Stabilization: Doctrine, Organization and Practice

Lessons from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States

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Acute crises in fragile states remain a key challenge to peace and security worldwide. While the governments of the UK, Canada, the US and the Netherlands subscribe to different ideas of stability as the ultimate goal of crisis management, they all define the problem in far narrower terms than the fragility of state institutions, which affect the majority of countries worldwide. Instead, the immediate problem is the breakdown of mechanisms that balance competing claims to power and through which disputes can be resolved. A realistic approach to stabilization seeks to support the reversal of that breakdown – which remains a high-risk and costly investment that needs careful consideration, a capable institutional infrastructure, and a constant willingness to learn from experience.

Table of contents

The Netherlands: support that is both quick and reliable

Conclusions

Policy options for Germany

Endnotes

Annex: Overview of eleven international stabilization actors

Executive summary

"Fragile" states continue to figure as one of the most significant challenges to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security worldwide. Stabilization, whether defined as the broad promotion of stability, or more narrowly as the management of acute, occasionally chronic conditions of emergency (crises), remains an important part of global peacebuilding and security governance. The present study analyzes relevant international experiences with the aim to develop policy options for Germany, mainly in four case studies of the UK, Canada, the US and the Netherlands.

Basic concepts: fragility, stability and stabilization

While there are major terminological differences in the understanding of stability, the concept of stabilization rests on a broadly shared foundation. Relating to situations of extreme fragility and acute crises, stabilization describes an urgent effort to prevent and overcome emergency situations of extreme political volatility and large-scale organized violence. Such emergencies may remain acute for many years (as in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

During a crisis, there is a breakdown of the political mechanisms through which competing claims to power are balanced, and disputed issues are negotiated between competing political actors. Stabilization seeks to return the situation from an urgent crisis to a "normal" level of fragility. Correspondingly, stabilization only describes one part of the inter-agency engagement in fragile states. Conditions of fragility exist in many places and are addressed with a range of tools, such as capacity development, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict transformation. Stabilization is undertaken, whether preventively or reactively, in exceptional cases only. Taking academic scholarship and civil society's legitimate criticism of the concept seriously, this comparatively modest definition of stabilization is the only viable approach.

The misunderstanding of short-termism: act quickly, but keep going

The pressure to act in a crisis is usually (if not always) genuine: local expectations are high, the risk of escalation is substantial, and the media and political dynamics further intensify the situation. This pressure to act demands rapid entry into visible on-the-ground engagement, combined with careful and modest communication, in particular with regard to the expectations of local populations. In contrast to the rapid start, quick but inadequate results may do more harm than good – a problem that calls for careful case-by-case considerations in light of the do no harm principle. A call for rapid action must not be misunderstood as a call for purely short-term funds or programs: the opposite is true. Long-term crises remain acute for years and require a mix of short-, medium- and long-term stabilization tools.

Stabilization as a high-risk investment

Every stabilization effort must be considered a high-risk investment. The risk of failure is high; at the level of individual projects, often higher than the probability of success. Conversely, there are risks in non-intervention: the escalation of violence and the progressive (self-)destruction of a society over years and decades. These considerations must be weighed in individual cases. In some cases, stabilization efforts will or must be undertaken. Preparation and implementation of stabilization efforts must be modest. We know more about what does not work in particular situations than which elements of a particular success can be generalized. Several basic assumptions have been disproved by reality: in the short- and medium-term, development alone does not create security at the crucial local level, whereas an improvement in a population's security does appear to create the potential for socio-economic development. Stabilization is therefore, above all, a learning process.

The state of emergency in bilateral relationships

In practice, stabilization implies the suspension of the usual limits of state sovereignty through a special kind of international intervention in the local political order. This intervention is often based on an agreement with local government seeking to benefit from it. How to handle this state of emergency in bilateral relations (and the relationship between multilateral organizations and state and societal representatives) is part of the intervention: it can and must be calibrated flexibly and negotiated with local political elites. The familiar principles of normal bilateral relations must not impose blinders in this regard.

What does stabilization require on the part of the German government?

The ambition to stabilize a country comes with a practical acceptance of shared responsibility for that state. Beyond intensifying all aspects of normal relations, a stabilization effort requires a "toolkit" of tailored instruments, such as contributions to the design and implementation of integrated civil-military peace operations, or bilateral activities to influence political dynamics in the short term. Political attention and effective inter-agency infrastructure is required to continuously improve these tools at all levels, requiring financial and personnel resources. Stabilization is much more expensive than conducting normal bilateral relations. Concrete requirements include, in particular, a substantial increase in the capacity for ongoing political analysis and improved capabilities for inter-agency contingency planning; political communication; the further development of rapidly effective and reliable stabilization activities; the flexible deployment and better integration of personnel across staff categories and institutions; and continuous development of all other instruments (partly through better monitoring and evaluation). The last chapter presents policy options on these and related issues, such as defining stabilization, strategic management, inter-agency coordination and the requirements for financial resources (see page 48 on).

Introduction

"Fragile" states continue to figure as one of the most significant challenges to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security globally. Within the German government, for example, "there is consensus that such 'fragile states' will become more relevant as a challenge and a task for international politics."[1] Stabilization, whether defined as the broad promotion of stability, or more narrowly as the management of acute, occasionally chronic conditions of emergency (crises), remains an important part of global peacebuilding and security governance. A variety of lessons can be drawn for Germany and its international partners from the political, civilian, police and military interventions of the last two decades. The present study analyzes international experiences, in particular. On this basis, it puts options for the further development of the government's conceptual, institutional and operational toolkit up for discussion.

The study was conducted in three stages. In the first stage, 11 national and multilateral actors were mapped according to their conceptual understanding of politically driven and primarily civilian stabilization efforts, the scope of their stabilization activities and the level of organizational integration in budgeting, decision-making and policy development. In the second stage, in agreement with the client, four countries were selected for closer analysis in detailed case studies according to the criteria of internationally recognized excellence and comparability in scope and political and institutional context to Germany. These countries include:

- United Kingdom;
- Canada;
- Netherlands;
- United States.

As part of the case studies, further literature reviews as well as 32 interviews with experts in London, Ottawa, The Hague and Washington DC were carried out. Finally, policy options for the German context were developed on the basis of the case studies and 17 background meetings with practitioners and independent experts in Berlin.

Identification and selection of relevant stabilization actors

Eleven actors were identified in close consultation with the client, including eight nation states and three multilateral/transnational institutions: Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US and the European Union (primarily the Instrument for Stability (IfS)), UN peace operations (i.e. the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its field missions) and the UN Development Programme (in particular the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)).

Based on publicly available information, the following data were collected for each of these actors, without a claim to completeness:

- How "stabilization" or equivalent concepts are defined (What is stabilization? What is to be stabilized? How is stabilization distinguished from concepts such as civil-military cooperation, humanitarian assistance and development work?);
- The scope of these players' activities (budget levels and geographic range);
- To what extent there are specialized budgets, working and decision-making structures for "stabilization."

For a number of actors, it became clear that there are either very few publications or that institutional arrangements have changed substantially in the recent past. This limits the utility of this first overview (see annex).

As a basis for the selection of four cases for a detailed investigation in the second stage of the study, the 11 actors were assessed according to two scalable dimensions: "scope" and "integration" (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Stabilization actors by scope and level of integration

The following considerations formed the basis for the further selection of cases:

1. Because of the comparability of their political and institutional contexts to Germany, countries with low to medium integration and a medium to high level of stabilization activities are best suited as "similar" cases from which lessons may be drawn directly (see the four top left fields: US, France, EU IfS, the Netherlands, Canada).

2. France is not a suitable case study because of its absence of a political and practical emphasis on stabilization (as understood here). Case studies on the EU and UN promised comparatively few ready-made lessons, even though UN peace operations make an interesting subject for study because of their laboratory character for civil-military integration.

3. The UK is internationally regarded as a pioneer. Its leadership role makes it interesting as a case study, even though its institutional context is different than Germany's.

4. Among the countries with relatively low institutional integration, the United States, given its enormous financial and personnel commitments as well as the dominance of security and defense policy concerns in its policy process, is as far as or even further removed from German conditions than for example Sweden, at the far end of the spectrum (the figure is misleading in this regard). At the same time, the US provides an enormous range of potentially instructive experience as compared to Sweden (or Denmark, where some interesting reforms could be studied). Therefore, the expected added value of a US case study was considered to be substantially greater. It was also a factor that the State Department's latest reorganization and its consequences have not yet been adequately analyzed in the literature.

Overview of the study

Chapters two to five investigate the four selected partner countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and the Netherlands. Each country study follows a common structure with regard to:

- Concept and mandate;
- Institutional responsibility and coordination;
- Development of concepts and policy;
- Funding;
- Project development, implementation and evaluation;
- Reinforcement of personnel and involvement of external experts;
- Summary of the main findings.

On the basis of the country case studies as well as further interviews on Germany's experience with stabilization interventions, chapter six sets out the analytical conclusions. Chapter seven presents policy options for the German government.

The issue of political communication and the related challenges of managing local expectations and maintaining sustained support at home were not initially part of the investigation, less because of a deliberate strategic decision than as a result of the client's and the authors' arbitrary limitation of the study's scope. When some of the interviewees, especially those from Canada, raised the issue themselves, some related conclusions and recommendations were included in the concluding part of the study.

The annex contains an overview of the 11 stabilization actors that were part of the original mapping with their definition of stabilization, budgets and a qualitative classification of departmental integration.

United Kingdom: crisis management as part of the way toward structural stability

Concept and mandate

By adopting the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS, 2011), Britain has elevated the promotion of stability to a strategic priority in its foreign, security and development policy. Stabilization ("building stability") is approached as an inter-agency task and vaguely defined as:

> "[To] address instability and conflict overseas because it is both morally right and in Britain's national interest. We will do this by using all of our diplomatic, development, military and security tools, and drawing on our unique experience, relationships, reputation and values."[2]

The BSOS contrasts the threat of instability with an ambitious understanding of stability as an objective that can hardly be found in any country receiving development assistance:

> "[Stability is] characterised in terms of political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all. This type of "structural stability", which is built on the consent of the population, is resilient and flexible in the face of shocks, and can evolve over time as the context changes."[3]

In order to achieve these goals, instruments are employed in three main areas:

1. Early warning system: improving the ability to anticipate instability and possible triggers for conflict.
2. Rapid crisis prevention and response: improving the ability to take appropriate and effective action quickly to prevent a crisis or defuse an escalation.
3. Investment in upstream prevention: helping build strong, legitimate institutions and robust societies in fragile countries in order to ensure that they are capable of managing tensions and unrest and thus reduce the likelihood of instability and conflict.[4]

As part of the ministries' joint responsibility to implement this strategy, the Conflict Pool, created in 2001 and most recently restructured in 2008, has a special role as an integrated fund for conflict prevention and early action. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department for International Development (DfID) jointly manage the pool.

Institutional roles and coordination

The Building Stability Overseas Board's (BSOB) Director-General, a rotating post among its members, is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the ministries' implementation of the strategy (BSOS). In addition to two representatives each from the FCO, MoD and DfID, the National Security Council Secretariat, the police and the Director of the Stabilization Unit (SU) are represented.[5] The SU is an advisory unit that also manages a personnel pool for rapid deployment. It employs around 75 staff members.

Subordinate to this inter-agency structure, inter-agency bodies for various regions make decisions on the allocation of resources from the Conflict Pool. Across the board, the lead role in identifying a need for action, proposing options and coordinating operations remains with the FCO. This role is held by the Conflict Department (part of the Multilateral Policy Directorate), which coordinates with the relevant country desks. Its mandate includes early warning, prevention and early action, the conceptual and strategic development of peacebuilding and support for the BSOB and Conflict Pool Secretariat.

In the context of the BSOS, the Stabilisation Unit now has an exclusively instrumental and operational role; earlier attempts to formulate strategy and coordinate the departments led to a substantial reduction of its authority. Its current leadership thus concentrates on the professionalization of operational work.[6] Through the SU, the government is able to rapidly provide integrated teams with military and civilian experts for fragile states. The unit has particular expertise in the sectors of security and justice, as well as in specific stabilization measures in conflict situations. Its own staff and external experts offer technical expertise to support the implementation of the Conflict Pool. The SU is also the focal point for international police missions and deploys civilians to multilateral operations.[7]

Policy development

In all ministries, there is a conflict between the regional desks and the crosscutting departments that collectively support the BSOS. As the unit responsible for early warning, the FCO's Conflict Department works closely with the Cabinet Office to combine intelligence information with diplomatic reports, public sources (such as reports by the International Crisis Group or other NGOs) and, recently, big-data products.

Through this process, the unit produces its own range of analytical products in competition with the embassy cables and regional desk reports. In addition, the

country strategy papers developed in the regional desks are discussed in "challenge meetings" at irregular intervals, for which the Conflict Department seeks to bring in external experts (primarily academics). These mechanisms help to avoid groupthink[8] and the systematic marginalization of dissenting perspectives in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Through these processes, the FCO itself makes the majority of the decisions on foreign policy questions regarding unstable areas; the same takes place in other ministries with respect to their areas of responsibility. The coordinating bodies of the BSOB structure are only involved in planning inter-agency interventions with military components or using Conflict Pool resources.[9]

Funding

The Conflict Pool comprises over £220 million (approximately €260 million). The fact that only about 50 percent of its projects need to meet the criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) gives the instrument flexibility. The pool is divided into five regional programs and the crosscutting Global Peace Operations Capacity Building program. Each program has a "senior responsible owner" in each of the three departments and is planned over several years, although revision of planning remains possible. Every decision requires unanimity among the three senior officials. An Early Action Facility of approximately £20 million, newly created in 2011, is separate from this complex structure in order to quickly provide financial resources in the first year of a new crisis and to protect long-term programs from sudden budget cuts due to acute crises. The great majority of Conflict Pool resources (80-85 percent according to our interviewees' estimates) are deployed by the FCO, fewer by the MoD and hardly any by DfID. According to experts, there are few benefits for DfID in submitting to the elaborate coordination and decision processes of the pool, since the department has sufficient resources that have increased substantially in recent years.[10]

The advantages and disadvantages of the consensus requirement, giving each department a veto over every project decision, attract mixed views. According to participants, during the 2013 intervention in Mali, the decision to provide support payments to France was made within 24 hours after having already been pledged at the political level. This was made in addition to another pledge to a fund for Mali security forces and the dispatch of the first British security experts to Bamako to reinforce the embassy. By contrast, the differing departmental views on whether counter-terrorism or statebuilding should be the key British priority in Somalia led to extended debates, delaying project decisions for several months. Participants and experts say that the triple-key arrangement makes for a high degree of attention to and understanding of the priorities of the other participants. However, in situations where there is no direct pressure from the political leadership to act, it comes at a high price in terms of lost efficiency. Considering this observation, the suitability of this decision-making process for preventive measures should be particularly questioned, since the objective here is precisely to be able to take action when a crisis has not yet attracted great political attention.

The distribution of Conflict Pool resources follows a formal prioritization process, during which annual quotas for countries and regions are decided at the ministerial level. The process is based on, but not exclusively tied to, a criteria-based reference

list of around 36 countries where the risk of conflict is considered high and which are politically relevant to the UK. Around 75 percent of the CP is allocated to countries formally categorized as "unstable and relevant," with the remainder following political priorities not on the list.

Measures undertaken in the Conflict Pool framework may be both short and long term. They are reviewed annually. Some are designed to be able to transition from CP funding into subsequent DfID funding. Others do not require this or receive additional funding from financially strong partners (e.g. the US).

Project development, implementation and evaluation

From the perspective of the Conflict Pool secretariat, CP measures start with an application by one of the participating departments. Some regional programs publish criteria for applications; others conduct an inter-agency Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) in order to identify specific challenges of instability and stabilization objectives. The departments develop project ideas on this basis. Sometimes, project ideas also come directly from the political leadership.[11]

- CP resources are given to three possible types of recipients:
- Trust funds (in particular multilateral trust funds);
- External implementation partners (commercial companies, NGOs);
- British government authorities providing direct services in target countries.

The Stabilisation Unit does not play a direct role in project management and implementation, even though individual staff members are occasionally dispatched as experts to identify needs or potential partners, to advise on project development or to serve as evaluators. Project monitoring is the responsibility of staff in the relevant department in the respective embassy, and is often local staff. The Conflict Pool does not have a fixed toolkit in terms of types of activities or implementation partners: the instrument's key feature is its flexibility to work with SU experts who can be deployed rapidly to find suitable implementers and activities to fund quickly and, when necessary, over the long term. In this sense, the Conflict Pool is politically designed and accepted as a high-risk investment: it is considered acceptable that a stabilization activity may at times be ineffective.

Interviewed British experts see monitoring and evaluation as the greatest current challenge. The CP secretariat is currently working on developing guidelines to familiarize less experienced colleagues, in particular in the FCO, with professional evaluation methods. Until now, there has been no measurement or evaluation of impact. In the view of those who support a rigorous evaluation practice, there is still a long way to go – not least because of the training needs.

Reinforcement of personnel and recruitment of external experts

The SU administers the Civilian Stabilization Group (CSG), which consists of 800 deployable civilian experts and over 200 civil servants and governmental agency

staff who are available for deployment to crisis regions as part of the Civil Service Stabilization Cadre. CSG members are employed in areas such as project management, communication, infrastructure development, judicial support, police reform and disarmament. The SU is responsible for selection, training, administration and the deployment of civilians. Staff are sent for a period ranging from a few days to a year and are engaged on a "pay for use" basis, i.e. no costs arise apart from the missions themselves.[12] The scope of the CSG is currently being reviewed with the objective of filtering out rarely used experts, whose area of expertise would only be useful in highly unlikely scenarios, such as another Afghanistan mission.[13]

Main findings

The Building Stability Overseas Strategy establishes a utopian objective of "structural stability," from which the actual practice of British stabilization efforts remains – inevitably – far apart. While conceptually sound, the link between these quick-impact activities for crisis prevention and response and the larger context of promoting peace and security remains at a virtual level. In practice, the two levels remain largely disconnected.

The Stabilization Unit and the Conflict Pool are considered international role models of an inter-agency approach. After the latest reforms – which were not exclusively positive – we arrive at a mixed assessment. Several aspects should be positively appreciated. A particularly important one is the willingness to accept risk and the resulting flexibility of Conflict Pool resources. CP funds are used for short-, medium- and long-term activities and without constraints in the nationality of implementing organizations. This flexibility is a decisive precondition for effective stabilization activities. The fact that both SU personnel pools – staff of government ministries and public authorities as well as independent experts – are managed jointly is exemplary, as is the SU's extremely rapid deployment procedure that allows it to dispatch certain categories of staff in as few as 24 hours. In time-critical prevention and response situations, in particular, this instrument is more effective in identifying possible activities and supporting analysis than the German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), whose personnel need to be contracted by the Federal Foreign Office (AA) in a time-consuming process, or the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), which only sends its own staff and has only recently developed a pool of staff who can be deployed at short notice.

At the same time, Conflict Pool decision-making structures are less suitable for Germany. The use of the veto mechanism to maximize coordination among the ministries has long-term potential to produce positive socialization effects, but at the cost of slower reaction time and the possibility of lower effectiveness in the short term. This is notwithstanding some exceptional situations in which political attention at the highest level short-circuited the barriers of normal operations. In this respect, the positive examples of Libya (directly after the air strikes) and Mali (at the start of the French military intervention), both of which our interviewees identified, are misleading. In light of the Conflict Pool's preventive objective, the months-long delay of project decisions in the absence of ministerial attention is concerning. If transferred analogously to Germany, greater ministerial autonomy as well as coalition and factional

dynamics could be expected to produce much more frequent deadlock than in Britain, even when there is significant pressure to act.

Beyond the Conflict Pool and the SU, the institutional mechanisms designed to diversify analytical perspectives in the FCO are worth a closer look. Hidden or non-obvious risks, particularly in early warning, and the likelihood of escalation in superficially stable situations, are often appreciated only as a result of open and critical debate between different points of view. Current management and reporting systems in the German ministries do not encourage staff to critically question embassy cables or the analysis of a single, solely responsible unit. In contrast, the FCO benefits from a more open culture of constructively challenging each other's perspectives. The resulting institutionalization of dissent should be seriously examined to see which of these elements could also be used in Germany.

Canada: short-term security and justice activities as part of the 3D approach

Concept and mandate

In April 2005, the Liberal Canadian government published a new Whole of Government approach as part of their International Policy Statement on the basis of the integration of the three elements Diplomacy, Defense and Development (3D approach).[14] The subsequent Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper reinforced Canadian involvement in fragile contexts by substantially increasing financial resources, primarily focused on Afghanistan and an alliance with the United States. The institutional core of the 3D approach was the establishment of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT). START was designed to be a hub for inter-agency planning and coordination, a center of excellence for Canadian foreign policy's operational contribution and a think tank for conceptual questions of peace, security and fragility.

Canada defines its stabilization approach as support for local partners in the long-term promotion of peace and prosperity:

> "[Efforts] to help a country or community manage, recover or emerge from an upheaval such as a violent conflict, political strife or natural disasters leading to large-scale social unrest. Achieving stability is one goal among others to pave the way for long term peace and prosperity. "[15]

Possible tasks for stabilization measures "in support of the host country" are:

- Coping with or reducing violence;
- Protection of civilians and key institutions;
- Provision of basic services;
- Promotion of the political processes;
- Preparation for long-term reconstruction, peace promotion and development.[16]

The Canadian understanding of stabilization is essentially based on the idea of short-term, quick-response crisis prevention and the creation of necessary preconditions

for longer-term forms of involvement, such as reconstruction, peacebuilding and development. This understanding of stabilization, as part of a broader involvement in fragile states[17], influences practical policy, not least the inter-agency memorandum of understanding between DFAIT and CIDA, the Canadian development agency, on their division of labor.[18] START's operational activities – carried out by state institutions (including the German GIZ International Services) and NGOs such as CANADEM or World Vision – prioritize short-term impact and public visibility. Compared with development policy tools, START is better able to follow political priorities and ensure confidentiality. CIDA sees this as an advantage, not least because it means the development budget is not tapped to fund short-term activities in every international crisis.[19]

Institutional roles and coordination

In Canada, stabilization is an independent foreign policy instrument intended to close the gap between the capacities of CIDA and the armed forces and make the foreign ministry more operational with its own project budget.[20] Since 2005, START has managed DFAIT's growing resources and coordinated the inter-agency approach. In the view of most experts, START catalyzed a noticeable change in organizational culture.[21]

Currently, START is a large department with over 100 staff members, organizationally separate from country desks and crosscutting sections. In addition to programming, inter-agency coordination (the Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs Division) and policy development, it coordinates Canadian contributions to peace operations (the Peace Operations and Fragile States Policy Division), the deployment of personnel (the Deployment and Coordination Division, with its own administrative structure for a civilian expert pool) and humanitarian assistance (the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Division). START's Director-General reports directly to the Associate Deputy Minister.[22]

START supports DFAIT regional desks in managing inter-agency, country-specific Task Forces. In contrast to the formal organization, participants state that the Task Forces in fact follow a "variable geometry"; in other words, a somewhat different structure and distribution of power is negotiated in each Task Force according to individual ministries' political and financial investments. External observers criticize that, as a result of the expansion of inter-agency coordination, DFAIT staff now hardly has time for exchanges with academics and NGOs, so that the frequently touted "whole of system approach" has little to do with reality.[23]

Policy development

START works as an information and knowledge hub inside DFAIT and the government. Within the foreign ministry, it primarily supports regional departments with technical crosscutting knowledge, managing complex coordination processes and drafting particularly demanding documents in situations where, on its own, the country desk would be overtaxed.[24] Its contribution to professional and coordinated communication falls into the same category. The self-imposed objective is to always emphasize to

domestic, international and host-country audiences alike that current stabilization activities can only be the start of a long-term commitment.

The Peace Operations and Fragile States Policy unit is responsible for the political coordination of Canadian contributions to peace operations, with the exception of Afghanistan. The unit develops Canadian financial, personnel and programming options. It also attempts to familiarize the foreign ministry and other departments with a guiding principle of conflict sensitivity. To do so, it runs joint analyses and assessments of country situations for country desk officers who require support for this purpose, as recently done for Mali.[26]

In recent years, START's expertise and personnel resources have made it possible for the Canadian government, and DFAIT in particular, to play an exceptionally influential role in the international conceptual and political debate on fragility and stabilization. START and CIDA representatives were jointly sent to OECD working groups (DAC/INCAF) in Paris. While external experts still fail to see a visible contribution to the further conceptual development of the topic of stabilization,[27] Canada may have benefited more from it than the global debate: knowledge derived from the OECD work has started to be used in policy development not only in CIDA but also in the foreign ministry. In view of the comparably greater influence of DFAIT in government circles, this led to an overall higher-quality debate in Ottawa on the questions of fragility, security and development.[28]

Funding

START manages a budget line called the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). In financial year 2011-2012, the GPSF budget was C$149.9 million (approximately €110 million).[29] GPSF projects (and thereby those of START) can only be designed for a maximum duration of six months to two years. This allows for projects to extend beyond a single financial year; the continuation of activities beyond two to three years, however, is hardly achievable within the budgetary rules.[30]

CIDA, which is largely independent but does not have equal standing to the foreign ministry, long fought a rearguard battle against DFAIT's increasingly frequent raids on its budget. In order to resolve the conflict, Canadian funds for international cooperation were in 2005 reorganized into an International Assistance Envelope (IAE), which was further divided into development cooperation (through CIDA and contributions to multilateral development organizations), international finance institutions, research on development policy (IDRC), peace and security (through DFAIT, UN contributions and contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget) and a flexible crisis pool of C$200 to C$400 million. The total IAE grew annually until 2010 when it was frozen at C$5 billion.

The separation of budgets and the creation of START largely resolved the budgetary conflict and created a setup in which joint policy work now runs harmoniously. The recipe for success was a relatively clear division of labor: CIDA surrendered all peace and security issues to the foreign ministry. Together with a simplified division into short-term (START) and long-term (CIDA) funds, however, this solution led to a massive funding gap. In practice, long-term activities in the area of peace and security can no longer be funded by any agency.

Project development, implementation and evaluation

Project management is highly bureaucratic, less because of restrictions imposed by budgetary law and more due to the straitjacket of formalized results-based management, which is applied throughout the entire Canadian government. Individual activities must be related to START's global objectives to be eligible for funding. In addition, every project must follow the same management framework: application documents must justify all activities using a logical framework (logframe) showing the effects to be achieved, specifying possible risks and indicating measurable indicators for the success of the project. According to implementers, however, START hardly uses these mechanisms to manage strategically, i.e. the net result is that lip service is paid and additional management costs are incurred.

Project ideas usually come from the managerial level, a regional desk or another ministry. Implementing partners may also present a project proposal. In the first case, START begins by looking for a suitable implementing partner. This requires substantial effort, including for a START staff member to take a survey trip to the relevant country, since it is not seen as desirable to work exclusively with Canadian organizations. The usual implementing partners include established Canadian and international providers such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (since closed), CANADEM, GIZ International Services and DCAF, as well as large INGOs such as World Vision, Oxfam and CARE. START and CIDA implementing organizations overlap less and less frequently.

If the proposed activity fits into the objectives framework and is politically approved, the potential implementing partner is asked to present a standardized, two-page Concept Note. This Concept Note is initially assessed internally and informally evaluated by START staff and the country desk responsible (Internal Review). If the proposal attracts interest, the implementer is requested to submit a full proposal. Usually this process takes no more than two weeks. In extreme cases, it can take only a few days. START formally consults legal, budget and country desks on the application before it is presented to a Project Accountability Team (PAT), consisting of directors or their representatives, for a decision. If the PAT agrees, the proposal is passed on to the DFAIT management level, which approves the project at the final stage. It normally takes four to eight weeks until a decision is reached, although there are exceptional cases that are dealt with extremely quickly or linger for months in consultations or in ministerial offices.

During project development, there is no requirement to explicitly specify or take into account major risks such as conditions under which a project might have to be cancelled due to security threats or planning requirements to ensure follow-up measures after the end of the project. The problem of dividing short- and long-term approaches between START and CIDA remains unresolved. There are evidently no examples of stabilization efforts successfully linked to longer-term, complementary CIDA programs.[31]

START staff in the embassy on-the-ground handle project oversight. For this purpose, there are currently one to two START officials in the four countries with the largest START project portfolios – Afghanistan, Haiti, Columbia and South Sudan; otherwise, someone at the embassy's political desk takes over monitoring responsibility. Implementing partners are asked to evaluate themselves; however, they

are not required to do so. Evaluation costs are covered as part of the START project budget. Inevitably, this process of self-evaluation only takes place during the span of the project and with respect to outputs and immediate outcomes – not, however, with regard to long-term impact.

At project level, external evaluations are not foreseen. Apart from occasional, selective audits, a substantive assessment of success is only made at the level of the country portfolios as part of START's annual reporting requirement. In addition, the ministry's Inspector-General regularly evaluates all budget lines, including the Global Peace and Security Fund. These evaluations by external consultants generally take place every five years; this timeframe is halved if changes in mandate or structure occur. In the past, researchers have observed a relatively rigorous practice of evaluation as well as a high level of transparency towards experts and the public. The 2009 Mid-Term Evaluation of the Haiti program was mentioned as an example of an honest and self-critical report that showed a genuine readiness to learn. This form of transparency has apparently declined significantly in recent years.[32]

Reinforcement of personnel and recruitment of external experts

Observers see START as more effective and transparent than CIDA in bringing in external expertise from expert circles in Ottawa and locally in the program countries. START personnel and embassy staff consult with external experts, particularly as part of study and program development visits to the affected regions.[33] Both instruments – the use of external and local expertise as well as direct monitoring on the ground – should not be underestimated in their relevance for developing sensible activities and selecting suitable implementing partners, particularly given the resources that this requires (e.g. adequate personnel recruitment and travel costs).

In addition, the Canadian government is active in deploying experts in policing, justice and administration reform as well as civilian specialists in peacekeeping and stabilization. START maintains a personnel pool and a 17-person unit to manage it. In addition, the NGO CANADEM, which itself manages a large pool of experts (and claims to do this in a more flexible and efficient manner with just three human resources staff), is also regularly contracted. By employing deployed staff and thereby covering their social security needs, CANADEM is able to offer the Canadian government complete mission packages, e.g. the deployment of a complete team of justice, policing and administrative advisers to Kabul or an election observer team to the Falkland Islands.[34]

Main findings

The Canadian government understands stabilization to be the support of a country in managing short-term instability (i.e. crisis management). It is the only one of the four countries examined that conceptually emphasizes an external stabilizer's support-only role towards local political actors who maintain primary responsibility. Stabilization is assigned to the foreign ministry and is part of a comprehensive, inter-agency engagement to promote lasting peace and prosperity by using diplomatic, development and defense instruments (3D).

With its enormous staff resources and the integration of all relevant roles within the Foreign Ministry, START has become a one-stop shop offering contributions to multinational missions and political and operational engagement. The organizational division between START and the diplomatic core business goes further than in any other country examined; in principle, Canada has consistently implemented the concept of a new, separate task in the foreign ministry (expeditionary or transformative diplomacy). On the positive side, it is important to emphasize the resources and care invested to combine political analysis with technical expertise on conflict and stabilization, the ability to undertake contingency planning based on extensive staff resources and the flexibility in deploying START staff to embassies to provide political oversight of stabilization activities.

Without a detailed evaluation of the portfolio, it cannot be assessed whether the operational quality of the activities justifies the enormous investment in personnel. Many interviewees express doubt in this regard, particularly in view of the inconsistent and unambitious practice of evaluation and the duplication of effort between START and the NGO CANADEM in the deployment of personnel. In addition, its separation from CIDA has created a serious gap: through the double division of labor according to the criteria of duration (short vs. long term) and sectorial emphases (security/justice vs. everything else), funding and attention gaps have formed in the long-term work in the area of security and justice, which in practice lead to damaging discontinuities. The process of linking short-term START measures and longer-term CIDA programs is still, eight years after the creation of START, described as "to be improved": there are evidently no examples of stabilization efforts successfully linked to longer-term complementary CIDA programs.

START's independence within the foreign ministry also leads to a situation in which working relationships with the political departments need to be negotiated anew for each stabilization situation. A certain degree of flexibility in coordination mechanisms is undoubtedly helpful here. However, the harm done by the perception of START as an expensive institution outside the core foreign policy apparatus is probably greater than the benefits obtained from the flexibility that comes with it.

US: stabilization as acute conflict management in the context of comprehensive statebuilding

Concept and mandate

In the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton defined the US stabilization approach as the task:

> "[To] prevent conflict, save lives, and build sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances fairly and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice systems. Over the longer term, our mission is to build a government's ability to address challenges, promote development, protect human rights, and provide for its people on its own. "[35]

Stabilization is thus understood to be an umbrella term for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, development, human rights promotion and capacity building of state institutions in countries where "instability creates transnational threats."[36]

The Pentagon, the State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) all contribute to stabilization activities. CSO, a product of the State Department's reorganization under Clinton, works with local partners in selected "states in crisis":

> "to break cycles of violent conflict, mitigate crises, and strengthen civilian security."[37]

OTI was created in 1994 and emphasizes the implementation of short-term, flexible stabilization activities to influence volatile political dynamics:

> "Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs."[38]

Institutional roles and coordination

In recent years, the Pentagon has had by far the greatest allocation of funds for stabilization activities, both for major infrastructure projects and for smaller, decentralized activities through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). However, since the devastating investigations of the Special Inspector-General for Reconstruction in Iraq (SIGIR) and Afghanistan (SIGAR), the Pentagon is widely seen as less-than-competent in its implementation of stabilization activities.[39]

Within the State Department, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) coordinates the civilian stabilization approach. Little over a year after the office was established as the successor to the Office of the Coordinator for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in January 2012, communication and implementation structures are still in the initial phase. CSO was created on the basis of the QDDR as part of the "J family" in the State Department, i.e. the crosscutting department for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights. Its predecessor S/CRS is widely seen as a failure that cast a long shadow from which CSO has had difficulty escaping. In practice, therefore, the regional desks continue to play the main role in policy development and inter-agency coordination on the part of the State Department. In any case, the State Department does not automatically hold the lead role when working with National Security Council (NSC) staff and the Pentagon.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is responsible for civilian stabilization activities at the local level. These initiatives are intended to create political space for long-term change through "quick impact" on the ground. OTI specializes in the personnel-intensive development and implementation of small projects, particularly in difficult contexts that are too dangerous for traditional development actors. Most of OTI's work is decentralized and operationally coordinated by the embassy and the military's regional combatant commands (CENTCOM in Florida, AFRICOM in Stuttgart, etc.).

Policy development

In the US, policy towards individual countries or crises normally develops in a decentralized manner by competing departments. Only in special cases that attract presidential attention, or when an exceptionally powerful National Security Advisor is involved, are the various agencies effectively coordinated by the NSC staff. The 2010 QDDR now assigns CSO the key role in developing US policy options and programmatic contributions for civilian stabilization. As Assistant Secretary, the head of CSO, Ambassador Rick Barton, holds the equivalent rank to the heads of the regional departments. Within the State Department, the bureau intends to play an increasing role in analysis and strategy. Compared to existing analysis by posts and the intelligence community, its added value is supposed to be in the greater attention given to alternative information sources, especially local NGO networks and news databases, as well as CSO's ability to link analysis directly to project funding. The fact that S/CRS had been limited to a purely conceptual role in direct competition with the regional desks has come to be seen as one of its weaknesses.

In order to live up to these expectations, CSO has invested in improving its conflict analysis methods. The existing International Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), however, is internally seen as impractical since it is an extremely slow process (over a year!), heavy in consultation requirements and weak in prioritization. It is to be replaced by a revised version that should be faster and more strategic. In initial field trials, ICAF 2.0 took around three months to complete, of which the analysis team (CSO, embassy, regional desk, USAID) spent around six weeks on the ground.

Funding

There is a fundamental reluctance in Congress to allocate budgetary resources to civilian foreign policy activities. Despite the scandals over reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon still enjoys greater confidence than the State Department with respect to the responsible management of resources; also because the State Department itself made catastrophic mistakes in the award of multi-billion dollar contracts for police development in Iraq and in the early years in Afghanistan.

Over the past decade, the Pentagon has had large special budgets for the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which all observers expect to decrease in the coming years. From 2006 through 2010, this allowed the Pentagon to offer the State Department up to US$100 million (approximately €75 million) per year under Section 1207 of the defense budget "for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries." This money was used to fund activities by S/CRS and USAID.[40] After this facility was discontinued in 2010, the Obama Administration managed for the first time to create a separate budget line for stabilization. However, despite the joint efforts of Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates, it remains part of the defense budget rather than the State Department budget. For this Complex Crises Fund, the Obama Administration asked Congress for US$56.5 million for the 2013 financial year. In 2012, US$43 million had been approved.[41]

OTI has had its own funding within the USAID budget framework for many years. This Transition Initiatives Fund was set at US$57.6 million in 2013. The fund allows OTI extreme flexibility in implementation, since it is subject to few limitations and conditions on which type of projects it should be used for. Consequently, the funding of flexible and rapid stabilization activities can generally be secured within weeks or months – in contrast to years for other budgets. OTI implements several times the size of its own budget from other sources such as the Complex Crises Fund and the disaster relief and development budgets (Disaster and Famine Assistance Account and Economic Support Fund). The total volume of OTI's portfolio amounted to approximately US$410 million in 2010.[42]

Project development, implementation and evaluation

CSO's and OTI's operational work differs markedly: despite its strong independent role in project identification, CSO mainly assigns funding without managing or overseeing project implementation very closely. Additionally, it suffers from the slow pace of inter-agency coordination in Washington. In contrast, on the basis of creative contracting,

OTI works as an integrated implementer (quite unlike the usual USAID model), which allows it to deploy the strengths of its management model based on the principle of "action learning" in insecure and volatile contexts.

CSO currently works in only four countries: Myanmar, Honduras, Kenya and Syria. Its activities are not strictly limited to particular sectors or types of projects; its emphasis is instead on process-oriented political activities by or in cooperation with local civil society. By contrast, CSO does not see infrastructure development projects as its strength. The fundamental concept for the further development of its instruments is to link in-depth political analysis from local non-state sources of information to the policy process in the State Department, and to identify and fund projects to influence local political dynamics on the ground. In this context, the use of civil society sources is seen as a necessary accelerator for preventive action (in productive competition with the established reporting channels) as well as a contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the situation that is to be influenced by stabilization measures.

In CSO's view, is it important that projects are developed and selected on the basis of detailed Field Assessments rather than from a desk in Washington. For this purpose, CSO staff travel to the relevant countries in order to be able to make well-founded decisions on appropriate projects.[43] The required inter-agency agreement on the use of the Complex Crises Fund usually takes three to four months from the submission of a project application, which is a considerable period given that – in the best case – the projects should have a preventive influence on volatile political processes. The activities are implemented through partners such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), local NGOs and USAID (including OTI), although most of USAID does not implement projects itself but passes them on to others. CSO activities should be completed within 18 months. Monitoring and evaluation are still under development.[44] In addition to its own continuous project monitoring, in the future CSO plans to commission professional evaluation firms to identify the long-term effects of projects several years after their conclusion.

OTI works quite differently. While CSO essentially acts as a "funding center," OTI places its emphasis on rapid, flexible implementation, mostly at the local level (while for example, advisory projects in ministries or regional administrative bodies also form part of the portfolio). Strong links to political dynamics, quality control and accounting requirements are secured by a personnel-intensive management approach that has little in common with USAID's usual business process through which large sector programs are tendered to commercial implementers in bulk. OTI uses the implementer primarily as a service provider for logistics and personnel but manages each project detail itself through a management process that follows the principle of "action learning."

The OTI model is particularly interesting in its local micro-projects in areas that are very difficult to reach politically. The development of an OTI program at the request of the embassy, the USAID country team or the armed forces starts with a two to three week deployment of regional OTI staff with relevant experience to assess the political context, local needs and practical considerations. On this basis, a rough concept is agreed on between the embassy and the local government, approved by the working level in Washington and, on the basis of a standing framework contract, implemented by the contractor with the most suitable project team. The more difficult the context, the smaller the scale of the initial effort: in many cases, OTI programs begin with only

a few individual activities that cost a few thousand US dollars, are kicked off within one to two weeks at the community level and are concluded a few weeks later. The emphasis is on visibility ("something is happening") and on "learning by doing" within the framework of weekly assessments in the OTI team and with representatives of the local community. With the help of a global database of all OTI projects and their lessons learned, the objective is to immediately improve the relevance and effectiveness of the next batch of activities in the following weeks. Through the first two or three months, a more dependable approach emerges. Based on a better understanding of the micro-political context, somewhat larger individual activities (US$30,000-35,000 each) are then implemented. The amounts remain small to allow for rapid reactions to political changes and limit the risk that, because of the speed, not every individual activity will really work ("better 80% useful at the right time than 100% useful but too late").[45]

For each of its 15 country programs, OTI defines individual objectives and performance indicators at local, regional and national levels, tied to the US embassy's larger country strategy. Once a year, a Program Performance Review (PPR) is carried out, with an external evaluation at the end of the project.[46] The current evaluations are however methodologically limited to the identification of a "plausible correlation"[47] with observed social and political changes.

Based on its own assessments and the results of external evaluations, OTI is considered able to work with its own (international) staff even in areas that are difficult to access such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, and even when most other implementers have to withdraw their staff. The model depends on the quality of the personnel: small numbers of regional experts who are equipped with many years of language and cultural knowledge as well as field experience in the conflict regions are selected at great expense and with the support of a commercial recruitment firm.[48] With a total annual budget of less than US$500 million and about 200 government employees (including 55 staff in the field and a reserve of an additional 45 staff who can be deployed at short notice), the OTI approach is notably personnel-intensive. In addition to government employees, there are several hundred international project staff and more than 100 local staff; in all, a total of 1600-2000 OTI "associates" have access to the OTI intranet. Despite the rapid deployment and reaction capability, OTI is unprepared to implement large volumes of funding because its management model is optimized for small-scale activities.[49]

Reinforcement of personnel and recruitment of external experts

CSO administers an extensive staff roster that was created by its predecessor S/CRS in response to the civilian capability gaps in reconstruction and counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. At US$24 million per year, this Civilian Response Corps now absorbs a substantial part of the CSO budget, while only 37 percent of the 140 staff kept on standby has in fact been deployed. In the foreseeable future, many of the skills for which CRC staff have been recruited in past years will not be required to such a great extent. Therefore, CSO is now trying to shed its expensive standing reserve and completely convert the system into a personnel pool whose members will not receive ongoing payment but remain available for deployment at various levels of readiness. This Civilian Response Network is a single pool of staff from numerous US government

agencies, academics of all nationalities and foreign government employees. Some of the latter are brought in to facilitate future project development rather than to be deployed as US government personnel.[50]

Main findings

The Obama Administration seeks to embed a bundle of short- and medium-term activities in civilian conflict prevention, life-saving emergency aid and immediate peacebuilding support within a longer-term agenda of promoting effective statehood. All of this takes place, however, in a context of security policy-making that is dominated by defense institutions and instruments and the armed forces – a fundamental difference to Germany. In this context, as well as with regard to the fragmentation of regular US mechanisms for inter-agency coordination and policy development, the organizational solutions found by the US are not generally a suitable model for Germany. The same applies to the unnecessarily complex setup of the Complex Crises Fund as part of the defense budget, which has more to do with political dynamics in Congress than with effective budgetary design. However, the capacity for forward-looking and inter-agency planning should certainly become a model. Unnecessarily complicated and time-intensive analytical tools need to be avoided, as already recognized by CSO; in contrast, investment in long-term analysis, early warning and scenario planning are worthwhile – particularly for preventive policy.

The recent reform of the civilian personnel pool exemplifies the challenges inherent in creating a structure for the short-term deployment of civilian experts that is sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing operational and personnel requirements. An extensive standing reserve of paid civilians has not proved viable for a US government seeking to avoid large-scale counterinsurgency and state-building projects as in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, for all the benefits of the network approach, which is also the basis for the ZIF pool in Germany, it should not be forgotten that the only way to ensure a pool's quality and operational effectiveness is to make sure individual careers can include both crisis deployments and periods of reflection, learning and professional exchange beyond the occasional seminar.

With regard to the practical development and implementation of civilian stabilization activities, the new CSO approaches are interesting, in particular in linking local sources with the established State Department analysis and decision-making processes. It remains to be seen, however, how much CSO can actually achieve. OTI is especially interesting regarding stabilization in areas that are difficult to access. It gives the US government a boutique tool with an established approach to implement micro activities in insecure and politically volatile situations. If the reaction times (a little more than four weeks from the first inquiry to OTI, to breaking ground for the first exploratory activity), the involvement of local political and social actors through experienced staff and the continuous development of the projects by "action learning" prove themselves in practice, then Germany has no comparable tool for this part of a stabilization intervention. At the same time, due to its extremely demanding personnel and management model, the OTI approach does not scale well. In the view of OTI director Rob Jenkins, even the current 15 country programs are a few too many; the organization can only grow very slowly.

The Netherlands: support that is both quick and reliable

Concept and mandate

In November 2008, the conservative/social-democratic Balkenende government (2006-2010) was the last to present a doctrine for Security and Development in Fragile States, explicitly subtitled "The Netherlands' strategy, 2008-2011" at that time. Now, two changes of government later, the political protagonists are no longer the same and external observers lament the absence of a clear-cut doctrine in the current cabinet.[51] At the same time, it would be reasonable to assume that the fundamental ideas behind the former strategy (evaluation of which is to be completed in late 2013) continue to shape official thinking in The Hague.[52] Firmly prioritized within development policy[53], the Dutch government understands fragile states to be

> "undermined by serious political and social tensions that have a highly detrimental effect on their populations. The governments of these countries often cannot guarantee the safety of their citizens and either fail in their duty to uphold their rights or are themselves guilty of violent acts."

These governments often lack capacity and legitimacy, sometimes throughout the country, sometimes only in parts of it. Lawlessness is widespread. There is little or no delivery of basic services such as infrastructure, education, health care, clean water or basic sanitation. The economy is at a standstill or in decline and there are few economic prospects for the population. All these problems affect all fragile states to some extent.

On this basis, the challenge "is to improve the security of the population under difficult circumstances ... [and] for the government to be able to protect people from conflict, so that the rule of law functions properly, human rights are upheld and basic services are delivered."[54] The coordinated use of a wide range of tools serves to implement these objectives:

For enhancing public safety and security:

- International stabilization operations with military, police, political components;
- Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR);
- Armed Violence Reduction (AVR).

For supporting a legitimate government with sufficient capacity:

- Capacity building for state institutions;
- Strengthening governmental legitimacy through a political processes;
- Violence prevention and transitional justice.

For creating a noticeable peace dividend:

- Better bridging of the gap between humanitarian and development assistance; [55]
- Gender;
- Private sector development;
- Improvement of basic services;
- Promotion of civil society.[56]

The current government has addressed these three areas as part of a policy note to parliament with five objectives for stabilization and reconstruction:

- Security for the population;
- Rule of law;
- Good Governance;
- Inclusive politics;
- A peace dividend.[57]

In practice, according to Dutch government officials, individuals work within the broad framework of these five objectives without sectoral or temporal boundaries.[58] Observers acknowledge a flexible mix of instruments from the fields of "conflict resolution, security and rule of law," which has developed from a previously intense focus on military security and classic development to a combination of security, justice and more targeted socio-economic interventions.[59] Furthermore, the principle of influencing dynamic processes of change as opposed to selecting static individual activities based on a list of criteria is of paramount importance. According to external experts, this principle is deemed a major advancement, which does, however, place high demands on political analysis and quick reactions in order to take advantage of opportunities and support positive developments.[60]

Institutional roles and coordination

The political and technical responsibility for policy, programming and deployment of personnel, as well as the role of secretariat for inter-agency coordination bodies for stabilization lies with the Directorate for Stability and Humanitarian Assistance (DSH) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. As an integrated ministry composed of two ministers, it is a uniform bureaucracy whose personnel rotate between all its sections. Although the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation is formally under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, she is independent and equally important in practice, not least due to the political weight of current incumbent Lilianne Ploumen (leader of the Labour Party up to the last election). Large

parts of the ministry are assigned exclusively to either the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, which imbues these departments with either a purely diplomatic or a purely development-driven identity.[61]

DSH came into being in 2012 as a result of the merger of the Peacebuilding and Stabilization Unit (EFV) with the Humanitarian Assistance and Good Governance units. Unlike the "core business" of foreign and development policy, DSH reports to both the Director-General for Political Affairs[62] and the Director-General for Development Policy and for this reason, has ties to both parts of the ministry. In practice, DSH is considered primarily accountable to the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

DSH manages and oversees the Netherlands' entire financial engagement throughout the conflict cycle. Multilateral peace operations mandates and deployments, however, lie outside its jurisdiction and with the security policy department. The resulting division is not ideal from DSH's perspective. At the same time, the complete integration of all stabilization tools in keeping with the strategy paper of 2008 (that explicitly defined "international missions" as a stabilization instrument) was not achievable when DSH was established at the end of 2012.[63] In contrast, both the internal stakeholders and external observers and evaluators see the context of an integrated ministry for humanitarian, stabilizing and developmental contributions as a major advantage.[64]

Inter-agency coordination takes place, on the one hand, by means of close informal cooperation at the operational level, and, on the other hand, in a Steering Group Military Operations (SMO) at the Director-General level, which is the most senior level in the civil service.[65] Moreover, there are special consultation procedures for individual budget lines (see below). The formal organizational details should not be overstated, however: Dutch interlocutors emphasize that the current practice of largely pragmatic and effective cooperation[66] is based on both the special political and administrative culture of the Netherlands ("polder model") and on two decades of trial and error under the dedicated leadership of several ministers.[67] Stakeholders identify the exchange of liaison officers between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense as being particularly relevant operationally. As high-ranking emissaries of the other respective minister, these advisers for development policy and political-military affairs enjoy access to and are fully integrated in the work of their host ministry. However, there is also dissatisfaction and criticism: for example, for a long time, the foreign ministry's development division saw itself as a victim of in-house discrimination by colleagues in the security division, and the Ministry of the Interior and police are still considered difficult partners due to disinterest on their part.[68]

Policy development

For its conceptual contribution to Dutch fragile states policy, the Directorate for Stability and Humanitarian Assistance combines its own expertise and cable reporting with external analytical perspectives, coming in constant contact with international expert organizations such as the International Crisis Group and International Alert, which receive ongoing funding in return for regular briefings.

The DSH has an undisputed mandate to provide advice internally and represent both conceptual and country-specific stabilization issues, in coordination with other departments and embassies vis-à-vis the ministers and parliament at home as well as international bodies. Resulting conflicts with other parts of the ministry are described in differentiated terms. Affected embassies are said to often be understaffed and accept intervention as the price to be paid for headquarters support (such as the additional staff DSH is occasionally able to deploy to embassies). Although there is a clear division of labor with the security policy department in The Hague, collaboration with regional desks is sometimes conflictive. With some regional desks, a workable solution has been found in assigning regional desk an impartial role coordinating between security policy, stabilization and traditional development cooperation. This supposedly works with the African and the MENA department, while for Afghanistan the security policy department holds the leadership role.[69]

Externally, the Netherlands has long played a relatively active role in the international debate on fragility and stabilization. According to insights from the current evaluation, DSH's predecessor EFV made important contributions to further developing international concepts in forums such as the INCAF (International Network on Conflict and Fragility) and as part of the New Deal for Fragile States.[70]

Funding

The Netherlands' stabilization instruments are based on four budget lines that form part of the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS), the total extent of which amounts to approximately €360 million per year. The four items are "stability" (about €100 million), "reconstruction," "good governance" and a delegated budget (about €120 million per year currently distributed to ten embassies).

Although there are elements of joint departmental decision-making on individual projects or delegated country portfolios, there is no real pooling of funds in terms of a veto structure. To date, only the Stability Fund is subject to a joint decision by the Director-Generals for foreign policy and development; the Ministry of Defense is involved in an advisory capacity. In terms of the reliability and longevity of the Netherlands' commitment, the bulk of the funds are managed in four-year planning cycles. There are, however, significant short-term funds available.[71] These are critical in their function as a flexible political lever on the regular development budget, since stabilization funds do not account for more than 10-15 percent of the Netherlands' commitment in any country. From the German perspective, however, it should be noted that the humanitarian assistance budget (about €225 million) could also be used quite flexibly in the Netherlands.[72]

The Stability Fund quickly and flexibly finances projects of all kinds, without any sectoral restrictions, within the theme of "conflict resolution, security, rule of law" in fragile states that have been identified on an official list. Projects can be approved within a few days.[73] The budget is designed in a way that allows it to fund individual activities in the long term, i.e. over several years. For example, the Stability Fund financed a justice and security sector development project in Burundi for eight years after which the embassy's own development fund seamlessly took over funding for follow-up activity.[74] According to the participants, ODA eligibility does not play a role in

the decision-making process; whether projects can be reported as ODA is checked only after the decision has been made. This has increased flexibility and is considered one of the fund's strong points.[75]

Although there are no formal mechanisms to link short- and long-term commitments, such links – analogous to the Burundi example – emerge from the fact that every proponent of a short-term project has a stake in continuing the work into the longer term through complementary activities.[76] In addition, the same implementing organizations are often commissioned, which – unburdened by unnecessary donor restrictions – have an interest in supporting seamless transitions between stabilization and development efforts.[77] On the whole, there are no sectorial or temporal restrictions whatsoever. Occasional attempts to refocus the Stability Fund on the short term only would be a mistake, according to decision-makers and external experts alike. Maximum flexibility is crucial to the ability to act appropriately in a high-risk environment such as fragile states in acute crises.[78]

According to external observers, the reconstruction fund does not play a significant role in the quick initiation of stabilization projects. It is exclusively available to external applicants from civil society. Observers believe it serves to strategically guide the development work of Dutch NGOs. Without exception the resources from this fund must be ODA-compliant.[79]

With regard to the future, the recent coalition agreement foresees the creation of a new budget line for International Security in the amount of €250 million per year, allocated to the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to be disbursed in agreement with the Minister of Defense, at least partially to cover the costs of military participation in international missions.[80] The details of this budget line are currently being negotiated.[81] It is considered possible that the Stability Fund, for example, will be included in this budget to protect it from pressure to save elsewhere.[82]

Project development, implementation and evaluation

Project applications are made by embassies or regional desks, with DSH support and in accordance with the latter's assessment of the situation (which is based on both internal and external sources and partnerships with local think tanks and NGOs in the project countries). Decisions are prepared by a joint secretariat drawn from DSH and the security policy department and are made by the two Directors-General.

NGOs, multilateral organizations and contractors carry out project implementation. In principle, there are no formal requirements for systematic monitoring and evaluation. There is, however, strong political pressure for evaluation. Depending on project requirements, the embassy and implementation partner perform project evaluations. In many cases, the Netherlands also participates in multilateral evaluations. At least once a year, DSH employees visit each of the ten countries where activities are under way for several weeks. During project development and when changes are made, the frequency of visits increases to up to three times a year. These deployments are also used to increase capacity at the embassies for a time.

Specific evaluation criteria for stabilization remain vague; a simple framework for results, however, is under development. Presently, its focus is on quality assurance during project development. The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB),

which only evaluates on a policy level, chooses its topics and mode of implementation independently of the political leadership. All its reports are published and addressed directly to Parliament. The respective minister may attach a response regarding the results and recommendations. IOB has 10 permanent employees, five fixed-term research assistants and a €3.5 million budget for professional evaluation consultants. Through a number of previous evaluations related to stabilization, one fundamental challenge was identified: a lack of knowledge regarding local political contexts and sensible sequencing and complementarity of projects often strictly limits the opportunities for effective intervention. For a long time, most actors, including international ones, had assumed a fundamental theory of stabilization according to which the provision of basic services would directly result in stability ("security needs development"). This theory has since been disproved, but a replacement is yet to be found.[83]

Reinforcement of personnel and recruitment of external experts

The Netherlands has developed two ways to close the gap between the limited staffing of smaller embassies, in particular, and the large requirements of a civilian-political contribution to crisis management and stabilization. Internally, there is a small pool of employees in the foreign ministry's stabilization directorate (DSH) whose tasks include being on site for several weeks to identify and monitor stabilization projects or temporarily support an embassy. During critical phases, such deployments are made several times a year to the same post. This serves not only to flexibly reinforce posts until their regular staff rosters may be increased, but also to deepen the basis for cooperation between DSH and the embassy: DSH has to interfere in the embassy's business, but it also has something to offer to the embassy.[84]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also keeps a short mission pool of about 200 external experts, which is considerably larger than the number of internal deployments. According to Dutch civil servants, requirements for admission into and support in the pool are not as stringent as those of the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Germany. It is used for deployments to multilateral operations (UN, NATO, OSCE), to occasionally reinforce embassies and for contracting external experts to manage political stabilization projects from Dutch embassies.[85] Importantly, unlike ZIF, the personnel pool is not limited to international missions.

Main findings

The context of an integrated ministry for foreign affairs and development cooperation after the Dutch model is as difficult to transfer to Germany as the British. The overall stabilization portfolio of the Netherlands ranges, according to its own definition, from participation in peace operations in the broadest sense to the provision of basic services and private sector development. The Netherlands has decided to integrate this entire range of budget lines, with the natural consequence of greater proximity to the ministry's developmental side, and to draw the organizational dividing line at the point of coordinating with Dutch contributions to international missions. This organizational choice is perfectly in line with the ministry's internal logic. At the same time, it accepts

a situation in which the Netherlands' role in international coordination of operations' mandates and design has less to do with its own assessment of the local situation than with alliance politics, and that coordination between mission contributions and financial resources is therefore more difficult.

The decisive lesson that the Dutch have learned from their many experiments with various budget structures is the need for long-term, yet more flexible resources. The Dutch stabilization concept also calls for visible short-term peace dividends. These can, however, only be the beginning of a lasting, reliable commitment, as useful activities take a long time to implement and the transition to traditional development funding is, as a rule, not achievable within a few years. When designing a stabilization budget, it is therefore important to create multi-annual resources, which – as in the UK, but not in Canada – are not bound to specific sectors, ODA criteria or types of projects and parts of which can be used for new projects within a few days or weeks.

In the Netherlands, grand theories such as "No Security without Development" are now clearly refuted – a verdict that is supported by the scientific literature. This experience has reinforced the understanding that a stabilization intervention is a high-risk investment in that key causal mechanisms are fundamentally uncertain. Performance expectations should be kept low and communicated as such. Such modesty serves as a shining example for practitioners, parliament and the general public in Germany. Accepting this starting point has crucial consequences for monitoring and evaluation, in the Netherlands as much as in the other countries investigated. As the British, the Dutch attach great importance to independent and professional evaluation of their stabilization instruments. However, given the lack of clarity on theories of change, the development of standardized criteria is not yet very advanced. Evaluation is critical in order to better learn from experience. At the same time, excessively high expectations of effectiveness do not do justice to the practical challenges of stabilization.

The Netherlands' efforts in analysis and contingency planning are exemplary in terms of the lessons that can be learnt for Germany. Initiatives such as the civil-military exercise series Common Effort of the first German/Netherlands Corps in Münster (in which the German Federal Foreign Office is involved as a kind of junior partner) need to be used more strategically for human resource development and to achieve a cultural change towards more joint and longer term planning and training.

Conclusions

Conceptual comparison: fragility, stability and stabilization

The basic concepts of this study and their implicit acceptance of the labels "fragility" for the problem, "stability" for the solution and "stabilization" as the path to be taken are widely seen as problematic by the academics and practitioners consulted for this study. In addition, these concepts are not employed in a fully comparable manner in the four cases, nor are the practical consequences of their use adequately reflected.

In line with the OECD consensus, all four governments at the center of this study have developed a broad understanding of fragility, according to which the weakness of one core element of statehood is sufficient to classify a country as fragile. Following this approach, the concept of fragility is practically indistinguishable from describing the normality of weak state institutions. However, most fragile states (more precisely: fragile contexts, whose boundaries do not stop at national borders) have a reasonably functional political order to resolve conflicts without the outbreak of large-scale organized violence. This situation, which is common for most Least Developed Countries not caught up in war or political turmoil, is commonly described as resilience.[86]

When it comes to stability as a goal, the approaches found in the four case studies begin to differ. The UK and US employ stability to describe a long-term, fundamental end-state for the path out of fragility. In the British version, the aim is to create "political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all."[87] At such a fundamental level, the Canadians and the Dutch use concepts such as "lasting peace and prosperity" instead of stability. Their understanding of stability as the absence of acute crises or as a synonym for resilience is more modest. From this perspective, this type of "stability as resilience" or "stable degree of fragility" is a prerequisite for the normal instruments of development, police and military cooperation to work at all and for a state to be sufficiently capable of assuming a minimum level of responsibility in the international system.[88]

With regard to stabilization itself, the four case studies show remarkable similarities, regardless of differences in understanding stability. Throughout, stabilization refers to an urgent effort to prevent and overcome emergency situations of extreme political volatility and large-scale organized violence. Such emergencies may remain acute for many years (such as in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). During a crisis, there is a breakdown of the political mechanisms through which competing claims to power are balanced and disputed issues are negotiated between competing political actors. Stabilization seeks to return the situation from urgent crisis to a "normal" level of fragility.

Correspondingly, stabilization (unlike "building stability" in the British vocabulary) only describes one part of the inter-agency engagement in fragile states.

Comparison of definitions regarding the problem, the solution and the resources

United Kingdom

BROAD VERION, RESOURCES Long-term inter-agency ("building stability overseas")		NARROW VERION, RESOURCES Short-term inter-agency ("stabilization")	
PROBLEM Instability & conflict	OBJECTIVE "Structural stability" (very demanding)	PROBLEM "Crises, escalation"	OBJECTIVE "Rapid crisis prevention and response"

Canada

BROAD VERION, RESOURCES Long-term inter-agency		NARROW VERION, RESOURCES Short-term, civilian mandate: DFAIT ("stabilization and reconstruction")	
PROBLEM "Fragility"	OBJECTIVE "Lasting peace and prosperity"	PROBLEM "Upheaval: violent conflicts, political crises, natural disasters"	OBJECTIVE Creating conditions for sustainable peacebuilding and development

United States

BROAD VERION, RESOURCES Long-term inter-agency		NARROW VERION, RESOURCES Short-term, civilian mandate: State Department/USAID ("stabilization operations/transition initiatives")	
PROBLEM "Instability as a transnational threat"	OBJECTIVE Comprehensively resilient states	PROBLEM "Cycles of violence, crises, threats to the security of the population"	OBJECTIVE "Stabilization: prevent conflict, save lives, promote sustainable peace"

Netherlands

BROAD / NARROW VERIONS, RESOURCES Long-term inter-agency, civilian mandate: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development ("security and development in fragile states," "security and the rule of law")	
PROBLEM "Fragile states," smooth transitions between ambitions and timelines	OBJECTIVE "Stability," promoted primarily by security and governance activities

In many countries, including Germany, addressing conditions of fragility with a range of tools such as capacity development, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict transformation is seen as an inter-agency challenge that requires special coordination. In contrast, preventative and reactive stabilization is only undertaken in exceptional cases where the traditional instruments of bilateral intergovernmental relations and development cooperation are insufficient on their own, but nevertheless necessary to complement specific stabilization activities.

Even with these limitations, the concept of stabilization is not without its problems. It implies that external, international actors (the "stabilizers") hold predominant influence over the development of the situation, while local elites hold little. The opposite is the case.[89] Academic and civil society critics see the concept as euphemistic and, due to the mixed record of previous stabilization efforts, even

misleading. Many political interventions that have been launched with the aim of stabilization have had counterproductive results. Examples include elections held in contexts where intense political competition has done more harm than good, as well as significant economic and social destabilization effects that have resulted from wage-price spirals due to international military interventions.[90]

Stabilization as preventing and overcoming a crisis

Taking the legitimate criticism of the concept in academic scholarship and civil society seriously, a more modest definition of stabilization is the only viable approach: as a means out of the state of emergency of an acute crisis, in which large-scale organized violence and high political volatility threaten to collapse the political order (or have already caused it). Thus understood, stabilization refers to intervention in an acute crisis to support local partners in restoring a legitimate and effective political order as part of the long-term promotion of peace and development.

In the short term, stabilization must be both preventive and reactive. The pressure to act in a crisis is usually (if not always) genuine, in the sense that local expectations and the risks of escalation are high. In addition, they are often exacerbated by media coverage and the political "crisis circus." This pressure to act requires rapid entry into visible engagement on the ground, combined with careful and modest communication, in particular with regard to the expectations of local populations. While a quick start is necessary, quick results are not always satisfactory – short-term recognition ("they are doing something") quickly gives way to disappointment when other expectations are not met. In accordance with the do no harm principle, a balance must be struck on a case-by-case basis between seeking quick impact and good impact, so as not to fuel the

NOTE: Data for the category "Political volatlity & violence" come from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (2013), while data for "Countries by decreasing level of fragility" come from the FFP Fragile States Index (2013). Indicators, data and the dotted line are for illustration only; there is no quantitative threshold that indicates political emergency.

frustration of the local population with unfinished buildings and stories of corruption. In addition, the call for rapid action must not be misunderstood as only a call for short-term funds or programs: the opposite conclusion is correct. Long-term crises, such as those in Afghanistan or the DRC, remain acute for many years and require a mixture of short-, medium- and long-term stabilization tools.

Stabilization as a high-risk investment

The earlier reference to political order makes it clear that stabilization is not about the construction of police stations and training of professionals according to the more or less universal principles of civil engineering or education. Instead, it is first and foremost a sensitive political process. Analogous to financial market stabilization, there is little reliable and generally-accepted scientific evidence to provide practitioners with clear guidance. Intervention in a violent and volatile situation in a foreign political context is full of risks for all stakeholders – especially the local population and its elites, but also for interveners, i.e. third-party governments and international organizations.

Each stabilization effort must therefore be considered a high-risk investment. The risk of failure is high; at the individual project level, it is often higher than the probability of success. This risk can only be managed to a limited extent: not intervening at all avoids the risks of stabilization, but not the consequences of an anticipated escalation of violence. To make very limited contributions to stabilization is not very costly, but brings with it shared political responsibility for further developments – even for the consequences of escalation, if prevention fails. Academic findings from the investigation into United Nations peace operations suggest that comprehensive political-military interventions in terms of high personnel and capital intensity relative to the local population and intensity of conflict have a higher probability of success than those with smaller initial investments.[91]

The risk of investing in stabilization is worthwhile if either the consequences of non-intervention are considered particularly grave or the value of even modest success – such as in Bosnia or Kosovo – promises comparatively high benefit: to avoid or stop the escalation of violence and the progressive (self-)destruction of a society over years and decades. Therefore, the threshold to engage in such a demanding stabilization effort should indeed be high. At the same time, preparation – not in isolation but as part of a comprehensive toolkit for conflict transformation and peacebuilding – is all the more important.

Preparations must be guided by modest ambitions. Although we know more and more about what has not worked in certain situations, we still know very little about which elements of a particular success can be generalized. Several basic assumptions have been disproven by reality: in the short- and medium-term, development alone does not create security at the crucial local level, while an improvement in security for the population does appear to create the potential for socio-economic development. Stabilization is therefore, above all, a learning process that has to be designed with professional methods. It needs to reach out to all relevant publics, both "on the ground" and "at home," so as to be able to better match ambitions, expectations and fears around stabilization with knowledge gained from practical experience.

The call for modesty is even more important when designing a single national (German) or departmental contribution to a complex multinational stabilization effort. Constant coordination with all stakeholders requires an enormous amount of resources – at diminishing returns, as both economic theory and practical experience suggest. Perfect coordination is therefore unaffordable and thus undesirable. This results in a design principle: all instruments to be used as part of a stabilization effort must be designed flexibly enough to allow any gaps identified during implementation on the ground to be closed and to avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort.[92] Appropriate incentives need to be built into monitoring and evaluation tools so that decision-makers on the ground are nudged toward using this flexibility for its intended purpose.

Stabilization and the state of emergency in bilateral relations

If stabilization is a way out of an acute state of emergency, what does that imply for bilateral and multilateral relations with local political elites? The concept of a state of emergency is important because it both describes and justifies a different quality of international intervention in the local political order. It implies a practical suspension of the usual boundaries of state sovereignty. In many cases, the local government agrees to these limits since at least some of the local elites expect to benefit from international intervention, even if the state may not. In any case, the balance of power and thus the relationship between those who govern and the governed changes, sometimes abruptly. Stabilization interventions are quite different from development cooperation, the political effects of which are less dynamic and stretched over longer periods of time.

How to handle this state of emergency is part of the intervention. It can and must be flexibly calibrated and negotiated with local political elites. In doing so, the familiar principles of normal bilateral relations cannot be allowed to impose blinders (so that for example, high demands on the sustainability of individual activities prevent their effectiveness, or serious academic findings and practical experience concerning the risks of elections in crisis situations are ignored, in order to create a legal basis for disbursing development funds). At the same time, international officials must not use the reality of limited sovereignty as an excuse to neglect the political needs of local partners (e.g. by discriminating against local elites in their own country). Formal and legal hurdles for the flexible design of these relationships should be reduced. The United States, for example, has created legal exceptions for implementing civilian stabilization activities in countries that do not currently meet the political and legal requirements for regular development cooperation.

Examples of stabilization instruments (within the context of multilateral civil-military operations or bilateral activities)

- Security sector reform and assistance to local security forces in coping with organized political violence;
- Training, equipping and advising key state institutions, including in insecure areas;
- Support to state institutions in building stable relations with the population, e.g. through providing basic services in insecure areas;
- Support critical political reforms (e.g. centre-periphery relations, taxation)

What does stabilization require of the German government?

Unlike in normal intergovernmental relations between a prosperous state in the global north and an economically and politically weak state in the global south, when a government such as Germany's stakes its claim to stabilization in a third country, it accepts a practical shared responsibility for that state. This is, as a rule, how the relevant general public understands it. As a result, all elements of the normal relationship intensify: from the frequency of visits to expectations about the appropriate level of all types of support. Levels of commitment that might be considered generous under normal circumstances – deploying a handful of police or military officers in a bilateral training project, for example – suddenly look inappropriate according to the benchmark of stabilization.

Apart from intensifying all aspects of normal relations and better coordinating existing tools, a stabilization effort requires a toolkit of special instruments that influence the political dynamic in the short term (see "examples" on page 40). None of these instruments are new: they were designed and refined in many countries and international organizations, at least since the creation of UN peacekeeping missions in 1956. However, many experiences and lessons learned have been institutionally forgotten time and again.[93]

To continuously improve these tools on all levels requires political attention as well as an effective institutional infrastructure in the inter-agency context, all of which need financial and personnel resources: stabilization is much more expensive than normal bilateral relations. All our case studies found that the governments we reviewed set aside considerable funds for stabilization. In relation to each country's economic capacity and international weight, "base levels" without expenditures for Afghanistan lie well above recent German Federal Foreign Office budget lines for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This resource requirement arises independently of specific operations (for the refinement of instruments, planning, learning, monitoring and evaluation).

Significantly increased requirements for continuous political analysis

In normal bilateral relations, the embassies' political departments conduct political monitoring and assessment while defense attachés analyze military matters. This work is complemented by development attachés, implementing agencies and non-governmental organizations' socio-economic and regional observations. The intelligence services contribute further information and analysis, the extent of which varies from region to region depending on resources and priority. The scope, depth and timeliness of these analyses satisfy the normal requirements of German bilateral relations with the country concerned, given their respective rhythm and intensity of mutual visits, government negotiations on development cooperation and military or police cooperation.

In the state of emergency of a stabilization engagement, time pressure and growing international attention accelerate these rhythms significantly. From designing multilateral stabilization missions to developing bilateral programs, the intensity of contact and frequency and gravity of decisions increase tremendously. Requirements for in-depth and up-to-date awareness and ongoing analysis of the local context extend well beyond the borders of the capital (the focus of embassy activities), escalating immediately and continuing to grow proportionately with the scope of stabilization activities. Effectively bringing together the existing contributions of different ministries is important and necessary, but insufficient to meet these requirements.

Anticipatory and joint contingency planning

In each of the case studies, we found that the governments we reviewed invest considerably more in institutionalized planning processes than Germany has thus far. These include formal, systematic processes for the development of country strategies and scenario-based simulations for training and further education in the long term (such as Dutch civil-military exercises) and to specifically prepare for decisions in the short term. These approaches are labor-intensive, but have paid off well as strategic investments. They serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, they help develop joint principles for decision-making and help each ministry in designing their individual contributions to stabilization, whilst on the other hand they allow multinational coordination to be more effectively influenced.

Some German priorities, primarily in military force, differ from those of its closest partners. It is particularly important not to underestimate this point. According to concurring statements from interlocutors in several government ministries, with well-established planning processes and scenarios, the federal German government would be in a position to enter international coordination processes at an earlier stage, like others do now. Moreover, by taking active part in designing stabilization interventions, Germany would no longer be forced to choose between either fully accepting or fully rejecting others' strategies.

Currently, planning deficits in all ministries preclude this level of involvement in shaping policy. Thorough planning is indispensable to responsibly prepare far-reaching political decisions about stabilization interventions, both with regard to current and conceivable future cases. In particular, constant contingency planning must become the rule rather than the exception. If a handful of inter-agency task forces continuously engaged in contingency planning for the future development of crisis regions and conceivable stabilization efforts, it would become as routine as meeting their regular reporting duties to parliament is today.

Communication

Any stabilization engagement requires professional communication with all relevant target audiences and the general public. This issue was raised with particular emphasis by interlocutors in Canada and the Netherlands, both countries in which the government suffered severe political blows for their involvement in Afghanistan from lost parliamentary support. However, communication is not just a tool to build and maintain political backing. It must also support a learning process among the politically-engaged public – not least to manage expectations of a risky and uncertain stabilization effort.

In this respect, it is important to have a dual focus. In domestic political communication, progress reports, independent and transparent evaluations and ongoing consultations with the opposition and civil society serve to maintain legitimacy and support learning. In addition, it is important not to neglect communication toward international audiences and those on the ground, in particular when it comes to managing the expectations of the local population and political elites.

This places special demands on both the professional expertise of communication experts and inter-agency coordination – not only because each ministry has its own institutional interests and priorities, but first and foremost, because the inter-agency division of labor results in a breakdown of target groups. As a rule, no single ministry's press department has all the relevant target groups of a stabilization effort in mind, although they must be taken into account as a whole in the government's strategic communications. **The necessary mandates and skills (thematic, regional and inter-agency) and processes need to be considered when further developing institutional solutions.**

Rapidly effective, long-term and reliable stabilization activities

Apart from using political influence and making civilian, police and military contributions to international missions, all the cases under review developed specialized instruments to implement tailored stabilization activities. Unlike the development cooperation toolkit, these instruments are not primarily designed for sustainability or promoting a country's socio-economic development in the long run. Instead, they seek to influence the political dynamic in the short term, with a goal of

stabilization. Our case studies result in one central conclusion, in particular: Budgetary and implementation rules for stabilization activities need maximum flexibility in terms of what to do and when/how long to do it. At the same time, they require detailed political oversight on the ground.

In our case studies, we found two essential focus areas for such activities: the field of conflict management, security and rule of law, and the delivery of basic public services. Any formal thematic division of labor according to the "sectors" of development cooperation raised exclusively negative associations. While necessary for donor coordination through long planning cycles, the sectoral division of labor turned out to be a source of systematic delivery gaps under the dynamic conditions of stabilization, particularly in justice and security sector development (see the Canadian case study). Stabilization instruments must therefore remain free of any restriction to individual sectors or types of activities. Such freedom requires, in return, equally vigorous political oversight, including systematic monitoring and evaluation, to safeguard the effective and responsible use of resources. **As a result, stabilization instruments require a substantial personnel commitment to political analysis and oversight, well beyond the needs of administrative management.**

The idea of "quick impact" versus long-term development cooperation has been widely misunderstood as a call for strictly limiting the duration of projects, for example to less than 24 months in Canada. In practice, while intuitively appealing, this limitation has often led to serious misallocations of resources, as effective changes to political dynamics require both time and confidence in the longer-term reliability of the international commitment. As the World Development Report 2011 prominently noted, the development of resilient institutions is a generational task. Stabilization's contribution to training, equipping, organizational development and political oversight of state institutions must be reliable in the medium to long term. **Stabilization activities should not be limited to "quick impact" interventions. Inter-agency coordination must also ensure that specialized stabilization instruments are linked effectively to complementary development activities.**

Flexible deployment and closer integration of personnel

The increased demands of stabilization for analysis, planning and political oversight require ever better-prepared personnel. Two types of challenges follow from this requirement: those of flexible deployment (i.e. staff exchanges across agencies, external recruitment and the ability to deploy the right person to the right position), and issues of integrating knowledge, experience and contacts between diverse career pathways and categories of staff.

In all case studies, we found mechanisms to rapidly deploy three categories of staff on the ground (at the embassies) and in the ministries concerned: their own officials; liaison or exchange officers from other relevant ministries or agencies (such as civil servants or contractors at development agencies, police authorities and intelligence services); and external experts (academics, regional experts). It is useful to visualize the challenges of deployment and knowledge management as three concentric circles.

In the inner two circles (within the civil service), a great deal has already been

achieved with regard to making exchanges, transfers and deployments more flexible in recent years. There has also been a major expansion of training and networking opportunities within individual staff groups and agencies. At the same time, there are still significant obstacles to temporarily recruit experts from academia and civil society and networking across institutional boundaries (e.g. between members of the ZIF personnel pool and federal officials from various agencies).

Continuous improvement of tools

In all cases, the use of stabilization instruments remains an issue of continuing experimentation. There is no reliable knowledge or experience base from which to generalize recommendations for stabilizing acute crises in fragile states. Academia, in particular, has learned a great deal more about what did not work under certain conditions than about how it could be done better – partly because each political intervention takes place in its own context, partly as a result of academic incentives and difficulties in accessing data.

This situation calls for modesty when using stabilization as an instrument. It also calls, however, for the continuous improvement of every tool during an operation – by closely monitoring results on an on-going basis and making appropriate adjustments (e.g. through real-time evaluation methods) – and in the long term, by investing in the design and implementation of different tools. **To ensure that stabilization is employed responsibly, it must be recognized that existing tools are imperfect. Each activity should be designed to support learning and continuous improvement.** The resources required to implement this principle (in terms of staff and external monitoring and evaluation) are necessary investments to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

Policy options for Germany

Concept and mandate

Following the German government's Fragile States Guidelines, "key skills and core competencies of German engagement regarding fragile states need to be defined" (IV.a). Within this context, stabilization should be understood as a specific, extraordinary form of intervention in acute crises that is characterized by extreme political volatility and large-scale organized violence. Acute crises often persist over several years and require a long-term, reliable commitment.

Deliberately, this reference to political volatility and organized violence does not imply a particular form of intervention such as peacebuilding or conflict resolution. Different instruments may be required before, during and after the stabilization phase. Similarly, stabilization is not either preventive or reactive. Indeed, stabilization can and should be employed for acute (short-term) prevention, if early warning and decision-making procedures are developed accordingly, as well as reactively in crisis management.

When stabilization is framed as an inter-agency task in the context of the Fragile States Guidelines, there needs to be a clear division of responsibility within the federal government. To strengthen inter-agency coordination, many experts tend to call on the Chancellery for political and operational leadership. In practice, however, experience has shown that attempts to centralize security policy according to the US or UK models do not fit Germany's political culture. Established expectations shape the interests of parties, political leaders and civil servants in a way that would undermine any formal attempt at reorganization. There is no institutional solution to this coordination problem in the foreseeable future. Instead, smart leadership is required to make things work within the existing principle of ministerial autonomy (Ressortprinzip).

Strategic management and inter-agency coordination

In order to effectively manage a foreign policy or political contribution to stabilization and play the necessary coordinating role within the Guidelines' framework more effectively, the Foreign Office's particular capacities for stabilization (in the dual sense of responsibility and ability) must be efficiently and flexibly pooled and developed further. This is especially important in facing the significant demands to analyze, plan, make decisions, implement and evaluate stabilization activities jointly with other ministries and agencies.

To this end, different organizational models are conceivable, each of which places different but significant demands on the Foreign Office's coordination ability. In any case, all relevant responsibilities and capabilities should be integrated effectively.

Other agencies and external expertise need to be effectively tapped through exchanging liaison officers and hiring fixed-term external experts.

Flexible budgets for stabilization measures

From the perspective of the authors, the widespread debate about pooling ministerial resources is far less important than how the relevant budget lines would be designed in practice. The joint management of funds only brings about effective political-strategic coordination if all the stakeholders are ultimately dependent on joint decisions and no ministry has its own significant funds to fall back on, as DfID does in the United Kingdom.

Irrespective of the pooling question, funds are necessary for rapidly effective long-term, reliable stabilization activities closely aligned with the Foreign Office's diplomatic stabilization engagement. These funds require full flexibility in terms of sectors (not just security or police), particular types of projects (construction, training, equipment) and implementation partners (e.g. German and foreign, public and private organizations). Such funds should allow contractual commitments beyond the current fiscal year and should not be subject to short-term fluctuations. Their management must be organizationally combined with a thematic expertise in stabilization. The planning and approval processes should be flexibly designed so that it is possible to plan the bulk of financial allocations strategically over several years (including in interactions with other ministries and donors). At the same time it must be possible to quickly, i.e. within a few days, implement new activities when a new or escalating crisis or a new opportunity for prevention so requires. In addition, budget items for stabilization and crisis prevention must be strictly separated, as these are subject to competing political dynamics.

Rapidly effective, long-term reliable stabilization activities

Based on an appropriate budget line, it is important to have an extensive toolkit of flexible funding and implementation instruments for the full range of activities that have proven effective. Again, in terms of stabilization as a high-risk investment, it is crucial to ensure thematic (not linked to sectors), temporal (not linked to tight implementation deadlines) and regional (not linked to individual countries) flexibility, as well as full freedom in the choice of implementing organizations according to their effective capacity to deliver in the respective country. Following the toolkit logic, any limitation on one or two global implementers must be avoided.

At the level of budget implementation, allowances should be made for the situational specificities of stabilization contexts (which might require, for example, case-by-case exemptions from record-keeping obligations or from the requirement to submit multiple bids). When designing new instruments, decision-making and managerial procedures need to ensure political oversight as part of the entire German contribution to stabilization.

Better training and knowledge integration across institutional boundaries

Staff development, training in and integration of existing expertise in all facets of stabilization must be improved in the relevant ministries and beyond. In recent years, expertise has been developed to a considerable degree at various levels (e.g. in the Foreign Office in Afghanistan, or in the ZIF pool as part of UN/EU/OSZE missions). Opportunities for individual reflection and learning should be expanded and cross-linked beyond the level already provided by the Federal College for Security Studies and ZIF. The decisive benchmark is the inclusion of all relevant groups: diplomats, military and police personnel and aid workers, including government officials and people from academia and civil society.

Flexible deployment models

Overall, there should be more flexibility in the use of in-house, inter-agency and external personnel. This involves improving the incentive structures across all career paths. It also involves consolidating and expanding, as well as improving the flexibility and short-term capacity of the mechanism that enables exchange and liaison officers to move between ministries and subordinate agencies, both within Germany and at embassies and international organizations.

Particularly pressing is the expansion of the recently established ways for temporarily contracting external civilian personnel from academia and civil society. Any remaining hurdles for the appropriate use of such expertise must be eliminated, particularly for the fixed-term employment of external experts in operational roles in the departments.

Criteria and procedures for monitoring and evaluation

In exchange for maximum flexibility, stabilization instruments must meet the highest accountability standards. To make a high-risk investment does not require a high success rate. Since it is taxpayers' money that is being invested, however, the responsible (including economic) use of resources must be guaranteed insofar as all planning measures follow an intersubjective, plausible logic from planning through completion, that basic principles such as "do no harm" are observed and that past failures are systematically learned from. Key criteria for appropriate approaches thus include to at least explicitly reveal the intended logic of intervention and scientifically evaluate results on an ongoing basis (in order to make adjustments) and after a certain interval following the termination of activities, projects and programs.

The case studies demonstrate that significant methodological investment is still needed in the field of evaluation. All governments examined use more comprehensive learning tools than Germany for most of its instruments thus far. It is therefore necessary to invest in the development of evaluation methods and establish different

tools (for real-time evaluation and ex-post evaluation, for example), which allow the valid collection of data and its critical and constructive analysis.

Finally, despite the key importance of learning at the level of planning and implementation, it is important not to lose sight of the political and social learning process on stabilization and foreign intervention. In this respect, evaluation procedures should not only be seen as a risk in terms of failures being politicized or provoking scandal. Instead, necessary public debate about evaluation findings is also an opportunity to manage expectations and question political demands from parliament and society.

Endnotes

1   Federal Foreign Office, Federal Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: For a coherent German government policy towards fragile states: Interministerial Guidelines, September 2012, p. 2 (abbreviated below as Guidelines for fragile states).

2   Building Stability Overseas Strategy 2011, p. 4. The BSOS and its associated institutional infrastructure are based on the British security policy reform in the framework of the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy (both 2010), on the basis of which an integrated National Security Council reporting to the prime minister was created for the first time.

3   Building Stability Overseas Strategy 2011, p. 5.

4   Building Stability Overseas Strategy 2011, p. 4-5.

5   British government official, April 2013.

6   British government official, March 2013.

7   Conflict Pool Strategic Guidance 2013: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/200169/Conflict_Pool_Strategic_Guidance_FINAL.pdf, p. 11.

8   Irving Janis (1982). Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

9   British government official, April 2013; academic, May 2013.

10   British government official, April 2013; academic, May 2013.

11   British government official, April 2013;

12   Stabilization Unit: Civilian Stabilization Group, http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/how-to-get-involved/civilian-stabilisation-group.html

13   British government official, March 2013.

14   Canada's International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (2005): http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Canada_2005.pdf

15   Canada's Approach to Stabilization, http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/assets/pdfs/Canadas_Approach_to_Stabilization.pdf, p. 1 (08/2013).

16   ibid.

17   Also notable in Sustaining Canada's Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations, 2009.

18   DFAIT (GPSF) and CIDA (Feb 2010) Coordination in crisis response and fragile states. Feb 2010. The document is in the authors' possession.

19   Canadian government official, March 2013.

20   The precursor to START was the much smaller Human Security Program (today: Glyn Berry Program), from which among other projects, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was financed. In 2001, it launched Responsibility to Protect.

21   Interviews with participants and scientists; cf. Godefroy (2010) Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later, p. 3.

22   Formative Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund (February 2011). Evaluation Division (ZIE) Office of the Inspector General, DFAIT, page xii.Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka.24   Canadian government official, March 2013.

23   Canadian government official, March 2013.

24   Canadian government official, April 2013.

25   Canadian government official, March 2013.

26   Canadian government official, March 2013.

27   Researcher, March 2013.

28   ibid.

29   http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/about-a_propos.aspx?view=d, as of 5 February 2013.

30   Canadian government official, March 2013.

31   Canadian government official, March 2013.

32   Researcher, March 2013.

33   ibid.

34   Canadian government official, March 2013.

35   QDDR Executive Summary (2011) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf, p. 13.

36   QDDR Executive Summary (2011), p. 15.

37   CSO (2013) Conflict Prevention and Crisis Response – Responding to Emerging Instability Overseas, Fact Sheet, p. 1.

38   OTI (2009) Office of Transition Initiatives: 15 Years, http://www.globalcorps.com/sitedocs/oti15yearreport.pdf, p. 1.

39   Both authorities have published numerous detailed investigation reports in recent years, see www.sigir.mil and www.sigar.mil.

40   Serafino (2011) Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010. Congressional Research Service.

42   The Complex Crises Fund: Rapid Response Funding to Help Prevent Deadly Conflict; Request to Congress "Conflict Stabilization Operations", p. 514.

43   American government official, March 2013.

44   American government official, March 2013.

45   ibid.

46   American government official, March 2013.

47   ibid.

48   ibid. See publicly available evaluation reports on the OTI website.

49   Consultant, March 2013.

50   American government official, March 2013.

51   American government official, March 2013, cf. QDDR Executive Summary (2011), p. 14.

52   Dutch academic, April 2013; cf. Strategy paper "Security and Development in fragile states – The Netherlands' strategy 2008-2011" (2008) and the coalition agreement "Coalition Agreement – Article V. The Netherlands in the World" (2012).

53   The draft evaluation report was available for internal comment by the significant political field partners in April 2013. The study team received an oral summary of the results, which were included in this case study.

54   cf. the strategy's introductory classification in the context of the Millennium Development Goals and the former coalition's political development priorities (Strategy paper, p. 4).

55   See footnote 53: Strategy paper, p. 8.

56   On the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation cf. Julia Steets, Donor Strategies for Addressing the Transition Gap and Linking Humanitarian and Development Assistance, GPPi 2011.

57   This is the complete list from the strategy paper (see footnote 53), p. 9-18.

58   See "Letter of 21 May 2012 from the Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the House of Representatives on security and the rule of law" via Email from Dutch government official, April 2013.

59   Dutch government official, April 2013.

60   Academic, April 2013; this is also the result of the evaluation: Dutch government official, April 2013.

61   Academic, April 2013.

62   Thus the matching analysis of all interlocutors and the results of the on-going strategy evaluation for Security and Development in Fragile States, Dutch government official, April 2013.

63   Both are roughly comparable to secretaries of state: highest official with content-specific leadership of each respective ministry, while a third "Secretary General" occupies a higher rank than the Director-Generals, but merely acts as the chief administrator. Dutch government official, April 2013.

64   Dutch government official, April 2013. According to Andriessen, the Security Policy Director did not want to forgo the missions' instrument and participation in protecting Dutch interests, cf. Security and Development in Fragile States, p. 10.

65   Dutch government official, April 2013. Dutch government official, April 2013.

66   Academic, April 2013; Dutch government official, April 2013.

67   The current evaluation of Dutch strategy in fragile states also shares the overall positive assessment of the cooperation. Dutch government official, April 2013.

68   Dutch government official, April 2013; Dutch government official, April 2013; anonymous German government official, May 2013, who, as a former exchange officer in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has special insights into its administrative culture.

69   Thus the results of the evaluation, Dutch government official, April 2013; Dutch government official, April 2013.

70   Dutch government official, April 2013.

71   ibid.

72   Dutch government official, April 2013.

73   ibid.

74   Academic, April 2013.

75   Dutch government official, April 2013.

76   Academic, April 2013.

77   ibid.

78   Thus a result of the evaluation, Dutch government official, April 2013.

79   Dutch government official, April 2013.

80   Academic, April 2013.

81   cf. coalition agreement "Coalition Agreement – Article V. The Netherlands in the World" (2012) (http://www. government.nl/government/coalition-agreement/the-netherlands-in-the-world).

82   Thus the minister has made it clear the budget would not be completely available to the defense ministry. Academic, April 2013.

83   Dutch government official, April 2013.

84   Dutch government official, April 2013.

85   ibid.

86   Academic, April 2013. Dutch government official, April 2013.

87   James Putzel, Jonathan di John: Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States, LSE 2012. cf. also OECD (2010) Conflict and Fragility: Do No Harm – International Support for Statebuilding. http://www.oecd.org/ development/incaf/44409926.pdf.

88   Building Stability Overseas Strategy, p. 5.

89   The concepts of stability and stabilization also invite misinterpretations in terms of cementing existing power structures (with stability as the opposite to change). Any responsible approach to stabilization needs to carefully distinguish itself from this shortsighted and counterproductive interpretation.

90   Christian Dennys, For Stabilization, Stability 2:1, p.3.

91   For a critical analysis of the stabilization concept in practice cf. inter alia Roger MacGinty (2012) Against Stabilization, Stability 1(1), p. 20-30, and Christian Dennys, For Stabilization, Stability 2(1), p. 1-14. On the issue of unintended consequences see, inter alia, Christopher Daase, Cornelius Friesendorf (eds.): Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences, Routledge 2010.

92   Michael Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis (2006) Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton University Press.

93   See also Steffen Eckhard (2013) Managing Peace-Building. Strategic Management, Organizational Performance and the Outcome of Post-Conflict Police Reform in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Dissertation submitted to the University of Konstanz, April 2013.

94   In institutional learning shortcomings, the stabilization field follows a similar dynamic as the counterinsurgency field. See inter alia, Philipp Rotmann (2009) Die neue US-Aufstandsbekämpfungsdoktrin und die Wende in Malaya (1950-52), Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, p. 587-595; and David Tohn, Jaron Wharton (2009), Learning under Fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military, Survival 51 (4), p. 31-48. On the learning record of UN peace operations, see Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, Philipp Rotmann (2011) The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? Oxford University Press.

Annex: Overview of eleven international stabilization actors

Actor	Definition of stabilization	Budget	Range
UNITED KINGDOM	The stabilization unit defines stabilization as a generic term for "the complex processes that have to be undertaken in countries experiencing, or emerging from, violent conflict to achieve peace and security and a political settlement that leads to legitimate government." Stabilization Unit Guidance Notes: http://www.stabilizationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/520/Stabilization_guide.pdf	Until 2015, £186-209 million per year (approx. €230 million). Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool (July 2012), Independent Commission for Aid Impact, p. 3.	The UK defines fragile states as "poor countries with weak legal and police systems where violence is common." The conflict pool currently promotes activities in Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe and the DRC (17 countries plus additional). AFG makes use of about 50 percent of the Stabilization Unit's resources/personnel. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/preventing-conflict-in-fragile-states--2/supporting-pages/conflict-pool
CANADA	START defines Canada's stabilization approach as help provided to a country or community to manage violent conflicts, political strife or a natural disaster that could lead to large-scale social unrest. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) executes Canada's contribution to stabilization. See Canada's Approach to Stabilization: http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/assets/pdfs/Canadas_Approach_to_Stabilization.pdf p. 1; Fragile States and Canada: http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/why-pourquoi.aspx	2011-2012: C$149.9 million (approx. €110 million). http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/about-a_propos.aspx?view=d	START currently supports activities in Afghanistan, Columbia, Sudan, Guatemala, Haiti, Horn of Africa, the DRC and in the Middle East through the Global Peace Security Programme. http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/gpsp-ppsm.aspx?view=d

Scope	Specific (and integrated) budgets?	Specific (and integrated) work and decision-making structures?	Integration
HIGH	Yes, conflict pool, jointly managed by three ministries FCO, DfID and MoD.	Yes, Stabilization Unit and BSOB (Building Stability Overseas Board) as well as overall National Security Council.	HIGH
MEDIUM	Yes and No: centrally, but at another ministry: Global Peace and Security Fund, managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).	Yes. START is part of the Foreign Ministry. http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2011/evaluation/gpsf_fpsm11.aspx?lang=eng&view=d	MEDIUM

Actor	Definition of stabilization	Budget	Range
SWEDEN	"Stabilization" is, apart from Afghanistan, relevant for Sweden above all in the context of peace building. There is no explicit stabilization policy or strategy, but since 2007 there has been a "National strategy for participation in international peace-support and security-building operations," which covers the complex of peace-keeping operations and stabilization measures. There, the focus of Swedish civil commitment is on the provision of civilian personnel. http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/10/80/95/73e64223.pdf	No explicit budget for stabilization projects, but "peace and security" with SEK 139 million (in 2010 corresponds to approx. €16 million), an important part of the budget for International Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not including Folke Bernadotte Academy or DC funds). http://www.government.se/sb/d/3103/a/131904	No concrete lists of countries at the stabilization level; both peace-support operations as well as DC follow their own priorities, partly along multilateral guidelines (e.g. UN peace operations).
FRANCE	France would like to create "space for mediation between citizens and public authorities" through social and political reforms. There is neither a definite structure for the reaction to fragile states nor a clear definition of stabilization projects. Position de la France sur les états fragiles et les situations de fragilité. (2007). Strategy approved by Comité inter-ministériel de la Coopération Interntionale et du Développement: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/EtatsFragiles-2.pdf, p.3.	N/A	There are no specific lists of countries at the stabilization level. France defines fragile states as those in danger, in the middle or aftermath of a crisis. Categories of fragility: • Failure of the rule of law • Powerless state • Unlawful or non- representative state • Failure of the economy • Weak society • Local volatility Position de la France sur les états fragiles et les situations de fragilité. (2007). Strategy approved by Comité inter-ministériel de la Coopération Interntionale et du Développement: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/EtatsFragiles-2.pdf, p. 3.

Scope	Specific (and integrated) budgets?	Specific (and integrated) work and decision-making structures?	Integration
LOW	No, aid resources are assigned by SIDA and MFA.	No, no unit. The Swedish Foreign Policy and Development Policy's coordination begins with the Joint Preparation Process, led by the Policy on Global Development (PGD). The Cooperation Strategy arises from the joint planning. The MFA meets regularly with SIDA to decide on Guidelines, if necessary, or to create a Working Group, as in the case of Sudan. Whole of Government – Approaches to Fragile States, 2006, OECD: http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/37826256.pdf, p. 51.	LOW
(Basically HIGH, but no specific stabilization tools)	No, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs manages an inter-ministerial work group on fragile states. Here, the Directorate General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships (DGM) is responsible for planning and evaluating bilateral aid. There is however no joined-up approach, combining security and development issues either through the French Development Agency (AFD) or others using formal structures.	Yes. START is part of the Foreign Ministry. http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2011/evaluation/gpsf_fpsm11.aspx?lang=eng&view=d	LOW

Actor	Definition of stabilization	Budget	Range
NETHER-LANDS	The current government has defined five objectives for stabilization and reconstruction within the framework of a policy note to parliament: • Security for the population • Rule of law • Good Governance • Inclusive politics • Peace dividend See "Letter of 21 May 2012 from the Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the House of Representatives on security and the rule of law."	The Dutch Security and Development Strategy 2008-2011 defines fragile states as being undermined by serious political and social tensions that have a highly detrimental effect on their populations and are not in a position to guarantee their citizens' safety (or endanger it themselves). The Dutch government is currently dealing explicitly with fragility in the following states: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Guatemala, Kosovo, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories and Sudan. Security and development in fragile states – The Netherlands' strategy 2008-2011, p. 6.	No concrete lists of countries at the stabilization level; both peace-support operations as well as DC follow their own priorities, partly along multilateral guidelines (e.g. UN peace operations).
USA	The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) defines the US's stabilization approach as a mission to "build sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances fairly and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice systems." This serves as a basis for the American contribution to conflict prevention and the stabilization of fragile states, in which "instability creates transnational threats." QDDR Executive Summary, State Department, 2011, p. 13-15.	On Afghanistan alone, the Pentagon had tens of billions of dollars a year via CER; plus various programs of other ministries, including OTI, which had $100 million in 2008 alone: (with 2005, $300 million). http://www.globalcorps.com/sitedocs/oti15yearreport.pdf, p. 6.	AFRICOM works in a number of African crisis countries. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations in the State Department currently focuses on 23 countries and the fight against the LRA. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/where/index.htm ICITAP (a Department of Justice police and justice program) is currently active in 33 countries. http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/programs/icitap-world-map.pdf OTI: Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Yemen. http://transition.USid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/aboutoti.html

Scope	Specific (and integrated) budgets?	Specific (and integrated) work and decision-making structures?	Integration
MEDIUM	There are special budgets, which cannot be regarded as genuinely cross-departmental or can only be seen as such in relation to military financing or police missions. There is at least a stability fund and a reconstruction fund, which are both part of the cross-departmental total budget for international cooperation (HGIS). The stability fund serves to finance government projects or multilateral partners; contrary to the reconstruction fund of implementing organizations, including NGOs.	Integration through communication between MFA and MoD, inter-ministerial committees and country-specific strategies. The most recent reform took place mid-2012 with the creation of a new position: Coordinator Security Issues/Comprehensive Approach in the Foreign Ministry. The Steering Group on Civilian Missions unites representatives from the finance, justice and economic ministries in addition to the core government departments. In 2013, a new National Security Strategy and Guidelines for a Comprehensive Approach was published. http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Andreas_Wittkowsky_Ulrich_Wittkampf_Jan_2013.pdf	MEDIUM
HIGH	No, several sources: government department budgets are separate. OTI: Transition Initiatives Fund ($40-50 million per year), see Development Assistance, Economic Support Fund.	No, but coordination through the National Security Council und Inter Agency Working Groups in situations with high political vigilance.	LOW

Actor	Definition of stabilization	Budget	Range
DENMARK	"Stabilization and security" has been one of the five pillars of the WoG approach towards fragile states since 2010 (countries with weak structures, weak internal cohesion, and significant poverty). Stabilization is carried out by civilian and military operations, in particular security and justice sector reform.	US$26.7 million (approx. €20 million). The Danish Stabilization Fund: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/11095/html/chapter06.htm	In 2010, 8 new partner countries were chosen including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan.
NORWAY	Despite Norway's engagement in international peace missions, there is no inclusive strategy for fragile states or explicitly for stabilization. Nevertheless, it is part of the official foreign policy "to promote stability and predictability in neighbouring countries." The approach corresponds to a long-term perspective and includes diplomatic efforts and support for the UN, NGOs and research institutes. Speech on Foreign Policy, February 2013: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/e_speeches/2013/address_february.html?id=714380 The Afghanistan Forum initiated in 2005 also represents an attempt to use other states' whole-of-government (WoG) approach as a basis for the Norwegian structure.	No concrete budget for "stabilization." €4 million for Mali via the UN fund; €11 million to Mali directly. Speech on Foreign Policy, February 2013: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/e_speeches/2013/address_february.html?id=714380 €100 million in emergency relief for Afghanistan. Policy brief: Norway's Whole-of-Government Approach, 2010, NUPI: http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/47107434.pdf, p. 33.	No concrete lists of countries at the level of stabilization; conflict prevention measures in the Middle East, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Peacebuilding in the Balkans; focus on Afghanistan. Strategic Framework "Peace building – A Development Perspective": http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/fredsarbeid/peace_engelsk.pdf
EU	The Stability Instrument for Stability (IfS) stabilization projects include: Registration of possibilities for joint response to crises Preventative activities during a crisis Acute crisis management Post-conflict reconciliation Post-crisis reconstruction From warning to action: Reportage on the EU's Instrument for Stability, 2008, European Commission, p. 11.	In 2011 the IfS mobilized €282 million. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-832_en.htm?locale=en	The IfS currently finances stabilization projects in 50 countries including Afghanistan, Bolivia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Uganda and Zimbabwe. http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_en.htm

Scope	Specific (and integrated) budgets?	Specific (and integrated) work and decision-making structures?	Integration
LOW	Yes, the Danish Stabilization Fund. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Development Co-operation (MDC) and the Minister of Defence (MoD) jointly distribute the fund's financial resources. http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/11095/html/chapter06.htm	Representatives of the Prime Minister's Office, the MFA, MoD and MoJ meet in an inter-ministerial Steering Group. The Inter-Ministerial Secretariat (PMO and MoD, but based in the MFA) is responsible for the group and designs coordinated proposals. http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/11095/html/chapter06.htm	MEDIUM
LOW	No, funds flow as a UN member-ship contribution or as emergency relief through bilateral aid.	No, at present there is no law or special unit that defines and records Norway's WoG approach to fragile states. The Norwegian approach emphasizes the separation of coordination from execution in order to avoid the problems of US, UK and CAN.	LOW
HIGH	Yes, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) serves the purpose of stabilization explicitly and exclusively. From warning to action: Reportage on the EU's Instrument for Stability, 2008, European Commission.	Management of the IfS is under the responsibility of the EU Foreign Policy Tools Service and under political responsibility of the European External Action Service. http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf	MEDIUM

Actor	Definition of stabilization	Budget	Range
DPKO	a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner. http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf, p. 23.	Estimate: cost of police forces (calculated as 13 percent share of the cost of all uniformed UN peacekeepers) – US\$410 million + Justice, SSR and civilian personnel = +US\$500 million. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml and http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/66/14	20+ Overview "DFS Mission Support": http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dfs_mission_supprt_map.pdf
UNDP	Stabilization is defined as support for innovative approaches to crisis prevention, early warning and conflict resolution, as well as to help bridge the gap between emergency relief and long-term development. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/preventing-crisis--enabling-recovery--bcpr-annual-report-2011/ The Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF) promotes for example conflict prevention, reconstruction, risk reduction, strengthening rule of law und governance, armed violence prevention, economic recovery, gender equality, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/crisis_preventionandrecoverythematictrustfund/	Since the beginning of 2000, the fund has liquidated US\$1 billion. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/BCPRAR2011_final.pd	According to the report, the "Highlights 2011" were: Haiti, Honduras, Libya, Tunisia, Kosovo, Iraq, Palestine, Armenian, Kyrgyzstan, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Colombia, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Fiji. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/BCPRAR2011_final.pdf, p.4.

Scope	Specific (and integrated) budgets?	Specific (and integrated) work and decision-making structures?	Integration
HIGH	Yes, Peacekeeping Support Account, financed by the UN member states' "Assessed Contributions."	Decisions are or have been carried out by missions (small projects). Result of complex budget and planning processes between missions, HQ and member states of the relevant General Assembly committees.	HIGH
MEDIUM	Yes, different funds for different donor needs (UNDP core budget, Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, direct funding from UNDP country offices).	Within the framework of the various UN coordination reforms, UNDP is generally closely involved in coordinating with other UN actors such as peacekeeping missions.	HIGH