfeasible	Neither feasible nor unfeasible	Somewhat feasible	Very feasible	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Wider sharing of evaluation results among stakeholders							
More long-term, learning-oriented evaluation efforts							
More consistent standards, guidelines and frameworks for evaluation uptake							
Strengthening evaluation culture and incentives to improve practice based on evaluation results							
Increasing stakeholders' openness for handling and addressing negative evaluation results							
Making evaluation-based recommendations more targeted and realistic for stakeholders to implement							
More collaborative and inclusive evaluations							

Section 1.2: P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance II

Support Structures

16. Which formats or structures exist to support evaluation and quality assurance of P/CVE in your country? *[multiple choice: select many]*

a.   Professional network(s)

b.   Interactive training or talks (e.g., webinars, advanced training, symposia, professional conferences)

c.   Non-interactive lectures

d.   Evaluation database(s)

e.   Knowledge hub(s)

f.   Toolkit(s) and other educational and guidance resources

g.   Helpdesk(s)

h.   No support structures exist

i.   Other, namely [open answer]

j.   Do not know

k.   Prefer not to respond

17. Has the availability of support structures around P/CVE evaluation changed in your country in the past year? If so, please describe the changes. *[open answer]*

Challenges

18. Below is a list of common obstacles to conducting frequent, widespread, high-quality evaluations. How have these obstacles developed in your country in the past year? *[multiple choice: select only one]*

	Significantly improved	Somewhat improved	Unchanged	Somewhat worsened	Significantly worsened	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Funding constraints							
Limited capacity and expertise to conduct evaluations							
Lack of central coordination and standard setting for evaluations							
Insufficient awareness of the value of evaluation							
Methodological challenges (including ethical considerations and obstacles to data collection)							

19. How important are the following measures to strengthen P/CVE evaluation and improve P/CVE practice in your country? Please rank them by priority.
[ranking question]

○ More high-quality, independent third-party evaluations

○ Increased appreciation and capacity of all P/CVE stakeholders to conduct and participate in evaluations

○ More collaborative evaluation efforts between different stakeholders

○ More standardized evaluation indicators

○ Better data-sharing agreements

○ A strategic national evaluation framework

○ New methodological frameworks to overcome methodological challenges

○ Increased and coherent government support for evaluations (financial)

○ Increased and coherent government support for evaluation (non-financial)

○ More government transparency, accountability to the rule of law in P/CVE

20. How feasible is progress in the following areas in your country in the coming 1-3 years? *[multiple choice: select only one]*

Continued on the next page

	Not feasible at all	Rather unfeasible	Nor feasible nor unfeasible	Rather feasible	Very feasible	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
More high-quality, independent third-party evaluations							
Increased appreciation and capacity of all P/CVE stakeholders to conduct and participate in evaluations							
More collaborative evaluation efforts between different stakeholders							

Continued from the previous page

	Not feasible at all	Rather unfeasible	Nor feasible nor unfeasible	Rather feasible	Very feasible	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
More standardized evaluation indicators							
Better data-sharing agreements							
A strategic national evaluation framework							
New methodological frameworks to overcome methodological challenges							
Increased and coherent government support for evaluations (financial)							
Increased and coherent government support for evaluation (non-financial)							
More government transparency and accountability to the rule of law in P/CVE							

Section 2: P/CVE and Related Fields

You have now completed more than half of this survey. In this section, we would like to learn more about the P/CVE and civic education landscapes in your country.

21. **What are the most promising recent innovations in P/CVE programming and activities in your country to help prevent violent extremism in general?**
    [open answer]

22. **What promising programs, activities or approaches exist in your country to prevent the radicalization of youth in online spaces?** *[open answer]*

23. **How has the relationship between civil society and the government in the P/CVE field evolved in your country in the past 2 years?** *[multiple choice: select only one]*

	Significantly improved	Somewhat improved	Stayed the same	Somewhat worsened	Significantly worsened	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
The relationship has							

24. **Looking beyond P/CVE, to other fields aimed at fostering social/community cohesion, resilience and peaceful co-existence in your country: Were there any notable developments or innovations in policy or programming in these areas in the past year? Please describe them.** *[open answer]*

Section 3: Violent Extremism and Preparedness

Before finishing this survey, we are interested in your insights on issues related to the violent extremist phenomena your country of expertise currently faces and is expected to face in the next years.

Threat Assessment

25. **Which violent extremist phenomena do you currently consider a threat to public safety in your country?** *[open answer]*

26. **Which violent extremist phenomena will likely threaten public safety in your country in the next 2-5 years if not adequately addressed?** *[open answer]*

27. **Which violent extremist phenomenon or tactic is the most underrated future threat to public safety in your country in the next 2-5 years?** *[open answer]*

28. **How prepared is the field of P/CVE stakeholders in your country to address these future challenges?** *[multiple choice: select only one]*

	Well prepared	Somewhat prepared	Neither prepared nor unprepared	Rather unprepared	Not at all prepared	Do not know	Prefer not to respond
Stakeholder preparedness							

29. **If not "well prepared": What is needed for the field of P/CVE to be better address these future challenges? Please list and describe the three most important changes needed.** *[open answer]*

Section 4: Final Question

In this survey, we have asked you about various aspects of P/CVE evaluation and quality assurance in your country:

1. *P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance I*
2. *P/CVE Evaluation and Quality Assurance II*
3. *P/CVE and Related Fields*
4. *Violent Extremism and Preparedness*

30. **Is there anything else you would like to share with us regarding the situation of P/CVE evaluations in your country that goes beyond these aspects, or that was missing within one of these sections?** *[open answer]*

31. **Please provide any feedback or insights you have on the style or structure of the survey, e.g., its clarity, logical flow, user experience.** *[open answer]*

32. **We thank you for your time and insights. Please note that once you click submit, you won't be able to modify your answers anymore. Finally, to ensure that we match your responses to the intended country context, please once more confirm your country selection.** *[open answer]*

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10   Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, "How Do We Know What Works."

11   Mike Levine, "'Modern Day Terrorism': How the Online Extremist Network 764 Is Threatening Teen Lives." ABC News, December 3, 2025. https://abcnews.go.com/US/modern-day-terrorism-online-extremist-network-764-threatening/ story?id=127528502; Kathrin Erdmann, "Sadistisches Online-Netzwerk 764 – Mehr Tatverdächtige Und Opfer." tagesschau.de, January 6, 2026, https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr/sadismus-online-netzwerk-manipulation-kinder-jugendliche-100.html.

12   See also Sofie Lilli Stoffel, "Seen but Not Heard: How Evaluation Misses Youth Realities in Extremism Prevention," 2025, Global Public Policy Institute, accessed January 23, 2026, https://gppi.net/assets/Stoffel2025_Study_SeenButNotHeard. pdf.

13   Stoffel, Bressan, and Korb, "Holding Ground."

14   Ibid.

15   Please see the section above on Trends in Violent Extremist Threats.

16   GOV.UK. "Online Safety Act: Explainer," April 24, 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer.

17   Stoffel, Bressan, and Korb, "Holding Ground."

18   Ibid., 15

19   For more details on AIDA, see https://www.project-aida.eu/.

20   For more details on UPM, see https://www.servimedia.es/noticias/investigadores-upm-desarrollan-sistema-detecta-contenido-radical-redes/.

21   To aggregate responses from the ranking questions, we applied the Borda count, a positional aggregation method widely used in social choice theory to convert individual rank orderings into a collective priority ranking (See N. Bradley Fox and Benjamin Bruyns, "An Evaluation of Borda Count Variations Using Ranked Choice Voting Data," *Social Choice and Welfare* (2025), published November 10, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01638-2; and Carmen Herrero and Antonio Villar, "Group Decisions from Individual Rankings: The Borda–Condorcet Rule," *European Journal of Operational Research* 291, no. 2 (2021): 757–65, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.043.). In the Borda method, each ranked position is assigned a descending weight, such that higher-ranked options receive more points than lower-ranked options. For this question, where respondents ranked seven options, a first-place ranking was assigned 7 points, second place 6 points,

continuing down to 1 point for the lowest rank. For each option, the number of times it received each rank was multiplied by the corresponding weight and summed to produce a total weighted score, following the general form:

Borda score = *(c1 ×n)+(c2 ×(n−1))+ ⋯ +(cn ×1)*,

where *ci* denotes the frequency with which an option was assigned rank , and is the total number of ranked options.

22 Stoffel, Bressan, and Korb, "Holding Ground," 20.

23 To aggregate responses from the ranking questions, we applied the Borda count. For this question, where respondents ranked ten options, a first-place ranking was assigned 10 points, second place 9 points, continuing down to 1 point for the lowest rank. For each option, the number of times it received each rank was multiplied by the corresponding weight and summed to produce a total weighted score, following the general form:

Borda score = *(c1 ×n)+(c2 ×(n−1))+ ⋯ +(cn ×1)*,

where *ci* denotes the frequency with which an option was assigned rank , and is the total number of ranked options.

24 Among those are:

Area	Rather / Very feasible (%)	Neither feasible nor unfeasible (%)	Rather / Not feasible at all (%)
More standardized evaluation indicators	40.63	28.13	31.25
Better data-sharing agreements	28.13	28.13	40.63
A strategic national evaluation framework	34.38	18.75	43.75
New methodological frameworks to overcome methodological challenges	34.38	37.50	18.75
More government transparency and accountability to the rule of law in P/CVE	31.25	21.88	40.63

25 Stoffel, Bressan, and Korb, "Holding Ground"; Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, "How Do We Know What Works."

26 Ibid.

27 Perroux et al., "Preliminary Assessment", 15; Sjøen and Jore, "Preventing Extremism," 272.

28 Claudia Wallner, *Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Through Education Initiatives. Assessing the Evidence Base*. Occasional Paper, (Royal United Services Institute, 2020), https://static.rusi.org/pcve_education_final_web_ version.pdf.

29 Primary prevention includes measures that target the broader society, aiming to mitigate conducive conditions, behaviors, or attitudes to radicalization, and building resilience against extremism. Secondary prevention refers to more targeted intervention, characterized by working with or among the social network of people considered at risk of cognitive and behavioral radicalization, which the measures aim to reduce. Lastly, tertiary prevention refers to deradicalization, disengagement, and rehabilitation. See Gerald Caplan, *Principles of Preventive Psychiatry*, New York: Basic Books, 1964; Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit, "What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia," *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8, No. 1 (January 2016). https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1104710; Sarah Marsden, James Lewis, and Kim Knott, *Introductory Guide: Countering Violent Extremism*, (Lancaster: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2017), https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/countering-violent-extremism/.

30 OECD, "Glossary of Key Terms."

31 Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, "How Do We Know What Works."

32 In the first monitoring round in 2023, the answers of one person answering for Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be excluded due to a strong suspicion of responses having been generated with the help of artificial intelligence software (see Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, 2024). Similarly, in the second round, one response for Côte d'Ivoire had to be excluded on the same grounds. These responses were excluded from the analysis and are not reported in the results.

33 Percentages presented in the report have been rounded to one decimal point for clarity. Multi-select questions are labeled as such. Please note that percentages for single-select questions may not always sum to 100% due to rounding.

34 Stoffel, Bressan, and Korb, "Holding Ground"; Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, "How Do We Know What Works."

35 See David Malet, "Countering Violent Extremism: Assessment in Theory and Practice," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 16, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1889017; Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison J. Sherley, "The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies," *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2 (2006), https://doi.org/10.15496/publikation-6059; Bressan, Ebbecke, and Rahlf, "How Do We Know What Works," 18.

Acknowledgments

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