



**INTER-AGENCY
HUMANITARIAN
EVALUATION**

INCEPTION REPORT

INTER-AGENCY HUMANITARIAN EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SOMALIA

June 2024

Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
CBPF	Country Based Pooled Fund
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EDG	Emergency Directors Group
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPPI	Global Public Policy Institute
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCF	Humanitarian Coordination Forum
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
IAHE	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
ICVA	International Council for Voluntary Agencies
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NFIs	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPAG	Operational Policy and Advocacy Group
OPR	Operational Peer Review
RC	Resident Coordinator
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SHF	Somalia Humanitarian Fund
SMS	Short Message System
SoDMA	Somali Disaster Management Agency
UNDP	United National Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department for Safety and Security
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USD	United States Dollars
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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1 Introduction

1. This inception report explains the background to the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia; describes the context; details the evaluation's scope, questions, and methods; and summarizes the organization and management of the evaluation.
2. It was prepared by Dr. Julia Steets and Dr. Elias Sagmeister of Global Public Policy Institute, an independent think tank in Germany and by Noura Mahmoud of Raagsan, a social enterprise in Somalia, who were commissioned by the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Management Group to conduct this exercise.
3. The inception report builds on a review of documents and 110 inception interviews held in person or remotely with strategically selected stakeholders at the global and country level. It incorporates feedback from the IAHE Management Group as well as members of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Mogadishu.

1.1 Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation

4. The present evaluation is an Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE).¹ An IAHE is an independent assessment of the results of the collective humanitarian response by Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) member organizations to a specific crisis or theme. IAHEs evaluate the extent to which planned collective results have been achieved and how humanitarian reform efforts have contributed to that achievement. They are not in-depth evaluations of any one sector or agency, and thus do not replace agency-specific humanitarian evaluations.
5. **Objectives and users.** IAHEs were introduced to strengthen learning and promote accountability to affected people, national governments, donors, and the public. They aim to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian system and to ensure that coordinated and accountable humanitarian action helps address the most urgent needs of people affected by crises. The intended users of IAHEs include:
 - Humanitarian Coordinators and Humanitarian Country Teams, informing decisions on course corrections, additional areas that need to be addressed, longer-term recovery plans, and preparedness efforts;
 - IASC Principals, Deputy Principals, the Emergency Directors Group, the Operational Policy and Advocacy Group, and working groups, informing decisions on future humanitarian action, policy development, and reform;
 - National governments and disaster management institutions, informing their policies and protocols for crisis responses involving international actors;
 - Affected people, informing them about the outcomes of the response;

¹ This section draws on IAHE Steering Group. 2018. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations: Process Guidelines. The team note the guidelines are currently under revision.

- Local and international NGOs, member states of international organizations, donors, and learning and evaluation networks, providing them with evidence on the collective response efforts in support of accountability and learning.
6. **Management response.** IAHE reports are public and provide country-level as well as global and systemic recommendations. Formal management response plans help ensure that recommendations are appropriately used and followed up on. At the country level, the Humanitarian Coordinator leads the development of the management response plan and is supported by the Humanitarian Country Team and the OCHA country office. At the global level, the Emergency Relief Coordinator delegates responsibility for ensuring that global and systemic recommendations are addressed and that follow-up is monitored to different groups. The Humanitarian Coordinator, the IASC Principals and designated IASC associated bodies report on progress in implementing the recommendations to the Emergency Relief Coordinator. The evaluation manager will engage close with these stakeholders to ensure management responses are developed as foreseen.
 7. **Scale-Up.** The Scale-Up Activation is a coordinated inter-agency effort activated in response to sudden or escalating humanitarian crises within a country, including at sub-national levels, when existing capacities are insufficient for the crisis scale, complexity, and urgency. It follows the IASC Scale-Up Protocols.² An activation encompasses: (a) ensuring that the IASC system delivers effectively in support of national authorities and existing capacities while monitoring its own performance; (b) establishing necessary leadership and coordination capacities and tools within the humanitarian system; (c) involving IASC member organizations and Global Cluster Lead Agencies to put the required systems in place, and to mobilize the resources required to contribute to the response as per their respective mandates. Additionally, it mandates triggering an IAHE within 9 to 12 months following a scale-up declaration.
 8. **Launch of the Somalia IAHE.** Following an Emergency Directors Group mission to Somalia in July 2022, the IASC Principals activated the Scale-Up Protocols in Somalia in August 2022 to support the ongoing drought response and famine interventions in the country. The scale-up was deactivated in September 2023. In November 2023, the Emergency Relief Coordinator officially launched the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the collective response to the crisis in Somalia.

1.2 Country Context: Somalia

9. **Economic development.** Over the last years, the Somali government implemented structural reforms and strengthened macroeconomic management, which culminated in the recent completion of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. This brought down Somalia's external debt from 64 percent of GDP in 2018 to less than 6 percent of GDP in 2023. In the same year, Somalia also joined the East African Community, which provides opportunities for regional trade integration. Building on opportunities created by rapid urbanization, the growing use of digital technologies, and planned investments in energy,

² Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Humanitarian System-Wide Scale-Up Activation. Protocol 1: Definition and Procedures, and Protocol 2: Empowered Leadership. November 2018: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/humanitarian-system-wide-scale-activation>.

ports, education, and health, Somalia aims to gradually transition from relying on humanitarian aid to sustainable development approaches.³

10. However, severe droughts, floods, locust infestation, the COVID-19 pandemic, volatile global prices, as well as insecurity, conflict and governance challenges including tensions between the federal state levels of government in Somalia have slowed this transition. Real GDP growth has been low and volatile, averaging only 2 percent per year between 2019 and 2023, with real GDP per capita reducing by 0.8 percent per year. With the end of the drought in 2023, the economy was expected to grow around 3 percent this year. Rains boosted agricultural production and exports, reducing food insecurity and supporting private consumption, while also causing destruction and displacement through flooding. But the economy remains heavily import-dependent, as conflict destroyed its productive capacity, and repeated shocks have eroded households' assets and purchasing power. In 2022, an estimated 55 percent of the Somali population lived below the national poverty line. According to the 2022 Integrated Household Budget Survey, poverty rates are higher among the nomadic population. However, due to the country's high level of urbanization, the majority of the poor live in urban areas. Only one-third of men and 12 percent of women participate in the labor market. Almost half of those employed are living below the poverty line. Building resilience to shocks is a priority to support economic growth and job creation.⁴
11. **Droughts and famines.** Over the past 25 years, Somalia experienced several extended droughts and two declared famines, as well as repeated floods. The famine in 1992 resulted in nearly 300,000 deaths and displaced 20 percent of the population. Reports indicate that up to one-third of Somali children may have perished during that period.⁵ The 2011 East Africa drought was also severe, leading to famine and the deaths of over 250,000 people in Somalia, including many children under five years old. In addition, this crisis forced more than 950,000 Somalis to seek refuge in neighboring countries and inflicted significant damage on the nation's agricultural and livestock sectors. In 2017, another significant drought occurred, leaving more than half the population food insecure (IPC Phases 2, 3, and 4) and in need of humanitarian assistance. The estimated death toll of around 45,000 people was lower than during the 2011–12 crisis, but again more than 900,000 people were displaced.⁶ A subsequent report found the “more proactive and far-reaching humanitarian response” compared to 2011–12 was an important factor in averting a higher number of deaths but called for even earlier and more targeted engagement by humanitarian actors during future droughts.⁷
12. The extended 2021–2023 drought facing East Africa, including Somalia, was then considered the worst in four decades. The Federal Government of Somalia declared drought in April 2021 and a drought emergency in November 2021. It affected millions, coinciding with global price rises, ongoing insecurity, and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. By the

³ World Bank Country Overview, 26 Feb 2024. See <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Clark, Jeffery. “Famine in Somalia and the International Response: Collective Failure,” US Committee for Refugees Issue Paper, November 1992.

⁶ Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2018.

⁷ Warsame A, Frison S, Checchi F. “Drought, armed conflict and population mortality in Somalia, 2014–2018: A statistical analysis.” PLOS Glob Public Health. 2023 Apr 12.

end of 2022, the cumulative impact of five consecutive failed or poor rainy seasons had severely strained the resilience of communities, agriculture, and livestock. Rainfall deficits during the March–May 2022 rainy season were the most severe on record, with subsequent poor rains in the October–December season worsening the humanitarian crisis further. While famine was averted, a recent estimate puts the toll of this most recent drought at an estimated 43,000 excess deaths in 2022.⁸

13. **Political situation.** Somalia's tumultuous history over the last several decades has set the stage for its current political and security challenges. The collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 plunged the country into a state of civil war, leading to the emergence of various clan-based factions vying for control. Formally, Somalia is a federal state composed of two levels of government: the federal government and federal member states, which include both state and local governments. Federal member states also have their own constitutions and armed forces and tensions between the federal member states and the federal government can be intense. Somaliland, for example, declared its independence already in 1991. Following a heavily contested electoral process, May 2022 saw the peaceful transition of presidential power from Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo” to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the formation of a new federal government, which brought some political stability. Nevertheless, the security situation remained dire throughout the period relevant for this evaluation.
14. Political power in Somalia has historically been shared along clan lines and clans critically influence the relationship between people and external actors in Somalia, including humanitarians. In the Federal Republic of Somalia, dominant clans share power, with the presidency and premiership rotating between the Hawiye and Darood clans, and the parliament speakership and the supreme court leadership being allocated to the Rahanweyn and Dir clans. The administrations of the federal member states are also influenced by clan affiliations, with pivotal governmental roles typically in the control of the dominant clans within those regions.⁹
15. **Conflict.** Somalia has seen more than three decades of conflict, insecurity, and political fragility. In March 2022, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).¹⁰ Discussions about the draw-down or potential replacement of ATMIS are ongoing. AMISOM had been established in 2007 to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. AMISOM supported the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against al-Shabaab militants. In August 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared a nationwide mobilization against al-Shabaab. The government launched offensive operations against al-Shabaab in Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle, Mudug, and Galgaduud regions with support from Hawadle, Abgal, and Habar Gedir clan militias.¹¹ This resulted in

⁸ Watson et al. 2023. Mortality patterns in Somalia: retrospective estimates and scenario-based forecasting.

⁹ EUAA, Country Guidance Somalia, 2023: The role of clans in Somalia.

¹⁰ More specifically, it was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which in turn will end in 2024 with full transition of security operations to the Somali National Armed Forces.

¹¹ Mohamed Dhaysane, “Somalia’s President Vows ‘Total War’ Against al-Shabaab,” Voice of America, 24 August 2022.

the highest number of conflict-related fatalities since at least 2018, with over 6,500 victims reported by ACLED.¹²

16. **Displacement.** To cope with droughts, conflict, and other shocks, Somalis commonly opt for internal and international migration in search for safety and access to safe shelter, food, health care and water, as well as livestock pasture. The result is that about 17 percent of the Somali population is internally displaced. On the one hand, this mobility is a source of vulnerability, as the displaced typically live in worse conditions than residents, with reduced access to social services and livelihoods.¹³ On the other hand, migration represents a key resilience capacity in the face of shocks, which is sometimes misunderstood by aid actors as merely representing a humanitarian or development “problem” to be solved.¹⁴
17. In January 2024, the National Bureau of Somalia indicated the number of Internally Displaced Person (IDPs) as 2.78 million. IOM’s displacement tracking matrix, by contrast, recorded approximately 3.45 million IDPs and 155,710 returnees in Somalia, down from a record 3.8 million IDPs recorded at the end of 2022. Top regions of origin are Lower Shabelle, Bay, and Bakool, while the regions of Banadir (31 percent), Bay (17 percent), and Gedo (10 percent) host the highest proportions of IDPs. The vast majority of IDPs (84 percent) live in urban areas. Of these, almost 90 percent stay in the approximately 4,000 IDP sites and around 10 percent in host communities.^{15,16}
18. Banadir and Bay, housing half of the country’s urban IDP population, exemplify the complex dynamics of urban displacement caused by drought, floods, and conflict. Most IDP settlements are informal and located on privately owned land. Land tenure is therefore often insecure and IDPs risk being evicted. In what has become known as the “IDP economy,” researchers and aid actors increasingly recognize humanitarian aid as part of Somalia’s (political) economy.¹⁷ Business interests entwined with Somalia’s IDP camps include a system of “gatekeepers” or “informal settlement managers” who control camps.¹⁸ On the one hand, gatekeepers can provide services to displaced populations where formal settlement management is lacking, but on the other hand many have been shown to be abusive, criminal, and/or corrupt.¹⁹ In any case, gatekeepers have managed to position themselves as unavoidable intermediaries between the IDPs and external actors, including aid agencies and municipalities.²⁰ They are part of a complex urbanization and migration dynamic, which at times clashes with the more static categorizations aid agencies and their donors are accustomed to.²¹

¹² ACLED, 2 March 2023. Heightened Political Violence in Somalia.

¹³ World Bank. 2022. From Protracted Humanitarian Relief to State-led Social Safety Net System: Somalia Baxnaano Program.

¹⁴ Bakonyi, Jutta, and Peter Chonka. 2023. Precarious Urbanism: Displacement, Belonging and the Reconstruction of Somali Cities.

¹⁵ IOM. 2024. Displacement Tracking Matrix, Somalia.

¹⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2024. Country Profile, Somalia.

¹⁷ The New Humanitarian. 26 October 2023. Powerful networks impose taxes on aid in Somalia. It’s time for this to end.

¹⁸ Bakonyi, Jutta, and Peter Chonka. 2023. Precarious Urbanism: Displacement, Belonging and the Reconstruction of Somali Cities.

¹⁹ The New Humanitarian. 18 July 2019. Somalia’s displacement camp ‘gatekeepers’ – ‘parasites’ or aid partners?

²⁰ Tana. 2017. Informal Settlement Managers: Perception and reality in informal IDP camps in Mogadishu.

²¹ Bakonyi, Jutta, and Peter Chonka. 2023. Precarious Urbanism: Displacement, Belonging and the Reconstruction of Somali Cities.

19. **Gender.** Gender inequality and a lack of women's empowerment are important challenges for Somalia.²² The country is ranked among the worst countries to be a woman or girl,²³ and ranks fourth to last on the UNDP Gender Inequality Index.²⁴ Somalia regularly records the highest prevalence of female genital mutilation, with 99 percent of girls and women aged 15 to 49 having undergone female genital mutilation, mostly in its severest forms.²⁵ Protracted conflict, structural gender inequality, and successive humanitarian crises continue to expose Somali women and girls to heightened levels of insecurity, including conflict-related sexual violence as well as early marriage.²⁶ Women and girls are disproportionately affected by humanitarian crises, with maternal and infant mortality rates among the highest in the world, and illiteracy rates among women significantly higher than for men.²⁷

1.3 Global Context

20. The humanitarian response to the extended 2021–2023 drought in Somalia took place against the backdrop of a series of challenging crises and events, as well as humanitarian reform efforts at the global level. One of the objectives of Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations is to inform future reform efforts.
21. **Recent and ongoing crises with special characteristics.** Several recent and ongoing crises present the international humanitarian system with unusual challenges regarding the acceptance of humanitarian assistance on a normative basis, the number and scale of concurrent large-scale emergencies, and the resources available for humanitarian response:
- The ability of the UN to deliver aid in Gaza was severely constrained and the existence of established aid organizations like UNRWA is challenged;
 - The war in Ukraine has been drawing a large share of traditional donor countries' attention and resources and has ripple effects on global food prices;
 - The COVID-19 pandemic affected humanitarian situations, developing countries, industrialized nations, and aid organizations alike;
 - Record levels of humanitarian funding in 2022 have reduced back to levels similar to those before 2022 and may see additional cuts.
22. **Previous reform efforts.** The IASC humanitarian system has continuously been undergoing reform efforts. The most recent effort from the Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA is the so-called Flagship Initiative, which seeks to strengthen community engagement, decentralize coordination, empower local initiatives, provide direct funding to local actors,

²² UN WOMEN. 2023. Somalia Country Overview.

²³ Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo. 2023. Women, Peace, and Security Index 2023/24: Tracking sustainable peace through inclusion, justice, and security for women. Washington, DC: GIWPS and PRIO.

²⁴ UNDP. 2023. Gender Equality and Social Inclusion. Somalia.

²⁵ UNICEF. 2024. Female Genital Mutilation: A global concern.

²⁶ OCHA. 2022. Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, p.23

²⁷ UN WOMEN and UNFPA. 2020. Funding for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls in Humanitarian Programming. Case Study: Somalia.

and adapt planning and programming in a set of pilot countries.²⁸ Previous reform efforts include the Agenda for Humanity,²⁹ which was adopted at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. One of the initiatives intended to help achieve the Agenda for Humanity was the Grand Bargain. In it, more than 50 of the largest donors and aid providers committed to a series of measures aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian responses.³⁰ Before that, the IASC had introduced the Transformative Agenda in 2011, which includes the Humanitarian Programme Cycle and the Scale-Up Protocols.³¹

1.4 The Humanitarian Response in Somalia

23. The IASC system has been responding to humanitarian crises in Somalia for over 30 years. This section outlines the key features of the most recent drought response.
24. **Planning.** Somalia has been part of the humanitarian appeal system since its inception in 1991.³² In December 2021, the IASC also published the 2022 Drought Response Plan, which aimed to address the needs of 3.2 million people facing severe shortages of water, food, health care and pasture.³³ All interventions outlined in this plan were incorporated into the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan. Over the past five years, the strategic objectives of the humanitarian response plans have remained largely unchanged: The top priority is to reduce loss of life for the most severely vulnerable people, including children under 5, by decreasing the prevalence of hunger, acute malnutrition, public health threats and outbreaks, and abuse, violence, and exposure to explosive ordinances. The second objective is to sustain the lives of people requiring humanitarian assistance and contribute to their resilience, by ensuring safe, equitable/inclusive, and dignified access to livelihoods and essential services. Thirdly, response plans aim to uphold commitments to the centrality of protection across the humanitarian response.³⁴
25. Due to the consecutive poor rainy seasons, the estimated number of people in need increased significantly in 2022 and 2023. Some aid workers interviewed during the inception phase of the evaluation questioned the reliability of needs data, which play an important role in planning processes. Figure 1 provides an overview of key humanitarian planning figures as indicated in the response plans.

²⁸ See <https://www.unocha.org/flagship-initiative>

²⁹ World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat. No date. *Agenda for Humanity*. <https://agendaforhumanity.org/>



³⁰ World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat. No date. *Grand Bargain*.

³¹ Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 2015. *The Implementation of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle*.

³² Sida, L., Mooney, E., Lough, O. and Fouad, L. et al. (2024) *Independent review of the humanitarian response to internal displacement*. HPG report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/en/publications/independent-review-of-the-humanitarian-response-to-internal-displacement).

³³ OCHA. 2021. *Somalia: 2022 Drought Response Plan*.

³⁴ See <https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/644>

Figure 1: Key Humanitarian Planning Figures 2021-2024

Data source: Humanitarianaction.info

26. **Other planning frameworks** relevant for the time covered by this evaluation include the Somalia National Development Plan 9, 2020–2024;³⁵ the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2021–2025,³⁶ including the Collective Outcomes 2019–2022; and the National Durable Solutions Strategy 2020–2024, which serves as a roadmap for durable solutions for displaced communities.³⁷
27. **Government role.** Somalia’s government structures have evolved since past crises. They now show a stronger presence than before, notably with the reestablishment of the Somali Disaster Management Agency; the appointment of a drought envoy in 2022; and the government’s strong role in the Baxnaano safety net program, funded by the World Bank. Despite this progress, tensions between the Federal Government and Federal Members States and challenges like political rivalries and inefficient resource allocation persist. There is criticism that government efforts focus too much on fundraising rather than building effective response systems. Humanitarian Outcomes (2024) describe challenges such as trust issues between government and humanitarians, confusion over agency roles, and direct approaches to donors by Federal Member States.³⁸
28. **Coordination.** Decentralized coordination played a crucial role in the response scale-up, with five core operational coordination hubs in South West, Banadir, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Jubaland established in 2023. UN agencies and NGOs deployed dedicated sub-national cluster coordination capacity in these hubs in the first quarter of 2023. In addition, there are area humanitarian coordination groups at district and regional level (Figure 2). Somaliland has a government-led coordination structure in place, covering four regions. In each region, there is a humanitarian coordination forum, chaired by the government and supported by an NGO/UN agency focal point. At the national level, it was proposed in 2023 that the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA) presides over a Humanitarian Coordination Forum (HCF), in which federal and state government line ministers, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, and embassies from donor countries come together bi-monthly to facilitate the coordination of all humanitarian action.³⁹


³⁵ <https://mop.gov.so/national-development-plan/>

³⁶ <https://somalia.un.org/en/96542-un-sustainable-development-cooperation-framework-somalia-2021-2025#:~:text=The%20UN%20Sustainable%20Development%20Cooperation,Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20in%20Somalia.>

³⁷ https://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/The-National-Durable-Solutions-Strategy-2020-2024_English.pdf

³⁸ https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/ho_ukhih_somalia_1023_2.pdf

³⁹ Federal Republic of Somalia, April 2023. Proposal for a renewed Partnership with the International Community (draft document reviewed by evaluation team).

Figure 2: Humanitarian coordination architecture in Somalia

Source: UN OCHA

29. **Funding.** Information about the funding situation of the humanitarian response in Somalia is not consistent across different sources, e.g., when comparing FTS data and CERF/CBPF reports. Moreover, as multiple previous reviews and evaluations have emphasized, these reports do not cover the significant resources provided through remittances and businesses. Table 1 seeks to provide an approximate overview of relevant figures relating to the IASC system. According to these figures, the 2022–23 crisis saw a significant increase in funding, roughly doubling what was available in each of the previous six years. Along with the funding growth came a shift in the distribution of funding across sectors. While the food security sector received between a quarter and a third of all funding between 2011 and 2017, its share in 2022 amounted to 57 percent. The data also shows the more significant role that cash and vouchers played in 2022, compared to earlier crises.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/ho_ukhih_somalia_1023_2.pdf

Table 1: Indicative Funding Overview (based on FTS data and humanitarianaction.info)

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Original requirement	1,090 million USD	1,460 million USD	2,300 million USD	1,596 million USD
Revised requirement	1,123 million USD	2,279 million USD	2,615 million USD	
Funding received	1,097 million USD	2,357 million USD	1,233 million USD	
% funded	76.8%	91.9%	44.3%	
Largest contributors ⁴¹	United States Germany European Commission UK SHF	United States Germany European Commission United Kingdom SHF	United States Germany European Commission SHF UK	United States European Commission United Kingdom Germany CERF
Government of Somalia	183.9 million USD	186.7 million USD	27.6 million USD	
Somalia Humanitarian Fund	39.9 million USD (FTS figure) 46.3 million USD (CBPF figure)	45.9 million USD (FTS figure) 71 million USD (CBPF figure)	57.1 million USD (FTS figure) 56.6 million USD (CBPF figure)	
Central Emergency Response Fund	30.3 million USD (FTS figure) 36.5 million USD (CERF figure)	48 million USD	35 million USD (FTS figure) 28 million USD (CERF figure)	

30. Recurring issues. Over the decades of humanitarian response in Somalia, a plethora of evaluations, reviews, and lessons learned exercises have been conducted. A review of key evaluative documents (summarized in Annex D) shows that these discuss several common and recurring themes. The systematic analysis of evaluative material from before the system-wide scale-up in 2022 will help to establish a baseline against which to assess whether progress has been made on critical issues. Recurring issues identified in the reviewed documents include:

- The importance of understanding and focusing on different **drivers of vulnerability**, such as gender, clan affiliation, and displacement, with a particular focus on the gaps of an appropriate response to displaced people;
- The difficulty of gaining humanitarian **access** and serving people in hard-to-reach areas, including the role played by the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) in facilitating safe access and the complications of remote management (with earlier reviews also frequently discussing the role of counter-terrorism legislation in restricting the ability to operate in areas controlled by al-Shabaab);
- The problem of **aid diversion** and the role of aid in Somalia's political economy;
- The need to strengthen **accountability to affected people** (with more recent reviews stressing the need to streamline different community feedback mechanisms);
- The challenges of **coordination**, especially in terms of having sufficient, dedicated, and appropriate coordination capacity; coordination at local level; and coordination across thematic areas or clusters (with more recent review particularly stressing the need for better data sharing and more joined up analysis)

⁴¹ Financial Tracking Service, accessed from: <https://fts.unocha.org/>.

- The key role played by **local actors**, especially in hard-to-reach areas and during the early phases of the responses, coupled with persisting problems in strengthening the capacity of local actors, involving them in coordination structures, and mobilizing more direct funding for them;
- Gaps in providing an **integrated response** that also covers non-food humanitarian sectors (including protection), strengthens resilience, and links to development and peacebuilding and stabilization efforts;
- Earlier evaluations and reviews very frequently pointed to a gap between available early warning and the lack of **early action** based on this information (this issue is much less prominent in recent reviews, even though they still comment on the late disbursement of funding).

31. **HCT reforms.** Based on an Operational Peer Review, as well as on the results of a report on post-distribution aid diversion in Somalia, the Somalia Humanitarian Country Team adopted an action plan to address critical issues such as the management of gatekeepers,⁴² local power networks exploiting aid distribution,⁴³ as well as beneficiary duplication and the presence of ghost beneficiaries in relief programs. Workstreams on research, targeting and identification, registration, data sharing, minority inclusion, reporting, hiring practices, camp coordination and camp management, as well as monitoring and evaluation were created to drive the reforms. The implementation and effects of these reforms will also be covered by this evaluation.

⁴² Update on the Collective Action to Improve the Impact of Humanitarian Response in Somalia. 11 July 2023.

⁴³ https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/10/26/powerful-networks-impose-taxes-aid-somalia-its-time-end?utm_source=brevo&utm_campaign=19th%20Newsletter%20-%20January%20Issue_copy&utm_medium=email

2 Evaluation Approach

2.1 Objectives and Scope


32. **Objectives.** As mentioned above, IAHEs generally aim at both promoting learning and strengthening accountability. The IAHE of the response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia mirrors this dual purpose. Its objectives are twofold: First, to provide an independent assessment of the collective response of IASC member agencies in meeting the humanitarian needs of the people in Somalia in 2022–2024. Second, to provide feedback on the implementation of the Humanitarian Country Team’s ongoing reforms.
33. **Thematic focus.** The evaluation covers the collective response of IASC member organizations to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia as laid out in the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plans for 2022 and 2023. The evaluation seeks to inform humanitarian policies and practice at both the country and the global level. Since the most salient issues regarding the humanitarian response in Somalia have already been identified, oftentimes many years ago, the evaluation will focus on identifying where and why progress in addressing these issues has or has not been made. This will create the basis for the evaluation team to develop recommendations together with key stakeholders that take both enablers and obstacles for change into account.
34. **Temporal scope.** This evaluation covers the collective response of IASC member organizations from the run-up to the scale-up activation in 2022 until the time of data collection in early 2024.
35. **Geographic scope.** The evaluation covers the whole of Somalia, including the areas most affected by the recent drought and areas less affected by the drought.

2.2 Intervention Logic

36. **Process.** IAHEs build on a standard “impact pathway” for coordinated humanitarian action.⁴⁴ The evaluation team took this model as a starting point to develop a more focused reconstructed intervention logic for the crisis response in Somalia (Figure 3). To do so, it reviewed the key planning documents for the humanitarian response in 2022 and 2023, the scale-up benchmarks, as well as the Somalia Humanitarian Country Team’s aid diversion action plan. Interviews with key humanitarian stakeholders during the evaluation team’s first mission to Somalia further inform the intervention logic.
37. **Purpose.** The reconstructed intervention logic presents the evaluation team’s understanding of what IASC member organizations sought to achieve through their collective response as well as through the system-wide scale-up for Somalia and what efforts were deemed necessary to improve and scale up the response so that it best supports people affected by the crisis. The intervention logic serves to guide the evaluation process. The evaluation questions refer to the different components of the intervention logic and aim to assess performance at the different results levels.

⁴⁴ UN OCHA. 2018. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Process Guidelines, p. 16.

38. **Narrative.** IASC member organizations have been providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia for three decades, covering all key response sectors including food security, nutrition, protection, WASH, health, education, shelter & NFIs, camp coordination & camp management, logistics & enabling programs. Over time, reviews, evaluations, and lessons learnt exercises have identified issues with the response and made recommendations for improving it. In addition, a system-wide scale-up was declared for Somalia in 2022 because the scale, complexity and urgency of the drought outweighed the capacity of the humanitarian system to respond effectively to the needs of affected people. Taken together, the system's continuous efforts to learn and improve, the scale-up activities and other supporting or hindering factors are intended to improve and scale up the humanitarian response in Somalia. The assumption articulated in existing evaluative materials and in aid worker interviews is that the response will be relevant and adapted to the needs of affected people as IASC members identify appropriate and relevant priorities, react to early warning indicators and provide a timely response and the collective response is accountable to affected people. The assumption is also that a well-coordinated and led response will mobilizes adequate and timely financial and human resources through effective collective advocacy, that it will be based on reliable data, that it will be integrated and link adequately to development efforts. Finally, it is assumed that the response will reach the most vulnerable people in as much as it identifies and addresses the needs of vulnerable groups and the IASC members increase access to hard-to-reach areas through effective security management and the right partners.
39. An improved and scaled-up response, in turn, is intended to lead to better outcomes for affected people, preventing the loss of life, sustaining lives and resilience and reducing risks. However, the scale-up can also have unintended effects such as an increased risk of aid diversion and duplication and increased displacement through the creation of pull factors. As aid diversion was identified as an unintended consequence of the scale-up, the HCT adopted a package of reforms intended to address this issue, which is also subject to this evaluation.

Figure 3: Reconstructed Intervention Logic

Source: Evaluation Team

2.3 Evaluation Questions

40. Based on the evaluation criteria, questions included in the terms of reference for this evaluation, the reconstructed intervention logic, and key issues that have already been identified, the evaluation will explore the following questions and sub-questions:

EQ 1: To what extent was the collective humanitarian response adapted to the needs of affected people and, in particular, the needs of the most vulnerable?

Criterion: Relevance

- 1.1. Relevance: To what extent did IASC members identify appropriate and relevant priorities for the scaled-up response?

1.2. Early action: How well did the IASC members react to early warning indicators, and how timely was the response?

1.3. AAP: To what extent was the collective response accountable to affected people?

EQ 2: To what extent did the IASC members' collective response achieve its objectives and what unintended effects did the response have?

Criterion: Effectiveness

2.1. To what extent did the response contribute to preventing the loss of life?

2.2. To what extent did the response support people to sustain their lives and build resilience?

2.3. To what extent did the response address critical protection needs?

2.4. What unintended effects did the response have?

EQ 3: To what extent did the IASC members' collective response reach the most vulnerable?

Criterion: Coverage

3.1. Inclusion: To what extent did the response identify and address the needs of vulnerable groups (for example of members of minority or marginalized clans, different gender groups and people with disability), and how did this affect the principle of impartiality?

3.2. Access: To what extent did IASC members manage to increase access to hard-to-reach areas, with effective security management and the right partners, and how did this affect the principles of humanity, neutrality and operational independence?

EQ 4: How well coordinated and led was the response and what other factors influenced the quality and scale of the response?

Criteria: Coordination, connectedness

4.1. Advocacy and resource mobilization: How effective were collective efforts to mobilize adequate and timely financial and human resources for the drought response?

4.2. Data: How reliable were data collection and analysis?

4.3. Integrated response: How effective was the implementation of an integrated response?

4.4. Nexus: How well did the humanitarian response link to development efforts and invest in resilience?

4.5. Other factors: What other factors influenced efforts to strengthen the quality of the response?

EQ 5: How did the HCT reforms on aid diversion affect the IASC members' collective response?

5.1. How relevant and appropriate was the HCT action plan to address aid diversion?

5.2. To what extent are agreed measures being implemented?

5.3. What factors support and hinder reform efforts addressing aid diversion?

41. The main differences between this formulation of the evaluation questions and the one contained in the terms of reference for this evaluation are:

- The issues covered through the evaluation questions derive more systematically from the reconstructed intervention logic, covering the effects of the scale-up on the humanitarian response and for affected people as well as the HCT reforms. As a result, the proposed questions do not explicitly address efficiency and they do not explore coherence or compliance with IASC and other priority commitments.
- For other topics deemed critical for influencing the quality and effectiveness of a humanitarian response, the evaluation questions prioritize those emphasized by stakeholders consulted during the inception phase as well as those identified on a recurrent basis as critical for Somalia.

2.4 Stakeholders

42. The evaluation is designed in a way that seeks to maximize the use of findings and uptake of recommendations at both the country and global level. The strategic involvement of relevant stakeholders in the evaluation process is key for achieving this objective. This includes the joint development and refinement of recommendations to ensure they are pertinent and actionable.

43. Table 2 provides an overview of relevant stakeholders and their involvement in the evaluation process.

Table 2: Stakeholder Overview

Country-level stakeholders and their stakes	Involvement in the evaluation
People affected by the crisis in Somalia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The evaluation's recommendations are intended to improve IASC members' responses to humanitarian crises in Somalia and beyond. The lives, livelihoods and dignity of crisis-affected people are directly affected by the quality and magnitude of the response. ➤ Crisis-affected people could use evaluation results to hold humanitarian actors accountable for their behavior. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand the effects of the response and the perceptions, experiences, and preferences of affected people by conducting key informant interviews, a survey, and focus group discussions. • The consultations with affected people will be designed in a human rights and gender sensitive way, seeking to ensure that members of different potentially marginalized groups are appropriately represented and data analyzed and presented in a disaggregated way. • Share evaluation results and planned follow-up actions with affected people through various channels, such as SMS messages and potentially radio programs.
International humanitarian actors, including UN agencies, NGOs, and donors, represented in the Somalia Humanitarian Country Team, led by the DSRSG/RC/HC for Somalia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Can learn from the results of the independent assessment of their collective effort and are responsible for formulating the country-level management response to the evaluation's recommendations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult during the inception phase of the evaluation. • Consult during the data-gathering phase of the evaluation. • Brief regularly about the process and emerging findings. • Involve in the co-development of recommendations. • Provide with separate findings regarding the HCT's reform process.

➤ May be affected by evaluation results in their reputation and ability to mobilize resources.	
Government agencies and local NGOs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Are directly affected by potential reform efforts following on the evaluation's recommendations, especially those relating to localization, international engagement with authorities, links with development actors and activities, and capacity building / empowerment. ➤ Can use evaluation results to hold international aid actors to account or to advocate for changes in their behavior. ➤ May use evaluation results for their own learning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult during the data-gathering phase of the evaluation. • Brief about evaluation findings, recommendations, and planned follow-up actions. • Provide with key findings and recommendations in Somali language.
Development and peace actors in Somalia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Are affected by potential reform efforts following on the evaluation's recommendations, especially those relating to the humanitarian – development – peace nexus. ➤ May use evaluation results for their own learning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult during the data-gathering phase of the evaluation. • Brief about evaluation findings and recommendations. • Potentially involve in the co-development of recommendations.
Global stakeholders	Involvement in the evaluation
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee, its members, subsidiary and associated bodies, led by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Can learn from the results of the evaluation, especially those relating to systemic enablers and barriers, and are responsible for formulating the global management response to the evaluation's recommendations. ➤ May be affected by evaluation results in their reputation and ability to mobilize resources. ➤ May adapt the future timing, focus and use of IAHEs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult during the inception phase to identify priority issues and potential windows for change. • Consult during the data-gathering phase about factors enabling and hindering efforts to address identified issues. • Involve in the co-development of system-wide or global recommendations • Provide with tailor-made collective or individual briefings on key findings and recommendations.
Key donors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Can use the evaluation results for their own learning, e.g. for strategies and resource allocation decisions. ➤ Can play a key role in supporting follow-up to recommendations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult during the inception phase. • Provide with collective or individual briefings on key findings, recommendations, and planned follow-up actions.

2.5 Ethical Considerations

44. The evaluation team will be guided by the [UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation](#) throughout the evaluation process. The inception report, data collection instruments and protocols will be reviewed by an Independent Review Board. Table 3 shows which ethical risks we have identified during the initial phases of the inception period and how we intend to mitigate them.

Table 3: Ethical Risks and Related Mitigation Measures

Ethical risks	Proposed mitigation measures
<p>The evaluation will cover sensitive issues such as aid diversion and the provision of aid to the most vulnerable. Providing information on these issues could put affected people and aid workers at risk of retaliatory measures.</p>	<p>Confidentiality and data protection: The evaluation team will collect only the minimum necessary personal information and always store personal information separately from notes on content. Notes and survey forms will not be shared outside the evaluation team. For electronically stored data, relevant folders will require two-factor authentication to be accessed and have additional password protection. Notes from interviews and focus group discussions, as well as any personal information that may be collected as part of the consultations, will be deleted two years after the completion of the evaluation.</p> <p>Informed consent: Verbal consent will be sought from every participant in the data collection. This will address the purpose of the evaluation, the voluntary nature of participating in it, a description of benefits and potential risks, confidentiality procedures, estimated duration, and (where relevant) permission to record audio or take notes. The research team will share a one-pager summarizing key information about the evaluation and including contact information with global-level interviewees, and a multi-language equivalent with participants of the KIIs and FGDs. The data collection team will enquire whether key informants feel confident that their confidentiality is respected in the chosen setting and means of communication, and adapt those where necessary. All informants consulted on potentially sensitive issues will explicitly be given the choice to opt out of answering the question. Only subjects who are at least 18 years old will be included.</p>
<p>The security situation in Somalia is volatile and can pose risks to individuals involved in collecting data for the evaluation.</p>	<p>The international team members will strictly adhere to UN security protocols.</p> <p>The evaluation team leader will ensure that all individuals involved in data collection feel adequately informed about the security situation and can opt out of certain missions if they have concerns. All individuals involved in data collection will follow Raagsan's Code of Conduct, which is an integral part of the data collection training and signed by all staff.</p> <p>Data collection activities will be aborted in case any security risks for participants become known to the evaluation team.</p>
<p>The remote coordination of parts of the evaluation due to security considerations can reinforce historical power imbalances.</p>	<p>As Bakonyi and Chonka (2023: 20) point out, "Somalia presents a particularly complicated environment for attempts to destabilize the power imbalances that characterize research on the continent. At the same time, the need for this here is particularly acute, considering... the high stakes of knowledge production."</p> <p>Conducting field research raises additional ethical challenges. The team will reflect on these challenges throughout and address them openly in discussions with research partners. For field research involving vulnerable people, we will carefully weigh whether/what kind of first-hand testimony is indeed crucial for the evaluation question at hand, or whether secondary data is available that can be used instead. Where it is considered crucial, the team will follow</p>

	good ethical practice as outlined, e.g., by Cronin-Furman & Lake (2018). ⁴⁵
Participating in the data collection may raise affected individuals' expectations of receiving additional aid.	Information materials and introductory components for consent forms will emphasize that data is being collected for an evaluation exercise and that the data collected is not intended to inform future aid allocations. The evaluation team will be equipped with general information on participants can request more information about available aid, if they want to.
Interviewees or focus group discussion participants may raise protection concerns or share examples of abuse/mistreatment with researchers	Researchers will be trained to handle such cases while avoiding the risk of re-traumatizing interviewees. They will not probe further on sensitive/traumatic issues but refer affected people to protection experts. The exact referral procedures will be tailored to the specific location and coordination structure, to be discussed with members of the research team and the protection cluster during the inception country visit. The evaluation team will also use available channels to report any misconduct of UN staff members or partners reported to the team.
Somalia is an environment characterized by frequent needs assessments as well as learning and evaluation exercises. This creates the risk of interview and survey fatigue both among aid workers and affected people.	For all data collection, the evaluation team will make a special effort to first collect and analyze existing data and to focus primary data collection on data gaps. The cooperation of IASC member organizations (especially of members of the Evaluation Management Group) will be required to ensure that as much existing data as possible is made available to the evaluation team. The team will focus on qualitative methods with select key informants rather than a large-N population survey. The team will also coordinate the data collection with assessment working groups and other key actors, to avoid duplication and/or over-consultation of specific locations. For affected people, data collectors will be instructed to stress the voluntary nature of participation and that a decision not to participate in data collection will not have any negative effects on their likelihood to receive aid. Participants in focus group discussions will receive a transport allowance, in line with local standards. Survey fatigue is often closely related to never hearing back or seeing any change in response to feedback provided. The evaluation team will thus offer every individual consulted the possibility to hear back about the findings of the evaluation via SMS/phone, and it will explore wider efforts to communicate back findings via radio and the existing community engagement activities of aid agencies (potentially after a management matrix has been approved by key stakeholders). As regards interviews with aid workers, the evaluation team will coordinate closely with any other evaluation exercises ongoing in parallel (such as the planned evaluation exercises by WFP and UNHCR) and focus its efforts on ensuring that evaluation results will be used.

⁴⁵ Cronin-Furman K, Lake M. Ethics Abroad: Fieldwork in Fragile and Violent Contexts. *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 2018;51(3):607-614. doi:10.1017/S1049096518000379

2.6 Gender and Inclusiveness

45. In Somalia, a range of factors are known to drive vulnerabilities. Due to structural gender inequality, one such key factor is gender.⁴⁶ Other important factors include belonging to a minority clan or ethnic group, being elderly, being (multiply) displaced, living with disabilities, and living in hard-to-reach areas.
46. The evaluation focuses on how relevant, appropriate, and effective the response was for the most vulnerable. The following evaluation features will help ensure that the evaluation applies a gender lens in all phases of the evaluation, in line with the UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation:
 - As part of the document review, the evaluation team will explore to what extent planning, monitoring, and reporting documents reflect relevant normative frameworks such as the UN System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and the IASC policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls in Humanitarian Action, including to what extent gender analysis influenced the response design.
 - Secondary data analysis will be disaggregated by gender and other drivers of vulnerability as much as the available data permits.
 - The evaluation will include an assessment of the achievements and limitations of the Gender Theme Group in Somalia.
 - Consultations with key informants and affected people will aim to achieve a gender balance among respondents and the sampling is designed to ensure sufficient coverage of minority groups.
 - The evaluation team will conduct separate focus group discussions for women and men.
 - Protocols for interviews and focus group discussions will cover issues related to gender and inclusiveness in ways that minimize risks for participants and members of the evaluation team.
 - The evaluation team consists of two female and one male core team members. Several team members have thematic expertise on gender. Raagsan team members involved in field data collection have been trained on gender.

⁴⁶ Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023, p. 30.

3 Methodology


3.1 Approach

47. The evaluation team uses an evaluation design focused on maximizing the use of evaluation results. Due to this utilization-focused approach, the evaluation team emphasizes consultation with key stakeholders at global and country level during the design phase to identify their interests and potential use cases. In addition, the research questions focus on identifying factors that have enabled or inhibited reform efforts in the past to enable recommendations addressing these factors. Key stakeholders will also be involved in the formulation or refinement of recommendations to ensure they are actionable.
48. As an ex-post evaluation, the evaluation design is non-experimental: For understandable ethical reasons, no control groups not receiving humanitarian assistance despite similar need and exposure profiles were defined when the response was implemented. During the inception phase, no panel datasets with sufficient data quality and detail to allow for quasi-experimental analysis approaches were identified.

3.2 Method Mix

49. To answer the evaluation questions, the team will rely on the following mix of quantitative and qualitative methods (see
50. Figure 4). The combination of sources, data collection methods, and data analysis methods will allow for method and source triangulation. The evaluation matrix which describes the criteria, indicators, sources and means of verification for each evaluation question and sub-question is available in Annex C.

Figure 4: Method Overview



Source: Evaluation team

3.3 Stakeholder Interviews

51. During the inception phase, the evaluation team conducted exploratory interviews with 110 key stakeholders at sub-national, national, regional and global level to validate the evaluation's focus and approach. As part of these interviews, stakeholders provided their initial analysis of what worked well in the scale-up and the wider humanitarian response, and what did not work well; what factors affected the humanitarian system's performance; to what extent the package of reforms initiated by the Humanitarian Country Team in 2023 are relevant and appropriate for addressing inefficiencies and accountability deficits; and what issues are most relevant in Somalia and at global level.
52. During the implementation phase, the evaluation team will conduct additional key informant interviews to explore the evaluation questions in greater detail. Depending on the background and experience of the interviewee, interviews conducted during the implementation phase will focus in on different aspects relating to the response as detailed in the evaluation matrix in Annex C. The team will conduct interviews remotely and in person, focusing on agency headquarters, Nairobi, Mogadishu, as well as the core sub-national humanitarian operational hubs in Somalia.
53. In line with the United Nations Evaluation Group's norms and standards for evaluation,⁴⁷ the evaluation team will take great care to engage appropriately and respectfully with participants in evaluation processes and implement measures to avoid harm to them. Interviewees will be asked to comment on their own organization's performance as well as on that of others. Critical comments from identifiable individuals or organizations create risks for that person's or organization's reputation, job security/funding, and in extreme cases even personal freedom. To mitigate these risks, all interviews are conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Only evaluation team members will be present during evaluation interviews. Since it is very difficult, and in some cases impossible, to anonymize interview data, interview notes will not be shared outside the evaluation team.
54. Interviews conducted during the inception or implementation phases will cover the following stakeholder groups:
 - Current and former staff working with UN agencies, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement (including Emergency Directors and country desk staff at the global and/or regional levels); country and regional managers in Somalia (including current and past UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators, members of the Humanitarian Country Team, cluster coordinators, and pooled fund managers); as well as teams responsible for monitoring and evaluation and communicating with communities;
 - Government representatives and relevant line ministries responsible for humanitarian and development planning at the national and federal levels in the regions studied in this evaluation;
 - Somali NGOs and civil society representatives, as well as key diaspora organizations;
 - Key donors at the country/regional level;

⁴⁷ United Nations Evaluation Group (2016). Norms and Standards for Evaluation. New York: UNEG.

- Representatives of selected development organizations engaged in resilience/nexus programming, including development and peace actors.

3.4 Document Review

55. In addition to the literature studied during the inception phase (see Annex B), the team will systematically review documents covering the period from the run-up to the scale-up declaration until the time of data collection, including:
- Existing inter-agency and agency-specific monitoring and evaluation reports, with a particular emphasis on reports reflecting the opinions of affected people. Evaluation reports and reviews covering the response before the activation of the system-wide scale-up will help to establish a baseline against which to review progress on critical issues;
 - Reports on needs and the situation of crisis affected people (e.g. needs assessments, IPC data, mortality and malnutrition data, data relating to socio-economic and protection situation of crisis-affected people) and analyses relating to context, gender, and conflict sensitivity, as well existing perception data from affected people (collected by, e.g., REACH, Ground Truth Solutions);
 - Feedback and complaints reports;
 - International, national, and regional policy and planning documents informing the humanitarian response;
 - Meeting minutes of the Humanitarian Country Team and other relevant coordination bodies;
 - Donor strategies and reports (including those of the Somalia Humanitarian Fund), as well as funding data (FTS);
 - Thematic reports and studies on topics including the “IDP Economy” and the role of so-called gatekeepers in it, minority inclusion and clan dynamics, and diversion and corruption;
 - HCT reform documentation and action plan to address post-distribution aid diversion.

3.5 Primary Data Collection from Affected People

56. As mentioned under the ethical considerations above, the evaluation team is cognizant of the ethical challenges involved in field research in fragile and violent contexts and of the particular challenges related to remote research coordination and survey fatigue in Somalia. Throughout the inception phase, we have carefully weighted whether/what kind of first-hand testimony is indeed crucial for the evaluation questions at hand, and examined what secondary data is available that can be used instead. We have further explored the options and constraints for gathering reliable primary data from affected communities.
57. Our desk review and interviews with experienced Somali researchers have shown several challenges. “Aid-related research in Somalia has produced interview fatigue and instrumentalist attitudes towards research by respondents, as donors and aid agencies continue to duplicate data collection.”⁴⁸ The political economy of data collection in Somalia is such that “at each link [in the contracting chain], pretty much everyone is incentivized to report positive information and to not report or deny negative information.”⁴⁹ When GTS

⁴⁸ Wasuge, M.; Musa, A.M.; Hagmann, T. (2021: 2): Who owns data in Somalia? Somali Public Agenda.

⁴⁹ Centre for Humanitarian Change (2023). Corruption and Aid Diversion in International Aid in Somalia. Discussion Paper.

(2023) asked community members about barriers to providing feedback, FGD participants described a “culture of fear”, where feedback is stifled for fear of safety and undermining aid receiving prospects.⁵⁰ Available evidence points to enormous challenges particularly for large-scale, anonymous surveys, especially where they don’t concern one specific intervention with validated beneficiaries of said intervention, but the general (affected) population and their views about aid in general. In comparison, qualitative approaches have produced more reliable information where they managed to develop trust amongst participants and create an open space for discussion. As one FGD participant in a recent study described it after a long exchange with female IDPs about the role of gatekeepers: “We are now forced to say what we’ve been hiding for a long time”.⁵¹ Qualitative approaches also allow for more rigorous quality control throughout the data collection process, as conversations are typically recorded or transcribed and provide more context to judge the information provided.

58. Where first-hand testimony from affected populations is considered crucial to understand the perspective of affected people, the evaluation will therefore rely heavily on qualitative data collection with a carefully selected range of key informants and focus group discussions. We will combine this with a very brief, standardized survey that both key informants and focus group participants will be asked to participate in. To optimize the experience for respondents, standardized survey questions will be asked alongside more open questions in both the KII and FGD instruments. All primary data collection from affected communities will be implemented by Raagsan and led by Noura Mahmoud.
59. **Selection of locations.** To ensure a balanced and comprehensive understanding of the situation across drought-affected communities in Somalia, our sample will cover 13 locations in total, chosen based on a range of factors. Priority is given to districts identified in the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan for a multi-sectoral response, ensuring alignment with broader humanitarian priorities. The sample will not be limited to those, however, but extend to some areas not prioritized in the 2023 HRP with high levels of need during 2022/23, as indicated by the number of people in need and the severity of needs (MSNA). Additionally, the percentage of multi-cluster reach in 2023, as reported by the ICCG/OCHA, is factored into the selection process, to allow for a diversity in humanitarian presence experienced during the drought. We also include access severity, ranging from 1 (very little constraint) to 4 (extremely constrained), to ensure that we cover a diverse range of accessibility conditions. Finally, geographic diversity is a key consideration; we aim to include all states and a mix of rural and urban settings. A tentative list of locations is shown below.

State	District	State	District
Banadir	Banadir	Disputed Area	Laas Caanood
South West	Baidoa	Galmudug	Hobyo
Somaliland	Hargeysa	South West	Xudur
Hirshabelle	Balcad	South West	Waaajid
Somaliland	Burco	Puntland	Burtinle
South West	Buur Hakaba	Jubaland	Afmadow

⁵⁰ GTS (2023): Overcoming power imbalances: Community recommendations for breaking the cycle. Cash Barometer.

⁵¹ Majid, N. & Adan, G. (2024). The Role of Gatekeepers in Somalia. Draft Final Report, February 2024.

60. **Selection of key informants.** For each location, key informants will be selected for their specialized knowledge and unique perspectives on the drought response in their community. To combine various points of view that together paint a comprehensive picture of the community perspective, we will select 1-2 informants from the following groups, adding up to a total of at least $n_{KI}=117$: Clan Elders from the Majority Clan; Clan Elders from Minority/Marginalized Clan; Representatives of the business community (small and medium businesses); Religious Leaders; Representatives of the Local Authority; Community / Camp Leaders; Local NGOs; other civil society groups such as Women or Youth groups, or groups representing the interests of people with disability.
61. Although it can be challenging to group participants by clan, Raagsan researchers address this by visiting the neighborhoods where minority or marginalized clan groups reside. Their local field researchers, who are familiar with the districts and villages, assist in the selection process and coordinate with camp/community leaders as needed. Raagsan considers clan affiliation in its hiring procedures and maintains a roster of researchers that allows making sure the researchers are of the same clan as the groups we are interested in for this evaluation, including minority clans.
62. **Focus group discussions.** Participants for FGDs will be identified in the same locations as listed above and selected based on chain-referral (sometimes called “snowball sampling”), a distinct method of convenience sampling which is considered particularly useful in conducting research in marginalized societies and conflict settings.⁵² The sample for FGDs will add up to at least $n_{FGD}=195$.
63. The evaluation team will endeavor to hold focus group discussions without the presence of community leaders to ensure that community members can express themselves more freely. Since it is not possible to ensure confidentiality in a group discussion setting, the evaluation team will stress in the introduction that participants should only comment on issues they feel comfortable addressing.
64. **Standardized survey.** In addition to the open questions discussed in key informant interviews and FGDs, all participants ($n_{combined}=312$) will be asked to respond to a range of standardized survey questions. Answers will be recorded anonymously on handheld digital devices and, immediately upon completion of the relevant round of interviews, transmitted into an electronic database where they will be stored in an encrypted, password-protected file. Survey results will be disaggregated according to relevant categories, including gender, age groups, displacement status, clan affiliation (minority vs. non-minority), state and location (rural vs. urban), whether people have received assistance, and whether people have disabilities or chronic illnesses.
65. **Entry procedures.** The project Team Lead drafts letters of request to conduct research which are either emailed, taken in person by the Field Coordinator, or sent to Raagsan field staff who reside in the districts concerned. The bearers of the letters then approach the local administration with locations where the data collection is to be conducted. The letters clearly outline the purpose of the research, the scope, respondent categories, risks and benefits of participation, and expected outputs of the evaluation. After getting consent to

⁵² Cohen, N. & Arieli, T. (2011). Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges and snowball sampling. *Journal of Peace Research*, 8/4, pp. 423-435.

conduct the data collection from the district authorities, Raagsan staff then proceed to get approval from community leaders, typically verbally. Copies of the approved letters might be provided to those that request it. In addition, the evaluation team may draw on support from aid agencies and coordinate with their focal points on the ground, so that they can attest to and confirm the reason of the visit and evaluation in their specific area.

66. **Security protocol.** Raagsan will follow a security protocol drafted specifically for this research and revised at regular intervals.
67. **Language.** The data collection instruments will be developed in English and then translated to the relevant dialects, orally in the case of dialects such as Af Maay and Af Maxa tiri.
68. **Researcher selection.** Raagsan relies on a roster of experienced field researchers who have been selected and trained over several years. They will receive specific training for the data collection for this evaluation.
69. **Protection of people consulted and researcher training.** The team will use the following set of measures to protect participants from harm:
 - Data collection will be anonymous and confidential, and respondents' names will not be noted.
 - Where respondents choose to provide their phone number in order to receive an update about the evaluation findings, this number will be stored separately from their responses or any personal data.
 - An evaluation team member will train researchers in all regions in protection-sensitive interviewing techniques and their responsibilities toward the people consulted. The training will be based on Raagsan's Field Data Collection Protocol, Code of Conduct, and Data Protection guides.
 - To avoid retaliation from community representatives against vulnerable groups due to suspicions surrounding the data collection, researchers will explain to community leaders in detail the objectives, method, and questions asked.
 - Every participant will be offered a leaflet in the local language explaining the background to the evaluation and including the responsible evaluation team member's phone number to call in case of complaints about the behavior of an enumerator.
 - In case of protection concerns, researchers will follow the agreed-upon referral procedures, which will be determined together with the protection cluster ahead of data collection.
70. **Data analysis.** The data analysis pursues three aims. First, it seeks to identify key perceptions and recommendations based on the feedback from affected people and community representatives/key informants. Second, it seeks to map and analyze trends in data. Third, the analysis hopes to establish whether plausible correlations between the assistance provided and people's well-being and livelihoods can be established.
71. **Qualitative analysis.** For qualitative data from interviews and focus group discussions, we will apply thematic analysis, i.e. identify and analyze patterns (themes) within the data. We will begin by reviewing interview and focus group transcripts to familiarize ourselves with the data. Next, the data will be coded, assigning labels to segments relevant to the evaluation questions. These codes will be grouped into themes that capture important aspects of the data in relation to the evaluation's objectives. Themes will be reviewed by separate members of the evaluation team and refined to ensure they accurately reflect the dataset and each group included in the consultations. This will provide a comprehensive

understanding of participant experiences and perspectives, capturing common patterns as well as nuances and complexities within the data.

72. **Analytical statistics.** Concerning the planned survey questions, we will analyze patterns in reported perceptions according to gender, age, displacement status, clan affiliation, location, as well as disability.
73. **Descriptive statistics.** The evaluation team will use descriptive statistical methods to analyze data drawn from needs assessments; early warning assessments; agency, cluster, OCHA, and government data on assistance delivered; and available government and World Bank statistics on key economic indicators, as well as health and mortality data. The analysis will aim to:
 - Map identified needs, defined priorities, and available data on assistance provided;
 - Analyze trends, e.g., in poverty, economic growth, health, excess mortality, between the period leading up to the scale-up and today;
 - Explore the plausibility of and triangulate between different datasets, in particular needs assessment data, data on aid delivered and people reached, existing perception data, and post-distribution monitoring data.
74. If data is available in sufficient detail (e.g., geographic breakdowns at district levels), analytical statistical methods will be used to analyze the effects of assistance on the lives and resilience of drought-affected people. The first approach used will be a linear regression model analyzing which factors influence key indicators for the impact of droughts, namely the number of children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admitted to treatment centers and the number of children who drop out of school. Covariates used in this analysis will include the type and level of humanitarian assistance provided, national health expenditures in the area, national education expenditures in the area, access to road infrastructure, and the number of beneficiaries enrolled in the productive safety net program.
75. **Access to data.** To get access to data, the evaluation team has already started reaching out to UN agencies and clusters/sectors, and will further approach national actors at the central and regional levels, line ministries, and research organizations. Support from the HCT and ICCG will be necessary to access all the available data.

3.6 Sequencing and Triangulation

76. The evaluation sequences different phases of data collection and analysis to enable different data collection and analysis tools to build on emerging insights and findings:
 - During the inception phase, the team collected the initial analysis of key stakeholders on what worked well in the scale-up and the wider humanitarian response, and what did not work well; what factors affected the humanitarian system's performance; and to what extent the package of reforms initiated by the Humanitarian Country Team in 2023 are relevant and appropriate for addressing inefficiencies and accountability deficits. This helped the evaluation team to narrow the focus of the evaluation, while already providing valuable information related to some evaluation questions. The data collection tools presented in this inception report are designed to explore the evaluation questions in greater detail.

- In the period after the inception country visit, the key informant interviews and focus group discussions with affected communities will be piloted, additional key informant interviews with aid workers focusing on aid workers who were deployed to Somalia during the scale up, as well as aid workers working at headquarters level will be held, and the quantitative data analysis will be conducted.
 - During the second country visit, tentatively planned for early July, the evaluation team will explore the evaluation questions in greater detail. An analysis of available findings from the key informant interviews and focus group discussions with affected people will inform the focus of this data gathering stage.
 - During the analysis, recommendation development, and reporting phase, the evaluation team will hold an internal analysis retreat to identify the main findings. Based on those, the team will hold consultations with country-level and global stakeholders to develop recommendations, before summarizing everything in an evaluation report.
 - The dissemination phase will include another country visit to allow for targeted workshops with and presentations to key stakeholders. It will also include the communication of findings back to affected communities via the key informants and potentially other channels such as SMS, radio, posters/leaflets, and via the existing community consultation processes of aid agencies where feasible.
77. The variety of data collection and analysis tools used will allow for triangulation. Triangulating between different sources, the evaluation team will, for example, compare information provided by aid workers to information provided by affected people and information provided by government officials, and compare information provided by female and male respondents. Triangulating across both sources and methods as well, the evaluation team will, for example, compare the analysis of response monitoring data to reports on the type, frequency, and quantity of assistance received to be provided through the primary data collection with affected communities and other available assessments.
78. The variety of data collection and analysis tools used will also allow the team to collect complementary information. For example, the evaluation team will complement data on the perceived quality of the assistance provided from affected people with quantitative data on the effects of the assistance (within the constraints of available data).

3.7 Limitations and Mitigation Measures

79. The evaluation team proposes the methodology outlined above as the best option to address the questions outlined in the terms of reference for this evaluation within given time and budget constraints. However, the proposed methodology includes limitations. First and foremost, the collection of primary data is limited to a one-off effort, which does not allow for a pre- vs. post-intervention comparison. Particularly regarding questions on the effects and effectiveness of the response, the analysis relies heavily on existing data, which can be limited in terms of availability, accessibility, and quality. The primary perception data from key informants and affected people will be essential, but can have its own limitations, especially where it is based on people's memory of past events. Second, the evaluation covers the humanitarian response in a single country and does not include comparisons to other emergency contexts. The evaluation team's ability to extrapolate findings and transfer conclusions to other contexts will therefore be limited. Table 4 provides an overview of specific limitations and proposed mitigation measures.

Table 4: Limitations and Mitigation Measures

Limitations	Mitigation Measures
Data reliability. Aid workers interviewed during the inception phase questioned the reliability of needs data.	The team will conduct a comparative analysis of different early warning and needs assessment data to judge the validity of available data, and use the datasets judged to be most accurate for analyses.
Data accessibility and availability. Data required for the analysis may not exist and/or the evaluation team may not be given access to relevant data.	Members of the Management Group are committed to supporting the team's efforts to get access to data. Where relevant data is not available, the evaluation team will, as far as possible, use proxy indicators.
Access and security. The final sample will be constrained by some of the same access constraints that the response at large is also facing, namely when it comes to areas currently under al-Shabaab control or experiencing violent conflict.	The team will rely on enumerators embedded in affected communities and can train and manage them remotely if needed. There is an option to conduct phone interviews with people in non-accessible areas, provided the evaluation team gets access to relevant phone numbers, or to interview people when they come out of inaccessible areas for work or other limited periods of time.
Limited institutional memory. Inception phase interviewees identified high staff turnover as an issue in Somalia. The evaluation team therefore expects limited institutional memory covering the period under review, as well as limits to people's access to historical response data.	The team seeks to identify key stakeholders with a long track record of working in Somalia, including national staff and aid workers, and will conduct interviews with aid workers who no longer work in Somalia.
Limited willingness to discuss critical issues, such as aid diversion. Due to the sensitivity and confidentiality of some of the issues covered by this evaluation, aid workers, affected people, and potentially government and local authority representatives may not dare to speak openly or voice critical opinions.	The team will communicate its strict confidentiality rules and data protection mechanisms to all interviewees. All interviews will be anonymous. Former aid workers who no longer work in Somalia will be consulted.
Bias linked to non-attribution of findings to individual interviewees or organizations. Interview data will be analyzed by the evaluation team alone and results will be presented without attributing findings to individual interviewees or organizations. Findings derived from interviews could therefore be affected by any biases held by the evaluation team.	Interview data will be triangulated with information derived from other sources and through other measures. The evaluation team will conduct data interpretation and analysis jointly to compensate for the potential bias of any individual team member. The team is composed of individuals with different backgrounds (national and international team members, team members with different academic backgrounds). When selecting team members, great weight was given to them not having any conflicts of interests and to having a high level of personal and professional integrity.

3.8

3.9 Evaluability Assessment

80. The evaluation team conducted a light evaluability assessment as part of the inception phase of the evaluation. The process involved the reconstruction of an intervention logic, based on stakeholder consultations and interviews, a review of available data, and a preliminary data quality check with regards to the response data reported by clusters.
81. One notable deviation from the originally planned approach based on the evaluability assessment concerns the evaluation of the response from the perspective of affected communities. Due to the challenges and constraints detailed in the previous section, the team opts for a more targeted and more qualitative approach to understand their perspective.
82. Another deviation lies in the approach to the HCT reforms and the initially planned learning paper on the topic. The inception phase showed that it is not possible to assess the effects of the reform efforts on the scale-up, as they were agreed upon later and are outside the time frame of the scale-up. Also, it became clear that it is too early to assess reform effects. Therefore, the main purpose of the proposed learning process on the HCT reforms (Annex I) is now to provide the humanitarian leadership in Somalia with real-time feedback on where the reform efforts stand and what next steps could be prioritized at country and global / headquarters levels. Instead of one report, feedback will be provided to the HCT through short, written inputs in presentation or Word-format, as well as through discussions / briefings.
83. Overall, the evaluability assessment concludes that the collective response to the drought in Somalia is evaluable in principle; that key (albeit not all) aspects are evaluable in practice; and that the evaluation can reasonably be expected to be useful and practicable.
 - Evaluability in principle: Based on document review and stakeholder interviews, the evaluation team was able to reconstruct a plausible intervention logic that serves as the basis for defining the evaluation questions (Figure 3).
 - Evaluability in practice: As detailed in the evaluation matrix, a broad range of information sources informing the evaluation questions is expected to be available. The availability of some important sources remains to be confirmed, such as:
 - WHO / academic data on excess mortality during including retrospective estimates of mortality in 2023 (currently being finalized);
 - The (confidential) Report to the Secretary-General on Post-Delivery Aid Diversion in Somalia (2023);
 - CFM data from IASC member agencies and aggregate CFM data;
 - Funding data from IASC member agencies data on corporate funds mobilized;
 - Staffing data from IASC member agencies incl. cluster leads to document human resource mobilization;
 - UNDSS and agency data on staffing, on security incidents and requests sought/granted;
 - Data on SHF eligibility criteria, applications, funding decisions;
 - Agency reports on implementation partners (PDM, TPM, other reports);
 - Somalia Response Gap Analysis for 2022 (see 2023 data [here](#))

- Expected utility and practicality of the evaluation: While the timing of the evaluation has been criticized, and poses challenges related to recall-bias and availability of key informants, key stakeholders such as humanitarian leadership in Somalia as well as important global stakeholders have expressed a keen interest in the evaluation. The foreseen learning process on the HCT reforms is intended to further add to the utility of the evaluation.

4 Evaluation Organization and Conduct

4.1 Evaluation Management and Team

84. The Somalia IAHE will be conducted by a team of independent external experts under the guidance and supervision of the **IAHE Management Group**. The Management Group includes ICVA, IOM, OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, WFP, and WHO. The group will be responsible for managing the evaluation, including providing quality control, safeguarding the independence of the evaluation process, taking all major process decisions, supporting dissemination and uptake, and serving as a point of contact for their organizations. The Management Group is chaired by OCHA's Evaluation Manager, who will be the main point of contact for the evaluation and ensure day-to-day support and consistency throughout the evaluation process.
85. Members of the Somalia Humanitarian Country Team are invited to comment on the draft inception report. The Management Group for the evaluation provides guidance and quality control and approves the final version of the inception report. The Somalia Humanitarian Country Team will help ensure the relevance, credibility, and utility of the evaluation. It will help facilitate evaluation planning and data collection, review draft documents, participate in briefings and validation workshops, and help prepare the country-level management response.
86. The core evaluation team consists of three members: Julia Steets, Elias Sagmeister, and Noura Mahmoud Ahmed.
87. Table 5 provides an overview of the team members and their responsibilities. To strengthen quality assurance, the evaluation team will also engage Ground Truth Solutions for statistical and evaluation peer review. GPPI's communications team will support the evaluation by providing visualization and layout support, as well as English-native-speaker editing of all key products of the evaluation.

Table 5: Evaluation Team Roles and Responsibilities

Team member and role	Responsibilities
Julia Steets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Evaluation Team Leader ➤ Director of GPPI ➤ >18 years of experience with humanitarian evaluations ➤ Evaluation and humanitarian reform expert 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsible for the overall design and quality of the evaluation • Main counterpart for the Evaluation Manager and the Management Group • Responsible for leading qualitative data gathering and analysis, evaluation team processes, and dissemination efforts
Elias Sagmeister <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Deputy Team Leader ➤ Non-Resident Fellow at GPPI ➤ >13 years of experience with humanitarian evaluations ➤ Methods and affected people consultation expert 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead for methodology design • Main counterpart for the Raagsan team • Alternate counterpart for the Evaluation Manager and the Management Group
Noura Mahmoud Ahmed <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Senior Evaluator and Raagsan Evaluation Team Lead ➤ Research Coordinator at Raagsan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsible for coordinating and quality assurance of field data collection • Contributor to analysis, report writing, and dissemination

➤ 7 years of experience	• Lead for dissemination to affected people
➤ Gender and inclusion expert	

4.2 Evaluation Deliverables and Timeline

88. Table 6 provides an overview of the evaluation's main deliverables and the associated timeline. Please see Annex H for the field workplan.

Table 6: Evaluation Deliverables and Timeline

Deliverable	Timeline (all 2024)
Inception briefing Management Group	March 18
Draft Inception Report for comments and ethical clearance	April 8
Discussion of draft Inception Report with Management Group	April 17
HCT process briefing	April 17
Management Group comments on Draft Inception Report	April 8–19
Inception mission to Nairobi, Mogadishu, Baidoa, Garowe, Banadir	April 24–May 9
HCT briefing	April 30
HCT comments on draft inception report	April 26–10 May
Final Inception Report for clearance by MG	Week 21
Primary data collection from affected people and key informants	Weeks 22–30
Short written input for learning process on HCT reforms to HCT and MG	Week 27
HCT comments on written input on HCT reforms	Weeks 28–29
Data collection mission to Mogadishu, and two field locations, including HCT-ICCG briefing/workshop	Weeks 29–20
Internal analysis workshop (Nairobi)	Week 33
Updated written input on HCT reforms to HCT and MG	Week 38
Draft Evaluation Report	Week 38
Management Group comments on Draft Evaluation Report and revisions	Weeks 38–39
HCT, OPAG and EDG comments on revised Evaluation Report and revisions	Weeks 40–41
Revised Evaluation Report shared with Steering Group and revisions	Weeks 42 - 43
Learning and dissemination mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu	September– October
Final Evaluation Report	Week 44
Dissemination briefings, workshops, and dissemination to affected people	October–November

4.3 Dissemination and Uptake

89. The evaluation team, with the support of the Management Group and the Evaluation Manager, plans to take the following steps and measures to maximize the use of evaluation findings and uptake of recommendations at the country and global levels:
- During the inception phase, the evaluation team has consulted stakeholders who are able to influence decisions on reforms at both the country and global level with a view to identifying potential windows for change that could be supported by evaluation findings and recommendations. Consulted stakeholders include decision-makers in key IASC member organizations, major donors, as well as leading HCT members.
 - The evaluation team will provide influential stakeholders, including members of the HCT, the Management Group, and other stakeholders consulted during the inception phase, with briefings and presentations on emerging findings following the inception and the data collection missions.
 - The evaluation team will present emerging findings regarding the HCT reforms in Somalia in separate short written products. The team will draft the first input before the

data collection mission in July and discuss relevant lessons during a learning workshop with the HCT as part of the data collection mission.

- Workshops with members of the HCT and the Management Group will be held to discuss the findings outlined in the draft Evaluation Report and to jointly further develop the recommendations. The evaluation team will also offer briefings to IASC associated bodies such as the Deputies' Forum, EDG and OPAG as well as targeted in-person and remote briefings to other key stakeholders, such as the management of IASC member organizations and key donors.
- The Evaluation Report will include a stand-alone summary, as well as infographics. It will be disseminated to all interviewed stakeholders via e-mail, phone, or in-person, presented at relevant fora, and posted on relevant learning platforms. The summary will be translated into Somali to strengthen dissemination among local and government stakeholders.
- Evaluation results and agreed follow-up actions to implement recommendations will be disseminated to affected people in Somalia via SMS messages with pictorial illustrations for people who participated in the data collection and potentially via radio programs.

4.4 Quality Assurance

90. GPPi conforms to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) standards, the OECD/DAC quality standards, and the Evaluation Quality Proforma of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), of which GPPi is a member. We are committed to the principles of quality, integrity, and learning, and we comply with the UN Ethical Guidelines as well as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Guidance for Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations. For the sub-question relating to the humanitarian principles, we will pilot UNEG guidance on reflecting humanitarian principles in evaluation.
91. To ensure the high quality of the Somalia Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation, GPPi will use the following quality assurance process:
 - **Close teamwork.** The evaluation team consists of a small core team. The evaluation workplan includes frequent, dedicated opportunities for the team to reflect jointly on the process and the findings.
 - **Early planning.** The evaluation team plans all the steps of the evaluation early and assures quality through timely feedback and guidance from the team leader on early drafts of the outputs prepared by team members. The timeline includes buffers in case one of the deliverables requires additional, initially unforeseen work to live up to our high-quality standards. The team is prepared to invest additional effort in such cases.
 - **Close communication with evaluation management.** The evaluation team leader will remain in close communication with the evaluation Management Group, including with regard to project and mission planning. This ensures that the priorities the team has set reflect the interests of key stakeholders including the evaluation Management Group. In so doing, the team guarantees that the evaluation findings are independent and reflect only the evidence collected.
 - **Peer review.** Key deliverables will undergo a rigorous peer review process. This includes internal peer review through GPPi colleagues not involved in the evaluation, as well as peer review for the affected people consultations by Ground Truth Solutions.
 - **Copyediting.** All products and public outputs will be copyedited by a professional, native-English-speaking editor.

Annexes

Annex A: List of People Consulted

Name	Position	Organisation
Abdiaziz Mohamed Kahiye	Membership & Communications Officer	Somali NGO Consortium
Abdifatah Jama	Regional Public Health Officer - Galka'yo	WHO
Abdikadir Issa Farah	Director	Formal Education Network of Private Schools
Abdikani	Health and Nutrition Manager	MARDO
Abdikarim Abdulle	Operations	Qatar Red Crescent
Abdulahi Mohammed Ibrahim	Nutrition Cluster Focal Point Banadir	WFP
Aden Abdulahi	Protection Cluster Focal Point Banadir	UNHCR
Aida Mengistu	Deputy Head	Peer to Peer Project
Ajayi Ayobamidele	Emergency Coordinator	UNFPA
Alice Obrecht	Head of Research and Impact	ALNAP
Anna McMahon	Senior Humanitarian Adviser	USAID BHA
Anne-Kathrin Landherr	Logistics Cluster Coordinator	WFP
Audrey Crawford	Country Director	DRC
Awil Ibrahim	Program Coordinator Hirshabelle	Islamic Relief
Axmad Naxar Siciid Awnuur	Director General	MOHADMA
Axmed Siciid Qaloombi	Deputy Minister	MOHADMA
Ayanle Awil Hassan	Food Security Cluster Co-Chair - Garowe	Somali Women's Association
Baseme Kullimushi	Senior Operations Coordinator	UNHCR
Begna Edo	WASH Cluster Coordinator	UNICEF
Birke Herzbruch	Head of Fragile and Conflict Affected States	Trócaire/ICVA
Biruk Kebede Abetew	Inter-Cluster Coordination Unit	UN OCHA
Blaise Kabongo Mujika	Deputy Head of Office	UN OCHA
Brian Ross	Head, Risk & Compliance	WFP
Christoph Oberlack	UN-World Bank Liaison Officer	World Bank
Christopher Rumens	Risk Management Unit	DSRSG/RC/HC Office
Clare Mbizule	Head, Risk Management Unit	DSRSG/RC/HC Office
Crispen Rukasha	Head of Office	UN OCHA
Daniel Jason Howard	Risk Management Unit	DSRSG/RC/HC Office
Daud Bishar	Founder	CPD
David Githiri Njoroge	Sr. Operations Officer	UNHCR
Dr Reinhilde Van de Weerd	Representative and Head of Office	WHO
Erna van Goor	Health Cluster Coordinator	WHO
Esana Kazza	Head of Programme	FAO
Felicia Mandy Owusu	Deputy Representative - Operations	UNHCR
Florencia Tateossian	Member of IAHE Management Group	UN Women
Fouzia Mohamed	Director of Operations	GREDO
George Conway	DRSG/RC/HC Somalia from August 2023	UN
Gintare Eidimtaite	Former Deputy Head of Office	OCHA
Gordon Dudi	Food Security Cluster Coordinator	FAO
Haliimo Elmi Weheliye	Coordinator	Somali NGO Consortium
Halima Namyaki Mohamed	Project Coordinator	SWDC

Hashim Abdireshid Ahmed	Protection State Coordinator	UNHCR
Holger Pfingsten	Africa Team, Humanitarian Assistance in Countries and Regions	German Federal Foreign Office
Ibrahim Hassan Mohamed	Director	MCAN
Ibrahim M. Ali	Site Manager Banadir	Somalia Community Concern
Ifeanyi Okudo	Health Emergencies	WHO
Isaiah Sciford	BRCiS Programme Manager	NRC
Issa Omar Mussa	Food Security Cluster Coordinator - Garowe	WFP
Javier Rio Navarro	ECHO Somalia Head of Office	ECHO
Jessa Serna	Cash Working Group Co-Chair	WFP
Jo Nickolls	Head of RC Office Somalia	OCHA
Johannes Braun	Head of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)	WFP
John McCue	Senior Regional emergency and Post Crisis Specialist	IOM
Joseph Katuramu	Principal Security Advisor	UNDSS
Joyce Asha Laku	Head of Office Baidoa	OCHA
Joyce Msuya	Deputy ERC	UN OCHA
Julienne Vipond	Education Cluster Coordinator	UNICEF
Juliet Parker	Director	ALNAP
Kirsten Young	Chief, Human Rights & Protection Group	United Nations Mission in Somalia
Lewis Sida	Team Leader IDP Review	independent
Liam Kelly	Technical Assistant	ECHO
Liesbeth Aelbrecht	Incident Manager	WHO
Lilian Kano	Child Protection Area of Responsibility Coordinator	UNICEF
Lola Runguru Mungai	Project Manager	WHO
Mahbubur Rahman	Chair CEA Taskforce	IOM
Maiadah Ba Wazir	Senior Operations Officer	UNHCR
Marta Ruedas	OPR lead	retired
Martina Iannizzotto	Food Security Cluster Coordinator	WFP
Matilda Oherono	Health Cluster Support Officer	WHO
Matthew McIlvenna	DCD – Operations Somalia	WFP
Mohamed Abdullahi Ali	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA
Mohamed Ahmed Osman	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst -Garowe	UN OCHA
Mohamed Aidid Hassan	Director of Disaster Preparedness & Resilience	MOHADMA
Mohamed Ali Yusuf	CCCM Cluster Coordinator - Banadir	UNHCR
Mohamed Black	Security and Safety Advisor	INSO
Mohamed Hersi Madey	Assistant Safety Advisor	INSO
Mohamed Ibrahim	Programme Associate - Garowe	FAO
Mohamoud		
Mohamed Isse Mohamoud	Nutrition Cluster Coordinator - Garowe	UNICEF
Mohamed Moalin	Representative	BPHCC
Mohamed Nur Aden	Protection Cluster Coordinator - Garowe	UNHCR
Nancy Balfour	Founding Trustee	CHC

Nasir Abdi Arush	Minister of Humanitarian & Disaster Management of South West State of Somalia	MoHADM
Nick Hutchings	Team Leader - Humanitarian, Health, Education and Resilience Team (MATL Cover)	FCDO
Nimo Hassan	Director	Somali NGO Consortium
Nisar Majid	Research director London School of Economics PeaceRep-Somalia programme	CHC
Nurta Mohamed Adan	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	UNHCR
Olivia Mocanasu	CCCM Cluster Coordinator	UNHCR
Osman Mohamed	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst -Garowe	OCHA
Paul Crook	Team Leader FAO Country Programme Evaluation Somalia	independent
Peter Hailey	Founding Director	CHC
Pusparaj Mohanty	GBV Area of Responsibility Coordinator	UNFPA
Rekha Das	Team Leader, Crisis Bureau	UNDP
Rene Nijenhuis	Deputy Head of Office	UN OCHA
Rihana Isack	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst	OCHA
Said Nuriye Abshir	Public Health Emergency / Sub-national Health Cluster Coordinator - Garowe	WHO
Saifa Asif	Food Security State Coordinator	WFP
Sharmark Ali	BOD Chairman	Puntland NGO Network (PUNTNGO)
Shashwat Saraf	Regional Emergency Director	IRC
Siad Muse Siad	Operations Manager	Puntland NGO Network (PUNTNGO)
Simon Girmaw	Emergency Officer	UNHCR
Sophie Kemkhadze	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP
Stephen O'Malley	Head	Peer to Peer Project
Tessa Richardson	Information Management and Assessment Working Group (IMAWG)	IOM
Themba Linden	Head, Access Unit	UN OCHA
Tinago Chikoto	Deputy Head of Office	OCHA
Ubax Cabdirashid Maxamed	Minister	MOHADMA
Waweru Ndungu	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	DRC
Yusuf Abdil Lare	Founder	LRDO
Zamzam Said	Nutrition Cluster Focal Point - Garowe	CARE
	Operations Manager	MARDO

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Annex C: Evaluation Matrix

EQ 1: To what extent was the collective humanitarian response adapted to the needs of affected people and, in particular, the needs of the most vulnerable? <i>Answers to this evaluation question will be based on a comparative analysis between preferences expressed through feedback mechanisms and in community consultations and key planning documents; community perceptions on relevance and accountability; as well as a matching analysis between early warning / situation data, response data, and quantitative data on the situation of affected people.</i>		
Evaluation sub-questions	Criteria / indicators	Sources / means of verification
1.1. Relevance: To what extent did IASC members identify appropriate and relevant priorities for the scaled-up response?	# Community perceptions on relevance of the assistance they received and priority gaps in the assistance # Comparison of identified needs and priorities # Comparison minimum response package and global standards # Perception of independent experts on appropriateness and relevance	* KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities * Needs assessments and planning documents * IRF / MRP documents, Sphere standards * KIIs with independent experts and review of studies
1.2. Early action: How well did the IASC members react to early warning indicators, and how timely was the response?	# Timing and quality of early warning information # Reported number and timing of people reached with assistance # Nutrition, mortality, morbidity trends over time # Community perceptions on timeliness	* FSNAU, SWALIM, and weather forecast data * Public statements and appeals * HRP reports * KIIs with agencies and donors * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities
2.6. AAP: To what extent was the collective response accountable to affected people?	# Follow-up on AAP-related priorities mentioned in HRPs # Number of single-agency community feedback mechanisms # Number, reach, and reported utilization of multi-agency or common community feedback mechanisms # Examples of program adaptations based on community feedback	* GTS and REACH survey data on AAP * Review of documentation on common feedback mechanisms (LOOP etc) * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities * CEAWG meeting notes, strategies

EQ 2: To what extent did the IASC members' collective response achieve its objectives and what unintended effects did the response have?

Answers to this evaluation question will be based on the perceptions of affected people regarding the difference humanitarian assistance made to their situation; cross-time analyses of available quantitative data relevant to the situation of affected people (such as mortality, malnutrition, household incomes, protection issues); as well as a matching analysis between response data, and quantitative data on the situation of affected people.

2.1. To what extent did the response contribute to preventing the loss of life?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Excess mortality # Prevalence of moderate and acute malnutrition # Treatment numbers for moderate and acute malnutrition # People reached according to different methodologies for calculating people reached # Reported livestock deaths # Reported cases and deaths linked to cholera / AWD and measles # IPC trends # Community perceptions on effects of aid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * WHO / academic data on excess mortality * Integrated food security, nutrition and mortality surveys * IPC data * FAO livestock monitoring data * Cluster reporting * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities
2.2. To what extent did the response support people to sustain their lives and build resilience?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # People reached according to different methodologies for calculating people reached # Funding for resilience, livelihoods # Income/poverty trends # Displacement # Community perceptions on effects of aid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Cluster reporting * Somali Integrated Household Budget Survey and other World Bank data * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities
2.3. To what extent did the response address critical protection needs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Reported protection incidents # People reached according to different methodologies for calculating people reached # Protection trainings conducted # Agreements reached with authorities & land owners (site tenure) # Funding for protection-related activities # Community perceptions on effects of aid # Reflection of protection in key planning and prioritization documents # Aid worker perceptions on priority given to protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Cluster reporting * ACLED data on violence * Aid worker security data * SHF, CERF, and donor reports * HRP, IRF, MRP documents * KIIs with aid workers * Coordination meeting minutes (incl. SODMA) * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities

2.4. What unintended effects did the response have?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Trust in humanitarian actors # Perceived neutrality of humanitarian actors # Community perceptions on effects of aid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities * KIIs with donors, experts * Assessments of displacement causes done by IOM, others * PDAD report findings * CFM data / meta-data
EQ 3: To what extent did the IASC members' collective response reach the most vulnerable? <i>Answers to this evaluation question will be based on the perception of affected communities on patterns of inclusion & exclusion; as well as a cross-time analysis of the reach of assistance into hard-to-reach areas.</i>		
3.1. Inclusion: To what extent did the response identify and address the needs of vulnerable groups, and how did this affect the principle of impartiality?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Needs analyses disaggregated by clan, gender, and disability # Specific adaptations of response planning, implementation and monitoring to increase inclusion # Community perceptions on inclusion # Minority rights groups' perceptions of inclusion # Differences in community perceptions based on gender, clan and disability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Joint / multi-sector needs assessments and analyses * KIIs with minority rights, gender, disability, and human rights advocates * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities
3.2. Access: To what extent did IASC members manage to increase access to people in hard-to-reach areas, with effective security management and the right partners, and how did this affect the principles of humanity, neutrality and operational independence?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Number of previously unreachable communities reached by aid # Changes in security management approaches # Key stakeholder perceptions on humanitarian principles # Reflection of humanitarian principles in access documents and discussions # Funding for national and local NGOs # Inclusion of national and local NGOs in decision-making processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * OCHA access mapping / reports * KIIs with DSS, INSO and aid workers (especially members of the access working group) * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities * SHF eligibility criteria, funding data and reports * Agency reports on implementation partners * KIIs with local and national NGOs * KIIs with SHF and agencies

EQ 4: How well coordinated and led was the response and what other factors influenced the quality and scale of the response?

Answers to this question will be based on an analysis aid worker perceptions about changes in the response over time and factors affecting response delivery, as well as driving or inhibiting reform efforts; document-based evidence about the inputs and outputs provided as part of learning efforts and the scale-up (e.g. human and financial resources deployed, information, guidance and planning documents developed, changed composition of coordination and decision-making fora), and a matching analysis between input, outputs, perceived changes in outcomes and theme-specific outcome indicators (e.g. level of resources available, availability and quality of coordination products; reliability of available data; coverage of integrated response).











































4.1. Advocacy and resource mobilization: How effective were collective efforts to mobilize adequate and timely financial and human resources for the drought response?	# Advocacy and resource mobilization activities # Timing and trends in overall funding # Specialists deployed # Coherence between strategic priorities and resource allocation	* FTS, CERF, SHF, and key donor data (incl. WB) * IASC member agency data on corporate funds mobilized * UNDSS and agency data on staffing * Strategic planning documents and reports
4.2. Data: How reliable were data collection and analysis?	# Coherence / discrepancies between different datasets # Aid worker confidence in available data # Independent / academic assessments of data reliability	* Agency, cluster, and government datasets * KIIs with aid workers
4.3. Integrated response: How effective was the implementation of an integrated response?	# Funding for integrated response # Reported IRF implementation # Aid worker perceptions on factors influencing implementation of an integrated response	* HRP / IRF reports * Cluster reports * FTS, SHF, CERF, donor reports * KIIs with aid workers * Coordination meeting notes
4.4. Nexus: How well did the humanitarian response connect to development efforts and invest in resilience?	# Adaptation of key development programs to the emergency # Funding for resilience programs # Perceptions on missed opportunities for linking the humanitarian response to development # Community priorities between different types of aid	* KIIs with development actors (e.g. World Bank) * Development program documentation * HRP and FTS reports * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities
4.5. Other factors: What other factors influenced efforts to strengthen the quality of the response?	# Perceptions on what are drivers and obstacles for reform efforts	* KIIs with aid workers, independent observers

EQ 5: How did the HCT reforms on aid diversion affect the IASC members' collective response?

Answers to this question will be based on aid worker, donor, and government perceptions about the relevance of the HCT action plan, aid worker perceptions and document-based evidence on progress made in the different workstreams, as well as key stakeholder perceptions on enabling and hindering factors.

5.1. How relevant and appropriate was the HCT action plan to address aid diversion?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Independent experts' perception on drivers of diversion # Long list of measures and voting by HCT to create shortlist # Findings of PDAD report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Transparency international and other independent studies * CFM data * KII with aid workers, independent observers
5.2. To what extent are agreed measures being implemented?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Activities / reform efforts implemented # Diversion cases reported by agencies # HQ involvement and policies / SOPs changed across organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * PDAD progress report * KIIs with aid workers, donors * Work stream reporting * Coordination meeting minutes * KIIs, survey and FGDs with affected communities
5.3. What factors support and hinder reform efforts addressing aid diversion?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # Common solutions piloted / implemented # Open / pending measures # Perceptions on progress and lack of progress by donors, IASC members, observers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * KII with aid workers, donors, independent observers, government * Task team / work stream reports * Coordination meeting notes

Annex D: Overview of Key Themes Covered in Previous Evaluations and Reviews

	2006 RTE	2011 RTE	2011 IASC evaluation	2014 famine lessons	2023 OPR
Drivers of vulnerability					
IDPs					
Access					
Role of UNDSS					
Remote management					
Counter-terrorism					
Aid diversion / pol. economy					
AAP					
Coordination capacity					
Coordination silos					
Data sharing / analysis					
Local actor capacity					
Local actors in coordination					
Funding for local actors					
Integrated response					
Nexus					
Early warning/ early action					
Follow-up to recommendations					

Sources:

2006 RTE: Grünewald, F. (2006). Somalia: Real Time Evaluation of the 2006 Emergency Response.

2011 RTE: Darcy, J. (2012). IASC Real Time Evaluation to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis. Somalia 2011-2012.

2011 IASC evaluation: Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). Dara. (2011). Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response in South Central Somalia, 2005-2010.

2014 famine lessons: Feinstein International Center. (2014). Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia? Learning from the 2011 Famine.

2023 OPR: Ruedas, M., et al. (2023). Somalia Operational Peer Review.

Annex E: Draft Instrument for Key Informant Interviews: Community representatives

Notes for the researcher:

- Always be respectful to the people you speak to (even if they are not respectful to you).
- Give people the leaflet and explain the objectives of the research.
- Remember that participation is voluntary; no one will be forced to participate in the evaluation.
- Ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Always keep the handheld device/notes with you.

Introduction and Consent: Key Informant Interviews

Hello, my name is _____, and I am part of an independent team of researchers working for Raagsan, who is conducting an independent study for the UN.

We evaluate whether international aid during the recent droughts in Somalia was managed well. We are interested in speaking to people in different parts of the country, both from communities who have received aid and those who have not received aid. The aim is to get your perspective on whether or not the aid provided was useful and fair, and to learn what can be improved next time. Your answers will help us understand what international aid agencies can improve, both in Somalia as well as in other countries affected by droughts or conflict. Your answers will not influence whether or not you or anyone in your community will receive aid in the future.

The interview will take about 1.5 hours. It is anonymous: We will not write down your name, and we will not share the details of what you told us with anyone here. In the report we write, we will only state what people together – not as individuals – have told us. Please feel free to talk to us openly.

If you have any questions or concerns, or if you find anything wrong with my behavior, you can call the number on the leaflet.

Your participation is voluntary. Before you say yes or no to being in this study, we will answer any questions you have. If you join the study, you can ask questions at any time. If there is any question you do not want to answer, you do not have to. You may end your participation and withdraw your consent at any point, if you so desire.

Do you have any questions? Do you understand everything I have explained?

Would you like to participate? Yes No

Code No: _____ Date: _____ Name of Enumerator: _____
Name of District: _____ Name of Location: _____

Demographics about key informant:

Age of the person interviewed: _____

Sex of the person interviewed: _____

Does the Interviewee have a disability? _____

If yes, which type of disability: _____

Main source of income or subsistence: _____

Farming Cattle raising Trading Other, please specify: _____

Male	Female	Other
Yes	No	

Are you from here? If not, where are you from originally? _____

Why did you move here? _____

When? _____

Clan affiliation _____

Information about community that needs to be confirmed/collected [to be added depending on results of preliminary research]:

Instrument for KII with community representatives

I am interested to hear your feedback about the challenges your community is facing, and especially what life for the poorest people is like.

1) What do you believe are the most pressing issues facing the poorest communities in Somalia that humanitarian organizations should help address?

[ask this question about relevance first to avoid bias]

Now, I would like to know what kind of assistance was provided in your community during the last drought. [Set reference point in time, e.g. elections / seasons / other events].

2) What kind of assistance did your community receive during this last drought (2022/23), and from whom? [Ask questions 2/3/4 openly, but record answer in the below]

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| c None | c Fertilizer | c School feeding |
| c Cash to buy whatever I want | c Water | c Education support |
| c A voucher for specific goods | c Sanitation | c Information |
| c Food | c Hygiene training | c Protection services to support against abuse, exploitation |
| c Fodder for animals | c Household items | c Other: _____ |
| c Vaccination for animals | c Shelter materials | |
| c Seeds | c Health services | |
| | c Malnutrition treatment | |

3) Who mostly provided this assistance?

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| c The government | c Elders |
| c A local NGO/charity | c Businesses |
| c An international NGO | c Our neighbors/friends |
| c The United Nations | c Family members living abroad |
| c The Red Cross | c Other... |
| c Religious leaders | |

4) How often / how long did your community receive this assistance during the drought?

- c Once
- c 2-4 times
- c More regularly [monthly]
- c Other: _____

Now, let us talk about the effects of the aid provided. *[For questions 5-17, mark the response but also get more information on why, additional stories and input from interviewees. Probe and ask for examples that correspond with the answers.]*

5) Overall, how useful was the assistance for your community?

Not at all useful 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 Very useful

6) What effect did the assistance have on your community?

- a) What was the most significant positive effect?
- b) Did your community experience any negative effects because of the assistance received? If yes, please elaborate.

7) Did the assistance come at the right time for your community's needs? [yes/no – why?]

8) What would have happened to your community if assistance was not provided?

- c no change
- c (more) displacement
- c More people had to sell assets (land, livestock, etc.)
- c More people had to borrow money
- c (More) people would have died in my community
- c Other: _____ (e.g. more livestock death, ...)

9) How did the aid affect your community's ability to eat / have enough food? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

10) How did the aid affect people's housing situation? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

11) How did the aid affect people's access to safe water? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

12) How did the aid affect people's access to sanitation (toilets)? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

13) How did the aid affect people's ability to earn an income? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

14) How did the aid affect people's ability to be safe from violence and harm? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

15) How did the aid affect people's access to health services? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

16) How did the aid affect people's children's access to schools? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

17) How did the aid affect people's community's preparedness for natural disasters like droughts and floods? [Got better | No effect | Got worse]

18) In your view, are international aid agencies today more or less reliable than they were during previous crises? [Got better | No effect | Got worse] Why?

19) How easy was it for your community to access the assistance when needed? What factors hindered your community from accessing all the assistance or additional aid needed?

- a) Who in your community received the most?
- b) Who was left out from receiving assistance? [probe deeply for this question to make sure we do not only get a generic answer]

20) Who do community members trust the most to help them cope with the effects of a drought? Who do they trust the least? Why? [Probe for the below, and other actors as relevant]

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| c The government | c Elders |
| c A local NGO/charity | c Businesses |
| c An international NGO | c Our neighbors/friends |
| c The United Nations | c Family members living abroad |
| c The Red Cross | c Other... |
| c Religious leader | |

21) Overall, how would you rate the performance of aid agencies during the recent drought, compared to previous crises you may have experienced? [better | the same | worse] Why?

22) If there will be another drought, what should humanitarian organizations do differently based on your community's experience?

23) Do you have any other feedback we should share with aid agencies, or any questions?

End.

If you want, we can inform you about the findings of our study. Do you want us to contact you once they are ready?

Yes | No.

→ add phone number to a separate list, don't record it with survey/interview responses.

Annex F: Draft Instrument for Key Informant Interviews: Field-based aid workers

Notes for the researcher:

- Always be respectful to the people you speak to (even if they are not respectful to you).
- Give people the leaflet and explain the objectives of the research.
- Remember that participation is voluntary; no one will be forced to participate in the evaluation.
- Ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Always keep the handheld device/notes with you.

Introduction and Consent: Key Informant Interviews

Hello, my name is _____, and I am part of an independent team of researchers working for Raagsan, who is conducting an independent study for the UN.

We evaluate whether international aid during the recent droughts in Somalia was managed well. We are interested in speaking to people in different parts of the country, both from communities and from aid agencies. The aim is to get your perspective on what went well during the response to the recent drought and to learn what can be improved next time. Your answers will help us understand what international aid agencies can improve, both in Somalia as well as in other countries affected by droughts or conflict. Your answers will not influence whether or not your organization will receive funding, or whether anyone in the communities you work in will receive aid in the future.

The interview will take about 1.5 hours. It is anonymous: We will not write down your name or organization, and we will not share the details of what you told us with anyone. In the report we write, we will only state what people together – not as individuals – have told us. Please feel free to talk to us openly.

If you have any questions or concerns, or if you find anything wrong with my behavior, you can call the number on the leaflet.

Your participation is voluntary. Before you say yes or no to being in this study, we will answer any questions you have. If you join the study, you can ask questions at any time. If there is any question you do not want to answer, you do not have to. You may end your participation and withdraw your consent at any point, if you so desire.

Do you have any questions? Do you understand everything I have explained?

Would you like to participate? Yes No

Code No: _____ Date: _____ Name of Enumerator: _____

Name of District: _____ Name of Location: _____

Demographics about key informant:

Age of the person interviewed: _____

Sex of the person interviewed: _____

Does the Interviewee have a disability? _____

Male	Female	Other
Yes	No	

Clan affiliation _____

Information about organization (anonymized):

Staff#, approximate budget, main donors and partners, year founded:

Information about community that needs to be confirmed/collected:

Instrument for KII with field-based aid workers

1) What kind of assistance did your organization provide during this last drought (2022/23), and to whom? [Ask openly, but record answer in the below]

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| c None. -> Why not? | c Fertilizer | c School feeding |
| c Cash | c Water | c Education support |
| c Vouchers for specific goods | c Sanitation | c Information |
| c Food | c Hygiene training | c Protection services to support against abuse, exploitation |
| c Fodder for animals | c Household items | c Other: _____ |
| c Vaccination for animals | c Shelter materials | |
| c Seeds | c Health services | |
| | c Malnutrition treatment | |

2) Who mostly benefitted from this assistance? [ask openly, probe for different groups, ask about how targeting was done].

- Who in affected communities received the most?
- Who was left out from receiving assistance? [probe deeply for this question to make sure we do not only get a generic answer]

3) How often / how long did your organization provide this assistance during the drought?

- c Once
- c 2-4 times
- c More regularly [monthly]
- c Other: _____

Now, let us talk about the effects of the aid provided. [Probe and ask for examples and evidence that corresponds with the answers.]

4) Overall, how useful was the assistance your organization provided for the community?

Not at all useful 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 Very useful

5) What effect did the assistance have on the community/communities you served?

- What was the most significant positive effect?
- Did you notice any negative effects because of the assistance provided? If yes, please elaborate.

6) Did your organization manage to provide the assistance at the right time? [yes/no – why/why not?]

7) What would have happened in the community/communities if your assistance was not provided?

- c no change
- c (more) displacement
- c More people had to sell assets (land, livestock, etc.)
- c More people had to borrow money

- c (More) people would have died in my community
 c Other: _____ (e.g. more livestock death, ...)

- 8) **Do you think communities in your area of work are now better prepared for natural disasters like droughts and floods compared to before the drought?** [Got better | No effect | Got worse]
- 9) **How easy was it for your organization to access the affected population, especially the most vulnerable?**
- a) What factors hindered your organization from accessing affected communities in need?
- b) During the drought, did you manage to access areas previously out of reach? How? Why/why not?
- 10) **Did your organization grow in staff or funding during the recent drought? How so?**
- a) What facilitated or hindered this growth?
- b) What was the effect of this growth / lack of growth?
- 11) **Did you notice any change in the coordination between aid agencies in your area during the recent drought? If so, what changed?**
- a) Did coordination become more effective or less effective? Why?
- b) Was your organization more or less involved in coordination mechanisms (cluster meetings, joint data collection, etc.) than before? Why?
- 12) **Do you think communities in your area trust aid agencies?**
- a) Why? Why not?
- b) How has this trust changed over the past years [better | same | worse]?
- 13) **Do affected people in your area of operation have to pay bribes or give part of the aid to influential people (gatekeepers, community leaders, aid workers)?**
- 14) **What can your organization do to avoid or mitigate this?**
- 15) **Do you think your organization is now better prepared to avoid diversion and corruption than in the past? Why? What changed?** [probe for specific changes due to the PDAD reforms]
- a) What else should aid agencies change to address the issue of diversion and corruption?
- 16) **If there will be another drought, what should humanitarian organizations do differently based on your experience?**
- a) What will your organization do differently?
- b) What lessons did you learn from the recent drought, if any?
- 17) **Do you have any other feedback, or any questions?**

End.

If you want, we can inform you about the findings of our study. Do you want us to contact you once they are ready?

Yes | No.

→ add phone number to a separate list, don't record it with survey/interview responses.

Annex G: Draft Instrument for Focus Group Discussions

Notes for the researcher:

- Always be respectful to the people you speak to (even if they are not respectful to you).
- Give people the leaflet and explain the objectives of the research.
- Remember that participation is voluntary; no one will be forced to participate in the evaluation.
- Ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Always keep the handheld device/notes with you.

Introduction and Consent: Focus Group Discussions

Hello, my name is _____, and I am part of an independent team of researchers working for Raagsan, who is conducting an independent study for the UN.

We evaluate whether international aid during the recent droughts in Somalia was managed well. We are interested in speaking to people in different parts of the country, both those who have and those who have not received aid. The aim is to get your perspective on whether or not the aid provided was useful and fair, and to learn what can be improved next time. Your answers will help us understand what international aid agencies can improve, both in Somalia as well as in other countries affected by droughts or conflict. Your answers will not influence whether or not you will receive aid in the future.

This discussion will take about 1.5 hours. It is anonymous: We will not write down your name, and we will not share the details of what you told us with anyone here. In the report we write, we will only state what people together – not as individuals – have told us. Please feel free to talk to us openly.

Please keep our discussion confidential. Do not tell people outside this group what specific participants said. Do we have your permission to record audio, video, or notes, in an anonymous way? The notes/recording will only be seen by the small group of researchers working on this study and will be destroyed after the study is completed.

If you have any questions or concerns, or if you find anything wrong with my behavior, you can call the number on the leaflet.

Your participation is voluntary. Before you say yes or no to being in this study, we will answer any questions you have. If you join the study, you can ask questions at any time. If there is any question you do not want to answer, you do not have to. You may end your participation and withdraw your consent at any point, if you so desire.

Do you have any questions? Do you understand everything I have explained?

Would you like to participate? Yes No

Code No: _____ Name of Enumerator: _____

Date: _____ Name of District: _____ Name of Location: _____

Demographic Characteristics

Age of the person interviewed:

Sex of the person interviewed:

Is the Interviewee the head of the household?

Does the Interviewee have a disability?

	Male	Female	Other
Yes	Yes	No	
Yes	Yes	No	

Household size < 3 3–5 >5

Are there people with difficulty hearing, walking, or speaking in the household? Yes No

Are there people who are chronically ill (physically or mentally) in the household? Yes No

Main source of income or subsistence:

Farming Cattle raising Trading Other, please specify: _____

Are you from here? If not, where are you from originally? _____

Why did you move here? _____

When? _____

Clan affiliation

Information about community that needs to be confirmed/collected:

Draft Focus Group Discussion Script

Introduction to Participants

Facilitator: Welcome, everyone, and thank you for joining us today. My name is [Facilitator's Name], and I'm part of a team from Raagsan conducting an evaluation about humanitarian aid provided in Somalia. Our goal is to understand your experiences with the aid provided and gather insights on how it can be improved in the future. Your participation and honest feedback are invaluable to this process.

Confidentiality: Before we begin, I want to assure you again [see IC form] that your responses will be kept anonymous, and any specific details shared will be kept confidential. We encourage open and honest discussion, but participation in this discussion is entirely voluntary. If at any point you feel uncomfortable or wish to stop participating, please let us know.

Discussion Topics

1. Received Assistance

- Can you share with us what kind of assistance your family received during the recent droughts?
- Who provided this assistance, and how often did you receive it?
- Did you feel that the assistance you received adequately met your needs during that time?

2. Effectiveness of Assistance

- What was the most significant positive effect of the assistance?
- Were there any negative effects or unintended consequences of the assistance?
- Did it come at the right time?
- If you experienced aid provision before, during earlier droughts: what was different back then compared to how agencies provided help in the recent drought? [probe whether anything was better/worse]

3. Overall, how useful was the assistance for your community? [ask for a rating from each, potentially using stones / printed materials where helpful]

Not at all useful 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 Very useful

4. Barriers to Aid

- Can you describe any challenges or difficulties you faced in accessing the assistance?

- What factors, if any, made it difficult for you to receive aid?
- Were there any specific groups or individuals in your community who faced greater challenges in accessing aid? [Probes for clan, gender, disability]
- Generally, would you say it has become easier or more difficult to access aid for people in your area? **[ask for a rating from each: easier | the same | more difficult]**

5. Fairness and Equity

- What criteria do you think were used to determine who received aid?
- Do you believe the aid distribution was fair and equitable? Why or why not?
- Were there any groups or individuals who you feel were overlooked or marginalized in the aid distribution process?
- Do people have to give some of the aid received to gatekeepers or back to NGOs? What is the effect of this?

6. Feedback Mechanisms

- Are you aware of any mechanisms for providing feedback or complaints to aid agencies?
- Have you ever provided feedback or filed a complaint with an aid agency? If so, what was the outcome?
- Do you feel that aid agencies listen to and respond to the feedback they receive from affected communities?

7. Trust and Support Networks

- Who are the most trusted sources of support and assistance in your community during times of crisis?
- How much trust do you have in international aid agencies compared to local organizations or community leaders? Why?
- Have your perceptions of aid agencies changed over time, and if so, why? Do you think aid agencies are more or less reliable/trustworthy than in the past? **[ask from each: they are more reliable | the same | they are less reliable]**

8. Future Recommendations

- Based on your experiences, what changes would you like to see in how aid is provided during future crises?
- What do you think aid agencies could do differently to better meet the needs of affected communities?
- Are there any specific lessons learned from past aid interventions that you think should inform future strategies?

Facilitator Instructions

Facilitator: Throughout our discussion, please feel free to share your thoughts and experiences openly. Your input is incredibly valuable to us, and we want to ensure that everyone has an opportunity to speak. I'll be taking

notes throughout our discussion to capture key points and insights, but if anyone would prefer not to be recorded, please let me know.

Conclusion

Facilitator: Thank you all for your participation and for sharing your experiences with us today. Your insights will be instrumental in shaping future aid interventions and ensuring that assistance reaches those who need it most. If you have any further thoughts or questions after our discussion, please don't hesitate to reach out. Thank you again, and have a wonderful day.

If you want to hear about the findings of our study, you can leave your phone number. We will record it on a separate piece of paper and only use it to share the findings when they are ready.

Annex H: Field Work Plan

Inception mission: 24 April - 9 May 2024

Day	Julia Steets	Elias Sagmeister
24.-27.4.		<u>Nairobi</u> Interviews with key stakeholders
27.4.	Arrive Mogadishu 11:05 Security briefing	Arrive Mogadishu 15:15
28.4.	Transfer to Garowe (together with 1 Raagsan staff member) Interviews with key stakeholders	Transfer to Baidoa (together with 1 Raagsan staff member) Interviews with key stakeholders
29.4.	Garowe interviews	Baidoa interviews
30.4.	Transfer from Garowe to Mogadishu (arrive 10:45) HCT briefing	Baidoa interviews
1.5.	Mogadishu interviews	Transfer from Baidoa to Mogadishu
2.5.	Mogadishu interviews	
3.-4.5.	<u>Mogadishu</u> Work meeting with Raagsan Potential interviews with some international stakeholders	
5.5.	Mogadishu / Banadir interviews	Departure from Mogadishu 10:05
6.-8.5.	Mogadishu / Banadir interviews	
9.5.	Departure from Mogadishu 10:05	

Data collection mission: 13-21 July 2024

Day	Julia Steets	Elias Sagmeister
8.-12.7.	Remote interviews with stakeholders in Somalia who cannot attend in-person meetings	
14.-15.7.	<u>Kismayo</u> Interviews with key stakeholders	<u>Beletweyne</u> Interviews with key stakeholders
16.7.	Interviews with key stakeholders in Mogadishu	
17.7.	Workshop with internal and local NGOs on emerging findings and next steps (Peace Hotel) Interviews with key stakeholders in Mogadishu	
18.7.	Joint HCT / ICCG workshop	

	Interviews with key stakeholders in Mogadishu
19.-20.7.	Joint work with Raagsan (Mogadishu)
21.7.	Government briefing HC briefing Departure

Learning & dissemination mission: September or October 2024

Day	Team Leader, Deputy Team Leader and Evaluation Manager
Day 1	Arrive Mogadishu
Days 2-3	<u>Mogadishu</u> Learning and dissemination workshops with key stakeholders Individual debriefings
Days 4-5	Transfer to and from 3 field locations; learning and dissemination workshops with key stakeholders
Day 6	Transfer to Nairobi
Days 7-8	<u>Nairobi</u> Learning and dissemination workshops with key stakeholders Individual debriefings
Day 9	Departure

Annex I: Learning Process on HCT Reforms

Purpose and guiding questions

The proposed learning process on the HCT reforms to address aid diversion aims to accompany the ongoing HCT reform efforts in the humanitarian response in Somalia. The main purpose is to provide the humanitarian leadership in Somalia with real-time feedback on where the reform efforts stand and what next steps could be prioritized at country and global / headquarters level. Feedback will be provided through short, written inputs in presentation or Word-format, as well as through discussions / briefings.

The learning process will address the following main questions:

- 1) How relevant is the package of HCT reforms to address aid diversion?
 - a. Does the reform package cover the right measures in order to reduce aid diversion?
 - b. Is anything missing and does anything need changing?
 - c. How strong is the buy-in of relevant stakeholders to the reform package?
- 2) What is the state of follow-up and implementation of the planned reforms?
 - a. Which measures have been taken to implement the agreed HCT reforms?
 - b. Which factors supported or enabled implementation?
 - c. Are there any significant gaps in the implementation of the HCT reforms?
 - d. What were the main barriers to implementation?
- 3) Which next steps should be prioritized?
 - a. What needs to happen at country level to solidify and maintain the gains made?
 - b. Are there any gaps the HCT needs to address as a matter of priority?
 - c. What supporting action is needed from the global / headquarters level?

Data sources and methods

The learning process will draw on the main data collection and analysis methods of the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. This includes:

- A review of documents related to aid diversion and the HCT reforms (in so far as they are accessible to the evaluation team).
- Key informant interviews with relevant stakeholders (members of the reform workstreams, UN agencies, NGOs, donors, government representatives) at country level during the inception mission for the evaluation.
- Key informant interviews with relevant global stakeholders (e.g. EDG members tasked with removing barriers to data sharing; members of fora addressing aid diversion).

Timeline and deliverables

The evaluation process will include the following deliverables related to the HCT reform learning process:

- Initial written input (early July).
- In-person HCT-ICCG workshop on findings and priority next steps as part of the data collection mission (July)
- Discussion / briefing with HC (July)

- Updated written input (September)
- In-person HCT-ICCG workshop on findings and priority next steps as part of the dissemination mission (September / October)
- Discussion / briefing with HC
- Inclusion of relevant issues in discussions / briefings with global stakeholders (September – November)